Hawks v. Hunt et al

Filing 9

OPINION. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 12/30/2016. (slt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
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BOBBY LEE HAWKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMANTHA HUNT, ET AL.,
Defendants.

Case No. 7:16CV00557
OPINION
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge

Bobby Lee Hawks, Pro Se Plaintiff.
The plaintiff, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that jail medical staff did not provide
him with appropriate care. Upon review of the Complaint, I conclude that the
action must be summarily dismissed.
I.
The plaintiff, Bobby Lee Hawks, is incarcerated at the New River Valley
Jail facility in Dublin, Virginia. Starting in July 2016, Hawks was seen at least
five times by the jail’s medical staff for unspecified complaints about one of his
eyes. On September 11, 2016, Hawks showed an officer that his eye was “swollen
again,” and the officer called the medical unit. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) The
officer reported that the medical unit was full, but staff had advised him to “keep

an eye on [Hawks] in case [his] eye got worse.” (Id. 3.) Hawks complained later
to another officer, who also called medical and received the same instructions. In
the morning, Hawks believed that his eye had gotten worse. When he showed his
condition to an officer who called the medical unit, the officer reported that the
medical staff had said Hawks would be scheduled to go to medical on September
13. This appointment did not occur, however. Hawks did not go to medical or see
the doctor until September 27, 2016.
Hawks filed a previous § 1983 action raising similar allegations and naming
only the medical staff as a defendant. Hawks v. New River Valley Regional Jail
(Medical), No. 7:16CV00475 (W.D. Va. Oct. 19, 2016). I summarily dismissed
the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because the medical staff as a group
cannot be sued under § 1983. In the dismissal Opinion, I noted:
In any event, Hawks’ allegations do not state any constitutional claim
actionable under § 1983 against anyone. His allegations present
merely his disagreement with the jail’s medical staff about how timesensitive his medical need was to have his eye examined by a
physician. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (holding
that only a prison official’s deliberate indifference to inmate’s serious
medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment). The deliberate
indifference standard “is not satisfied by . . . mere disagreement
concerning ‘[q]uestions of medical judgment,’” Germain v. Shearin,
531 F. App’x 392, 395 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (quoting Russell
v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975)). See also Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding that in constitutional
claim regarding prison medical care, “the essential test is one of
medical necessity and not simply that which may be considered
merely desirable”).
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Id., Op. 2 n.1, ECF No. 7.
At the end of November 2016, Hawks filed this § 1983 action, raising
virtually the same allegations as presented in the earlier § 1983 Complaint, but
naming as defendants Samantha Hunt and Betty Akers. Hawks contends that being
denied medical care for sixteen days violated his constitutional rights. Hawks’
Complaint does not state what relief he seeks.
II.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), the court is required to dismiss any § 1983
action “with respect to prison conditions . . . if the court is satisfied that the action
is frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Giarrantano v.
Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Therefore, a plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to
state all the elements of [the] claim.” Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324
F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
As stated, “deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.” Jackson
v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).
Objectively, the inmate’s medical condition must be “serious” in the sense that it
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“has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Subjectively, a
prison official is “deliberately indifferent” if he “knows of and disregards [or
responds unreasonably to] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Under this deliberate indifference standard,
Hawks fails to allege facts stating any actionable Eighth Amendment claim against
Hunt or Akers.
First, Hawks does not describe the condition of his eye or offer any evidence
suggesting that it presented a serious medical need for treatment between
September 11 and 27, 2016. By his own allegations, it is clear that he received
medical care for his eye on several occasions prior to September 11, and was
examined by a doctor on September 27, 2016. Nothing in the Complaint suggests
that his condition required more or different treatment than he received or that the
two-week break between examinations in September allowed his condition to
worsen in any way. 1
Second, Hawks does not state facts showing that Hunt or Akers knew his
eye condition presented an excessive risk of serious harm requiring immediate
An official’s intentional act or omission that merely delays an inmate’s access to
necessary medical care may state a constitutional claim only if plaintiff shows that the
defendant’s conduct resulted in substantial harm to the patient. Webb v. Hamidullah, 281
F. App’x 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
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assessment or care in September 2016. As I advised Hawks in my Opinion
dismissing his prior § 1983 case, his allegations present, at most, a disagreement
between Hawks and the jail’s medical staff about the appropriate timing of medical
examinations and treatment for his eye problems. Such disagreements are not
actionable under § 1983, as they suggest nothing more than negligence.
For the stated reasons, I conclude that even after Hawks was advised in his
prior § 1983 case of the deficiencies in his allegations, Hawks’ Complaint in this
action fails to state any § 1983 claim against the defendants he has named.
Accordingly, I will summarily dismiss his Complaint with prejudice pursuant to
§ 1915A(b)(1).
A separate Order will be entered herewith.
DATED: December 30, 2016
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge

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