Fuller v. Carilion Clinic
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 12 Carilion Clinic's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 10/29/18. (sas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
ROGER S. FULLER, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 7:17CV564
(STAMP)
CARILION CLINIC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
CARILION CLINIC’S MOTION TO DISMISS
I.
Background
This civil action arises out of the arrest of an employee by
an officer of his employer’s private police department.
The
plaintiff, Roger S. Fuller, Jr. (“Fuller”), filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, Roanoke Division, on December 20, 2017.
ECF No. 1.
The
complaint alleges claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
supplemental state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
ECF No. 1.
The defendant, Carilion Clinic, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint (ECF No. 3), and the plaintiff then filed an amended
complaint.
ECF
No.
10.
The
motion
to
dismiss
the
original
complaint was then denied. ECF No. 21. The amended complaint
asserts that the plaintiff was employed by Carilion Clinic as a
janitor and that he was at work when he found three burned, wooden
stick matches and a signed piece of paper near the Carilion Clinic
dentistry lab.
ECF No. 10 at 4.
The amended complaint asserts
that the plaintiff notified the receptionist of what he had found,
and that the Carilion police then arrived to investigate the
incident.
ECF No. 10 at 4.
The Carilion Police and Security
Services Department is a private police department maintained by
Carilion Clinic and authorized by the Virginia General Assembly
(see Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-101).
ECF No. 10 at 2.
The amended complaint then alleges that the Carilion police
came to the plaintiff’s residence the following morning and staged
a “surround and call out,” a swat-style arrest tactic, before
entering the plaintiff’s home and taking him to the Carilion police
station for questioning.
ECF No. 10 at 5-6.
Next, the amended
complaint asserts that the Carilion police coerced the plaintiff
into confessing to lighting the matches.
ECF No. 10 at 6-7.
Lastly, the amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff was
terminated from his employment at Carilion Clinic after he refused
to meet with the Carilion police without counsel present.
10 at 8.
ECF No.
Count I of the amended complaint is a claim for the
unreasonable seizure of the plaintiff’s person by the Carilion
police.
ECF No. 10 at 8.
Count II is a claim for the unreasonable
seizure of the plaintiff’s person by Carilion Clinic.
ECF No. 10
at 12.
ECF No. 10
Count III is a claim for false imprisonment.
at 14. Count IV is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
ECF No. 10 at 17.
2
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint
for failure to state a claim.
ECF No. 13.
memorandum
motion
in
support
of
the
to
In the defendant’s
dismiss
the
amended
complaint, the defendant argues that Counts I and II of the amended
complaint fail to state a claim because Carilion Clinic has no
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the acts of its employed
police officers.
ECF No. 13 at 5.
First, the defendant argues
that respondeat superior is not a basis for § 1983 liability.
No. 13 at 5.
of
Appeals
ECF
The defendant points out that the United States Court
for
the
Fourth
Circuit
has
held
that
a
private
corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of its
private police solely on a theory of respondeat superior.
ECF No.
13 at 6 (citing Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728
(4th Cir. 1999)).
Second, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has not
alleged a specific written policy or custom that led to the actions
by the Carilion police.
ECF No. 13 at 6.
The Supreme Court has
held that for a local government to be held liable under § 1983,
the injury must be the result of a specific policy or custom of
that government.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
The Fourth Circuit has held that
Monell applies to private corporations that employ police officers.
Austin, 195 F.3d at 728.
Thus, the defendant contends that in
order to survive a motion to dismiss, the amended complaint would
3
need to allege a specific policy or custom of Carilion Clinic’s
that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury.
ECF No. 13 at 6.
Third, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has not pled a
state agency relationship. ECF No. 13 at 7. The defendant asserts
that in order for § 1983 liability to apply, the plaintiff here
must show that Carilion Clinic’s police were state actors. ECF No.
13 at 7.
The defendant points out that under United States v. Day,
591 F.3d 679 (4th Cir. 2010), there is a two-factor test to
determine if a state agency relationship exists.
ECF No. 13 at 8.
The Court is to consider “(1) ‘whether the [g]overnment knew of and
acquiesced in the private’ individual’s challenged conduct; and (2)
‘whether the private individual intended to assist law enforcement
or had some other independent motivation.’”
(citations omitted).
Day, 591 F.3d at 683
Because the plaintiff has not alleged any
such relationship, the defendant argues that Counts I and II of the
amended complaint must be dismissed.
ECF No. 13 at 8-9.
Further, the defendant argues that Counts III and IV of the
amended complaint are claims that arise under Virginia state law,
and, as such, if the court dismisses Counts I and II, it should
also dismiss Counts III and IV because there will be no federal
claims pending.
ECF No. 13 at 9 (citing United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are
dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed
as well.”)).
4
The
plaintiff
filed
a
response
in
opposition
defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
to
the
ECF No. 16.
In response, the plaintiff first argues that the amended complaint
does
not
rely
solely
on
a
establish § 1983 liability.
theory
of
respondeat
ECF No. 16 at 2.
superior
to
The plaintiff
contends that Carilion Clinic can incur § 1983 liability for the
decision to arrest Fuller.
ECF No. 16 at 2.
The plaintiff points
out that the Supreme Court has held that a single decision by a
policymaking official can be the basis of liability.
ECF No. 16
at 2; see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)
(“[M]unicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by
municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.”).
The
plaintiff alleges that here, Chief Lugar, the Chief of the Carilion
Police, made the decision to arrest Fuller.
ECF No. 16 at 3.
Second, the plaintiff argues that Day is not the correct test
to determine if the Carilion Clinic acted as a state actor.
No. 16 at 4.
ECF
The plaintiff contends that the instant case is
distinguishable from Day because “there is no third party who is
aiding or assisting the government authority by asserting the
police power.
Carilion is the police power.”
(emphasis in original).
ECF No. 16 at 5
Instead, the plaintiff contends that the
Court should apply the “public function” test under Rodriguez v.
Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 338 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2003).
No. 16 at 4.
ECF
In Rodriguez, the Fourth Circuit held that a private
5
party
is
subject
to
§
1983
when
they
are
acting
under
the
government’s conferral of a power that is traditionally exclusive
to the state, and that the power to arrest is “the function most
commonly associated with the police.”
(citation omitted).
Rodriguez, 338 F.3d at 355
Thus, the plaintiff contends that, under
Rodriguez, Carilion Clinic is a state actor because it has the
power to arrest.
ECF No. 16 at 5.
The plaintiff does not dispute that if Counts I and II are
dismissed, Counts III and IV should also be dismissed.
ECF No. 16
at 5.
The defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff’s response in
opposition.
ECF No. 17.
The defendant argues that, although
Pembaur allowed for liability to be based on a single decision of
a policymaking official, Fuller has not alleged that Carilion
Clinic
created
the
relevant
policymaking authority.
policy
or
that
ECF No. 17 at 1.
Chief
Lugar
had
Thus, the defendant
contends that Counts I and II of the amended complaint fail to
state a claim because they do not allege sufficient facts to
establish that Carilion Clinic is liable under § 1983 for Fuller’s
arrest.
ECF No. 17 at 4.
II.
Applicable Law
In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pled facts
contained in the complaint as true.
6
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc, 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
However, “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and
bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement fail to
constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.”
Id.
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
This
Court
also
declines
to
consider
“unwarranted
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
inferences,
Wahi v. Charleston Area
Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir. 2009).
It has often been said that the purpose of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the
claim for relief; it is not a procedure for resolving a contest
about the facts or the merits of the case.
5B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed.
1998).
The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
Id.
For
purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in
the
light
essentially
most
the
favorable
court’s
to
the
inquiry
party
is
making
directed
the
to
claim
and
whether
the
allegations constitute a statement of a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a).
Id. § 1357.
A complaint should be dismissed “if it does not allege ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
7
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Facial
plausibility is established once the factual content of a complaint
‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Nemet Chevrolet,
591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
Detailed
factual allegations are not required, but the facts alleged must be
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III.
Discussion
A. Any actions by the Carilion Clinic police outside of the real
property owned, leased, or controlled by Carilion Clinic were not
authorized by Virginia Code § 9.1-101. Therefore, such actions
will not be considered in analyzing plaintiff’s § 1983 claim,
because such conduct does not constitute as state action.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him
of his rights under the Constitution or federal law.
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; see also Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 547 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).
“In cases construing [§] 1983, under color of law has been treated
consistently as the equivalent to the state action requirement
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge
Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 341 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing
Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211,
215 (4th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are
two factors that guide state action determinations:
8
[S]tate action requires both an alleged constitutional
deprivation caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the [s]tate or by a person for whom
the [s]tate is responsible and that the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be
said to be a state actor.
Id. (citing American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 50, 119 S. Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Virginia Code § 9.1-101 defines a “private police department”
as:
any police department, other than a department that
employs police agents under the provisions of § 56-353,
that employs private police officers operated by an
entity authorized by statute or an act of assembly to
establish a private police department or such entity’s
successor in interest, provided it complies with the
requirements set forth herein. No entity authorized to
operate a private police department or represent that it
is a private police department unless such entity has
been authorized by statute or an act of assembly or such
entity is the successor in interest of an entity that has
been authorized pursuant to this section, provided it
complies with the requirements set forth herein. The
authority of a private police department shall be limited
to real property owned, leased, or controlled by the
entity and, if approved by the local chief of police or
sheriff, any contiguous property; such authority shall
not supersede the authority, duties, or jurisdiction
vested by law with the local police department or
sheriff’s office including as provided in §§ 15.2-1609
and 15.2-1704 . . .
(emphasis added).
The plaintiff asserts that Carilion police were acting under
color of state law and are recognized as state actors.
at 2.
ECF No. 16
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that Carilion operates a
private police department authorized and established under Virginia
9
Code § 9.1-101.
Id.
However, it is clear that under the Virginia
Code, the incidents listed particularly in paragraphs 18 to 25 of
the amended complaint, alleging actions that the Carilion police
took place outside the premises of Carilion Clinic, would not be
considered actions under “color of state law.”
Therefore, the
defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted as to any liability under
§ 1983 based on any activities by the private police force that
occurred outside of property owned, leased, or controlled by
Carilion Clinic.
The defendant might still be liable on the state
claims asserted in the amended complaint.
B. Assuming without deciding that the Carilion Clinic police force
is a state actor, the plaintiff has presented enough evidence that
the Clinic may be liable under § 1983.
1. The Court will assume, for purposes of the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, that Carilion Clinic is a state actor.
A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the actions of a
private entity should be attributed to the state. Austin, 195 F.3d
at 727-28.
The Supreme Court has specifically left open the
question of whether private police officers may be considered state
actors under § 1983.
Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
163-64 & n.14 (1978). The Fourth Circuit has not decided the issue
presented here - namely whether a private entity may be held liable
for the actions of a private police force that has been provided
certain power under a statute
or ordinance.
However, the Fourth
Circuit has decided that a private corporation could be liable
10
under § 1983 for the actions of a police officer hired as a
security guard.
Austin, 195 F.3d at 727-28.
In analyzing the issue, the Court may turn to other circuits
and districts. Other courts have analyzed the issue by determining
whether the private police force exercise the type of police power
that would subject it to liability as a state actor. See Henderson
v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (3d Cir. 1980); Wade v. Byles, 83
F.3d 902, 904-07 (7th Cir. 1996); Studivent v. Lankford, No.
1:10CV144, 2012 WL 1205722, at *1 n.2 (M.D. N.C. Apr. 11, 2012).
For example, courts have held that if the state cloaks private
individuals with virtually the same power as public police officers
and the private actors allegedly abuse that power to violate the
plaintiff’s civil rights, that plaintiff’s ability to claim relief
under
§
1983
should
be
unaffected.
See
Payton
v.
Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 184 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir.
1999); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975).
The test for determining whether or not a particular private
entity is considered a state actor is extremely fact specific.
Most if not all of the cases that have decided a similar issue to
the one at hand has been after a motion for summary judgment has
been
filed,
Therefore,
rather
this
than
Court
a
will
Rule
12(b)(6)
assume
without
motion
to
deciding
dismiss.
that
the
defendant is a state actor but only for purposes of the defendant’s
11
motion to dismiss.
Further discovery is needed in order to assess
whether or not Carilion Clinic is considered a state actor.
2. Assuming without deciding that Carilion Clinic is a state
actor for purposes of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the
Carilion Clinic may be liable under § 1983 due to the decision, or
alternatively deliberate omission, by the Chief of the Carilion
police force, or other designee in his chain of command, that
allegedly led to a deprivation of plaintiff’s rights.
The
Supreme
Court
has
“consistently
refused
to
hold
municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior.”
Board of County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 402, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
to
§
Monell,
municipality
1983
may
liability
arise
when
against
a
execution
local
of
Pursuant
government
the
or
government’s
unconstitutional policy or custom causes plaintiff’s injury.
See
Walker v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir.
2009). Specifically, the plaintiff must demonstrate the following:
“(1) the municipality [has] actual or constructive knowledge of the
custom and usage by its responsible policymakers, and (2) . . .
failure by those policymakers, as a matter of specific intent or
deliberate indifference, to correct or terminate the improper
custom or usage.”
Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty, Md., 302 F.3d
188, 201 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“municipal
policy
may
be
founded
in
written
ordinances
A
and
regulations or, in certain affirmative decisions of individual
policymaking officials, or in certain omissions on the part of
policymaking officials that manifest deliberate indifference to the
12
rights
of
channels,
citizens.
a
Outside
municipal
custom
of
may
such
arise
formal
is
a
decisionmaking
practice
is
so
persistent and widespread and so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.”
Carter v.
Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 690-91; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84; City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
“The
Supreme Court has recognized that under appropriate circumstances
a municipality may incur § 1983 liability for a single decision of
a policymaking official.”
Austin, 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)).
Moreover, as mentioned previously, the Fourth Circuit has held that
Monell applies to private corporations as well.
Austin, 195 F.3d
at 728.
Carilion Clinic may not be held liable under § 1983 based on
respondeat superior.
However, the plaintiff has alleged that the
Chief of Carilion Police, or his designee in the chain of command,
made a decision to arrest, interrogate, and imprison the plaintiff
and that such a decision amounted to a constitutional deprivation.
ECF No. 16 at 3.
Moreover, the plaintiff argues that such a
decision, or the failure to prevent the events alleged from
occurring,
constitutes
a
single
policymaker with final authority.
13
decision,
Id.
or
omission,
by
a
This Court finds that the
plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to show that Carilion Clinic
may be liable under § 1983 due to the decision, or deliberate
omission, of the Chief, or other designee in his chain of command.
Although further discovery may be needed to show such liability at
trial, or to defeat a motion for summary judgment, for the purpose
of satisfying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the facts alleged
by the plaintiff are sufficient to establish a claim under § 1983.
Therefore, this Court finds that the plaintiff does not fail to
state a claim under § 1983 based on a “policymaking” theory.
Accordingly,
the
defendant’s
motion
to
dismiss
the
amended
complaint is denied with respect to this issue.
3. The Carilion Clinic may be liable under § 1983 due to
exercising powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state.
The Supreme Court has identified three situations in which
particular conduct by a private entity constitutes state action.
The first situation is when there is a “symbiotic relationship,” or
in other words, “a sufficiently close nexus between the [s]tate and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the [s]tate itself.”
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 2785-86,
73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S., 345, 350, 95 S. Ct. 449, 453, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
state
is
responsible
for
the
The question is whether the
specific
14
conduct
of
which
the
plaintiff complains.
Id.
The second situation arises when there
is extensive government regulation of a private entity.
Id.
This
occurs when the state exercises “coercive power or [] provide[s]
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [s]tate.”
Id.
Lastly, and most relevant to the case at hand, is the “public
function” exception, where a “private entity [] exercise[s] powers
that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.”
(citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353, 95 S. Ct. at 454) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Relevant to all three categories is the
level of government funding the private entity receives, although
receipt of state funds alone is insufficient.
Goldstein, 218 F.3d
at 347.
Under the “public function” exception, the relevant question
is not whether a private group is serving a “public function;”
rather, it is whether the function performed has been traditionally
the
exclusive
prerogative
of
the
state.
See
Haavistola
v.
Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 215-16 (4th
Cir. 1993).
It is not enough that a private entity performs a
function which serves the public.
301, 317 (4th Cir. 2001).
Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d
The test is “so carefully confined that
it has been found only in narrow circumstances.”
Id. (citing
Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 348) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A
factor relevant to the state action determination is how the state
15
itself views the entity.
Although not dispositive, if a state
views a private entity as a state actor, this “militates in favor
of [] finding state action.”
Id. at 318 (citing Goldstein, 218
F.3d at 347) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After a finding
that the entity is carrying out functions that are traditionally
and exclusively reserved to the state, no specific demonstration of
a nexus to the alleged constitutional violation is necessary.
Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 347.
The plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff was placed under
arrest by individuals with full law enforcement authority. ECF No.
16 at 5.
following
The plaintiff states that the Court should consider the
factors:
(1)
the
time,
place,
and
purpose
of
the
encounter; (2) the words used by the officer; (3) the presence of
multiple officers; (4) the display of a weapon; and (5) physical
contact with the plaintiff.
Id. (citing United States v. Weaver,
282 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2002)).
The plaintiff argues that
“[g]iven the public function test; Virginia’s view of the Carilion
Police Department; the plenary police power the state has vested in
the Carilion Police Department; the totality of the circumstances
regarding
Fuller’s
arrest
and
the
rights
of
the
individual
protected by § 1983, the Court should find that Carilion is a state
actor for the purposes of § 1983.”
Id.
This Court finds that the
plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to show that Carilion Clinic
may be liable under § 1983 under the “public function” exception.
16
Although further discovery may be needed to show liability based on
such a theory at trial, or to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
for the purpose of satisfying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
the facts alleged by the plaintiff are sufficient to establish a
claim under § 1983. Therefore, this Court finds that the plaintiff
does not fail to state a claim under § 1983 based on the “public
function”
exception.
Accordingly,
the
defendant’s
motion
to
dismiss is denied with respect to this issue.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Carilion Clinic’s motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The
motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to any liability under § 1983 based
on: (1) any activities by the private police force that occurred
outside of property owned, leased, or controlled by Carilion
Clinic; and (2) liability based on respondeat superior. The motion
to dismiss is DENIED as to any liability under § 1983 based on: (1)
a “policymaking” theory; and (2) the “public function” exception.
Further discovery regarding these issues and as to whether Carilion
Clinic is a state actor under claims for acts not outside of
defendant’s property is warranted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
17
DATED:
October 29, 2018
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
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