Wyatt v. Owens et al

Filing 108

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on 11/10/2016. (tvt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
CASE NO. 7:14-CV-00492

MICHAEL E. WYATT,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

v.
JOHNNY OWENS, ET AL.,

JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON

Defendants.

Michael E. Wyatt (“Plaintiff”), acting pro se, filed this case on September 11, 2014,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Johnny Owens, Allen Shelton, William Harris, Scott
Wyatt, and M.D. Pickeral (“Defendants”) used excessive force while arresting Wyatt on July 3,
2012. (Dkt. 1 at 1–4). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of
that case against all defendants. (Dkt. 25). That motion was granted in part and denied in part.
(Dkt. 31). The case against Harris and Pickeral was dismissed because they were neither present
at nor involved with the alleged incident, while the case against the remaining defendants was
allowed to proceed. (Id.) Harris and Pickeral had been misidentified by Plaintiff at the time of
filing his pro se complaint from prison. (Dkt. 81 at 1).
On June 10, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion with the Court for leave to amend his
complaint; he wished to replace the two dismissed defendants with Thomas Nicholson and
Robert Worsham, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. (Dkt. 58). The Court granted
Plaintiff’s motion, and the complaint was promptly amended to add Nicholson and Worsham
without objection. (Dkts. 59 & 60). On September 2, 2016, Nicholson and Worsham filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims against them were barred by the statute of
limitations.

(Dkt. 73).

The Court found that the claims against Nicholson and Worsham

properly related back under Rule 15(c)(1), and thus the claims against them were not time
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barred. (Dkt. 96).
Plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the complaint again, this time to add Pittsylvania
County Sheriff Michael Taylor, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failing to train or supervise the
officers involved in the incident, also known as a “Monell claim.” (Dkt. 72); see Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). On October 12, 2016, the Honorable Robert
S. Ballou, United States Magistrate Judge, denied the motion to amend, on the basis that the
claims against Sheriff Taylor did not relate back pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1), and thus they were
time barred. (Dkt. 95). Judge Ballou held that relation back was impermissible because Plaintiff
failed to satisfy all three required elements of Rule 15(c)(1). (Id.) Plaintiff then filed a motion
for reconsideration of Judge Ballou’s order. The matter has been briefed and is ripe for decision.
Because Judge Ballou’s order was not clearly erroneous and Plaintiff’s amended
complaint does not satisfy the requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c)(1), Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration will be denied.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 permits a party to submit objections to a magistrate’s
ruling to the district court within fourteen days of the order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also 28
U.S.C. § 636(b). The standard of review applied by the district court differs depending on
whether the issue decided by the magistrate is dispositive or nondispositive of the litigation. For
dispositive matters, the district court undertakes a de novo review of those portions of the
magistrate’s report and recommendation to which objections were made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a);
see also Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1982). If an issue is nondispositive,
however, the district court will modify or set aside the magistrate judge’s order only if it “is
clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The parties agree that Judge
Ballou’s order should be reviewed using the “clearly erroneous or . . . contrary to law” standard.
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(Dkt. 99 at 3; dkt 105 at 2); see also Everett v. Cherry, 671 F. Supp. 2d 819, 820 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(employing a “clearly erroneous” standard for evaluating a magistrates decision to deny a motion
to amend).
A ruling is “clearly erroneous” only when the totality of the record leaves the Court with
“the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Minyard Enterprises, Inc. v. Se. Chem. & Solvent Co.,
184 F.3d 373, 380 (4th Cir. 1999). It is “‘contrary to law’ when it fails to apply or misapplies
relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Bowers v. Univ. of Virginia, No. 3:06-cv00041, 2008 WL 2346033, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 6, 2008). “The leading treatise on federal
practice and procedure describes altering a magistrate’s nondispositive orders as ‘extremely
difficult to justify.’” Carlucci v. Han, 292 F.R.D. 309, 312 (E.D. Va. 2013) (quoting 12 Wright
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3069 (2d ed. 1997)); see also McDonough v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., No. 3:09-cv-00071, 2010 WL 1418878, at *8 (W.D. Va. Apr. 8, 2010).
II. ANALYSIS
The parties do not dispute that the date of the incident and the date of initial filing are
July 3, 2012, and December 1, 2013, respectively. (Dkt. 74 at 3; Dkt. 30 at 4). Because “[t]here
is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, . . . the state limitations period which
governs personal injury actions is applied.” Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 947 F.2d 733,
735 (4th Cit. 1991) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985)). In Virginia, the
limitations period for personal injury actions is two years from “when the plaintiff possesses
sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of
action.” Va. Code § 8.01-243(a); Nasim v. Warden Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc). Thus, there is no question that, in the absence of relation back, Plaintiff’s
claims against Sheriff Taylor accrued and expired over two years ago.
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To survive the statute of limitations, Plaintiff invokes Rule 15, which governs amended
and supplemental pleadings. (Dkt. 81 at 1). Rule 15(c)(1) states that “[a]n amendment to a
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment changes the
party or naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted” and three requirements are
satisfied: (1) the amendment arises out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence”; (2) the
new parties received notice of the action sufficient to avoid prejudice is defending it on the
merits; and (3) “the new parties knew or should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the property party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1). Furthermore, “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of
the District Court.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
If Plaintiff cannot establish that his claims against Sheriff Taylor relate back under Rule
15(c)(1), then his claims will be time barred, and thus leave to amend must be denied as futile.
Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006).
A.

The same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence”

The Supreme Court has held that “[s]o long as the original and amended petitions state
claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back will be in order.” Mayle v.
Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff and Defendants, through their briefing, have established that there is
disagreement among the district courts about the degree to which a new claim needs to be tied to
the original facts alleged. Plaintiff argues that, because the purported failure to train or supervise
resulted in the beating that underpins the existing claims, his claims against Sheriff Taylor arise
out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Plaintiff cites
Armour v. Country Club Hills, No. 11-5029, 2014 WL 63850, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2014)—
along with the cases cited therein—to support the proposition that numerous courts facing
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similar facts have found that Monell claims relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(B). Defendants
respond by citing Stidham v. Jackson, No. 2:07-cv-28, 2007 WL 2156155, at *3–4 (W.D. Va.
July 26, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 2405722 (W.D. Va. Aug. 17,
2007), which held that a Monell claim did not relate back when the claim relied on facts well
outside the initial complaint.
Despite the competing case law on the issue, the Court need not definitively resolve the
issue. Judge Ballou’s finding that these new claims did not arise out of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence was far from “clearly erroneous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). In fact,
concerns about clear error are obviated by the fact that Judge Ballou’s ruling was in conformity
with another decision within the Western District of Virginia. While Plaintiff is correct that all
the facts needed to support a new claim need not be in the original complaint, their Monell claim
against Sheriff Taylor would rely on entirely independent set of facts not “tied to [the] common
core of operative facts.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664. Plaintiff’s original complaint dealt entirely
with the alleged beating; litigating a claim of failure to train or supervise would require the
parties to research facts and circumstances far beyond the scope of the original complaint, such
as past practices in the Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s Office. It would likely require additional
depositions, additional written discovery, and new witnesses. The narrowness of Plaintiff’s
initial complaint distinguishes the instant case from those cited by Plaintiff. See, e.g., Armour,
2014 WL 63850, at *5–6 (permitting relation back of a Monell claim against a defendant already
present in the case); Triano v. Town of Harrison, NY, 895 F. Supp. 2d 526, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(same).
Therefore, Judge Ballou did not clearly err when he held that Plaintiff’s claims against
Sheriff Taylor do not relate back, because they do not arise out of the same conduct, transaction,
or occurrence. Because he has failed to satisfy the first requirement of Rule 15(c)(1), Plaintiff’s
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claim against Sheriff Taylor does not relate back and is time barred.
B.

Knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against
them, but for Plaintiff’s mistake

Even assuming that the first two requirements of Rule 15(c)(1) are satisfied, Plaintiff
must still establish that the added defendant “knew or should have known that the action would
have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, stated, “At bottom,
the inquiry, when determining whether an amendment relates back looks at whether the plaintiff
made a mistake in failing to name a party, in naming the wrong party, or in misnaming the
party . . . .” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2007).
Unlike Plaintiff’s previous amendment—which sought to correct the misidentification of
two officers involved in the alleged beating—this proposed amendment adds an individual who
was not present at the alleged beating, is not mentioned in any of the factual allegations of the
original complaint, and is being sued based on an entirely different legal theory. It strains the
imagination to construe such an amendment as simply correcting a “mistake concerning the
proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). As Judge Ballou’s order made clear,
“Wyatt’s original complaint exclusively focused on the alleged excessive force.” (Dkt. 95 at 3).
Plaintiff did not make a mistake in failing to add a Monell claim; he simply limited his complaint
to the officers that allegedly beat him. To call such a decision a mistake, would allow relation
back to swallow statutes of limitations. Were the Court to adopt Plaintiff’s definition of a
“mistake,” parties could freely and routinely amend their complaints to add parties and claims
long after the limitations period had closed. This in turn would undermine the purpose of
statutes of limitations, which “give defendants predictable repose from claims after the passage
of a specified time.” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 467.
Even if the Court were to accept that Plaintiff made a mistake in failing to name Sheriff
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Taylor in his first two complaints, there is good reason to think that he still fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). The rule requires that the added defendant “knew or
should have known” that the action would be brought against him in the absence of mistake.
Even if Sheriff Taylor had knowledge of the action, it is not clear that he knew or should have
known that such a claim would have been brought against him, absent Plaintiff’s error. Sheriff
Taylor was not present at the alleged incident, and it was reasonable for him to think that
Plaintiff had simply decided not to sue him, and instead Plaintiff was pursuing more obvious
claims versus more obvious defendants. Unlike the Nicholson and Worsham—who participated
in the alleged beating, were aware that they were two of the five officers involved, and knew that
five officers were being sued—Sheriff Taylor could have reasonably believed that Plaintiff had
decided not to bring a Monell claim, focusing instead on the specific officers that allegedly beat
him. “Thus, when a person would reasonably believe that the time for filing suit had expired,
without having been given notice that [he] should have been named in an existing action, that
person is entitled to repose.” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 472.
The foregoing analysis notwithstanding, it is worth noting again that the parties agree the
Court should evaluate Judge Ballou’s order using a “clearly erroneous or . . . contrary to law”
standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Not only does it appear that Judge Ballou made the right
decision about whether Sheriff knew or should have known claims would be brought against him
but for Plaintiff’s mistake, but he did not clearly err or act contrary to law.
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of Judge Ballou’s order
will be denied. Judge Ballou’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend/correct was not clearly
erroneous because Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Taylor are, in fact, time barred. The statute
of limitations on Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Taylor has expired, and the claims do not
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qualify for relation back under Rule 15(c)(1). Judge Ballou’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion
for leave to amend was not clearly erroneous because his conclusions—(1) that Plaintiff’s claims
against Sheriff Taylor do not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence; and (2)
that Plaintiff’s failure to bring claims against Sheriff Taylor was not based on mistake—were
based on the relevant facts and grounded in legal precedent. Not only were they not clearly
erroneous, but they were likely correct.
An appropriate Order will issue, and the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to send a
certified copy of this Memorandum Opinion to Plaintiff, Defendants, and all counsel of record.
10th
Entered this _____ day of November, 2016.

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