Taylor v. Fleming
Filing
72
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 11/13/2020. (Opinion mailed to Pro Se Party via US Mail)(slt)
Case 7:17-cv-00099-EKD-JCH Document 72 Filed 11/13/20 Page 1 of 5 Pageid#: 286
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
DANIEL TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
LESLIE FLEMING, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Case No. 7:17-cv-00099
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Daniel Taylor, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court previously granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, but it gave
Taylor an additional opportunity to file another amended complaint if he could cure the
identified deficiencies in his last complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 59, 60.) Now pending before the court is
a second motion to dismiss by all defendants (Dkt. No. 66), in which they seek dismissal of
Taylor’s second amended complaint in its entirety, which the court has described as Dkt. No. 61,
as supplemented by Dkt. No. 64. (See Dkt. No. 65.) The court also has considered Taylor’s
response in opposition (Dkt. No. 69). 1 Because Taylor’s second amended complaint still fails to
plausibly state a claim against any defendant under § 1983, the court will grant defendants’
motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Taylor’s second amended complaint names four individuals as defendants: (1) Harold
Clarke, the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”); (2) Leslie Fleming,
the Warden at Wallens Ridge State Prison (“WRSP”), where Taylor was housed at all relevant
1
Taylor’s opposition (Dkt. No. 69) primarily attempts to add additional facts that are not part of his second
amended complaint and are outside the scope of its claims. A party may not amend his pleadings through briefing,
however. S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184–85 (4th
Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the court does not treat those allegations as part of the second amended complaint. See id.
Case 7:17-cv-00099-EKD-JCH Document 72 Filed 11/13/20 Page 2 of 5 Pageid#: 287
times; (3) Craft, a laundry supervisor at WRSP; and (4) Sensabaugh, who also was a laundry
supervisor at WRSP. (Second Am. Compl. 1–2, Dkt. No. 61.)
In his second amended complaint, Taylor alleges that he receives new clothing only once
every twelve months and sometimes less frequently. He also complains that he is given
insufficient “white laundry”—i.e., “only four pairs of socks, four tees and four pairs of boxer
shorts” every twelve months, along with only one pillowcase, one hand towel, and one
washcloth, instead of two of each. (Id. at 3.) He claims that over time, “dirt and grime can be
detected on tees” when returned after being laundered. (Id.) He also complains that laundry is
placed on the same cart with mopheads, although in a plastic bag. (Id. at 3–4.) He alleges that
inmates assigned to the restricted housing unit (“RHU”) are not permitted to keep with them any
thermal top or bottoms they have purchased through the commissary. 2 He complains that the
lack of thermal clothing is problematic because the cells in the RHU are “so cold it’s caused me
to think hypothermia is setting in” and says that on one occasion, “frost from breathing” was
visible. (Id. at 4.) He also alleges that WRSP does not issue scarves or gloves, and that boots
and hats have to be purchased and even those are “slip-on shoes” that do not adequately protect
his feet from snowfall or rainfall. (Id.) He claims that, as a result of these combined conditions,
he has had a “runny nose, minor cough” and “recently,” a “throat irritation.” (Id.)
Taylor alleges “personal involvement” of defendants on the basis that his requests for
laundry have been “ignored during winter months.” (Id. at 5.) He also claims that Clarke and
Warden Fleming “both know of the situation” and contends that they should know from
unspecified paperwork and from policies both that insufficient clothing is being issued and that
2
Taylor includes this allegation both as part of his first claim and as a second, separate claim
2
Case 7:17-cv-00099-EKD-JCH Document 72 Filed 11/13/20 Page 3 of 5 Pageid#: 288
thermal tops and bottoms, even ones previously purchased from the commissary, are not
permitted in the RHU. (Id.)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s legal and factual
sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 554–63 (2007); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In considering
the motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 2014). A
court need not accept as true a complaint’s legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences,
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. Pro se complaints are
afforded a liberal construction. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006).
B. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual living
conditions. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). But “the Constitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons,” id. at 349, and conditions that are “restrictive and even harsh . . .
are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. at 347.
It is well established that “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the
Eighth Amendment.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). To sustain an unconstitutional conditions claim, a prisoner must show
that: (1) objectively, the deprivation was sufficiently serious, in that the challenged, official acts
3
Case 7:17-cv-00099-EKD-JCH Document 72 Filed 11/13/20 Page 4 of 5 Pageid#: 289
caused denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”; and (2) subjectively, the
defendant prison officials acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or
safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations omitted).
To establish the first element, the prisoner must show “significant physical or emotional
harm, or a grave risk of such harm,” resulting from the challenged conditions. Shakka v. Smith,
71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995). To establish the second element of deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant was personally aware of facts indicating a substantial risk
of serious harm and that the defendant must have actually recognized the existence of such a
risk. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838–840; Conner v. Donnelly, 42 F.3d 220, 222 (4th Cir.
1994). The plaintiff also must show that the defendant subjectively recognized that his actions
were inappropriate in light of that risk. Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).
As with the prior version of his complaint, Taylor’s claims in his second amended
complaint fail to state a claim. First of all, it does not appear that Taylor can show a
“significant” harm or grave risk of such harm as a result of having to wear clothing that is not
laundered or replaced as often as he would like, from not being given hats, scarves, and boots, or
from not being permitted to wear thermal tops and bottoms while housed in the RHU, where the
temperatures are cold. As the court noted in its prior opinion, the symptoms Taylor describes—a
runny nose, cough, and throat irritation—are unlikely to satisfy the objective element of an
Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Canada v. Stirling, 2018 WL 6981119, at *5 (D.S.C. Dec.
17, 2018) (recommending grant of summary judgment where plaintiff alleged an Eighth
Amendment claim based on being given only shower shoes to wear and explaining that “alleged
injuries of ‘wet feet’ and ‘coldness’ are not sufficiently serious to justify relief”), report and
4
Case 7:17-cv-00099-EKD-JCH Document 72 Filed 11/13/20 Page 5 of 5 Pageid#: 290
recommendation adopted by Canada v. Stirling, 2019 WL 132869 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2019);
Chance v. Spears, 2009 WL 3768736, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Although plaintiff
makes conclusory assertions about the potential harm that may be wrought without additional
protective clothing, his allegations simply do not rise to the level of extreme deprivation
necessary to state a conditions-of-confinement violation.”).
Even if he had stated a sufficiently serious deprivation, though, Taylor’s claims are
nonetheless subject to dismissal because he has not alleged adequate facts to establish deliberate
indifference on the part of any defendant. In particular, Taylor does not identify any facts to
show that any of the four defendants had knowledge of a substantial risk to him and were
deliberately indifferent to it. Ignoring laundry forms, or being aware of general policies
prohibiting RHU inmates from possessing thermal tops does not show that any defendant was
subjectively aware of a substantial risk to Taylor (or anyone) from the conditions he describes.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Moreover, defendants cannot be liable under the theory of
respondeat superior. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 n.7 (1978).
III. CONCLUSION
Because Taylor’s second amended complaint fails to state a constitutional deprivation
actionable under § 1983, defendants’ motion to dismiss must be granted and Taylor’s complaint
must be dismissed. An appropriate order will be entered.
Entered: November 13, 2020.
/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?