Chenevert v. Kanode et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 36 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 7/29/2022. (Opinion and Order mailed to Pro Se Party via US Mail)(aab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
PAUL ANTHONY CHENEVERT,
Plaintiff,
v.
B.L. KANODE, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 7:21-cv-00562
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is plaintiff Paul Anthony Chenevert’s motion for preliminary
injunction (Dkt. No. 36), to which defendants have responded (Dkt. No. 38). Chenevert’s
motion must be denied because it seeks relief against non-defendants and is based on allegations
that are unrelated to the claims and the relief sought in his complaint. Additionally, he has failed
to show a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. For these reasons, set
forth in more detail herein, his motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The operative complaint in this case is Chenevert’s second amended complaint. (Dkt.
No. 27.) In it, he sets forth various allegations, all based on events that took place at River North
Correctional Center (“River North”). Nearly all the defendants are persons who work at that
facility. His primary claim is that he was denied access to the law library on different dates and
by different defendants. He also contends that his legal mail was read on several occasions and
was confiscated, allegedly in order to “verify the sender.” He further claims that he was
threatened with the use of a canine if he did not withdraw grievances he had filed. (See
generally Dkt. No. 27.)

Chenevert has since been transferred to Wallens Ridge State Prison (“Wallens Ridge”).
In his motion for preliminary injunction, he complains that Wallens Ridge has a policy denying
prisoners physical access to the law library. He notes that he is only able to obtain “cell
delivery” of research materials. Because he is not in segregation, he believes he should be
permitted regular access, and he contends that the restrictions are creating unconstitutional
conditions. (Pl.’s Decl. & Mem. of Law at 1, Dkt. No. 36-1.) Chenevert asks that the court issue
an injunction requiring “that he be permitted to visit the law library in person at least four hours
per week.” (Id.) He states that he will not be able to adequately prosecute his current lawsuit
without the injunction he seeks. (Id. at 3.)
Defendants oppose Chenevert’s motion, primarily on the ground that he is seeking
injunctive relief arising from events at a different facility and that is unrelated to his claims in
this suit.
II. DISCUSSION
Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary” remedy that courts should grant only
“sparingly.” See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir.
1991). The party seeking the preliminary injunction must demonstrate that: (1) he is likely to
succeed on the merits at trial; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the
public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 22 (2008); League of
Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 249 (4th Cir. 2014). The remedy may
be granted only on a “clear showing” of entitlement to relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
Important here, a preliminary injunction is not appropriate when the harm complained of
does not arise from the harm alleged in the complaint. Omega World Travel v. TWA, 111 F.3d

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14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997). The movant thus must establish a relationship between the injury claimed
in the motion and the conduct giving rise to the complaint. Id.; see In re Microsoft Antitrust
Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2003). “[A] preliminary injunction may never issue to prevent
an injury or harm which not even the moving party contends was caused by the wrong claimed in
the underlying action.” Omega World Travel, 111 F.3d at 16; see Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d
470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994).
Applying those standards, the court concludes that Chenevert’s motion must be denied.
First, he seeks relief presumably against non-defendants, as nearly all of the defendants he names
are personnel at River North, while the injunction would be imposed against personnel at
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Wallens Ridge. The court may not grant injunctive relief against individuals over whom it does
not have jurisdiction. Nor does Chenevert allege that staff at Wallens Ridge “are in active
concert or participation” with any party or its agents, employees, or attorneys, so as to permit an
order to bind them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d)(2) (explaining who may be bound by an
injunction).

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The court acknowledges that several of the defendants in this case are VDOC personnel who are not
assigned to a particular prison. Specifically, Chenevert names defendants Clarke, Robinson, Walters, and Richeson,
describing them as persons employed at VDOC’s Richmond offices and who failed to take “disciplinary action or
other action to curb” the “pattern of atrocious civil rights violations being committed against plaintiff by the [River
North] staff (defendants herein).” (Second Am. Compl. 85, Dkt. No. 27.) But to the extent the injunctive relief
could be directed at them to alter the policy at Wallens Ridge, Chenevert is not entitled to that relief because he has
not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims against any of these individuals. Among other reasons,
Chenevert fails to allege any personal involvement whatsoever by Robinson, Walters, or Richeson. See Wilcox v.
Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that liability will lie under § 1983 only “where it is
affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally” in the violation of plaintiff’s rights and affirming
dismissal of claim where plaintiff did not allege personal involvement by defendant) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs,
550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Likewise, his claims against Clarke rely on his allegation that his mother
contacted Clarke “regarding plaintiff being denied access to the law library and also concerning the unlawful
confiscation of his legal correspondence.” (2nd Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 76.) The fact that a supervisor has knowledge
of an alleged violation, without more, does not state a constitutional claim. Cf. id. Nor has Chenevert alleged facts
sufficient to hold any of these defendants liable under a theory of supervisory liability. See Wilkins v. Montgomery,
751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (setting forth elements to establish such liability).

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Chenevert’s motion is also subject to dismissal because it asks for relief that is unrelated
to his underlying claims, in violation of the principles set forth in Omega World Travel. If
Chenevert believes that the limitations on his law library access or interference with his mail at
Wallens Ridge has violated his constitutional rights, he may assert such a claim in a separate
lawsuit, after first exhausting his administrative remedies. But that claim is not before the court,
and the harm claimed in his current motion is not “caused by the wrong claimed in the
underlying action.” See Omega World Travel, 111 F.3d at 16. Thus, the injunctive relief he
seeks is not related to the claims in this lawsuit, and the court may not grant it. See id.
The court further notes that Chenevert has not shown that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of an injunction. First of all, he admits that he can obtain legal materials
from the law library, and he has been able to prosecute this case thus far. He has already
responded to the motion to dismiss, and his response included citations to a number of cases and
other legal authority. Second, there is nothing else he needs to research or file at this point in the
case. Thus, a lack of access to the library is not likely to cause him irreparable harm. Lastly, if
he needs additional, reasonable extensions to conduct any future legal research or to prepare any
future filing, he may ask for them.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Chenevert’s motion for preliminary
injunction (Dkt. No. 36) is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this order to the
parties.
Entered: July 29, 2022.

/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon
United States District Judge
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