Wood v. McGlauphlin

Filing 10

OPINION. Signed by Judge James P. Jones on 6/11/2018. (tvt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
DAVID DEAN WOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
McGLAUPHLIN,
Defendant.

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Case No. 7:18CV00106
OPINION
By: James P. Jones
United States District Judge

David Dean Wood, Pro Se Plaintiff.
David Dean Wood, a Virginia jail inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that when he was attacked by three other
inmates, the two guards who were escorting him ran away, leaving him to be
punched and kicked by the inmates. Upon review of the record, I find that the
action must be summarily dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), the court may dismiss any § 1983 action
“with respect to prison conditions . . . if the court is satisfied that the action is
frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Section 1983 permits an aggrieved party to file a civil action against a person for
actions taken under color of state law that violated his constitutional rights. See
Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013). To hold an official liable

under § 1983, the plaintiff must state facts that affirmatively show how the official
acted personally to deprive him of constitutional rights. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550
F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977). Wood’s Complaint names a guard, McGlauphlin, as
a defendant and seeks monetary damages. Wood does not describe any action this
individual personally took in violation of Wood’s constitutional rights, however.
Thus, Wood states no claim actionable under § 1983 against McGlauphlin.
Wood’s allegations in general also fail to state a constitutional claim against
anyone.
The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but
neither does it permit inhumane ones. Prisons house persons with
demonstrated proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often violent,
conduct, and at the same time strips inmates of virtually every means
of self-protection. The government and its officials are not free to let
the state of nature take its course, and gratuitously allowing the
beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate
penological objective.
Prison officials are, therefore, obligated to take reasonable
measures to guarantee inmate safety. In particular, prison officials
have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.
That being said, not every injury suffered by a prisoner at the
hands of another translates into constitutional liability for prison
officials responsible for the victim’s safety. Rather, liability attaches
only when two requirements are met. First, a prison official’s act or
omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities. For a claim based on a failure to prevent harm, the
plaintiff must show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.

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Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 132-33 (4th Cir. 2015). 1 In this case, Wood
must show, objectively, that he has suffered a “significant physical or emotional
harm” as a result of the hazardous condition at issue. Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d
162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995). Wood makes no such showing. He does not allege facts
showing that he suffered any significant injury from the incident described in his
Complaint.
The second requirement in the constitutional standard is to show that,
subjectively, the defendant official knew facts indicating a substantial risk of
serious harm, recognized the existence and seriousness of that risk, and failed to
respond reasonably to alleviate it. Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133-34. While prison
officials are constitutionally “obligated to take reasonable measures to guarantee
inmate safety” against attacks from other inmates, they cannot be liable under
§ 1983 for failing to prevent such an attack through mere inadvertence or
negligence. Id. at 132. Wood alleges that the inmate attackers should have been
locked in their cells while he was being escorted through the area. Without more,
this allegation suggests merely negligent oversight, which does not support a
constitutional claim against anyone.
While theoretically Wood might be able to plead additional facts in order to
overcome the deficiencies in his case as noted above, prison officials “may be
1

I have omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations here and
throughout this opinion, unless otherwise noted.
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found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm
ultimately was not averted.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994). Based
on Wood’s description of the events, the escorting guards did not respond
unreasonably to the circumstances by running for help when they were
outnumbered by attackers.
For the stated reasons, I am satisfied that Wood cannot state facts consistent
with his allegations that will support an actionable § 1983 claim against anyone.
Accordingly, I will dismiss this civil action with prejudice under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c)(1). An appropriate order will enter this day.
DATED: June 11, 2018
/s/ James P. Jones
United States District Judge

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