DePaola v. Clarke et al

Filing 33

OPINIO & ORDER denying 32 Motion to Stay Case; the defendants are DIRECTED to respond within 30 days from entry of this Opinion and Order, to plaintiff's discovery requests and DePaola is DIRECTED to submit his responses to defendants' motion for summary judgment within 60 days from entry of this Opinion & Order. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 7/30/2018. (tvt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
ERIC DePAOLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HAROLD CLARKE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 7:17CV00028
OPINION AND ORDER
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge

Eric DePaola, Pro Se Plaintiff; Mary Grace Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for
Defendants Clarke, Barksdale, Mullins, Robinson, and Elam.
The plaintiff, Eric DePaola, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, alleges in
his Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that he was denied due process
protections in disciplinary proceedings in which he was found guilty and fined.
The defendants, by counsel, have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting
that they are entitled to absolute or qualified immunity and, in the alternative, that
DePaola’s claims are without merit. The defendants have also moved to stay
discovery until the threshold issue of qualified immunity is decided. After review
of the record, the court concludes that the requested stay is not appropriate.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages where “their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity, as a

threshold issue, can operate to protect government officials from the burdens of
discovery and trial. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1991). An officer
is entitled to qualified immunity if the court finds that either: (1) the facts, taken in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not present the elements necessary to
state a violation of a constitutional right; or (2) the right was not clearly established
such that it would not have been “clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377 (4th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that court may determine which facet
of qualified immunity analysis to consider first).
The defendants first argue that DePaola’s § 1983 claims about his
disciplinary proceedings are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
and that as such, they were entitled to qualified immunity. I cannot agree.
Under the ruling in Heck, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred . . . if
success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [that
prisoner’s] confinement or its duration,” unless the prisoner proves that the
challenged criminal or disciplinary conviction has been terminated in his favor.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (interpreting Heck holding); see
also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647-48 (1997) (applying Heck to § 1983
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claim seeking restoration of good conduct time forfeited as penalty for prison
disciplinary conviction).

The favorable termination requirement in Heck and

Balisok does not apply, however, to disciplinary conviction challenges that do not
call into question the fact or length of the inmate’s term of confinement. See, e.g.,
Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648; Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (per
curiam) (finding Heck requirement to overturn disciplinary conviction by other
means before filing a § 1983 does not apply where success in § 1983 action
“threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of [inmate’s]
sentence”). The fine imposed on DePaola had no effect on the length of his
confinement.

Thus, his success in this § 1983 action would not imply the

invalidity of that term of confinement, and his current claims are not barred under
Heck.
The defendants also argue that compared to expected prison conditions, the
fine imposed on DePaola was not an atypical and significant hardship that
triggered federal constitutional protections. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
484 (1995). In the alternative, they argue that because DePaola had adequate postdeprivation remedies under state law, he has no constitutional claim regarding the
fine as a property loss. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). I
reached similar conclusions when I summarily dismissed DePaola’s Complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See DePaola v. Clarke, No. 7:17CV00028, 2017
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WL 2984144, at *5-6 (W.D. Va. July 13, 2017), appeal dismissed and remanded,
708 F. App’x 792 (4th Cir. 2018) (unpublished).1
Nevertheless, in dismissing DePaola’s appeal as a nonfinal order, the court
of appeals did not find these defenses to be determinative of DePaola’s due process
claims. DePaola, 708 F. App’x at 793. Rather, the court of appeals noted that
DePaola might be able to cure the defects in his claims by amending the facts
about the disciplinary proceedings, id., and DePaola has filed an Amended
Complaint. In light of the court of appeals’ findings and remand, I intend to
address the merits of DePaola’s due process claims under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution,
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
In addition to the previously referenced legal defenses, the defendants argue
that they are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of DePaola’s claims. In
so doing, however, they submit extensive evidence that contradicts DePaola’s
allegations in the Amended Complaint. I find that DePaola’s allegations state
potential due process and/or state law claims against one or more of the
defendants, and that the due process principles at issue are clearly established.
Moreover, DePaola requests not only monetary damages, but also injunctive relief
to expunge his disciplinary conviction from his record.
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For these reasons, I

I also found, in the alternative, that DePaola had not alleged any denial of the
limited due process protections required in prison disciplinary proceedings. Id. at *6.
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conclude that a stay of discovery pending a separate ruling only on qualified
immunity is not warranted.
For the reasons stated, it is now ORDERED as follows:
1.

The defendants’ motion to stay discovery (ECF No. 32) is DENIED;

2.

The defendants are DIRECTED to respond within 30 days from entry

of this Opinion and Order, to plaintiff’s discovery requests; and
3.

DePaola is DIRECTED to submit his response to defendants’ motion

for summary judgment within 60 days from entry of this Opinion and Order.
ENTER: July 30, 2018
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge

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