Hendrick et al v. Caldwell et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Glen E. Conrad on 2/8/17. (sas)

CLERK'~~ OFFICE U.S, OIST. COURT
AT~OQ,VA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
CARY HENDRICK, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

v.
DONALD CALDWELL, et al.,
·Defendants.

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FILID

FEB 0 8 2017

Civil Action No, 7:16CV00095
MEMORANDUM OPINION

By: Hon. Glen E. Conrad
Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Cary ·Hendrick, Bryan Manning, Ryan Williams, Richard Deckerhoff, and
Richard Walls bring this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants
Donald Caldwell and Michael Herring, in their official capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. This case is presently before the court on defendants' motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set
forth below, the court will grant defendants' motion. 1
Background

The following facts, taken from the plaintiffs' complaint, are accepted as true for
purposes ofthe defendants' motion to dismiss. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The named plaintiffs in this matter lll'e homeless individuals who suffer from alcohol use
disorder and have been interdicted pursuant to Virginia Code § 4.1-333(a). Defendants are
prosecutors for the Commonwealth of Virginia.

On August 26, 2016, a Suggestion of Death was filed in regards to plaintiff Cary Bendrick. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25, the decedent's successor or representative has ninety days from service of the
notice to file a motion for substitution. No such motion was made. If the motion is not made within ninety days, the
action by the decedent must be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(l). Accordingly, all claims asserted by Cary
Hendrick will be dismissed. Under this rule, the court will proceed to evaluate the claims of the remaining plaintiffs.

Virginia Code§ 4.1-333(a) states:
When after a hearing upon due notice it appears to the satisfaction of the circuit
court of any county or city that any person, residing within such county or city,
has been convicted of driving any automobile, truck, motorcycle, engine or train
while intoxicated or has shown himself to be an habitual drunkard, the court may
enter an order of interdiction prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to such
person until further ordered.
The statute does not define "habitual drunkard," and there is no clear standard for removing the
label once determined to be such. Compl. ~ 32-33. A person can be interdicted in absentia, and a
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defendant does not have the right to counsel or trial by jury at the interdiction hearing as it is a
civil proceeding. Id.

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19.

It is a Class 1 misdemeanor for an interdicted individual to "consume, purchase or
possess, or attempt to consume, purchase or posses, any alcoholic beverage." Va. Code § 4.1305. It is this prohibition of consumption, possession, or attempted possession or consumption
that plaintiffs challenge (the "consumption prong"). Virginia Code § 4.1-322 also makes it a
Class 1 misdemeanor for an interdicted person to be drunk in public, and plaintiffs do not
challenge this aspect of the statutory scheme. The punishment for conviction of a Class 1
misdemeanor is "confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than
$2,500, either or both." Va. Code § 18.2-ll(a). Between August of 2005 and August of 2015,
there were 4,743 convictions under this statutory sclieme (the "Interdiction Statute"). Id.

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21.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), plaintiffs seek to certify a class of
homeless alcoholics who have been or will be interdicted, and a class of defendant Virginia
Commonwealth Attorneys who have the authority to enforce the Interdiction Statute. The
complaint alleges that alcoholism is an addiction: a chronic disease of the brain that compels the
plaintiffs to pathologically pursue alcohol use. Id.

~

25. Their homelessness exacerbates their

alcoholism and makes long-term abstention "nearly impossible." Id.
2

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26.

The named plaintiffs were interdicted between 2009 and 2012. These four plaintiffs have
been arrested and prosecuted under the Interdiction Statute between ten and thirty times each. All
of the named plaintiffs were either interdicted in absentia or requested counsel, but their requests
were denied. Id. ~ 19. The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs have been arrested for
constructive possession of alcohol, including situations in which a plaintiff was merely sitting
near open containers or emitting a detectable odor of alcohol. Id. ·~ 29.
Plaintiffs challenge the Interdiction Statute, claiming that it violates their rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs bring five claims against
defendants. 2 Count One alleges that the enforcement of the Interdiction Statute results in cruel
and unusual· punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Three alleges deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Count Five claims that the Interdiction Statute is unconstitutionally vague in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Seven alleges deprivation of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Eight requests injunctive and declaratory relief
pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Plaintiffs ask the court to certify the classes ofplaintiffs
and defendants, declare that the defendants' practice of enforcing the consumption prong of the
Interdiction Statute against homeless alcoholics violates their constitutional rights, and enjoin
defendants from further enforcing this portion of the Interdiction Statute against plaintiffs and
others in the class.
Standard of Review

"The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint."
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F .3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). When deciding a motion to

Originally, plaintiffs brought eight claims. On August 26, 2016, the parties jointly moved to voluntarily
dismiss counts two, four, and six. The court granted the motion.
2

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dismiss under this rule, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and draw all
reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);
see also Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d 527, 539 (4th Cir. 2013). '"While a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Discussion

Defendants make five arguments, four of which are procedural and one of which is
substantive, in support of their motion to dismiss: (1) that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction over this case; (2) that plaintiffs have had the
opportunity to challenge their interdictions in state court, and those judgments have preclusive
effect; (3) thatplaintiffs' request for future equitable relief is not ripe for adjudication; (4) that
plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief is barred by the statute of limitations; and (5) that
plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I.

Procedural Arguments
a. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants contend that plaintiffs' complaint is a de facto appeal from a state court
judgment and is thus barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arises

4

from Congress' assignment of original jurisdiction to the district courts and appellate jurisdiction
over final state court judgments to the United States Supreme Court. Thana v. Bd. of License
Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2016). When applicable, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar that prevents a state court loser from seeking, in
substance, appellate review of his adverse state court decision by a federal district court. Am.
Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). In determining whether the
doctrine applies, the fundamental question is whether the litigant is seeking federal appellate
review of the merits of a state court decision. Id. A litigant may not "escape the jurisdictional bar
ofRooker-Feldman by merely refashioning its attack on state qourtjudgments as a §1983 claim."
Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997). Stated otherwise, if
the federal court's action would render the state court judgment ineffectual, Rooker-Feldman is
implicated. Id.
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and clarified its
narrow scope. See Thana, 827 F.3d at 319 ("[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow and
focused ...."). Noting that the "distinction between preclusion principles and the RookerFeldman doctrine can sometimes be subtle," the Fourth Circuit observed that the RookerFeldman doctrine "assesses only whether the process for appealing a state court judgment to the
Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) has been sidetracked by an action filed in a district
court specifically to review the state court judgment." Id. (emphasis in original). The Fourth
Circuit further emphasized that the Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine should be
restricted "to cases whose procedural posture mirrored those in the Rooker and Feldman cases
themselves." Thana, 827 F.3d at 320 (citing Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

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544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a district court's
jurisdiction in similar situations: when ''the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court
after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment
and seeking review and rejection of that judgment." Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291. The Fourth Circuit
has never, in a published opinion, applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to preclude a district
court's jurisdiction. Thana, 827 F.3d at 320.
In the instant case, and in light of the Fourth Circuit's most recent clarification of the
narrow scope ofthe Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court does not believe the doctrine applies.
While the instant action was filed after the state proceedings ended, the plaintiffs are not
"complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection
of that judgment." Id .. They do not seek to overturn their orders of interdiction or their prior
convictions as interdicted individuals. Instead, plaintiffs challenge the statutory scheme-that is,
how the Interdiction Statute is applied to them in the future. The court finds that this claim, as
pled, is sufficiently independent so as not to act as an impediment to the exercise of federal
jurisdiction. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (stating that if the party "presents
an independent claim, it is not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that the same
or a related question was earlier aired between the parties in state court"). The court, however,
cannot escape the tension between the state proceedings and the instant action. Nevertheless, the
Fourth Circuit has determined that Rooker-Feldman is not the appropriate vehicle to manage
such tensions. Instead, they are to be examined through the doctrines of preClusion, comity, and
abstention. Thana, 827 F.3d at 320 (citing Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292-93).

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b. Res Judicata
The co\lrt next turns to the question of whether plaintiffs' claims are procedurally barred
under preclusion principles. "Federal courts asked in a § 1983 action to give res judicata effect
(in any of the doctrine's aspects) to a state court judgment are bound under the Full Faith and
Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, to apply the law of the rendering state to determine whether
and to what extent the state court judgment should have preclusive effect." Davenport v. North
Carolina Dep't of Transp., 3F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1993). The effects of res judicata can be
divided into two categories: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Lee v. Spoden, 290 Va. 235,
245 (2015). In Virginia, under the doctrine of claim preclusion,
A party whose claim for relief arising from identified conduct, a transaction, or an
occurrence, is decided on the merits by a final judgment, shall be forever barred
from prosecuting any second or subsequent civil action against the same opposing
party or parties on any claim or cause of action that arises from the same conduct,
transaction or occurrence, whether or not the legal theory or rights asserted in the
second or subsequent action were raised in the prior lawsuit, and regardless of the
legal elements or the evidence upon which any claim in the prior proceeding
depended, or the particular remedies sought.
Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:6(a). Whether a subsequent claim involves ''the same conduct,
transaction or occurrence" depends on whether the claim is based on a different cause of action.
Lee, 290 Va. at 248.

~'[A]

cause of action is a set of operative facts which, under the substantive

law, may give rise to a right of action.". Roller v. Basic Constr. Co., 238 Va. 321, 327 (1989). "A
right of action, on the other hand, 'is the remedial right accorded to a person to enforce a cause
of action and arises only when a person's rights are infringed."' Lee, 290 Va. at 249. Multiple
rights may arise under a single cause of action, but "a wrongful act generally gives rise to only a
single indivisible cause of action."
In the instant case, the plaintiffs are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding
future arrests. and prosecutions that plaintiffs assert are certain to occur. These prosecutions will

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necessarily include a separate "set of operative facts" that gives rise to the right of action. Lee,
290 Va. at 248. Therefore, although there remains the issue of whether plaintiffs have standing to
proceed based on future occurrences, the court does not believe that the instant matter addresses
the same cause of action. Accordingly, the doctrine of claim preclusion does not prevent suit.
Similarly, the doctrine of issue preclusion does not bar plaintiffs' claims. Issue preclusion
"bars 'successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid
court determination essential to the prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a
different claim." Lee, 290 Va. at 246 (quoting Taylor

v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)).

Here, as explained, there are no factual issues that have already been litigated, as the facts simply
have not yet unfolded. Moreover, defendants do not assert that plaintiffs actually litigated their
constitutional claims in the state court proceedings. Instead, defendants argue that plaintiffs had
the opportunity to do so in their previous state court proceedings, but chose not to raise these
issues.
In arguing that plaintiffs' claims are barred by res judicata, the defendants rely upon
Colvin v. Deaton. 577 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. Va. 1984). In Colvin, ten individuals brought
constitutional challenges to the Interdiction Statute. The court held that res judicata precluded the
plaintiffs from bringing their claims because plaintiffs had the opportunity to fully and fairly
litigate their constitutional claims in their state court proceedings, but chose not to do so. Id. at
928.
The court questions whether the plaintiffs in the instant matter had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate their constitutional claims. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980)
(holding that res judicata can apply to § 1983 claims but noting that "[ c]ollateral estoppel does
not apply where the party against whom an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full

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and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court"). In determining that
the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their constitutional claims in their state
court proceedings, the Colvin court relied, in part, on (1) the fact that the plaintiffs "were
represented by counsel at their state court hearing"; and (2) the fact that "[t]heir present claim for
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief arises from the very fact of the state court
proceedings themselves." Colvin, 577 F. Supp. at 928-29. The district court also referenced
Southern Jam, Inc. v. Robinson, 675 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1982), a case in which res judicata barred
a plaintiffs constitutional claims because the plaintiffs did not take the opportunity to raise these
claims at the state court proceeding. The Colvin court observed that the state law applied in
Southern Jam required a party to raise any claim it may have against an opposing party that arose
out ofthe same transaction or occurrence in that same proceeding. Colvin, 557 F. Supp. at 930.
In Virginia, however, "[a]ll counterclaims are permissive." Tyler v. Berger, No. Civ.A.
605CV00030, 2005 WL 2596164, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2005); Va. Code § 16.1-88.01.
The fact that counterclaims are permissive in Virginia supports the argument that plaintiffs may
not have had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate their claims. See Brown V'. Transurban
USA, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 809, 832 (E.D. Va. 2015) ("The plain language of Rule 1:6 ... limits
the application of res judicata to bar future claims only by a 'party whose claim for relief ... is
decided on the merits.' If, in the prior case, no counterclaim was raised by the prior defendant,
she cannot fairly be said to have been a 'party whose claim for relief ... [was] decided on the
merits."') (quoting Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:6(a)).
Similarly, while the instant matter does "arise from the very fact of the state court
proceedings themselves," namely, the order of interdiction, unlike in Colvin, plaintiffs are not
seeking to invalidate those state court proceedings. Instead, plaintiffs seek prospective relief

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relating to the future enforcement of the consumption prong of the Interdiction Statute. This
request does not prevent the court from giving "a state court judgment the same force and effect
as it has in the state in which it was rendered" because no such state court judgment has been
made. Colvin, 577 F. Supp. at 929. If successful, plaintiffs remain interdicted with their previous
convictions intact, and defendants would be free to prosecute them as interdicted individuals for
other proscribed behavior in the future. Moreover, unlike Colvin, the plaintiffs in the instant
action were either interdicted in absentia or without counsel. See id. ("Those interdicted were
represented by the same counsel in those proceedings .... "). In short, the court does not find
defendants' reliance on Colvin persuasive.
Defendants also argue that plaintiffs have failed to take advantage of a state court
remedy: the interdicting court may amend, alter, or withdraw an interdiction order at any time.
Va. Code § 4.1-333(B). However, plaintiffs correctly point out that, when there is no state
criminal proceeding pending, "[e]xhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies ... [is]
not necessary." Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432 (1975). "[W]here there is simply threatened
prosecution, . . . the opportunity of adjudication of constitutional rights in a federal forum, as
authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act, becomes paramount." Id. (citing Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462-463 (1974)). Consequently, the court does not believe that
plaintiffs' claims are precluded.
c. Standing
Although not barred by res judicata, plaintiffs' claims must also be ripe for adjudication.
Federal courts address "cases" or "controversies," and abstract injury does not suffice. O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1974). Accordingly, "[a] claim is unripe 'if it rests upon
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all."'

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United States v. Simmons, 604 F. App'x 280, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Scoggins
v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Ass'n, 718 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2013)). Defendants' argument
is based on the fact that plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in regards to future events and facts that
have not yet been developed.
To have standing in a pre..,enforcement challenge, a plaintiff "must show a threat of
prosecution that is both real and immediate ... before a federal court may examine the validity
of the criminal statute." Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing cases).
"Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief .... " O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496. However, "[p]ast wrongs [are] evidence bearing
on 'whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury .... ' [T]he prospect of future
injury rest[s] 'on the likelihood that [plaintiffs] will again be arrested for and charged with
violations of the [allegedly unconstitutional] criminal law."' City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 495-97).
Here, plaintiffs have alleged that they are homeless alcoholics, who are compelled to
possess and consume alcohol. Because they are homeless, this possession and consumption is
necessarily in the public view, repeatedly subjecting them to the same set of circumstances that
led to their convictions under the consumption prong of the Interdiction Statute. Moreover, each
of the remaining named plaintiffs has been arrested under the Interdiction Statute between ten
and thirty times. The court believes that these facts, as alleged, raise a sufficient case or
controversy. From the face of the complaint, there is '"a sufficient likelihood' of encountering
some future harm" from the enforcement of the Interdiction Statute. Bane v. Va. Dep't of
Corrections, No. 7:12-CV-159, 2012 WL 6738274, at *4 (W.D. Va. Dec. 28, 2012) (quoting

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Equal Rights Ctr. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 510, 516 (D. Md. 2010)). This
"sufficient likelihood" is enough "to permit a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief." Id.; see also
Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179, 1181 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the argument that plaintiff
lacked standing when the regulation at issue had been applied to him previously and plaintiff
demonstrated a likelihood that it would be applied to him again).
As to the unnamed plaintiffs, once the named litigants have established standing, "[t]his
conclusion does not automatically establish that [the named plaintiffs are] entitled to litigate the
interests of the class [they] seek to represent, but it does shift the focus of examination from the
elements of justiciability to the ability of the named representative to 'fairly and adequately
protect the interest ofthe class."' Sonsa v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,403 (1975) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)); see also Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing how
the standing requirement is addressed in relation to the named plaintiff and whether the named
plaintiff may bring claims on behalf of a putative class is considered under a Rule 23 (a) analysis)
(citing 1 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions§ 2:6 (5th Ed.)). Therefore, the court
believes that the named plaintiffs have pled the requisite real and immediate harm to confer
standing. Whether they may bring claims on behalf of the putative class of homeless alcoholics
will be analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

d. Statute of Limitations
Defendants next assert that the indirect nature of plaintiffs' challenge does not excuse
plaintiffs from complying with the appropriate statute of limitations. The Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act ("DJA'') does not provide a statute of limitations. 118 East 65th Owners, Inc. v.
Bonner Props., Inc., 677 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1982). Instead, it adopts the applicable
limitations of the suit "in which the issues involved would have been litigated if the [DJA] had

12

not been adopted." Id. Additionally, the DJA does not provide an independent jurisdictional
basis; it merely provides a supplemental remedy. City Nat'l Bank v. Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942,
945 n.6 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is clear that § 2201 is remedial only, and is not itself a basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction."). Therefore, in this action, jurisdiction is based on plaintiffs'
claims under 28 U .S.C. § 1983. See 28 U .S.C. § 1331 (providing jurisdiction for claims arising
under federal law). "There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, so the state
limitations period which governs personal injury actions is applied." Lewis v. Richmond City
Police Dep't, 947 F.2d 733, 735 (4th Cir. 1991). In Virginia, the statute of limitations for
personal injury claims is two years, and therefore, a two-year statute of limitations applies in the
instant case. See A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011) ("With
regard to the§ 1983 ... claims, the statute-of-limitations period for both is two years.").
While state law dictates the applicable limitations period, federal law determines when
the cause of action accrues. Nasim v. Warden, 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995). A cause of
action accrues "when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that
reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action." Id. The Fourth Circuit adheres to the doctrine
of continuing violation, in which "claims premised upon allegations concerning a continuing
pattern of unlawful conduct that remains in effect when a lawsuit is filed are not barred by the
statute of limitations, even if the alleged pattern commenced prior to an otherwise pertinent
limitations period." Scott v. Clarke, 64 F. Supp. 3d 813, 826 (W.D. Va. 2014) (citing sources).
For the continuing violation doctrine to apply, an actual violation must have occurred within the
limitations period. Pledger v. City ofVirginia Beach, 103 F.3d 119, 1996 WL 671730, at *1 (4th
Cir. 1996) (citing Woodard v. Lehman, 717 F.2d 909, 915 (4th Cir. 1983)). A "mere allegation

13

of continuing discrimination without any identification of a discriminatory event within the
statute oflimitations period is insufficient .... " Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 n.4 (4th Cir.
1992).
Defendants assert that four of the five original plaintiffs were interdicted more than two
years ago, and that at that time, the plaintiffs had sufficient facts about the harm done that a
reasonable inquiry would have revealed their cause of action. Thus, because the suit was filed
more than two years after their cause of action allegedly arose, defendants contend that the suit is
barred by the statute of limitations. Consistent with their previous arguments, plaintiffs point out
that their cause of action has not yet accrued, as they are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
in relation to future events. In the alternative, plaintiffs assert that the continuing violation
applies because plaintiffs Manning and Deckerhoffwere last convicted in November of2015 and
plaintiffs Walls and Williams in March and May of 2016. ·All four have convictions within the
statute of limitations.
The court agrees that the statute of limitations has not lapsed because plaintiffs are
seeking prospective relief. See Poe v. Lynchburg Training Sch. and Hosp., 518 F. Supp. 789, 794
(W.D. Va. 1981) ("The remedies which plaintiffs are now permitted to seek encompass
prospective relief only, premised on an allegedly continuing deprivation.... Since the alleged
deprivation is of a continuing nature, the action ... is obviously not time barred.") (citing
Williams v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 530 F.2d 539, 542 (4th Cir. 1975)); cf. Lyons P'ship,
L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 799 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the doctrine of
laches may be applied to equitable claims but that the doctrine does not apply to prospective
injunctive relief as such an injunction is "entered only on the basis of current, ongoing conduct
that threatens future harm"). Moreover, to the extent a statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs'

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claims for declaratory relief, if at all, each of the four remaining named plaintiffs can point to a
recent conviction, allegedly in violation of their Constitutional rights, that is within the two-year
limitations period. Accordingly, the court does not consider plaintiffs' claims time barred.

II.

Substantive Arguments
a. Eighth Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs allege that enforcement of the consumption prong of the Interdiction Statute

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it
punishes the status of being a homeless alcoholic. In contrast, defendants assert three reasons
why the Eighth Amendment claim fails. 3 For the reasons set forth below, the court will dismiss
plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim.
First, defendants argue that Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S~

477 (1994), bars the claim. In

Heck, the Supreme Court held that if a § 1983 claim would necessarily invalidate an existing and
presumptively valid state court judgment of conviction, the § 1983 claim is not cognizable unless
the plaintiff alleges and proves that the conviction "has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination,
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus .... " Id. at 48687. Thus, if in granting relief, judgment in plaintiffs' favor would suggest the invalidity of the
conviction or sentence, the suit must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. at 487. This doctrine applies regardless
of whether damages or injunctive relief is sought. Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir.

Plaintiffs contend that defendants' third argument, that the Interdiction Statute does not violate Eighth
Amendment Proportionality principles, is misplaced because plaintiffs are not challenging "the length of any future
jail sentence." Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n 36, Docket No. 21. Because there is no challenge to the potential sentence that
would be imposed, the court will not consider a proportionality analysis.

15

2002). Therefore, defendants argue, because plaintiffs have not pled that the lawfulness of the
state court conviction has been impugned, they fail to state a claim for relief.
Defendants' argument misunderstands the relief requested by. the plaintiffs. They do not
seek to invalidate their previous state court convictions or interdiction proceedings. Instead, they
seek prospective injunctive relief requiring the defendants to comply with the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Such claims are not subject to dismissal under the Heck line of cases.
See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (noting that ''the prisoner's claim for an injunction
barring future unconstitutional procedures did not fall within habeas' exclusive domain" and was
not barred by Heck) (emphasis in original); Lawrence v. McCall, 238 F. App'x 393, 396 (lOth
Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court's determination that Heck does not bar the plaintiffs from
seeking prospective relief).
Second, defendants argue that the Interdiction Statute does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because it criminalizes conduct, not
the status of being a homeless alcoholic. Plaintiffs' argument in response relies upon the Fourth
Circuit's pronouncement that "the State cannot stamp an unpretending chronic alcoholic as a
criminal if his drunken public display is involuntary as the result of disease." Driver v. Hinnant,
356 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1966). Plaintiffs' reliance upon Driver, however, necessarily hinges
on the continued validity of that holding, which plaintiffs contend was not overruled by the
United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (discussing the scope of
the Supreme Court's holding in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). Plaintiffs also
assert that their claim is further supported by two recent Ninth Circuit cases, Ledezma-Cosino v.
Lynch, 819 F.3d 1070 (2016) and Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006).

16

In Ledezma-Cosino, a Ninth Circuit panel addressed whether a chronic alcoholic could
be deemed a person of "bad moral character," thus excluding him from electing "voluntary
removal" when faced with removal proceedings brought pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 819 F.3d at 1074-75. The panel found that the
government's classification of chronic alcoholism was not rationally related to whether the
individual had good moral character. Id. ·Plaintiffs aver that this determination rested on the
conclusion that the "habitual drunkard" exclusion of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) criminalized the
status of being an alcoholic and not any particular conduct. However, Ledezma-Cosino is
inapplicable for at least three reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit granted a petition for a rehearing
en bane. Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2016). In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "The three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the
Ninth Circuit." Id. This court sees no reason to give that opinion more precedential value than
the Ninth Circuit itself. Second, the Ledezma-Cosino plaintiff brought due process and equal
protection claims and not Eighth Amendment

ones~

819 F .3d at 1072. Third, the Ledezma-

Cosino panel held that "link[ing] a person's medical disability with his moral character" could
not survive rational basis review. Id. at 1076. The Ninth Circuit did not address whether a statute
that linked conduct incident to the disease could survive rational basis scrutiny. Instead, the
Ledezma-Cosino court expressly noted that "when or how persons with chronic alcoholism may
be punished for criminal acts committed while in an alcoholic state is another question to be
considered elsewhere." Id. at 1078 n.l. Accordingly, the court finds Ledezma-Cosino inapposite
to the instant case.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Jones, however, addresses a more difficult issue. In Jones,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[a] closer analysis of Robinson and Powell instructs that the

17

,------------------------

involuntariness of the act or condition the City criminalizes is the critical factor delineating a
constitutionally cognizable status, and incidental conduct which is integral to and an unavoidable
result of that status, from acts or conditions that can be criminalized consistent with the Eighth
Amendment." Jones, 444 F.3d at 1132. However, the Jones opinion was vacated as part of the
parties' settlement agreement, and district courts within the Ninth Circuit have rejected its
precedential value. See Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1225 (2009) ("This
Court finds that, though the Jones opinion is informative, it is not binding, and the Court will
limit the weight given the decision accordingly."); Anderson v. City of Portland, No. 08-1447AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009) ("Ultimately, I part company with the
reasoning employed by Jones . . . ."). After careful consideration of Robinson, Powell, and
Fourth Circuit precedent, this court declines to adopt the holding set forth in Jones. Instead, the
court believes that Powell articulated two important principles applicable to the instant case: (1)
that Robinson did not reach the question of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits
punishment of conduct symptomatic of a disease; and (2) that the doctrines of criminal
responsibility are traditionally the province of the states.
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a law that made it a
crime "to be addicted to the use of narcotics." 370 U.S. at 664. The Supreme Court determined
that the statute made the "'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender
may be prosecuted ... whether or not [the offender] has ever used or possessed any narcotics
within the State." Id. at 666. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the statute at issue punished
an illness, narcotic addiction, that may be contracted innocently or involuntary, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.

18

The Supreme Court visited a similar issue in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), when
an alcoholic brought a constitutional challenge to a statute that prohibited public intoxication. In
upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the plurality clarified the scope of Robinson: to
prohibit the criminalization of "mere status." Powell, 392 U.S. at 532 (1968). The Supreme
Court observed:
It is suggested in dissent that Robinson stands for the 'simple' but 'subtle'
principle that ' (c)riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in
a condition he is powerless to change.' In that view, appellant's 'condition' of
public intoxication was 'occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the disease'·
of chronic alcoholism, and thus, apparently, his behavior lacked the critical
element of mens rea. Whatever may be the merits of such a doctrine of criminal
responsibility, it surely cannot be said to follow from Robinson.... [Robinson]
thus does not deal with the . question of whether certain conduct cannot
constitutionally be punished because it · is. in some sense. 'involuntary' . or
'occasioned by a compulsion.'

Id. at 533-534 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court declined to extend the Eighth
Amendment protection to "involuntary" conduct. Instead, ''[t]he court specifically rejected in
Powell the notion that since the status of alcoholism could not be criminally punished under
Robinson, conduct symptomatic of alcoholism (e.g. public drunkenness) was constitutionally
protected as well." Fisher v. Coleman, 486 F. Supp. 311, 316 (W.D. Va. 1979).
This rejection has been understood by courts within this circuit as abrogating Driver. See
Fisher, 486 F. Supp. at 316 ("In so holding, the court overruled and made inapplicable the
holdings in the cases of Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) and Easter v. District of
Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966), insofar as those cases held that the Eighth Amendment
bars criminal punishment of behavior symptomatic of alcoholism."); Rakes v. Coleman, 359 F.
Supp. 370, 380 (E.D. Va. 1973) ("Driver ... turned in essence upon the concept of mens rea
specifically rejected-in Powell. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Powell overrules Driver.").

19

Moreover, the defendants correctly cite to published opinions from this district and the State of
Virginia which hold that the Interdiction Statute "does not make the status of alcoholism a
criminal offense, but merely makes specific behavior ... unlawful." Fisher, 486 F. Supp. at 316;
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 122, 124 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) ("Code§ 4.1-322 imposes
no criminal sanction for the status of being an alcoholic. It forbids specific behavior: possession
of alcohol and public drunkenness by interdicted persons. Therefore, ... Code § 4.1-322 does
not violate the Eighth Amendment ...."). Indeed, under the statutory scheme, a person cannot
be subjected to criminal penalties unless he or she engages in the act of consuming, possessing,
or attempting to consume or possess alcohol. Va. Code § 4.1-305. Thus, the statute punishes
conduct. 4
Furthermore, and consistent with the statute analyzed in Powell, the Interdiction Statute
imposes "a criminal sanction for public behavior which may create substantial health and safety
hazards . . . and which offends the moral and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the
community." Powell, 392 U.S. at 532. The dissent in Jones recognized that "both the [Supreme]
Court and [the Ninth Circuit] have constrained this category of Eighth Amendment violation to
persons who are being punished for crimes that do not involve conduct that society has an
interest in preventing." 444 F.3d at 1139 (Rymer, J., dissenting); see also Anderson, 2009 WL
2386056, at *7 (noting, in rejecting plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim, that "a critical factor is
whether and to what degree the City's enforcement of the [challenged] ordinances criminalizes

The court notes that plaintiffs assert that they are prosecuted for constructive possession of alcohol and thus
are not engaged in the "act" of possessing alcohol. However, the court cannot find any case suggesting that
constructive possession is without an actus reus. Haskins v. Commonwealth, 602 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Va. Ct. App.
2004) (noting that constructive possession can be shown by "acts, statements, or conduct of the accused .... ")
(emphasis added). Moreover, the Interdiction Statute penalizes not only possession and consumption but attempted
possession and consumption, which also requires an "act." Hix v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 335, 347 (2005) (noting
that an attempt to commit a crime is comprised of both the intent to commit the crime and "a direct, ineffectual act
done towards its commission").

4

20

'conduct that society has an interest in preventing"'). In Powell, the plurality stressed the
importance of that consideration:
[T]he most troubling aspects of this case, were Robinson to be extended [to
include involuntary conduct derivative of status], would be the scope and content
of what could only be a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility.... We
cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection of interlocking and
overlapping concepts which the common law has utilized to assess the moral
accountability of an individual . . . . The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea,
insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tolls for
a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the
criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of
the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the
province of the States.
Id. at 533-34. In Virginia, the Jackson court aptly observed that "suggestions for changes in
societal views on the cause and effects of alcoholism and their impact on the laws· of the state
should be addressed in the legislature." 604 S.E.2d at 125. Accordingly, the court concludes that
defendants have failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel !lnd unusual punishment
under a theory that the Interdiction Statute punishes status and not conduct. The Supreme Court
has not answered ''the question of whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished
because it is, in some sense, 'involuntary' or 'occasioned by a compulsion"'; courts within this
circuit have discounted the validity of Driver and upheld Eighth Amendment challenges to the
Interdiction Statute; and determining the outer contours of what can be punished is properly left
to the States. 5 Powell at 533-34. Moreover, to hold differently would open the door to challenges
to punishments which seemingly fit squarely within the bounds of the Eighth Amendment, such
as claims by narcotics addicts for being punished for the status of "being" in possession of drugs.

Similarly, the court generally ''defers to a state court's interpr~tation of a state statute." Bush v. Palm Beach
Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000). As discussed, a Virginia appellate court has already determined that ·
the Interdiction Statute punishes conduct. See Jackson, 604 S.E.2d at 124 ("Code § 4.1"322 imposes no criminal
sanction for the status of being an alcoholic.;').

21

Similarly, a variety of sex offenders could evade punishment by arguing that their conduct was
symptomatic of their disease. See Id. at 545. Without clear authority to do so, the court is
unwilling to extend the Eighth Amendment protections to such lengths.
To the extent plaintiffs argue that Powell, Fisher, and Jackson were decided on
inadequate records, the court is not persuaded. While the plurality in Powell stated, "We are
unable to conclude, on the state of this record or on the current state of medical knowledge, that
chronic alcoholics ... suffer from an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public,"
the Supreme Court also emphasized that it had not articulated "a constitutional doctrine of
criminal responsibility." Powell, 392 U.S. at 535. The undeveloped record, therefore, was not
determinative. Additionally, the plurality declined to extend Robinson to "the question of
whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense,
'involuntary' or 'occasioned by a compulsion."' Id. Further, the decisions in Jackson and Fisher
based their holdings on more than just a deficient record. See Fisher, 486 F. Supp. at 316
(holding that the Interdiction Statute makes specific behavior unlawful); Jackson, 604 S.E.2d at
125 (holding that the Interdiction Statute requires an act and thus does not punish status).
Plaintiffs, however, also argue that the Interdiction Statute, as applied to them as
homeless individuals, violates the Eighth Amendment because their homelessness provides them
with no other place to consume or possess alcohol other than in public. This argument is based
on the assertion that the Interdiction Statute punishes status and not conduct, which has the
result, plaintiffs allege, of punishing plaintiffs for just "being" a homeless alcoholic. As
discussed, the court does not believe the Interdiction Statute punishes status. See Fisher, 486 F.
Supp. at 316 (finding that the Interdiction Statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment when

22

the homeless plaintiff had admitted alcoholism). The Interdiction Statute makes it illegal for
interdicted individuals to possess or consume alcohol, which is an act, regardless of whether that
possession or consumption is in public or in the confines of their own home. Va. Code § 4.1305. 6 Thus, in holding that the Interdiction Statute punishes acts, the court does not believe the
fact of plaintiffs' homelessness makes the application of the Interdiction Statute to their conduct
violative of the Eighth Amendment. In sum, the court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to
state an Eighth Amendment claim and will dismiss Count One.
b. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
Plaintiffs claim that the Interdiction Statute, as applied, deprives them of the due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects citizens from being deprived of "liberty" or "property" without "due
process." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In order to prevail on a procedural due process claim, a
plaintiff must show: "(1) a cognizable liberty or property interest; (2) the deprivation of that
interest by some form of state action; and (3) that the procedures employed were constitutionally
inadequate." Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 528 (4th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs make two
arguments: first, that they are denied due process because they are not afforded counsel at their
civil interdiction proceedings; and second, that they are denied due process because the civil
nature of the interdiction proceeding allows the Commonwealth to prove an element of the
consumption-prong crime by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendants argue that due
process does not require the appointment of counsel at interdiction proceedings, because such
proceedings are civil in nature and the individual is not subject to immediate arrest, prosecution,

6

The court acknowledges an exception to Va. Code § 4.1-305: "Any person who keeps and possesses
lawfully acquired alcoholic beverages in his residence for his personal use .... " Va. Code § 4.1-200. However,
interdicted individuals may not lawfully acquire alcoholic beverages, and thus, this exception does not apply.

23

or imprisonment. Instead, itis plaintiffs' "subsequent defiance of the law ... that brings into play
the criminal process" and the right to counsel. Ferguson v. Gathright, 485 F.2d 504, 506 (4th
Cir. 1973). Finally, defendants contend that proof of being a "habitual drunkard" is not an
element of the crime; rather, defendants must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
individual was interdicted.
Due process requires fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Beyond that, its requirements are "flexible and call[] for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972). The Supreme Court has observed that the Due Process Clause creates a presumption
that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when an adverse decision would
result in his or her deprivation of physical liberty. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham
Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("The pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this
Court's precedents on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been
recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation."). However, the Due Process Clause does not require the appointment of counsel for
indigent persons in every such civil proceeding. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 443 (2011)
(surveying past cases and

ob~erving

that the right to counsel attaches '"only' in cases involving

incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such cases") (emphasis in original). The
exact requirements of due process are determined by an examination of the relevant factors set
out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. See,
.

~.

Turner, 564 U.S. at 444 ("[W]e
.

consequently determine the 'specific dictates of due process' by examining the 'distinct factors'
that this Court has previously found useful in deciding what specific safeguards the

24

Constitution's Due Process Clause requires in order to make a civil proceeding fundamentally
fair."). Therefore, the court must first determine whether plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that
their civil interdiction proceedings deprive them of their physical liberty. If not, the court then
must analyze whether the net balance of the private interest at stake, the government interest, and
the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous deprivations outweigh the presumption of
counsel that arises only when there is a loss of personal freedom. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28
("We must balance these elements against each other, and then set their net weight in the scales
against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is
unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.").
Here, the court is not convinced that plaintiffs have pled facts demonstrating that the civil
interdiction hearings themselves deprive them of their physical liberty. The court finds Ferguson
v. Gathright, 485 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1973), instructive. In Ferguson, an individual was convicted
of driving a motor vehicle after his license had been revoked. Id. at 505. Seeking habeas relief,
the individual argued that he was deprived of due process because he did not receive the aid of
counsel at the revocation proceeding. Id. at 505-06. In denying relief, the Fourth Circuit
highlighted the important difference between the "quasicriminal" revocation proceeding and
subsequent criminal proceeding: the revocation hearing did not result in the loss of liberty or
threat of incarceration. Id. at 506. Instead, the individual came under the threat of incarceration
"only if he subsequently determine[d] to take the law into his own hands and to operate a motor
vehicle on the public highway without a valid permit." Id. (emphasis in original).
In the instant case, plaintiffs are not incarcerated upon an order of interdiction being
entered against them. However harsh the label of "habitual drunkard" may be, it is the
subsequent act of consuming, possessing, or attempting to consume or possess alcohol that gives

25

rise to the deprivation of physical liberty. See id. (rejecting the argument that "because the [civil]
proceedings provide a basis for the subsequent prosecution for the crime . . . they must be
deemed an integral and essential part of that prosecution"). Moreover, the plaintiffs are afforded
counsel at these subsequent proceedings in which incarceration is at risk. Therefore, it is not the
civil proceedings that lead to the loss of liberty. Consequently, the presumptive right to counsel
is not implicated. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.
Plaintiffs, however, contend that they are alcoholics and are thus compelled to consume
and possess alcohol. Because they are homeless, this possession and consumption occurs in the
public view, leading to their deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that the
presumption of a right to appointed counsel applies. Even assuming that the interdiction
proceeding deprives the plaintiffs of physical liberty, the court finds that the Due Process Clause
does not require the appointment of counsel at that proceeding. In making this determination, the
court considers the nature of the "private interest that will be affected," the comparative risk of
an erroneous deprivation, and the government interest at stake to determine whether plaintiffs
were afforded sufficient due process. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Here, as in Turner, the "private interest that will be affected" weighs in favor of the right
to counsel if, as plaintiffs argue, being interdicted likely leads to their incarceration. The Due
Process Clause is implicated when imprisonment is at issue.

See,~.

Turner, 564 U.S. at 445.

However, in contrast to the plaintiffs' interest, the court cannot ignore the Commonwealth's
obvious concern in protecting the safety and welfare of its citizens by seeking to make illegal, in
certain instances, the consumption or possession of alcohol. See Mitchell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 182 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1999) ("It cannot seriously be disputed that [the

26

Commonwealth] has a legitimate interest in discouraging alcohol and drug abuse."). The
determination of what due process is required seemingly hinges on the third factor: the risk of
erroneous deprivation.
Regarding this third factor, the court is reminded that each of the named plaintiffs is an
alcoholic who is compelled to possess and consume alcohol, often in the public view because of
his homelessness. They seek to certify a class of homeless alcoholics. Virginia Code § 4.1-333
provides that a "court may enter an order of interdiction" when "after a hearing upon due notice
it appears to the satisfaction ofthe circuit court ... that any person ... has shown himself to be a
habitual drunkard ...."In this situation and with these procedural protections, including notice,
a hearing, and the ability of the issuing court to amend or alter the order of interdiction, the court
believes that the risk of erroneously finding an alcoholic who is compelled to consume and
possess alcohol a "habitual drunkard" is minimal. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the assistance
of an attorney would change the result See United States v. Kerley, No. 02CR1529, 2004 WL
187154, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2004) ("This Court reads the third prong of the Eldridge
balancing test as an inquiry into whether an attorney's legal skills or training would alleviate the
risk of erroneous decisions" and noting that, as a practical matter, the presence of an attorney
would not have helped the plaintiff). In light of these facts, "[i]t is difficult to see how additional
process could significantly reduce the chance of erroneous deprivation." Snider Int'l Corp. v.
Town of Forest Heights, 739 F.3d 140, 149 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Turner, 564 U.S. at 446
("[W]e must take account of opposing interests, as well as consider the probable value of
'additional or substitute procedural safeguards."').
The court recognizes that in the case of some individuals, the risk of erroneous
deprivation may be greater, tilting the balance towards the appointment of counsel. However,

27

"due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility
and economy must always be sacrificed." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973). As in ·
Lassiter, the court believes that "the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of
counsel for indigent [individuals in interdiction proceedings should] be answered in the first
instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review." 452 U.S. at 31.
Plaintiffs also allege that the Interdiction Statute violates their Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights because the Interdiction Statute allows .the Commonwealth to prove an
element of a crime using a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. To be criminally
convicted under the Interdiction Statute, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant was
interdicted and engaged in a prohibited act. See Va. Code § 4.1-305. In In re Winship, the
Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged." 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Plaintiffs contend that this statutory scheme allows the
Commonwealth to prove the facts necessary to sustain a conviction at a civil proceeding where
the state need not meet such an onerous burden.
The fundamental flaw in plaintiffs' argument is that being a "habitual drunkard," the
showing required in an interdiction proceeding, is not an underlying fact that leads to
incarceration. Instead, the Commonwealth must prove the fact that the individual has been
interdicted, in addition to proving that defendant has possessed, consU1lled, or attempted to
possess or consume alcohol. Va. Code § 4.1-305. Given that plaintiffs are appointed counsel at
this subsequent criminal proceeding, that they are afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to interdiction, and that there is an available means of challenging the underlying

28

interdiction, albeit perhaps not without difficulty, the court concludes that plaintiffs have failed
to state a valid Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

c. Fourteenth Amendment Vagueness Claim
In Count Five, plaintiffs challenge the Interdiction Statute under a void-for-vagueness
theory. "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). In evaluating whether a statute is vague, a court considers
both whether it provides notice of the unlawful activity and whether it adequately curtails
arbitrary enforcement. See United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs
claim that the civil component of the Interdiction Statute is tantamount to a criminal proceeding,
because they will inevitably be convicted under the consumption prong of the Interdiction
Statute. Consequently, because Virginia Code § 4.1-333 does not define "habitual drunkard,"
plaintiffs assert that it is void-for-vagueness.
It is well-settled that "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not

successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974). "[W]here a
statute does not regulate First Amendment freedoms, claims of overbreadth and vagueness may
not be brought by persons whose actions fall clearly within the terms ofthe statute in question."
Fisher v. Coleman, 486 F. Supp. 311, 314 (W.D. Va. 1979) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 608-10 (1973)). It seems readily apparent that the statutory term "habitual drunkard"
applies to homeless alcoholics compelled to possess and consume alcohol with no choice but to
do so in public spaces. See id. (finding the plaintiff, a homeless alcoholic, lacked standing to sue

29

under the void-for-vagueness theory). Plaintiffs do not have standing to mount a facial challenge
to the Interdiction Statute under a void-for-vagueness theory.
To the extent that plaintiffs assert that the statute, as applied to them, is unconstitutionally
vague because it does not provide sufficient notice of the proscribed conduct, the court does not
agree.
The Constitution does not require a precise statutory definition for every essential
term used in a statute, but merely requires that the terms used have a meaning
which would give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his conduct is
forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to
be proscribed.
Id. at 314. When assessing the constitutional clarity of the terms of a statute, the court evaluates
the statute in light of the conduct to which the statute is applied. United States v. Nat'l Dairy
Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 31 (1963). State statutes are presumed to be valid and "should be
construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality." Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,
547 F. Supp. 791, 796 (E.D. Va. 1982) (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382-83
(1971)). A statute will not fail simply because there is difficulty in determining whether certain
marginal offenses fall within their language. Nat'l Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. at 32.
In the instant case, the Interdiction Statute contains explicit standards which law
enforcement may apply to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The court further
believes that it puts the plaintiffs on reasonable notice as to the proscribed conduct. Compare Va.
Code§ 4.1-305 (making it illegal for an interdicted person "to consume, purchase or possess, or
attempt to consume, purchase or possess, any alcoholic beverage"), with Tomlin v. Anderson,
106 F.3d 402, 1997 WL 35577, at *5 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding a statute that made it illegal for
a person to possess a firearm "while under a disability," including persons who were "drug

30

dependent, in danger of drug dependence, or a chronic alcoholic"). Moreover, the issue of the
statute's vagueness as applied to a homeless alcoholic has been litigated in this district
previously. See Fisher, 486 F. Supp. at 314-15. The Fisher court determined that the term
"habitual drunkard" was sufficiently precise. Id. at 315. ("[T]he common meaning of the tenns
habitual drunkard clearly encompasses one who ... is admittedly in the continual habit of being
intoxicated from alcohol."). This court sees no reason to depart from the holding in Fisher, which
upheld the. Virginia Interdiction Statute as applied to an admitted alcoholic with no home who
was routinely convicted for public intoxication. 7

d. Equal Protection Claim
Lastly, defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to state an equal protection claim.
Defendants argue that the Interdiction Statute does not discriminate against a protected class and
does not implicate a fundamental right. Defendants also argue that the Interdiction Statute is the
proper exercise of the Commonwealth's police power in promoting public safety by subjecting
recidivist individuals to heightened criminal sentences for possession of alcohol and public
intoxication. Plaintiffs allege that they state an equal protection claim because they are treated
· differently than similarly-situated individuals and because the Interdiction Statute implicates a
fundamental right: the right to be free from incarceration.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that no state "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1. Simply put, a State generally cannot "burden[] a fundamental right, target[] a suspect class,

7

To the extent plaintiffs argue that Fisher is distinguishable because they have alleged no convictions for
public intoxication prior to interdiction, the court notes that plaintiffs are seeking prospective injunctive relief. With
that in mind, the ten to thirty convictions each plaintiff has received are squarely in line with the numerous
convictions the plaintiff in Fisher had received, further demonstrating that the instant matter is on all fours with
Fisher.

31

or intentionally treat one differently than others similarly situated . . . ." Loesel v. City of
Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2012). As with vagueness challenges, "[i]n
considering an equal protection challenge, [courts] generally will presume the legislation at issue
to be valid and will uphold the statute if the classification it draws is rationally related to a
legitimate purpose. If; however, the statute employs a suspect class or burdens the exercise of a
constitutional right," strict scrutiny is applied. Mitchell v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 182
F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1999). When a fundamental right is not implicated, "[t]o succeed on an
equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from
others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of
intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.
2001 ). Once this threshold is passed, "the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in
treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny." Id. Classifications based not on a
suspect class will be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest, as
will statutes that do not burden a fundamental right. Id. Accordingly, the court considers whether
the Interdiction Statute targets a suspect class, treats plaintiffs differently from similarly situated
individuals, or burdens a fundamental right.
At the outset, the court notes that plaintiffs are not a suspect class. Alcoholics have not
yet achieved that status. Mitchell, 182 F.3d at 274. Neither have homeless individuals. Joel v.
City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2000). Therefore, plaintiffs have not stated a
claim that the statute impermissibly targets a suspect class.
The court next turns to the question of whether plaintiffs were treated differently than
similarly-situated individuals. Plaintiffs frame their argument as if they are similarly situated to
non-interdicted individuals and non-alcoholics. The court does not consider interdicted

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individuals and non-interdicted individuals, or alcoholics and non-alcoholics, to be similarly
situated. To demonstrate that they are similarly situated to other individuals, the plaintiffs must
be "similar in all aspects relevant to attaining the legitimate objectives of legislation." VanDer
Linde Housing, Inc. v. Rivanna Solid Waste Auth., 507 F.3d 290, 291 (4th Cir. 2007).
In the instant case, those individuals who have been interdicted have different legal rights
than those who have not been: they have been either convicted of driving under the influence or
shown in a judicial proceeding to be a habitual drunkard, prohibiting them from engaging in
certain conduct. See,

~.

Berg v. Egan, 979 F. Supp. 330, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that

distinctions between people with different rights and responsibilities are less likely than other
distinctions to be irrational or arbitrary); United States v. Nicolas-Juan, 426 F. App'x 154, 2011
WL 1624963, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2011) (finding that a convicted criminal alien was not
similarly situated with a non-criminal alien). Nor is the court convinced that they are, despite this
difference, "similar in all aspects relevant to attaining the legitimate objectives of legislation,"
when a possible aim of the legislation is to protect the public from the harms of excessive
alcohol consumption. Van Der Linde Housing, Inc., 507 F.3d at 291. Importantly, even if
plaintiffs were similarly situated to non-alcoholics, plaintiffs have alleged no discriminatory
purpose or intent in treating non-alcoholics and alcoholics differently. 'See Morrison, 239 F.3d at
654 ("To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been
treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment
was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.").
Plaintiffs, however, also argue that the criminal prong of the Interdiction Statute treats
similarly-situated interdicted individuals disparately, as homeless interdicted individuals are
allegedly prosecuted more so than similarly-situated non-homeless interdicted individuals. This

33

claim also fails as the complaint is devoid of any allegation that the facially-neutral criminal
prong of the Interdiction Statute has a discriminatory intent or purpose. See Morrison, 239 F.3d
at 654. Consequently, unless the plaintiffs demonstrate that a fundamental right is implicated,
rational basis will apply.
In equal protection cases, ''the focus, for purposes of determining whether a 'fundamental
interest' is involved, is not upon the punishment or other imposition to which the complaining
party has been subjected, but rather upon the activity of the complaining party which has been
made the reason for the punishment or imposition." United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 133
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original). As a result, the court does not apply strict scrutiny when
the consequence of violating a regulation or substantive law is incarceration. Id. With this
understanding, the activity giving rise to the punishment is the possession or consumption of
alcohol by homeless alcoholics who have been interdicted. Possession and consumption of
alcohol is not a fundamental right. Cf. Giordano v. Connecticut Valley Hosp., 588 F. Supp. 2d
306, 321-22 (D. Conn. 2008) (upholding a smoking ban at a state-operated psychiatric facility
and finding that plaintiffs did not have a fundamental right to smoke). If the consumption prong
of the Interdiction Statute violated the fundamental right of being free from incarceration, it
would follow that every penal statute or civil contempt proceeding that led to incarceration
would need to survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the court does not believe that the Interdiction
Statute implicates a fundamental right and will review the statutory scheme under a rational basis
standard.
The plaintiffs assert that the Interdiction Statute does not survive this highly deferential
standard of review. They contend that there is no rational basis for criminalizing the possession
. and consumption ofalcohol by homeless alcoholics. In support of this argument, plaintiffs again

34

rely on Ledezma-Cosino, in which the Ninth Circuit determined that whether someone was an
alcoholic had no rational relationship to their good moral character. 819 F.3d at 1075. For the
reasons discussed above, Ledezma-Cosino is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the
Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in discouraging alcohol and drug abuse. See Mitchell,
182 F.3d at 274. It cannot be said that preventing the possession or consumption of alcohol by
individuals who, like plaintiffs, admittedly cannot mitigate their alcohol consumption, or who
have been adjudged to be at risk of abusing alcohol through interdiction proceedings, is not
rationally related to this legitimate interest. As a result, the court will grant defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' equal protection claims.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,·defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted. The Clerk is
directed to strike this case from the court's active docket and to send copies of this memorandum
opinion and the accompanying order to all counsel of record.
DATED: This

<l ~·day of February, 2017.

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