May v. Wright

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Thomas T. Cullen on 3/6/2025. (Opinion mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(jv)

March 06, 2025
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK
BY: s/J.Vasquez
ROANOKE DIVISION

WILLIAM K. MAY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES WRIGHT,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 7:23-cv-00053
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By:

Hon. Thomas T. Cullen
United States District Judge

Plaintiff William K. May, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that, on October 18, 2022, during his transport from an
emergency room to the New River Valley Regional Jail, Defendant Corrections Officer James
Wright (“Defendant”) used excessive force against him by throwing him to the floor,
repeatedly dumping him from a wheelchair, and tossing him into a transport van. (See Am.
Compl. [ECF No. 48].) This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (See
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 49].) The parties fully briefed the motion, and it is ripe for
disposition. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny Defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
I.
Plaintiff’s claim arises from his October 18, 2022 transport from an emergency room
at Wythe County Community Hospital in Wytheville, Virginia, to the New River Valley
Regional Jail. (See Pl.’s Mtn. Am. ¶ 1, 4 [ECF No. 35].) 1 Plaintiff alleges that, because he was

1 Although Plaintiff’s original complaint contained additional factual allegations, the court does not consider

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not “able to move fast enough,” Defendant “grabbed” him by his handcuffs and leg shackles
to “sling him in a [wheel]chair” but missed the chair and threw him to the floor. (Am. Compl.
¶ 2.) Plaintiff further contends that the wheelchair he was riding in when he was moved from
the hospital room to the transport van did not have a footrest and that his boots were too
heavy for him to hold his feet up. (Id. ¶ 3.) As a result, his boots got caught under the
wheelchair, causing him to “flip” onto the floor, face-first, three or four times. (Id.)Further,
Plaintiff claims that Defendant and a fireman—who assisted Defendant in transporting
Plaintiff to the van—threw him into the van and only partially closed the door, leaving his feet
dangling outside. (Id. ¶ 4.) After departing the hospital, Defendant allegedly pulled the vehicle
over to get Plaintiff’s feet inside and properly close the van door. (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant continued “mistreating” him upon his arrival at the jail,
although he does not specify how he was further mistreated. (Id. ¶ 5.) He claims that video
footage and witnesses can support his claims of “cruel and unjust behavior and unnecessary
physical abuse” against Defendant. (Id. ¶ 6.) In his operative complaint, 2 Plaintiff does not
allege that he was injured by Defendant’s alleged actions. (See generally id.)

those alleged facts here because “an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading, rendering the original
pleading of no effect.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 573 (4th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds
as recognized by Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593 (4th Cir. 2023). Nor does the court consider any factual allegations
found in Plaintiff’s other filings, including his brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (See,
e.g., Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 35].); see Megaro v. McCollum, 66 F.4th 151, 157
(4th Cir. 2023) (“Courts are limited to considering the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint
and the documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
2 Although, as noted above, the court cannot consider allegations outside of his operative pleading, the court

would be remiss if it did not acknowledge that, in his original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he injured his
back when Defendant “slammed” him into a wheelchair, and that being “dragged” down the hallway “further
cause[ed] debilitating injury to [his] back.” (Compl. ¶ E.2 [ECF No. 1].)

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II.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See,
e.g., Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). “[I]t does not resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Id. In
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007). Legal conclusions in the guise of factual allegations, however, are not entitled
to a presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Rule 12(b)(6) does “not require heightened fact
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. A claim is plausible if the complaint contains “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,”
and if there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft,
566 U.S. at 678.
To allow for development of a potentially meritorious claim, federal courts are obliged
to construe pro se pleadings liberally. See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982).
Further, “liberal construction of pleadings is particularly appropriate where . . . there is a pro se
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complaint raising civil rights issues.” Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir.
1978)(emphasis added); see also Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless,
“generous construction of pro se complaints are not . . . without limits.” Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). “A pro se plaintiff still must allege facts that state
a cause of action.” Scarborough v. Frederick Cnty. Sch. Bd., 517 F. Supp. 3d 569, 575 (W.D. Va.
2021) (quoting Bracey v. Buchanan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
III.
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s amended complaint, as the court is required to do for
pro se litigants, the court infers that Plaintiff asserts a claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Section 1983 authorizes a citizen to bring a civil action for deprivation of their “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States by a
person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The legal standard for an excessive-force claim is informed by whether, on the date of
the alleged offense, Plaintiff was serving an active sentence or in custody as a pretrial detainee.
See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–38 (1979). If
Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced at the time of the alleged use of force, his claim would
arise under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. See Whitley,
475 U.S. at 327. If he was in pretrial custody at the time of the alleged excessive force, his
claim would arise under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535–38; see also
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Simmons v. Whitaker, 106 F.4th 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2024). Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint
does not specify his status on the date that the alleged excessive force occurred, the court will
consider the viability of his claim under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim
“A prisoner bringing an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim must make two
showings—one objective, the other subjective.” Alexander v. Connor, 105 F.4th 174, 182 (4th
Cir. 2024).
The subjective prong is “a demanding standard” that asks whether the officer acted
with “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (quoting Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112,
119 (4th Cir. 2019)). To satisfy the subjective prong, the plaintiff must allege “wantonness in
the infliction of pain.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112. Whether a defendant acted with wantonness
turns on “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see also
Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 301–02 (4th Cir. 2021).
Not surprisingly, “[d]irect evidence of motive or intent may be hard to come by.” Dean,
984 F.3d at 302. Thus, the Supreme Court has identified factors from which a defendant’s
subjective state of mind can be inferred:
[T]he extent of injury suffered . . . [,] the need for application of
force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force
used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,
and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (cleaned up); see also Brooks, 924 F.3d at 116. While the severity of any
injury factors into whether a defendant used excessive force, the force itself is what “ultimately
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counts.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (noting that
the “minor” nature of the injuries “provide[d] no basis for dismissal”). Nonetheless, the extent
of injury is relevant in determining “the amount of force applied” and “whether the use of
force could plausibly have been thought necessary.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (quoting Whitley,
475 U.S. at 321).
The objective prong measures the gravity of the force employed; it “asks whether the
force applied was sufficiently serious to establish a cause of action.” Id. (quoting Brooks, 924
F.3d at 112). “This is not a high bar.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38; see also Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112.
Generally, only more than de minimis or nontrivial use of force is required. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at
38. And “when a use of force is malicious or repugnant, a plaintiff need not suffer anything
significant to establish an excessive force claim.” Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 101 (4th
Cir. 2017); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (“When prison officials maliciously and sadistically
use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. This is true
whether . . . significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any
physical punishment . . . inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” (quoting Whitley,
475 U.S. at 327)).
Defendant argues that the amended complaint does not state a valid Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim because it fails both the subjective and objective prongs.
(Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 13 [EFC No. 50].) The amended complaint, he argues,
fails the subjective prong because it contains no allegations about Defendant’s mental state.
(Id.) For the objective prong, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff merely alleges trivial use of force
because Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any injuries. (Id.) but applying the liberal
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standard of construction required at this stage, the court finds that Plaintiff’s amended
complaint states a claim for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff alleges three instances of excessive force. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
“grabbed” him by handcuffs and leg shackles to “sling him in a [wheel]chair,” but missed the
wheelchair and instead threw him to the floor. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that
he fell on the floor three or four times because the wheelchair did not have a footrest and his
boots got caught underneath the wheelchair. (Id. ¶ 3.) Impliedly, Plaintiff alleges—and the
court must accept—that after each fall, Defendant placed Plaintiff back in the same
wheelchair, without any foot support, and permitted him to fall onto the floor repeatedly.
Lastly, Plaintiff claims that Defendant threw him into the transportation van. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Starting with the subjective prong, the facts plausibly allege that Defendant acted with
“wantonness in the infliction of pain” or applied force “maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112. The Fourth Circuit has acknowledged
the difficulty of alleging facts pertaining to an officer’s subjective motivation. Dean, 984 F.3d
at 302. Because direct evidence of intent is “hard to come by,” id., the court “may ‘infer the
existence of th[e] subjective state of mind,” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 116 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 738 (2002)). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant deliberately missed the wheelchair
he tried to place him in, caused him to fall out of the wheelchair on the way to the van, or
intentionally thew him into the van. (See Am Compl. ¶ 2–4.) Plaintiff does, however, allege
that Defendant “grabbed” and slung him into the wheelchair because Plaintiff was “not able
to move fast enough.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Further, he alleges that he fell out of the wheelchair not once
but three or four times, which is suggestive of deliberate—rather than accidental—infliction
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of pain. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Construing Plaintiff’s amended complaint liberally, and drawing all
inferences in his favor, the court can infer that Defendant plausibly applied force with
“wantonness in the infliction of pain” because Plaintiff was not moving at a satisfactory pace.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allege that Defendant was not
acting in a manner, and did not apply force, “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.” Id. at 7.
The amended complaint also contains sufficient facts to support the objective prong
of an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. Defendant correctly states that the amended
complaint does not assert that Plaintiff suffered any injuries as a result of that alleged force.
But his lack of injuries is not dispositive. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37; see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10.
The core judicial inquiry is into the nature of the force alleged, and force that is maliciously
applied can violate the Eighth Amendment even if it does not result in serious injury. Thompson,
878 F.3d at 101.
Defendant had to apply at least some force to move Plaintiff from the emergency room
to the transportation van. Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that safe
transportation requires an officer to take at least some action). On Plaintiff’s allegations, safe
transportation did not require Defendant to grab and sling Plaintiff toward the wheelchair or
throw Plaintiff into the van. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2–5.) No facts suggest that Plaintiff was resisting
transportation, posing a threat, or engaging in other conduct that would warrant the force
alleged. (See generally id.) To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that he was merely “not able to move
fast enough.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the facts alleged make it
plausible that Defendant applied more than de minimis force—and force that was unnecessary
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under the circumstances—when he grabbed and threw Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also alleges that he fell three or four other times because it was “impossible”
for him to hold his boots up and they got caught under the wheelchair on the way to the
transportation van. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant’s push of Plaintiff’s wheelchair may have been de
minimis before Plaintiff fell out of the chair for the first time because Defendant had no reason
to anticipate that Plaintiff would fall. (Id.) The court can safely infer, however, that Defendant
had reason to temper his force after the first fall but didn’t, resulting in Plaintiff falling faceforward several more times. (Id.) This is sufficient for the court to conclude that there is “more
than a sheer possibility” that the Defendant used nontrivial force. Ashcroft, 566 U.S. at 678.
For these reasons, if Plaintiff was in custody after conviction at the time of the alleged
offense, he has stated a valid claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Excessive Force Claim
Under the Due Process Clause, a pretrial detainee is protected from excessive force
that amounts to punishment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell,
441 U.S. at 535–39). To prevail on an excessive-force claim, a pretrial detainee’s allegations
must establish (1) that force was purposely used against him and (2) that the force was
objectively unreasonable. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015).
First, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would show that the defendant acted
deliberately “with respect to his physical acts.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395. This means that “his
state of mind with respect to the bringing about of certain physical consequences in the world”
must have been “purposeful, . . . knowing, or possibly . . . reckless.” Id. at 396. “[L]iability for
negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”
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Id. at 396 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)) (emphasis in original).
If, for example, “an officer unintentionally trips and falls on a detainee, causing him harm, the
pretrial detainee cannot prevail on an excessive[-]force claim.” Id. The use of force must be
“deliberate” for the plaintiff’s claim to proceed. Id.
Second, the plaintiff must show that the force was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at
397. In Kingsley, “[t]he Supreme Court provided a non-exhaustive list of factors courts must
use to determine objective reasonableness,” including:
[1] the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used; [2] the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; [3]
any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount
of force; [4] the severity of the security problem at issue; [5] the
threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and [6] whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.
Simmons v. Whitaker, 106 F.4th 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). “A
court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Kingsley,
576 U.S. at 397. Moreover, a court must also account for the government’s legitimate interest
in facility management, “appropriately deferring to ‘polices and practices that in th[e]
judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.’” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 540, 547).
Once again, Defendant argues that the limited facts in the amended complaint are
insufficient to state a claim. (Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss ¶ 17.) He contends that Plaintiff’s
amended complaint makes no allegation that Defendant’s use of force was unreasonable under
the circumstances. (Id.) He also argues that his alleged use of force can, at most, be construed
as negligent acts that are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. (Id. ¶ 19–20.)
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Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court concludes that the
amended complaint states a valid claim for a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force
violation. First, the facts alleged make it at least plausible that Defendant acted deliberately in
“bringing about . . . certain physical consequences in the world.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395.
Plaintiff does not assert that Defendant purposefully or knowingly “missed the chair” while
transporting him from the hospital bed, which caused Plaintiff to be “thrown to the floor.”
(See Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) But Plaintiff does allege that the Defendant grabbed him and threw him
into the chair because he was not “able to move fast enough.” (Id.) While sparsely detailed, the
alleged motivation for the use of force—viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff—is
sufficient for the court to infer that the Defendant acted purposefully or knowingly when he
grabbed and threw Plaintiff. Likewise, the motivation alleged is sufficient for the court to infer
that the Defendant also knowingly or purposefully threw Plaintiff into the van. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the weight of his boots and lack of a footrest on the
wheelchair caused him to fall out of the wheelchair three or four times on the way to the van.
(Id. ¶ 3.) These causes are distinct from the Defendant’s pushing of the wheelchair, but the
number of falls allows the court to infer that the Defendant applied force to the wheelchair
with a purposeful or knowing state of mind because Plaintiff repeatedly fell out of it. (Id.)
Thus, Plaintiff has alleged facts that make it plausible that the Defendant deliberately used the
force alleged.
Additionally, based on the Kingsley factors, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the force
used was not objectively reasonable. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Starting with the relationship
between the need for force and amount of force used, “[g]rabb[ing]” Plaintiff to “sling” him
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into a wheelchair and throwing him into the transportation van is not commensurate with the
need to transport. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4.) A reasonable (and cool-headed) officer at the
hospital would not sling or throw a detainee because they were unable to move quickly. (Id.)
Likewise, a reasonable officer would not apply force to a wheelchair in a manner that causes a
detainee to repeatedly fall face-first out of it. (See id. ¶ 4.) The relationship between the need
for force and amount of force used is, therefore, sufficient to suggest that Defendant’s actions
were objectively unreasonable.
As for the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries—the second Kingsley factor—Plaintiff does not
allege any injuries in his amended complaint. This factor weighs against a finding of objective
unreasonableness, though it is not dispositive. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397.
The third Kingsley factor—efforts made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of
force used—tilts toward a finding of objective unreasonableness with regard to the pushing
of the wheelchair. Id. Because Plaintiff fell three or four times, the court can infer that the
Defendant did not temper or limit his force to prevent Plaintiff from repeatedly falling out of
the chair. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) As it relates to throwing Plaintiff to the floor, the court can
easily conclude that “slinging” or “throwing” an inmate toward a wheelchair is not a
“tempered” manner of moving someone from a hospital bed to a wheelchair, regardless of
whether Defendant hit or missed his intended mark.
Nothing in Plaintiff’s amended complaint suggests that there were any security
concerns that required a use of force to control. (See generally Am. Compl.) The court does
note, however, that transportation from a hospital to a detention center generally poses both
security and safety concerns to the detainee, officer, and broader public, such that the
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government has a legitimate interest for which it must account. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–40.
Nonetheless, the court cannot say, at least at this early stage, that Defendant’s use of force was
objectively reasonable in light of these general security and safety concerns.
As for the remaining Kingsley factors, the facts alleged do not enable the court to infer
that Defendant reasonably perceived a threat or that Plaintiff resisted transportation. (See
generally Am. Compl.) To the contrary, Plaintiff implies that he was cooperating, but he was
not moving “fast enough” for Defendant’s liking. (See id. ¶ 2.)
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff states a valid Fourteenth Amendment claim for
excessive force if he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged use of force.
C. Qualified Immunity
As an alternative ground for dismissal, Defendant asserts that he is immune from suit
under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government actors “from
civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent
with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). To determine whether Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity, the court considers (1) whether a constitutional violation occurred and (2) whether
the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Est. of Jones v. City of Martinsburg,
961 F.3d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (June 10, 2020). A court has sound discretion to
decide which prong of the qualified immunity inquiry to consider first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.
If the answer to either question is “no,” a defendant is immune from suit for the alleged
conduct. Id. A defendant can present a qualified immunity defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
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but he or she “faces a formidable hurdle” and “is usually not successful” at this early stage of
proceedings. Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’y’s Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014). Defendant
asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff does not allege a violation of
a clearly established constitutional right. (Def.’s Bf. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 23.) The court has
found, however, that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged § 1983 claims against Defendant. Moreover,
Plaintiff’s rights to be free from excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
were clearly established at the time of the alleged use of force. See, e.g., Dean, 984 F.3d at 310
(citing Hudson, 502 U.S. at 7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–31) (explaining that inmates’ Eighth
Amendment “right to be free from pain inflicted maliciously and in order to cause harm” has
long been “clearly established”); Orem, 523 F.3d at 448 (same with regard to a pretrial detainee’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force).
To the extent that there is any lingering question of whether Defendant violated a
clearly established constitutional right, that question is premature at this stage. See Willingham
v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, the question of qualified immunity
should be decided at the summary judgment stage.”). Accordingly, the court will deny
Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity without prejudice; he may reassert
the defense at a later stage.

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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be denied.
The clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and the
accompanying Order to all counsel of record.
ENTERED this 6th day of March 2025.

/s/ Thomas T. Cullen________________
HON. THOMAS T. CULLEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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