Griffith v. Vanover

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on 1/5/2017. (slt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
DANNY KEITH GRIFFITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE HENRY VANOVER,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 7:16cv00563
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By: Norman K. Moon
United States District Judge

Danny Keith Griffith, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil action against a state
court judge. After reviewing the complaint, I conclude that this lawsuit must be summarily
dismissed as frivolous.
Griffith is serving time due to a conviction related to a “domestic dispute” with his wife.
Griffith alleges that defendant Judge Vanover said that “people like [Griffith] shouldn’t be
allowed to be married” and that Judge Vanover violated his right to “freedom of religion” when
he “denied all communication between [Griffith] and his wife.” Griffith believes that he “should
have been given the right to communicate with his wife to mend the relationship instead of being
forced to give up so eas[i]ly.”
The court must dismiss any action or claim filed by a prisoner against a governmental
entity or officer if the court determines the action or claim is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). A “frivolous” claim is one that “lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).

Judges are absolutely immune from suits under § 1983 for acts committed within their
judicial discretion.1 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). “Absolute judicial
immunity exists ‘because it is recognized that judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted
must be able to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without apprehension that they
will be subjected to burdensome and vexatious litigation.’” Lesane v. Spencer, No. 3:09CV012,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *6, 2009 WL 4730716, at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2009) (quoting
McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted), overruled on other
grounds by Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1995)). Judges are entitled to immunity even
if “the action [they] took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of [their]
authority . . . .” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.
Griffith’s claims in this lawsuit are clearly baseless, and, therefore, I will summarily
dismiss the action under § 1915A(b)(1) as frivolous.
5th
ENTER: This ___ day of January, 2017.

1

Only two exceptions apply to judicial immunity: (1) nonjudicial actions, and (2) those actions, “though
judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (citation
omitted). Neither exception applies here.

2