Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company et al v. Jacobsen
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 35 Motion to Intervene; granting 36 Motion to Amend Counterclaim; directing Defendant to file Amended Counterclaim. Signed by District Judge David A. Faber on 7/10/15. (sas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
AT ROANOKE
NATIONWIDE PROPERTY &
CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.
and
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL
INSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No: 7:14-00516
KELLEE NICHOLE JACOBSEN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court are Craig Jacobsen’s motion for
leave to intervene, (Doc. No. 35), and defendant’s motion for
leave to amend her counterclaim.
(Doc. No. 36).
For the
reasons that follow, both motions are GRANTED.
I.
Factual Background
The instant dispute arises out of an automobile accident
that occurred on December 8, 2013.
On that date, defendant was
riding in a Hyundai Elantra driven by Krista Crennan in
Arlington County, Virginia.
(Doc. No. 1 at Exh. 5).
In snowy
conditions, a car driven by Gerald Deshunn Newsome crossed the
median and struck Crennan’s Elantra head-on.
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Id.
Defendant
sustained multiple injuries in the accident, including sacral
fractures, a right elbow fracture, and a right collarbone
fracture.
Id.
Months earlier, in February 2013, defendant’s father, Craig
Jacobsen, contracted with Nationwide agents to purchase
automobile insurance and umbrella insurance coverage for his
family.
(Doc. No. 12.)
The insurance coverage afforded no
fewer than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00) in
coverage, which included expenses for medical payments as well
as uninsured and underinsured motorist (hereinafter “UM/UIM”)
coverage.
(Doc. No. 1).
In June 2014, defendant initiated litigation in the Eastern
District of Virginia against Newsome to recover damages as a
result of the accident.
(Case No. 1:14-cv-67).
In connection
with the litigation, defendant sought UM/UIM coverage from
plaintiffs.
(Doc. No. 1).
As a result, plaintiffs filed the
instant suit, seeking a declaratory judgment ordering that
plaintiffs have no obligation to provide insurance coverage or
benefits to defendant.
(Doc. No. 1).
Defendant counterclaims
for a declaratory judgment, as well, seeking an order that she
is entitled to UM/UIM coverage and medical expense benefits.
(Doc. No. 12).
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II.
Motion for Leave to Intervene
Defendant’s father, Craig Jacobsen, moves the court for
leave to intervene in this action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b).
Jacobsen argues that his intervention is
appropriate because the court will determine the existence of
UM/UIM coverage on one or more policies of insurance issued to
him and other members of his family.
(Doc. No. 35 at 1).
Plaintiffs oppose the intervention and argue that the only issue
before the court is whether defendant, rather than Jacobsen, may
claim coverage.
(Doc. No. 39 at 1–2).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs intervention and
provides for both mandatory and permissive intervention.
Under
Rule 24(a), a court must permit intervention where federal
statute gives a party the unconditional right to intervene or
where a party “claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest,
unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”
(2015).
In this case, Jacobsen has not cited a federal statute
providing him with an unconditional right to intervene, nor does
he claim that his interest is so situated that disposing of the
instant suit might impair his ability to protect his interest.
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As a result, mandatory intervention under Rule 24(a) is
unwarranted.
Rule 24(b) governs permissive intervention and allows the
court, “at its discretion, to permit anyone to intervene who
‘has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact.’”
Linkous v. Am. Alternative
Ins. Corp., Civil Action No. 7:11-cv-278, 2011 WL 4894233, at *3
(W.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B)).
“In this context, a claim or defense generally refers to the
kinds of claims or defenses that can be raised in courts of law
as part of an actual or impending law suit.”
Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76-7 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, courts must analyze the timeliness of a
party’s proposed intervention under Rule 24, which explicitly
requires a timely motion.
Our Court of Appeals has outlined
three factors that govern the question of timely intervention:
“first, how far the underlying suit has progressed; second, the
prejudice any resulting delay might cause the other parties; and
third, why the movant was tardy in filing its motion.”
Alt v.
United States E.P.A., 758 F.3d 588, 591 (4th Cir. 2014).
At its
core, the timeliness requirement prevents “a tardy intervenor
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from derailing a lawsuit within sight of the terminal.”
Id.
(internal citations omitted).
Having examined Jacobsen’s motion to intervene, the court
concludes that his intervention is appropriate because he
presents a claim before the court sharing common questions of
law or fact as those presented by defendant.
Jacobsen himself
negotiated purchase of the insurance policies at issue in this
case.
When he did so, he sought policies that would provide
UM/UIM coverage for himself, his wife, and their four children,
including defendant.
Defendant and Jacobsen are named together
on at least two of the policies:
5345V644638.
policy numbers 5345V644637 and
Plaintiffs claim that defendant was not a named
insured under the policies at issue and request a judgment that
they have no obligation to provide UM/UIM coverage for
defendant.
Any judgment the court renders will almost certainly
affect Jacobsen’s rights as well, as he is also named under
these policies.
Therefore, his intervention is appropriate.
The court further finds that Jacobsen’s intervention is
timely.
The litigation has not progressed to the point where
Jacobsen’s intervention would derail the process or prejudice
plaintiffs.
The parties have not yet concluded discovery nor
have they filed dispositive motions.
The court notes that
Jacobsen has not provided a reason for his delay in moving to
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intervene, but finds that the factors in support of his
intervention outweigh this omission.
Accordingly, Jacobsen’s
motion to intervene is granted.
III. Motion for Leave to Amend
Additionally, defendant moves the court for leave to amend
her counterclaim.
(Doc. No. 36).
In her motion, defendant
represents that “discovery and investigation have revealed the
existence of additional causes of action based on the same
operative facts as alleged in the original counterclaim.”
at ¶ 2).
Id.
Plaintiffs oppose defendant’s proposed amendment,
arguing that amendment would require new discovery deadlines and
that the interests of justice do not favor amendment.
(Doc. No.
38 at 1–2).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs the amendment of
pleadings.
Rule 15(a)(1) provides a plaintiff with an
opportunity to amend his or her complaint once as a matter of
course, subject to certain time limitations.
Rule 15(a)(2), on
the other hand, provides that “[i]n all other cases, a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave.
The court should freely give
leave when justice so requires.”
As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “A district court may
deny a motion to amend when the amendment would be prejudicial
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to the opposing party, the moving party has acted in bad faith,
or the amendment would be futile.”
Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d
404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
“A common example of a
prejudicial amendment is one that ‘raises a new legal theory
that would require the gathering and analysis of facts not
already considered by the [defendant, and] is offered shortly
before or during trial.”
Id. at 427 (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat
Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986)).
Granting leave
to amend a complaint is futile when the proposed amendment is
“clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.”
Oroweat Foods
Co., 785 F.2d at 510.
Having reviewed defendant’s proposed amended counterclaim,
(Doc. No. 35 at Exh. A), the court concludes that amendment is
appropriate in the interest of justice.
Initially, the court
notes that defendant may not amend her counterclaim as a matter
of course under Rule 15(a)(1), as the deadlines for such an
amendment have passed.
However, defendant may employ Rule
15(a)(2) to amend her counterclaim.
The court finds that
defendant’s proposed amended counterclaim would not prejudice
plaintiffs because her new claims find their bases in the same
issues raised in her original counterclaim.
Defendant does not
offer new legal theories that would require additional
discovery.
The court further notes that the parties have not
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yet reached the deadline for discovery, offering plaintiffs
additional opportunities to explore and defend defendant’s new
claims.
Finally, it does not appear that defendant has acted in
bad faith and, having reviewed her amended counterclaim, the
court concludes that amendment would not be futile.
Accordingly, the court grants leave for defendant to amend her
counterclaim.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the motion to
intervene filed by Craig Jacobsen, (Doc. No. 35), and
defendant’s motion to amend her counterclaim.
(Doc. No. 36).
Defendant is DIRECTED to file the amended counterclaim.
The
Clerk is DIRECTED to add Craig Jacobsen to this action as a
defendant.
The Clerk is further DIRECTED to send copies of this
Order to all counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of July, 2015.
Enter:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
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