McClenney v. Meadows
Filing
78
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Michael F. Urbanski on 11/25/20. (mka)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
DANIEL RASHEEM MCCLENNY,
)
)
Plaintiff
) Civil Action No. 7:18-CV-221
v.
)
)
OFFICER STEVEN WAYNE MEADOWS, ) By: Hon. Michael F. Urbanski
) Chief United States District Judge
Defendants
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on defendant Officer Steven Wayne Meadows’
(“Officer Meadows”) motion in limine to exclude evidence of a subsequent incident of claimed
excessive force. ECF No. 40. Plaintiff Daniel Rasheem McClenny opposed the motion. ECF
No. 51. The court heard argument on August 14, 2020 and took the motion under advisement,
pending production of documents pertaining to the allegations and supplemental briefing on
the matter. ECF No. 68. Meadows filed his supplemental brief on November 2, 2020, and
attached reports related to the excessive force allegations as exhibits. ECF Nos. 73, 75, and
76. McClenny’s supplemental brief was docketed on November 24, 2020. ECF No. 77. The
matter is ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in
PART Meadows’ motion in limine. Balancing the factors under Federal Rules of Evidence
404(b) and 403, the court concludes that McClenny may introduce the evidence concerning
the facts of an August 7, 2018 incident concerning inmate Jason Byrns (hereinafter referred to
as the “Byrns incident”), but may not mention to the jury the subsequent Grayson County
indictment and the dismissal thereof.
In sum, the court finds the evidence to be relevant to the issues of intent and whether
the injuries sustained by McClenny were accidental. The reliability of this evidence is manifest
from the Report of Investigation prepared by Johnny R. Acosta, Master Special Agent, Virginia
Department of Corrections. As the court will give appropriate limiting instructions explaining
the narrow purpose for which this evidence may be considered, the court does not find that
its probative value is substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice or confusion of the
issues. See United States v. Cowden, 882 F. 3d 464 (4th Cir. 2018). However, the court will
not permit mention of the indictment filed following the Byrns incident as the court finds the
fact of a prosecution which was later dismissed not to be probative of any issue in this case.
I.
McClenny brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining of an incident that
occurred at River North Correctional Center (“RNCC”). He claims that on January 4, 2018,
Officer Meadows violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force in restraining
in him following a fight between inmates in a prison pod. ECF No. 1, at 3. McClenny claims
he suffered two fractures and severe angulation of his fingers due to the excessive force. Id.
For his part, Officer Meadows claims he applied the authorized key lock restraint technique
without using excessive force and denies breaking any fingers in the process. ECF No. 20, at
4. McClenny filed this lawsuit on May 17, 2018. ECF No. 1.
On February 10, 2020, Officer Meadows filed the motion in limine at issue, seeking to
exclude at trial excessive force allegations subsequently made against him. Meadows Mot. in
Limine, ECF No. 40. Specifically, Officer Meadows seeks to exclude an alleged instance of
excessive force that occurred on August 7, 2018, approximately eight (8) months after the
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incident at suit. In the August 7, 2018, incident, Officer Meadows was accused of using
excessive force on a different inmate, Jason Byrns, resulting in injuries to Byrns’ shoulder. On
July 26, 2019, Officer Meadows was indicted in the Circuit Court of Grayson County for
malicious wounding in violation of Virginia Code §18.2-51. On January 24, 2020, the
indictment was dismissed by order of nolle prosequi. Mem. in Support of Mot. in Limine,
ECF No. 41, at 2. Officer Meadows argues that this evidence should be excluded under
Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) Rules 401 and 4021 as irrelevant because the circumstances
were dissimilar, Rule 404(b) 2 as improper character evidence, and Rule 403 3 as unduly
prejudicial because the allegations are unreliable. Id., at 1. McClenny opposed the motion,
arguing that the allegations are admissible as probative of Officer Meadows’ intent and lack of
accident.
The court heard argument on Officer Meadows’ motion in limine on August 14, 2020
and issued a Memorandum Opinion on September 25, 2020. In its opinion, the court noted
1
Fed. R. Evid. 401: Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.
Fed. R. Evid. 402: Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.
2
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b): (b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence
of mistake, or lack of accident. On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor
intends to offer at trial; and
(B) do so before trial — or during trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial
notice.
3
Fed. R. Evid. 403: The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
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that “[c]redible evidence that a correctional officer exceeded the bounds of permissible force
against an inmate a second time is relevant to an excessive force claim, regardless of the
specific restraint technique used or injuries sustained.” Mem. Op., ECF No. 67, at 4. Further,
the court found that McClenny did not seek to introduce the allegations for the purpose of
attacking Officer Meadows’ character. Id. at 5. If substantiated, the allegations would be
probative evidence of intent and lack of accident. However, the court noted that “[w]hile the
allegations may be admissible even if the prosecution was dismissed and Officer Meadows was
not convicted, the court cannot admit the vague allegation without additional documentation
supporting its veracity” under FRE Rule 403. Id. at 6. In its order and opinion, the court
indicated it would rule on the motion in limine once written documentation concerning the
Byrns incident was produced and evaluated. The court directed the parties to file supplemental
briefs following review of reports regarding the Byrns incident. ECF No. 68.
Officer Meadows filed his supplemental brief on November 3, arguing that the
documents related to the allegations support his motion to exclude the evidence. ECF No. 73.
Specifically, he claims that “[p]laintiff should still not be permitted to admit evidence of this
subsequent allegation of excessive force because the allegation is unreliable, not credible, and
not proven.” He contends that “[n]othing in the report or any other document demonstrates
that Meadows actually engaged in the conduct for which he was accused.” Moreover, Officer
Meadows argued that the bulk of the allegations and the primary focus of the ensuing
investigation focused on the conduct of Sergeant Michael Duane Dean (“Sergeant Dean”), the
other correctional officer involved in the incident. Therefore, Officer Meadows argues, even
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if the allegations were reliable, their probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice to him.
McClenny argues that the Byrns incident is relevant to Meadows’ intent and lack of
accident regarding the injuries suffered by McClenny. McClenny notes similarity in the two
episodes, each involving injuries to restrained inmates, and their close proximity in time.
II.
The court finds a review of the documents related to the subsequent allegations of
excessive force instructive. In response to the court’s order following the August 14, 2020
hearing, Meadows produced a report prepared by Johnny R. Acosta, a Virginia Department
of Corrections Master Special Agent (“Agent Acosta”), who investigated the allegations that
Sergeant Dean and Officer Meadows used excessive force on inmate Byrns at RNCC on
August 7, 2018. ECF No. 76, at 2.
The series of events was instigated by a rumor that Byrns had threatened to harm a
female member of the Medical Department at RNCC. Id. at 3. Corrections Lieutenant King
P. King (“Lieutenant King”) allegedly directed Sergeant Dean to escort Byrns to the Restrictive
Housing Unit (“RHU”) pending further investigation into the matter. Id. Officer Meadows
accompanied Sergeant Burns.
Upon arriving at Byrns’ cell, Sergeant Dean did not request that Bryns step out of the
cell into the view of the surveillance cameras, as required by protocol, but instead entered the
cell and ordered Byrns’ cellmate to leave. Id. When asked why he did not follow protocol in
entering the cell to restrain Byrns, Sergeant Dean stated he “had established rapport with
Byrns” and “did not believe that there would be any problems.” Id.
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In response to inquiries by Agent Acosta, Byrns and the correctional officers offered
strikingly differing accounts of the ensuing events. Sergeant Dean claimed that as soon as his
cellmate left, Byrns struck him on the left part of his chest with an open hand. Id. at 6. Sergeant
Dean states that he attempted to take Byrns to the floor using a “Tinkle Technique,” but that
instead Byrns fell backwards into the corner of the cell. Id. He states that Byrns fell to the
floor and was rolling around to resist restraint when Sergeant Dean called for back up from
Officer Meadows, who then entered the cell to help restrain Burns. Id. Sergeant Deans stated
that Officer Lundy assisted by restraining Byrns’ legs.
Officer Meadows claims that upon entering the cell, Sergeant Dean asked Byrns to turn
around so that he could be handcuffed. After Sergeant Dean told Byrns that he was being
escorted to segregation, Byrns assaulted Sergeant Dean. As a result of Bryns’ assault, Officer
Meadows stated that “they needed to take Byrns to the ground so no one got hurt.” Id.
In contrast to the accounts of Sergeant Dean and Officer Meadows, Byrns claims that
after he acceded to the officers’ request to turn around, his head was slammed into the back
corner of his cell, resulting in injury. Id. at 3. Byrns claims that both Sergeant Dean and Officer
Meadows “got on top of him and started punching him…in the back of the head and ribs.”
Id. He states that during the assault, they made a remark about the alleged threat Byrns made
to a female member of the medical staff. Id. Both officers deny ever punching, kicking, or
using any other unnecessary force against Byrns. Id. at 7, 9. Officer Lundy, the only other
officer in the vicinity for the beginning of the incident, told Agent Acosta that he did not see
the actual altercation as he was outside the cell watching the cellmate. Id. at 12-13.
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After Sergeant Dean and Officer Meadows restrained Byrns with handcuffs and leg
irons, they escorted him out of the cell to the RHU using the key lock technique. Id. at 6. They
both claim that Byrns resisted the escort, straightening his legs stiffly and pushing backwards
against the officers to hinder walking, which prompted Lieutenant King to urge Byrns to calm
down. Id. at 6, 8. They claim that Byrns continued resisting the escort, which forced them to
place Byrns on the ground “for his safety and the safety of other staff.” Id. at 6, 8.
Byrns denies intentionally resisting the escort, claiming that while he was walking his
pants fell to his ankles, which prevented movement and provoked Sergeant Dean and Officer
Meadows to push him to the ground and grab his throat. Id. at 4. Byrns alleges the rough
takedown caused three fractures, one requiring surgery. Id. at 4, 7. Officers Glenn and Lundy
recall Byrns resisting the escort before the takedown. Id. at 13-14.
After the takedown, Lieutenant King directed Sergeant Dean and Officer Meadows to
seek medical attention, and recalled visible scratches on both of their hands. Id. at 8, 11. Other
officers escorted Byrns to RHU, where he was photographed by Corrections Lieutenant Jason
C. Higgins (“Lieutenant Higgins”). Id. at 4. Agent Acosta noted that these photos show “red
marks about Byrns’ face and head and right shoulder” but that there were no photos of Byrns
without his shirt to capture the alleged injuries to his chest and arms. Id.
On August 13, 2018, a few days after the incident, Corrections Lieutenant Jamin B.
Robinson (“Lieutenant Robinson”) photographed Byrns without his shirt. Id. at 17. He claims
Byrns requested photos be taken because his body displayed severe bruising. Id. Lieutenant
Robinson told Agent Acosta that the photos did in fact show “very heavy bruising” to Byrns’
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chest and shoulder. These photographs are missing, and efforts to locate them have been
unsuccessful. Id. at 4.
Agent Acosta took photographs of Byrns during his interview on August 16, 2018,
which his report states show bruising to Byrns’ neck, chest, shoulders, feet, toes, and right
ankle. Id. Agent Acosta’s report indicates that the photographs also show abrasions to the
top and back of Byrns’ head and wrists. Id.
Upon questioning, Sergeant Dean attributed Byrns’ multitude of injuries to his “rolling
around on the floor or when he was taken to the ground on the outside walkway.” Id. at 7.
Sergeant Dean reported to Agent Acosta that he believed Byrns’ shoulder fracture occurred
during the takedown on the walkway to the RHU. Id. He pointed out that he was on Byrns’
right side, but that Officer Meadows was on Byrns’ left side, the side that was fractured. Id.
Officer Meadows claims he is not aware of any injury to Byrns’ shoulder and did not hear
Byrns complain of pain. Id. at 9.
Agent Acosta’s report describes photographs taken by the Medical Department
depicting a wound on Sergeant Dean’s middle fist knuckle on his right hand and elbow. The
photographs also show a red mark on Sergeant Dean’s chest, which he attributes to the alleged
first blow Byrns made in the cell. Id. at 3.
III.
Officer Meadows argues that the report demonstrates that the allegations of excessive
force in the Byrns incident are unreliable and that his involvement in the incident was merely
tangential. The court disagrees, finding the detailed investigative report by Agent Acosta
assures adequate reliability, that Meadows was directly involved in the takedown as to which
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Byrns claimed injury, and that the two episodes are sufficiently similar and close in time to be
relevant to issues of intent and lack of accident.
The court finds that the allegations do not constitute impermissible character evidence.
Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Such evidence, however, may “be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
Id. Furthermore, “to be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be (1) relevant to an
issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d
306, 317 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1087 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 404(b) is “an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that
which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 271–
72 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, “[a]s a rule of inclusion, the rule's
list is not exhaustive.” United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994–95 (4th Cir. 1997).
The court finds that the allegations implicate Officer Meadows in the intentional use
of excessive force against an inmate. If believed by the jury, the evidence could support a
showing of intent in Officer Meadows’ alleged use of force against McClenny and lack of
accident. As such, this evidence does not run afoul of the prohibition of character evidence in
Rule 404(b). In Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 380 (4th Cir. 1993), the Fourth Circuit reversed
and remanded an excessive force case in part because of the district court’s failure to admit a
prior incident under Rule 404(b), holding that “[b]oth intent and lack of mistake are proper
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purposes for admission of prior acts under Rule 404(b).” Id. at 381. Likewise, in Thorne v.
Wise, 47 F. 3d 165 (table), 1995 WL 56652, *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 1995), the court held:
We have characterized Rule 404(b) as “an ‘inclusionary rule,’
which permits the introduction of all relevant acts except those
that prove only character.” Kopf, 993 F.2d at 380. In this case, the
Troopers suggested that Thorne’s injuries were accidental. The
fact that the Troopers have a history of inflicting pain and
punishment upon arrestees was unquestionably helpful to the
jury in assisting it in determining whether Thorne’s injuries were
in fact accidental, as the Trooper’s suggested. Because the
evidence was not admitted to prove only character we hold that,
in this case, it was admissible under Rule 404(b).
However, the court recognizes that the allegations did not lead to a conviction,
disciplinary action, or other form of conclusion that Sergeant Dean and Officer Meadows
were guilty of impermissible behavior. Therefore, the court must evaluate the reliability of the
evidence. Evidence is reliable unless “it could not be believed by a rational and properly
instructed juror.” United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence of prior bad acts is reliable if a jury could
reasonably find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the act was committed by the
defendant. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988); United States v. Hadaway,
681 F.2d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 1982). In assessing this “minimal standard of proof,” the court
must consider all potential evidence, as “the sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be
greater than its constituent parts.” United States v. Mussmacher, No. 09-cr-0169, 2010 WL
2292214, at *5 (D. Md. June 3, 2010) (quoting Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690).
The court finds the allegations plainly meet the evidentiary standard for reliability,
particularly given the detailed investigation conducted by Agent Acosta. The court recognizes
that evidence as to the Byrns’ episode will have to be proscribed so that it does not
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predominate over the claim of excessive force by McClenny to be decided by the jury. United
States v. Cowden, No. 5:16CR24, 2016 WL 5794763, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 4, 2016), aff'd,
882 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding disputed allegations admissible despite the slight risk of
a “‘mini-trial’ within the trial” because they are supported by direct testimony). As noted, the
court will provide appropriate limiting instructions explaining the narrow purpose for the
admission of evidence regarding the Byrns’ incident.
Officer Meadows argues that even if the allegations are found reliable, their admission
is barred because the facts are sufficiently dissimilar. “The more similar the prior act is (in
terms of physical similarity or mental state) to the act being proved, the more relevant it
becomes.” Queen, 132 F.3d at 997; see also Helsabeck v. Fabyanic, 173 F. App'x 251, 257 (4th
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (upholding the district court's exclusion of 404(b) evidence in an
excessive force case where the facts were not sufficiently similar). Specific act evidence must
also pass muster under FRE 403, which considers, among other things, whether the alleged
prior act is too remote in time. Kelly, 510 F.3d at 437. In both the Byrns and McClenny
incidents, Officer Meadows was called upon to restrain an inmate and employed the key lock
restraint technique. In each case, the inmates claim to have been injured during the restraint
process. These incidents occurred approximately eight months apart. The court finds them
sufficiently similar in time and substance to be admissible.
Finally, Officer Meadows seeks exclusion of the allegation on the basis that his
involvement in the Byrns incident was minimal, and so the prejudicial effect of involvement
in the incident far outweighs any probative value. “Rule 403 provides a more limited bar to
otherwise admissible evidence.” United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 326 (4th Cir. 2009).
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Under this rule, “damage to a defendant’s case is not a basis for excluding probative evidence,”
because “[e]vidence that is highly probative invariably will be prejudicial to the defense.”
United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 833 (4th Cir. 1998). Rule 403 “only requires
suppression of evidence that results in unfair prejudice—prejudice that damages an opponent
for reasons other than its probative value, for instance, an appeal to emotion, and only when
that unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” United
States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619–20 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Unfair prejudice “speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the
factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
The court finds that the basis for potential prejudice from the introduction of evidence
of the Byrns incident directly stems from its value as probative evidence. “[A]lthough the ‘bad
act’ evidence unquestionably was prejudicial to [defendant], this evidence also provided
significant information about [defendant]'s actions when dealing with individuals he perceived
as manifesting resistance to law enforcement authority.” Cowden, 882 F.3d at 473. Although
Officer Meadows served in a supporting role to Sergeant Dean, the allegations specifically
identify him as involved in the assault on Byrns in his cell and the forceful takedown of Byrns
in the walkway. In restraining both Byrns and McClenny, Officer Meadows employed the key
lock restraint technique, and in each case, the inmate claims that the force used to implement
the restraint was excessive, resulting in injury.
In sum, and applying the four-factor test for admission of prior “bad act” evidence
noted in Cowden, 882 F. 3d at 472, the court concludes that the evidence at to the Byrns
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incident (1) is relevant given the similarity of the Byrns and McClenny events and their close
proximity in time; (2) is probative as to the issues of intent and lack of accident and is not
offered to establish the general character of the defendant; (3) is reliable as evident from Agent
Acosta’s investigative report; and (4) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by
confusion or unfair prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate reason to emotion in
the factfinding process. Again, the court will provide appropriate limiting instructions.
Accordingly, the court DENIES in PART Officer Meadows’ motion in limine, ECF
No. 40, finding the Byrns incident to be thoroughly investigated and sufficiently reliable.
Officer Meadows was directly involved in restraining inmates in each incident using the same
key lock technique, resulting in claimed injuries. The incidents are close enough in time and
character to be probative as to intent and lack of accident. As such, facts surrounding Officer
Meadows’ involvement in the Byrn incident may be admitted for these narrow purposes with
appropriate limiting instructions. However, Officer Meadows’ motion is GRANTED in
PART, as McClenny may not mention to the jury or introduce evidence that Meadows was
charged with a crime, which was later dismissed, arising out of the Byrns incident.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Entered: November 25, 2020
Michael F. Urbanski
Chief U.S. District Judge
2020.11.25 16:36:51 -05'00'
Michael F. Urbanski
Chief United States District Judge
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