Williams v. Gilbert et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief District Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 3/6/2025. (Opinion mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(jv)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
ALUCIOUS WILLIAMS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
LT. FLEMING, et al.,
Defendants.

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March 06, 2025

LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK
BY: s/J.Vasquez

Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-00671
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
Chief United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Alucious Williams, Jr., a prisoner acting pro se, brought a lawsuit alleging
violations of his constitutional rights during his incarceration at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP).
That suit was severed into several actions, including this one. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Before the court is
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Williams did not exhaust his
administrative remedies. (Dkt. No. 29.) Williams was granted an extension of time to respond
(Dkt. No. 33), but his second motion for an extension was denied for lack of excusable neglect
(Dkt. No. 36). Thus, plaintiff has not filed any response.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be
granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Claims
Williams’ verified complaint names several defendants, including Lt. Fleming, Sgt.
Jones, Sgt. Little, and Sgt. Bentley. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Williams brought a variety of claims,
including that these four defendants placed him in four-point restraints in a cold cell saturated
with mace for nearly two days in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Compl. ¶ 52.)

Williams alleges that the incident began at approximately 7:45 p.m. on February 1, 2021.
Williams was upset because he did not receive a certified mail receipt for money he had sent out
a few days earlier. To show his displeasure, he “squirted a liquid substance” out of his cell, and
it landed on a correctional officer. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Defendants Little, Jones, and Bentley were
called to his cell and attempted to coerce Williams to do a “cell extraction.” (Id. ¶ 34.) When
Fleming showed up, Williams told him why he was upset. Williams was then removed from his
cell and escorted by these defendants to the sallyport. He does not allege any excessive force
occurred during the transport, although he states that defendants “huddled around [him] in an
intimidating manner.” (Id. ¶ 36.)
Williams does not allege that he saw them do so or explain how he knows, but Williams
submits that Jones, Little, and Bentley sprayed mace on the bunk, sink, toilet, and floor of the
cell where he was going to be housed. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 52.) Because of the “heavy stench of the
mace,” he could barely breathe. (Id. ¶ 40.) He “began to cough, choke, and sneeze over a fourhour period, and his only relief came when he used the sink to rinse out [his] nostrils.” (Id.)
After he was confined, Fleming told Williams that he would be in restraints for 48 hours.
Fleming also told Williams that he was a “crooked cop” and that Williams had “f**ked with the
wrong shift.” (Id. ¶ 41.)
During rounds that evening and the next morning, Little refused to speak to Williams on
one round, and when Williams expressed his concerns about officers conspiring with inmates to
steal from him, Bentley responded, “‘All of my people are solid’ with a racist undertone.” (Id. ¶
44.) He also alleges that to “demoralize” him on February 2, he was denied eating utensils at all
three meals. Also on February 2, 2021, throughout the day, Williams asked defendants Phipps
and Woods and several other officers to remove him from the restraints. He was told, however,

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that per Lt. Fleming’s order, he was supposed to be left in restraints until Fleming’s shift came
in. (Id.) He does not allege that he complained to them about being uncomfortable or in pain.
(Id. ¶¶ 45–47.)
On July 21, 2023, the court dismissed all of Williams’ claims except for his Eighth
Amendment claims against Fleming, Jones, Little, and Bentley. (Dkt. Nos. 9, 10.)
B. Facts in Support of Defendants’ Motion
In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants filed the declaration of T.
Still, the grievance coordinator responsible for maintaining grievance files at Red Onion. (Still
Decl. ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 30-1.)
Virginia Department of Corrections Operating Procedure (OP) 866.1, the VDOC
Offender Grievance Procedure, provides an administrative process for resolving inmate issues
and complaints. (Still Decl. ¶ 4, Encl. A.) Inmates are oriented to the Offender Grievance
Procedure when they are initially received into the VDOC, as well as each time they are
transferred to a different facility. According to VDOC records, Williams attended an orientation
session and received information on the procedure on October 31, 2017. (Id. ¶ 5, Encl. B.)
Under OP 866.1, an inmate must first try to resolve his issue informally, orally and then
in writing by submitting a Written Complaint, which must be submitted within 15 days of the
original incident. If the inmate is not satisfied with the result of the informal process or if staff
fail to provide a written response to the Written Complaint within 15 days, the inmate may
escalate his issue by submitting a Regular Grievance. A Regular Grievance must be submitted
within 30 days of the original incident. (Id. ¶¶ 6–8.)
To be accepted, a Regular Grievance must comply with the requirements of OP 866.1. If
a Regular Grievance is accepted at intake, the Facility Unit Head of the Assistant Facility Unit

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Head responds at Level I of the review process. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Level I
decision, he may appeal the determination to Level II. For most issues, Level II is the final level
of review. Emergency Grievances and Facility Requests are not Regular Grievances under the
Grievance Procedure. The exhaustion requirement is met only when a Regular Grievance is
accepted at intake and appealed through the highest eligible level without satisfactory resolution.
(Id. ¶¶ 9–14.)
According to VDOC records, Williams filed two Written Complaints on February 22,
2021, ROSP-21-INF-00336 and ROSP-21-INF-00337. The first complaint stated that between
May 1, 2020, and February 19, 2021, Red Onion staff and inmates conspired to submit money
withdrawal forms in his name. ROSP-21-INF-00337 stated that since February 4, 2021,
Williams had not been receiving his incoming mail. Neither complaint referenced or complained
about an incident occurring on February 1, 2021. During the 30 days following the February 1,
2021 incident, Williams did not submit any grievances or complaints other than these two
Written Complaints. (Id. ¶¶ 15–19, Encl. C, D.)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original).

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In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all inferences must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Additionally, the party opposing summary judgment
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Id. at 586. That is, once the movant has met its burden to show the absence of a material fact
dispute, the party opposing summary judgment must then come forward with affidavits or other
evidence demonstrating there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986). If “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party,” then a dispute of fact precludes summary judgment. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248; see Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013). On the
other hand, summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence is “so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. And, “the mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id.
B. Exhaustion
“The Prison Litigation Reform Act (‘PLRA’) requires that inmates exhaust all available
administrative remedies before filing an action challenging prison conditions in federal court.”
Woodhouse v. Duncan, 741 F. App’x 177, 177 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1)).
This “requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002), and federal courts do not have discretion to waive it or to excuse a plaintiff’s failure
to exhaust administrative remedies that were otherwise available to him, see Ross v. Blake, 136
S. Ct. 1850, 1855–59 (2016). The PLRA also “‘requires proper exhaustion,’ which ‘means using
all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly,’ to allow the agency a full and fair

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opportunity to address the issues on the merits.” Woodhouse, 741 F. App’x at 178 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 93 (2006)); see also Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 217–18 (2007). Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, defendants have the burden of pleading and proving lack of exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S.
at 216.
Although the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is “strict,” it “does not operate as an
absolute bar to prison litigation in federal court.” Griffin v. Bryant, 56 F.4th 328, 335 (4th Cir.
2022). This requirement “hinges on the ‘availability’ of administrative remedies: An inmate,
that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.” Ross, 136 S.
Ct. at 1859 (brackets omitted). A remedy is “available” when it is “‘capable of use’ to obtain
‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Id. (quoting Booth v. Churner, 523 U.S. 731, 738
(2001)). Conversely, a remedy is not available when:
(1) “it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or
consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”;
(2) it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable
of use”; or (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking
advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.”
Woodhouse, 741 F. App’x at 178 (quoting Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859–60). These are the “three
kinds of circumstances” where the Supreme Court has recognized that “an administrative
remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief” in the prison
context. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859. “When the facts on the ground demonstrate that no such
potential exists, the inmate has no obligation to exhaust the remedy.” Id.
Defendants have provided evidence that Williams accessed the grievance procedure in
the same month as and following the incident described in the complaint, but Williams did not
grieve any of the claims raised in this lawsuit. He did not respond to the motion for summary
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judgment or provide any evidence to contradict the evidence put forth in support of defendants’
motion. While Williams alleges that administrative remedies were not available to him (Compl.
¶ 49), this assertion is directly contradicted by his undisputed grievance activity that took place
in February of 2021. The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are sworn under penalty of perjury,
and a verified complaint can, in some circumstances, defeat a motion for summary judgment.
See VanPelt v. Stanley, Civil Action No. 7:21cv00139, 2022 WL 520803, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb.
22, 2022) (explaining that verified complaints by pro se prisoners “are to be considered as
affidavits and may, standing alone, defeat a motion for summary judgment when the allegations
contained therein are based on personal knowledge). However, when a pro se plaintiff “fails to
respond to a defendant’s specific evidence contradicting the conclusory allegations of [the
plaintiff’s] complaint or submissions, . . . that defendant may be entitled to summary judgment.”
Allah v. Engelke, Case No. 7:20-cv-00755, 2023 WL 2188736, at *5 (W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2023);
see also Montgomery v. Johnson, 2007 WL 1960601, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2007) (citing
Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 1998)). Williams has not provided any evidence to
create an issue of fact in response to defendants’ motion or the Still affidavit. Therefore,
defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
The court will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment in an appropriate order.
Entered: March 6, 2025.

/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon
Chief United States District Judge

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