Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company et al v. Jacobsen
Filing
86
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER denying 50 Motion to Add Necessary Parties. Signed by District Judge David A. Faber on 11/10/15. (sas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
AT ROANOKE
NATIONWIDE PROPERTY &
CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.
and
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL
INSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants,
v.
Civil Action No: 7:14-00516
KELLEE NICHOLE JACOBSEN
and
CRAIG JACOBSEN,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is plaintiffs’ motion to add
necessary parties.
(Doc. No. 50).
For the reasons that follow,
plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
The instant dispute arises out of an automobile accident
that occurred on December 8, 2013.
On that date, defendant
Kellee Jacobsen was riding in a Hyundai Elantra driven by Krista
Crennan in Arlington County, Virginia.
(Doc. No. 1 at Exh. 5).
In snowy conditions, a car driven by Gerald Deshunn Newsome
crossed the median and struck Crennan’s Elantra head-on.
Id.
Defendant Kellee Jacobsen sustained multiple injuries in the
accident, including sacral fractures, a right elbow fracture,
and a right collarbone fracture.
Id.
Months earlier, in February 2013, defendant Craig Jacobsen,
Kellee Jacobsen’s father, contracted with Nationwide agents to
purchase automobile insurance and umbrella insurance coverage
for his family.
(Doc. No. 12).
The insurance coverage afforded
no fewer than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00) in
coverage, which included expenses for medical payments as well
as uninsured and underinsured motorist (hereinafter “UM/UIM”)
coverage.
(Doc. No. 1).
According to defendants, the
Nationwide agents who sold the policies to Craig Jacobsen
assured him that UM/UIM coverage existed, both before and after
the accident.
(Doc. No. 45 at 4, 7).
In June 2014, defendant Kellee Jacobsen initiated
litigation in the Eastern District of Virginia against Newsome
to recover damages as a result of the accident.
cv-67).
(Case No. 1:14-
In connection with the litigation, defendant Kellee
Jacobsen sought UM/UIM coverage from plaintiffs.
(Doc. No. 1).
As a result, plaintiffs filed the instant suit seeking a
declaratory judgment ordering that plaintiffs have no obligation
to provide insurance coverage or benefits to Kellee Jacobsen.
(Doc. No. 1).
2
Defendant Kellee Jacobsen originally sought a contrary
declaration, but later amended her pleading to include claims of
quasi-contract, waiver, negligence, breach of contract, and
constructive fraud.
(Doc. No. 45).
At the same time, Craig
Jacobsen moved the court to intervene as a defendant and
counterclaimant, pursuing the same claims.
(Doc. No. 35).
The
court granted Craig Jacobsen’s motion and added him as a party
to this action.
II.
(Doc. No. 43).
Analysis
In their motion, plaintiffs argue that Nationwide agents
Don Hodson and Sam Duncan are necessary parties to this action.
(Doc. No. 50 at 3).
Defendants’ amended counterclaim alleges
that defendant Craig Jacobsen told Nationwide agents Don Hodson
and Sam Duncan that he wanted to purchase insurance policies
with UM/UIM coverage for his family and gave them his home
address as well as those of his children, including Kellee.
(Doc. No. 45).
Nationwide contends that the policies issued to
Craig Jacobsen do not provide UM/UIM coverage to defendant
Kellee Jacobsen and defendants have countersued for a contrary
declaration or, in the alternative, relief based upon claims of
waiver, quasi-contract, negligent failure to procure insurance,
breach of contract to procure insurance, and constructive fraud.
Id. at 10–14.
Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ “broad prayer
3
for relief would necessarily include an award against Don Hodson
and, or, Sam Duncan.”
Id. at 2.
Accordingly, plaintiffs
contend that Hodson and Duncan are necessary parties to this
suit.
Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that they
seek no relief from either Hodson or Duncan.
4).
(Doc. No. 54 at
Instead, defendants argue that they seek relief solely
against plaintiffs pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
Defendants aver that they have not sued these agents
and cannot be forced to do so.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 governs necessary
joinder of parties.
Rule 19(a)(1) provides:
A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot
accord complete relief among existing parties;
or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s
absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede
the person’s ability to protect the
interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple,
or
otherwise
inconsistent
obligations because of the interest.
(2012).
When a person “who is required to be joined if feasible
cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity
4
and good conscience, the action should proceed among the
existing parties or should be dismissed.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(b).
Initially, the court notes that joinder of Hodson and/or
Duncan likely would deprive the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
As the claims proffered by both sides in this
litigation are state law claims, the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction is based upon diversity jurisdiction.1
By all
indications, both Hodson and Duncan are citizens of Virginia, as
they both worked in the Roanoke area and it appears that
depositions of both were conducted this year in Roanoke.2
Doc. No. 65 at Exhs. 3, 6.
See
As these two individuals are likely
Virginia citizens, their joinder in this case would destroy
diversity and prevent the court from exercising subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Therefore, the preliminary element of Rule
19(a)(1) is not met, preventing joinder of Hodson and Duncan.
1
As described in plaintiffs’ complaint, both Nationwide Property
and Casualty Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company are Ohio corporations with their principal places of
business in Columbus, Ohio. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). Defendants
Kellee and Craig Jacobsen are citizens of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, residing in Arlington and Roanoke, respectively.
(Doc. No. 45 at 1–2). Furthermore, the amount in controversy
alleged in this case exceeds $75,000.00, giving the court
subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
2 Furthermore, defendants represented to the court in a previous
hearing that Don Hodson is defendant Craig Jacobsen’s neighbor.
5
However, even if Hodson and Duncan were citizens of another
state and subject-matter jurisdiction survived, the court would
nevertheless find that their joinder is not necessary because
the court can afford complete relief among the currently named
parties.
Courts have consistently concluded that an agent or
agents need not be joined in a suit seeking to hold the
principal vicariously liable.
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F.
Supp. 3d 75, 100 (D. D.C. 2014) (citing Rieser v. Dist. of
Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 469 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see also
Bausch v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (D.
Md. 1989) (“Principles and agents are not, as a general rule,
indispensable parties.”) (Niemeyer, J.); Nottingham v. Gen. Am.
Comm. Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Milligan
v. Anderson, 522 F.2d 1202, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is
well established that Rule 19 does not require the joinder of
joint tortfeasors.
Nor does it require joinder of principal and
agents.”); Barnes v. Tidewater Transit Co., Inc., Civil Action
No. 1:13-cv-00537-JEC, 2014 WL 1092288, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 18,
2014); Pierrelouis ex rel. Pierrelouis v. Bekritsky et al., No.
8 Civ. 123 (KTD), 2012 WL 6700217, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21,
2012); Harding v. Transforce, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:11-CV244, 2011 WL 6941701, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2011).
6
As defendants point out, all of their claims seek relief
from plaintiffs based upon theories of respondeat superior.
While defendants allege certain conduct on the part of agents
Hodson and Duncan, defendants also contend that plaintiffs,
Hodson’s and Duncan’s principals, are responsible for this
conduct, rather than Hodson or Duncan.
Defendants seek no
recovery from Hodson or Duncan and, should the court rule in
defendants’ favor, it can accord complete relief from plaintiffs
and plaintiffs alone.
Furthermore, the considerations under Rule 19(a)(1)(B) do
not apply, either, because no party claims an interest that any
disposition of this case will either impede his ability to
protect his interests or leave him subject to further or
inconsistent obligations.
The court notes that neither Hodson
nor Duncan claim an interest in this case at all.
Indeed,
neither move the court for entry in this case; instead, it is
Nationwide who seeks to include its agents as parties.
Because
defendants seek relief solely from plaintiffs, any disposition
of this case will not affect Hodson’s or Duncan’s rights and
will not expose them to a possibility of double, multiple, or
inconsistent obligations.
Finally, because the court has
concluded that Hodson and Duncan are not necessary parties to
this case, the considerations of Rule 19(b) do not apply.
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For
all of these reasons, the court concludes that neither Don
Hodson nor Sam Duncan are necessary parties to this case and, as
a result, plaintiffs’ motion must be DENIED.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons expressed above, plaintiffs’ motion to add
necessary parties is DENIED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send
copies of this Order to all counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of November, 2015.
Enter:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
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