Newman v. North Western Regional Adult Detention Center, et al.

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Michael F. Urbanski on 1/2/2025. (Opinion mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(aab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
DERRICK NEWMAN,
Plaintiff,

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v.
DENZEL COOPER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 7:23-cv-00431
By: Michael F. Urbanski
Senior United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Derrick Newman, a former inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this
civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while he was still incarcerated. Following his release from
prison, Newman filed an amended complaint against three correctional officials at the
Northwestern Regional Adult Detention Center (NRADC): Transportation Sergeant Daniel
Cooper, Correctional Officer Daniel Largent, and Transportation Captain Tana Jones. Having
reviewed the amended complaint, the court concludes that it must be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I.

Background

According to the amended complaint, the events giving rise to this action occurred at
the NRADC on June 8, 2022. Am. Compl., ECF No. 18, at 4. At approximately 4:00 a.m.,
Newman was instructed to pack his belongings because he was being moved to prison. Id. at 6.
When it was time to leave, Newman told unidentified correctional officers that he had a “hip
that was out of place” and that he needed a wheelchair. Id. The officers advised him to “just try
to walk and take [his] time.” Id. After stopping three times due to pain, Newman arrived in the
booking area and was taken outside to a “paddy wagon” or police van. Id.

At that point, Newman encountered defendants Cooper and Largent. Id. Newman
alleges that Cooper asked him if he would be able to climb the steps to the van and that he told
Cooper that he could not do that. Id. Cooper and Largent subsequently gripped him by the
arms and lifted him into the back of the van. Id.; see also id. at 4 (“I couldn’t get in [the] vehicle,
so they picked me up and lifted me up in the back.”). When they arrived at the prison four hours
later, Newman was in “a lot of pain.” Id. at 6. He alleges that he had to sit on the floor of the
van and scoot out of the vehicle on his buttocks. Id. He fell down twice upon arriving at intake
and was taken to the medical department, where he received a wheelchair. Id. at 6. Newman
alleges that he continues to use a wheelchair to this day. Id.
Newman claims that Cooper and Largent “deprive[d]” him of “medical care” by
transporting him in a vehicle that was not handicap-accessible. Id. at 2; see also id. at 7 (“I’m
asking the courts to grant me $350,000. They were not allowed to transfer me in that vehicle.”).
The court liberally construes the amended complaint to assert an Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and a claim for compensatory damages under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
II.

Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which governs in forma pauperis proceedings, the court has
a duty to screen initial filings. Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 2006).
The court must dismiss a case “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). To survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
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U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant must be construed liberally. King v. Rubenstein,
825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). “Principles requiring generous construction of pro se
complaints are not, however, without limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,
1278 (4th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint “must still state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Sakyi v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 770 F. App’x 113, 113 (4th Cir 2019) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
III.
A.

Discussion

Eighth Amendment Claim under Section 1983

Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under color of state law, deprives
another person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Additionally, because liability is “determined person by person,” a plaintiff
must show that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Newman claims that Cooper and Largent acted with deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs by transporting him in a police van that was not handicap-accessible. An Eighth
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Amendment claim of deliberate indifference has an objective and a subjective component.
Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). “The objective element requires a serious
medical condition,” and “[t]he subjective prong requires the prison official to have acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, specifically, deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s health or
safety. Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 124 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Deliberate indifference is an “exacting standard” that is not met by a showing of “mere
negligence or even civil recklessness.” Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. An official acts with deliberate
indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs “only when he or she subjectively ‘knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Specifically, the official must “both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . also draw the
inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “And, in addition to subjectively recognizing that
substantial risk, the [correctional] official must subjectively be aware that [the official’s] actions
were inappropriate in light of that risk.” Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 236 (4th Cir. 2016); see
also Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[U]nder the subjective prong, [the
plaintiff] can prevail only if the defendants subjectively recognized that there was such a risk [of
serious harm] and that their actions were inappropriate in light of that risk.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Applying these principles, the court concludes that the amended complaint fails to state
a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Cooper and Largent. Even assuming that
Newman’s hip impairment satisfies the objective component, the amended complaint does not
set forth sufficient facts from which the court can reasonably infer that these defendants knew
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that Newman faced a substantial risk of serious harm from being transported in the police van
and consciously disregarded that risk. At most, the allegations could support a claim of
negligence against Cooper and Largent, which is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment.
See Mixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[M]ere negligence is not enough to
show deliberate indifference.”); see also Hunt v. Warden, 748 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment by transporting him to FCC Coleman in a non-wheelchair-accessible van
without a seatbelt . . . . We agree with the district court that Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a
claim under the Eighth Amendment . . . . Defendants’ conduct in not providing a van with
greater safety features does not constitute ‘more than ordinary lack of due care’ and does not
rise to something more than negligence.”) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835).
Newman also names Tana Jones as a defendant. Aside from the list of defendants,
however, the amended complaint does not mention Jones and therefore does not provide any
indication as to what Jones did to allegedly violate Newman’s constitutional rights. Therefore,
the amended complaint also fails state a claim under § 1983 against Jones. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676 (explaining that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendants, through
their own individual actions, violated the Constitution); see also Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206,
1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the
defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the
caption, the complaint is properly dismissed, even under the liberal construction to be given
pro se complaints.”).

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B.

ADA Claim

“Title II of the ADA provides that no qualified individual shall, ‘by reason of [a]
disability,’ be denied the benefits of public ‘services, programs, or activities’ or be subject to
discrimination by a public entity.” Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2020)
(alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). “To make out a basic ADA violation, [a
plaintiff] must show that he: (1) has a disability; (2) was otherwise qualified to get some public
program, service, or activity; and (3) was denied that program, service, or activity on the basis
of his disability.” Koon v. North Carolina, 50 F.4th 398, 405 (4th Cir. 2022). The third prong
may be satisfied by “a failure to make reasonable accommodations.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). More specifically, “disability discrimination includes the failure to provide
reasonable modifications that would make accommodations accessible to the disabled without
causing an undue burden to the program.” Id. at 406.
“[T]he proper defendant under a Title II claim is the public entity or an official acting in
his official capacity.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 501 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009). “Title II of the
ADA does not . . . provide for suit against a public official acting in his individual capacity.” Id.
(collecting cases); see also Barnes v. Young, 565 F. App’x 272, 273 (4th Cir. 2014) (same).
Additionally, under the ADA, plaintiffs can only recover compensatory damages for intentional
discrimination. Koon, 50 F.4th at 400. Although the showing that requires is an “open question”
in the Fourth Circuit, “it at least requires deliberate difference to the prisoner’s federally
protected rights.” Id.
Against this backdrop, the court concludes that the amended complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for compensatory damages under the ADA. Even assuming that Newman
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intended to sue the defendants in their official capacities and that he could state a plausible
claim for violation of the ADA, he has not alleged facts sufficient to establish that any of the
defendants “deliberate[ly] or conscious[ly]” ignored his statutory rights by transporting him to
prison in a standard police van. Id. at 406; see also id. at 407 (“An official must know of the
dangers to federal rights and nonetheless disregard them.”). While Newman alleges that he
should have been transported in a more handicap-accessible vehicle, “[i]t is not enough simply
to point to what could or should have been done.” Id. at 406. “That is the language of
negligence,” not deliberate indifference. Id.; see also Basta v. Novant Health Inc., 56 F.4th 307,
317 (4th Cir. 2022) (emphasizing that deliberate indifference in this context “requires much
more than a showing of pure negligence”). Consequently, the court concludes that the amended
complaint fails to state a claim for compensatory damages under the ADA against any of the
defendants.
IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Based on Newman’s status as a pro se litigant,
the court will allow him an opportunity to file an amended complaint within 30 days.
An appropriate order will be entered.
Entered: January 2, 2025
Mike Urbanski
Senior U.S. District Judge
2025.01.02 20:09:25
-05'00'

Michael F. Urbanski
Senior United States District Judge

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