Tatoian v. Andrews et al

Filing 107

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Glen E. Conrad on 1/31/17. (sas)

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IN THE UNITED STATES OISTRICT COURT
FORTHE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION

CLERK'S OFFICE U.S. DIST. COURT
AT ROANOKE, VA
FILED

JAN 31 2017
JU~-D
DLEY, CLERK

BY:

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CLE

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JOHN TATOIAN,
Plaintiff,

v.
WILLIAM LEE ANDREWS, III, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 7:14CV00484
MEMORANDUM OPINION

By: Hon. Glen E. Conrad
Chief United States District Judge

John Totoian brought this action against William Lee Andrews, III ("Andrews"), Virginia
Worldwide Group, LLC ("Virginia Worldwide"), Black Ink of Virginia, Inc. ("Black Ink"), and
others, alleging that defendants were in a scheme to defraud him~ The plaintiff also. sought to
pierce the corporate veil, holding defendant Andrews liable for the wrongs of Virginia Worldwide,
a business entity which was wholly owned by Andrews. Throughout the course of the litigation,'
the Clerk made entries of default against several of the defendants and several others were
dismissed. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which was held on November 22, 2016, against the
three remaining defendants: Andrews, Virginia Worldwide, and Black Ink; After deliberations, the
jury returned with a completed special verdict form, indicating that it found Virginia Worldwide
liable in the amount of $29,870and that plaintiffhad.not pierced the corporate veil. The matter is
currently before the court on plaintiffs motion to amend judgment. For the reasons that follow, the
plaintiffs motion will be denied.
Discussion

A motion to

~ter

or amend judgment under Ru1e 59(e) is not intended as a means for a

dissatisfied litigant to reargue ''the very issues that the court has previously decided." DeLong v~

Thompson, 790 F. Supp. 594, 618 (E.D. Va. 1991). "A Rule 59(e) motion may only be granted in
three situations: '(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for
new evidence not available [previously]; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice."' Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing. Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir.
2012) (quoting Zinkand v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 2007)). The decision to alter or
amend ajudgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) is within the sound discretion of the district court. See,
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Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 653 (4th Cir. 2002). "It is an

extraordinary remedy that should be applied sparingly'' and only in "exceptional circumstances."
Mayfield, 674 F.3d at 378.
Applying these principles, the court concludes that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief
under Rule 59(e). At trial, plaintiff introduced evidence that Virginia Worldwide transferred funds
to Black Ink; that Black Ink had a bank account opened and maintained personally by Andrews;
that Andrews was the sole owner of both Black Ink and Virginia Worldwide; and that Andrews
was the sole person directing the activities of Black Ink and Virginia Worldwide. In light of these
facts, the plaintiff asks the court to "harmonize" what plaintiff alleges is an inconsistent jury
finding: that Virginia Worldwide defrauded him but Andrews did not. See Bristol Steel & Iron
Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182, 190 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The answers to special
verdicts should be reconciled under any rational theory consistent with the evidence, and equally
the answers should be harmonized if possible."). Accordingly, plaintiff asks the court to amend
judgment so that both Andrews and Virginia Worldwide are responsible for the judgment in
plaintiffs favor.
The court does not see the inconsistency plaintiff alleges in the jury's verdict. The Supreme
Court of Virginia has specifically held that proof of dominion or control of a corporation is not

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enough to pierce the corporate veil. Hence, the plaintiff must also establish "that the corporation
was a device or sham used to disguise wrongs, obscure fraud, or conceal crime" in order to hold the
shareholder liable. Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 548
(4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., Inc., 234 Va. 207, 212
(1987)). In this case, the jury was instructed regarding this standard. See Jury Instructions, Docket.
No. 95. The jury was also instructed on plaintiffs claims of unjust enrichment and receipt of stolen
goods against Black Ink.
The jury's determination that plaintiff did not successfully pierce the corporate veil, that
only the corporate entity was liable, that Black Ink was not unjustly enriched and did not receive
stolen goods, and that neither Andrews nor Black Ink wrongfully appropriated plaintiffs property
is internally consistent and in congruence with the law of corporations. See,

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Perpetual Real

Estate Servs., Inc., 974 F.2d at 547-48 ("Virginia courts have long recognized the basic
proposition that a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its shareholders."). From
the jury's verdict, it appears that while the jury understood Virginia Worldwide to be under the
dominion and control of Andrews, it did not believe that Virginia Worldwide was used to
"disguise wrongs, obscure fraud, or conceal crime." Id. This conclusion is further supported by the
fact that $20,870 judgment represents the amount of money that remained in Worldwide
Virginia's possession. Simply put, it appears that the jury treated Virginia Worldwide
independently of Andrews and Black Ink. This is a rational view of the case and a view that
controls. See Bristol, 41 F.3d at 190 (citing Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.,
369 u.s. 355, 364 (1962)).
Moreover, the court does not believe the jury verdict to be the product of a "clear error of
law or ... manifest injustice." Mayfield, 674 F.3d at 378. Additionally, plaintiff presents no

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argument regarding a change of law and does not argue that there is any new evidence. See id.
While the plaintiff may disagree with the court's decision on this issue, "mere disagreement does
not support a Rule 59(e) motion." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993); see
also Pritchard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 3 F. App'x 52, 53 (4th Cir. 2001) ("When the motion [for
reconsideration] . , . merely requests the district court to reconsider a legal issue or to 'change its
mind,' relief is not authorized.") (quoting United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310,312 (4th Cir.
1982)). Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion to alter or amend the judgment will be denied.
Conclusion

For the reasons stated, plaintiffs motion to amend judgment will be denied. The Clerk is
directed to send certified copies of this memorandum opinion to all counsel of record.
ENTER:

This~ l /Pf" day of January, 2017.
Chief

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