Bratcher v. Virginia Department of Corrections et al

Filing 4

OPINION. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 5/8/2017. (tvt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
JOSEPH BRATCHER,
Plaintiff,
v.
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 7:17CV00175
OPINION
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge

Joseph Bratcher, Pro Se Plaintiff.
The plaintiff, Joseph Bratcher, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Bratcher alleges that the Virginia Department of
Corrections (“VDOC”), a “John Doe” VDOC classification official, and officials at
two VDOC prisons have violated his constitutional rights in various ways in the
last three weeks. After review of the record, I conclude that the complaint must be
summarily dismissed, because Bratcher admits that he failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Bratcher’s lengthy Complaint, signed and dated on April 17, 2017, alleges
that on March 31, 2017, a VDOC classification official retaliated against Bratcher
for past lawsuits by transferring him against the advice of Bratcher’s treating

mental health professionals from Buckingham Correctional Center (“BKCC”) to
St. Brides Correctional Center (“SBCC”). Bratcher also alleges, among other
things, that SBCC officials have failed to provide him with adequate treatment and
accommodation of his mental health needs; access to his legal materials and
adequate legal research facilities; the ability to continue providing legal assistance
to disabled inmates at BKCC; appropriate medication for his migraine headaches;
and assistance in identifying inmates who pose a threat to him. Bratcher has
moved for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction directing
SBCC officials to correct these problems.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), mandates that a
prisoner cannot bring a civil action concerning prison conditions until he has first
exhausted available administrative remedies. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850,
1856 (2016).

Failure to follow the required procedures of the prison’s

administrative remedy process, including time limits, or to exhaust all levels of
administrative review is not “proper exhaustion” and will bar an inmate’s action.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). “A court may sua sponte dismiss a
complaint when the alleged facts in the complaint, taken as true, prove that the
inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d
358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017).

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Bratcher describes the grievance process at BKCC as beginning with “an
Informal Complaint, which is answered by the person involved or responsible.
The next step is a Regular Grievance, which is sent to the Warden for the
Warden’s review.

The final step is to submit an appeal to the Regional

Administrator.” Compl. ¶ ¶ 10-12, ECF No. 1. Bratcher states that while he was at
BKCC, he made “frequent use of the [grievance] system” when he experienced a
problem there. Id. ¶ 9. As to his claims in this case, however, Bratcher states:
“The plaintiff has in good faith began [sic] the process, but the procedure cannot
and will not provide necessary relief. The grievance system is such in name only,
and has never afforded the plaintiff relief, leaving the plaintiff without any real
remedies.” Id. ¶¶ 215-16.
Taking these allegations as true, I can only conclude that Bratcher did not
complete all steps of the prison’s grievance procedure as required under § 1997e(a)
before filing this lawsuit. Instead, Bratcher decided that the procedure did not
offer the relief he himself believed necessary under the circumstances and filed the
lawsuit prematurely, without even attempting to exhaust all levels of the grievance
procedure that he admits had been available to him on prior occasions. The
exhaustion requirement in § 1997e(a) is mandatory, Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1856,
however, and applies to all inmate suits, even if the particular form of relief the
inmate seeks in his lawsuit is not available through the prison’s grievance
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proceedings. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Bratcher does not state
any facts suggesting that the grievance procedures at BKCC and SBCC were
unavailable to him in any respect, or that the procedures did not offer any relief.1
Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859.

Moreover, the timing of the events described in the

Complaint indicates that Bratcher filed the lawsuit before there had been time to
utilize all steps of the grievance procedure.
Because Bratcher’s allegations indicate that he did not exhaust
administrative remedies as to the claims raised in this case before coming to court,
I will summarily dismiss the action without prejudice under § 1997e(a). 2 I will
also dismiss as moot the pending motion seeking interlocutory injunctive relief.

1

I recognize that § 1997e(a) will not bar an inmate’s lawsuit if administrative
remedies are not “available.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1856. In three rare circumstances, a
prison grievance procedure can be considered unavailable for purposes of exhaustion
under § 1997e(a) if: (1) “it operates as a simple dead end — with officers unable or
consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) its “rules are so
confusing that . . . no reasonable prisoner can use them”; or (3) “prison administrators
thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1859-60 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Bratcher does not allege that any of these circumstances prevented
him from utilizing the available administrative remedies.
2

I note that Bratcher’s Complaint also fails to comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governing proper joinder of claims and defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18,
20. He improperly asserts in one lawsuit claims against officials at two different prisons,
concerning completely unrelated events. Moreover, Bratcher is advised that SBCC is
located within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, and any claims concerning events at SBCC are to be filed in that court.
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A separate Order will be entered herewith.
DATED: May 8, 2017
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge

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