Walton v. WVRJ Managerial Administration and Staff et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Thomas T. Cullen on 8/29/2024. (Opinion mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(aab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION

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TIMOTHY DEXTER WALTON,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
Case No. 7:23-cv-00436
)
v.
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
)
WVRJ MANAGERIAL
)
By:
Hon. Thomas T. Cullen
ADMINISTRATION STAFF, et al.,
)
United States District Judge
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Timothy Dexter Walton (“Walton”), a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed
this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Walton alleges that, while he was confined
at the Western Virginia Regional Jail (“WVRJ”), the defendants allowed another inmate to
steal funds from Walton and then took various actions to retaliate against Walton for filing
grievances and a state-court lawsuit about the alleged theft. Defendant Shawn Body has filed
a motion to dismiss, and Defendants Superintendent David Cox, Captain Willie Smith,
Sergeant Todd Wilson, Sergeant Kristopher Johnston, Lieutenant Richard Haines, Officer
Parker Beard, and Officer Anthony Jones have jointly filed a separate motion to dismiss.
Walton has responded to both motions, making them ripe for consideration. 1 Walton has also
Walton has filed a motion asking the court to compel the defendants to provide him with documentation and
pictures that he had stored on a jail-issued tablet device. (ECF No. 33.) The court denied a prior version of this
motion as disproportional to the needs of the case and “too vague or broad for the court to conclude that they
were relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” (See ECF No. 32.)
From the previously stored tablet data, Walton seeks (1) copies of all emails to or from the grievance
coordinator from April 16, 2022, until the present and (2) “pictorial data” of his “land and property that are
relevant to other legal proceedings pending before other courts.” (ECF No. 33.) Walton also seeks production
of jail and pod video footage of “John Doe officers packing up, giving away and removing [Walton’s] property
from [his] cell” at unspecified times on January 26 and September 23, 2023. (Id.) For reasons discussed in this
Memorandum Opinion, the court concludes that Walton’s allegations about interference with his grievances
and his personal property do not state constitutional claims actionable under § 1983. Furthermore, the court
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filed two motions seeking to add new defendants and retaliation claims about different time
periods to his Complaint. After review of the pleadings, the court concludes that the motions
to dismiss must be granted and Walton’s motions to amend must be denied.
I.
Walton’s Complaint is devoid of a coherent or chronological description of the relevant
events underlying his claims. Liberally construing the Complaint, copies of state-court records
attached to Defendant Body’s motion to dismiss, court records, and other verified submissions
from Walton, the court understands the relevant factual allegations as follows.
WVRJ has an automated computerized telephone system that inmates may utilize by
inputting an identification (“ID”) number and a PIN. 2 Between April 16 and 30, 2022, Walton
alleges that Inmate Brian Brim “robb[ed Walton] and [his] account of one hundred and fifty
(150.00 dollars.” (Compl. 3 [ECF No. 1].) 3 Brim then apparently obtained and used Walton’s
ID number and PIN to avail himself of Walton’s account for his own benefit for a total of
$150.

finds no justification to order discovery of information related to Walton’s cases pending in other courts.
Moreover, no part of the WVRJ grievance process is at issue here. The court will therefore deny Walton’s
current motion to compel for these reasons as well as the reasons noted in the court’s prior Order. (See ECF
No. 32.)
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss if those
documents are integral to the Complaint and are authentic. Sec’y of State for Def. v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484
F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). Walton has not challenged the authenticity of the documents from Walton’s
state-court lawsuit that Body attached to his motion to dismiss. In an affidavit that Body filed in that state-court
lawsuit, Body stated that he was employed by Global Tel Link (“GTL”) as Site Administrator at WVRJ and
that each inmate may access his WVRJ telephone account only by inputting an identification number and PIN.
(Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. C, at 9 [ECF No. 12-3].)
2

For the sake of clarity, the court will cite to page numbers as assigned to the pleadings by the court’s electronic
filing system.
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Walton allegedly tried to bring criminal charges and grievances at the jail about Brim’s
action, but these efforts were fruitless. In September 2022, Walton brought a lawsuit in the
Roanoke County General District Court Small Claims Division, Case No. GV2200163-00,
against Brim and others—including Body as WVRJ Site Administrator for telephone
services—seeking to recover his $150. Body moved for summary judgment, and the General
District Court granted that motion and dismissed the case in June 2022. (See Mem. Supp. M.
Dism. Corrected Ex. D [ECF No. 12].) Online state court records indicate that Walton
appealed that decision to the Roanoke County Circuit Court in July 2023, Case No.
CL23000923-00, and a final order concluded that appeal on October 10, 2023.
In his Complaint, Walton asserts that Brim’s theft of his account funds occurred
because Body, Cox, and unnamed WVRJ “administrative heads and staff of civilian and
correctional officers in charge of overseeing the day[-]to[-]day operational duties”
(“administrative defendants”) at the jail “were and are grossly . . . negligent” as supervisors
and in “control of and over equipment” (Claim #1). (Compl. at 3 [ECF No. 1].) Walton asserts
that because they failed at “safeguarding and protecting [him] and [his] inmate account from
illegal pilfering and fraudulent theft of monies . . . through the jail’s automated computerized
telephone system,” they “aided and abetted in collusion, complicity and helped inmate Keith
Brim in and at robbing Walton.” 4 (Id.) Walton also alleges that these defendants, on an

Walton’s § 1983 Complaint does not explain how he believes Brim obtained access to his telephone account.
The copies of the state-court documents attached to Body’s motion to dismiss, however, provide more detail.
Walton alleges that during booking at WRVJ, staff gave him “a postcard size card with I.D. numbers written
on it in big black boldface block print” that anyone “half blind could see to read thirty (30) feet away).” (Mem.
Supp. M. Dism. Exhibit B, at 1 [ECF No. 12-2].) Walton asserts that “anyone using the eleven[-]digit I.D.
numbers written on these jail[-]issued postcards can activate the institution[’]s computerized debit telephone
service system and fraudulently make telephone calls.” (Id.) Then, jail staff assigned Walton to share a cell with
Brim for a week, after which the inmates were moved to different housing areas. Walton alleges that between
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unspecified date, “deliberately trashed, discarded and/or gave away [his] personal property,”
including several sodas, two writing pens, a jar of Vaseline, a jar of lotion, shower shoes, and
a chess set. (Id. at 3-4.) Walton also contends that Body, Colonel Cox, and the administrative
defendants conspired to impede his “timely access to the jail’s gr[ie]vance procedure, the police
and magistrate office and the courts,” hindering his efforts “to file criminal and civil charges.”
(Id. at 4.)
In a separate count, Walton contends that Cox and the administrative defendants and
others (Captain Willy Smith, Lieutenant Haines, Sergeant Todd Wilson, Sergeant Kristopher
Johnston, Laundry Officer Jones, Disciplinary Officer Parker Beard, and other Jane and John
Doe correctional officers) engaged “in a free-range systematic conspiracy and campaign of
harassment and cruel and unusual punishment, intimidation and threats” (Claim #2). (Id.)
Generally, Walton alleges that after his complaints and his state-court lawsuit about the theft
of his telephone funds, the defendants retaliated against him through various actions. (Id. at
2.) These retaliatory acts allegedly included: unnamed officers taking his therapeutic mattress
provided for his back injury; Laundry Officer Jones giving him “raggedy half sheets and towels
and los[ing] [his] clothes for weeks,” which “forc[ed] him to not shower or change into clean
clothes for days and weeks” and deprived him of “proper sleep due to no sheets covering the
thin plastic mattress”; unnamed officers mishandling his legal mail by copying it onto his kiosk
tablet; unnamed officers “stopping the courts procedural due process of serving Inmate Keith
Brim” a copy of “the warrant in debt subpoena” for stealing Walton’s monies; unnamed

April 15 and May 10, 2022, he could not access the kiosk or tablet service system and that during this time,
Brim colluded with Body and two other persons to use Walton’s telephone account without his consent.

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officers delivering legal mail in the early morning hours, against jail policy; unnamed officers
keeping him “locked down inside [his] cell for two and three days” without any disciplinary
charge; unnamed officers allegedly led by Sgt. Johnston coming to Walton’s cell at two or three
in the morning and playing with “taser guns,” making him fear for his safety because he had
made unspecified complaints to Colonel Cox; and unnamed officers refusing to notarize legal
documents unless “they were allowed to read them first to see if they contained complaints
about the jail administration and staff.” (Id. at 4–6.) Walton also alleges that on January 26,
2023, “several neo Nazi Gestapo skinheaded klan members led by a John Doe lieutenant”
“jumped on and physically assaulted him” after he asked for a coat to wear to court. (Id. at 6.)
In another incident, unspecified officers allegedly threw Walton “in the hole (isolation) with
[his] personal property getting packed up by officers who deliberately on purpose left,
discarded, trashed and/or gaveaway [sic] [his] personal property items.” (Id. at 6.) Walton
complains that he has not been reimbursed for the lost property items, although Lieutenant
Haines allegedly said that he would be reimbursed. As relief in this action, Walton demands
monetary damages and reimbursement for his personal property items.
II.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts
alleged on the face of a plaintiff’s pleading. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th
Cir. 1999). In considering a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded factual allegations contained in
a complaint are to be taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). The complaint must contain
“more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
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action,” and it must allege facts specific enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).5 To state an actionable claim, the
plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” to one that is “plausible on its face,” rather than merely “conceivable.” Id. at 570.
The court is required to liberally construe complaints filed by plaintiffs proceeding pro
se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent
standard than those drafted by attorneys. Id. This requirement of liberal construction does not
mean, however, that the court should ignore a clear failure to plead facts that set forth a
cognizable claim. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Section 1983
permits an aggrieved party to file a civil action against a person for actions taken under color
of state law that violated his constitutional rights. Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir.
2013). ). “[A] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 676; Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122,
125 (4th Cir. 2023) (upholding dismissal of civil rights action where complaint made only
collective allegations against all “defendants,” without identifying how each individual
Defendant personally interacted with plaintiff or acted personally to violate plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment rights).

The court has omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations here and throughout this
Memorandum Opinion, unless otherwise noted.

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III.
A.
Liberally construed, Walton’s Claim 1 alleges that Body, Cox, and administrative
defendants at the jail inadequately supervised the telephone system by which Brim stole finds
from Walton’s account and inadequately supervised officers who mishandled Walton’s
property items. These allegations fail to state any claim against Body, Cox, or the administrative
defendants.
Walton’s claims against Body fall well short of the Iqbal pleading standard. Simply put,
he fails to provide any facts to establish a viable claim that Body’s personal actions (or
inactions) violated his constitutional rights. 6 Walton does not identify what Body did (or didn’t
do) in his role as Site Administrator that caused Brim to have unauthorized access Walton’s
telephone account. Indeed, Walton does not allege that Body had any responsibility for the
postcards jail staff gave Walton during intake that included his ID number, let alone that Body
had any obligation to safeguard Walton‘s account. Nor does Walton state any facts that, taken
as true, would show that Body had any interaction with Brim, Cox, or the administrative
related to Walton’s account or its access numbers. Walton’s Complaint is simply devoid of any
facts that would show that Body took any action, or failed to take any action, that proximately
caused harm to Walton. Moreover, the Complaint utterly fails to allege any actions by Body
related to the loss of Walton’s personal property items or his attempts at jail grievance

As an alternative defense, Body’s motion argues that the court should apply the abstention doctrine of Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and its progeny. This defense was based on
the fact that Walton’s circuit court appeal of the state court action was still pending. That appeal has since been
concluded. Therefore, the court does not find that the Colorado River abstention doctrine is applicable.

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mechanisms. Rather, the claims against Body are built using nothing more than Body’s job
title and conclusory assertions without the requisite facts to support them. The court will grant
Body’s Motion to Dismiss as to all claims.
Walton has also failed to state facts to support his claims against Cox, whom he
identifies as regional superintendent, or the administrative defendants. For the most part,
Walton has not identified any individual persons within this group of administrative
defendants. The Complaint refers to them as those “in charge of overseeing the day[-]to[-]day
operational duties of running” the WVRJ—“John and Jane Doe administrative heads and staff
of civilian and correctional officers.” (Compl. 3 [ECF No. 1].) Moreover, Walton does not
allege with any specificity that Cox or any other jail supervisor took or failed to take any action
to cause the loss of monies from Walton’s telephone account or how they acted to assist Brim
in using monies stolen from Walton’s account. Similarly, Walton does not provide any facts
to support a claim that Cox or any other jail supervisor participated in or took action that
caused the loss of his personal property items. Indeed, he does not even state when this loss
of property apparently occurred.
Finally, the same kind of factual deficiencies exist with Walton’s other asserted claims
against Cox and the administrative defendants in Claim 1. He does not allege facts showing
how Cox or other supervisory officials personally acted or conspired with each other to
impede Walton’s access to the WVRJ grievance procedure, the police, the magistrate’s office,
or the court system. His conclusory assertions are insufficient to state a claim.
Moreover, Walton fails to state any claim against Cox or any defendant as a supervisory
official. Supervisory officials are not automatically liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
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their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Rather, a plaintiff
must state facts showing that: (1) the supervisor had “actual or constructive knowledge” that
a subordinate’s conduct posed a “pervasive and unreasonable” risk of constitutional injury to
the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to this knowledge was “so inadequate as to show
deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization” of the potentially unconstitutional practices;
and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the
constitutional injury the plaintiff suffered. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
Specifically, the plaintiff must show that the supervisor had knowledge before the
constitutional injury occurred that his subordinate’s past behavior placed the plaintiff at risk.
Chavez v. Bailey, No. 7:19CV00014, 2020 WL 2751899, at *7 (W.D. Va. May 27, 2020).
Walton failed to allege any facts that would meet the supervisory liability standard as
to Cox or the administrative defendants. He does not cite any prior incident that put these
defendants on notice of a danger that inmates like Walton would suffer constitutional
deprivations of telephone monies, personal property after a cell reassignment, or problems
accessing the WVRJ grievance procedure, the police, the magistrate’s office, or the court
system. Again, Walton fails to provide the necessary factual support for his asserted claims
against these defendants. 7

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In a response to the motion to dismiss, Walton asked the court to order that the named defendants provide
him names for the administrative defendants he was unable to identify. (ECF No. 9.) The court construes this
submission as a motion to compel discovery for purposes of service of process. At the time he filed this
response/motion, no defendant had yet waived service, so no defendant was yet a party whom the court could
direct to provide names. Moreover, for the reasons stated, even if Walton could name these supervisory
defendants, he has failed to state facts to support any viable claim against any of them. Therefore, the court will
deny the motion seeking to compel defendants to provide their names.

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Furthermore, Walton has no viable claims regarding the alleged interference with his
ability to use the grievance process. It is well-settled that “inmates have no constitutional
entitlement or due process interest in access to a grievance procedure. An inmate thus cannot
bring a § 1983 claim alleging denial of a specific grievance process.” Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017).
Finally, as to Claim 1, Walton has no § 1983 claim based merely on officers’ alleged
misdeeds regarding his personal property. An allegation that a person under color of state law
intentionally or negligently deprived an inmate of property while acting outside the scope of
official policy or custom cannot state an actionable claim under § 1983 if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Walton possesses
a post-deprivation remedy under Virginia law via the Virginia Tort Claims Act (“VTCA”). Va.
Code §§ 8.01-195.3, et seq. “Section 1983 was intended to protect only federal rights guaranteed
by federal law, and not tort claims for which there are adequate remedies under state law.”
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985). Therefore, Walton cannot prevail under
§ 1983 based on an alleged property loss for which he can seek redress under VTCA. See Artis
v. Mapp, No. 91-6016, 931 F.2d 54, 1991 WL 61299, at *1, (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 1991) (per curiam)
(affirming with the modification dismissal of inmate’s complaint about jail officials’
deprivation of his property as frivolous because of availability of a post-deprivation remedy).

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For these reasons, the court will grant the parties’ Motions to Dismiss as to all parts of
Claim 1. Moreover, the court will summarily dismiss all claims raised against the unnamed
administrative defendants and staff under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. 8
B.
In Claim 2, Walton alleges that the administrative defendants and defendants Smith,
Haines, Wilson, Johnston, Jones, and Beard all conspired to retaliate against him in numerous
and various ways for filing grievances and pursuing a state-court lawsuit about Inmate Brim’s
theft from his telephone account in April 2022. But Walton has not proffered any facts
supporting claims of conspiracy or retaliation in this case.
To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if true,
would establish that the defendants acted “jointly in concert and that some overt act was done
in furtherance of the conspiracy, which resulted in [the] deprivation of a constitutional right.”
Glassman v. Arlington Cnty., 628 F.3d 140, 150 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg,
81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996)). The allegations must establish that each member of the
alleged conspiracy shared the same conspiratorial objective. Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 421. A plaintiff’s
factual allegations must reasonably lead to the inference that the defendants came to a mutual
understanding to try to “accomplish a common and unlawful plan.” Id. A plaintiff’s allegations
must amount to more than “rank speculation and conjecture.” Id. at 422.
Here, Walton has not alleged any facts suggesting that the defendants reached an
agreement to violate his rights. Rather, Walton attempts to build a conspiracy claim from

In any civil action where “a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity,” the court shall dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

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footless conclusions and unsupported assertions that entirely fail to support a conspiracy claim
against any defendant. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. His conspiracy claims, therefore, will be
dismissed.
His retaliation claims fare no better. To succeed on a § 1983 retaliation claim, Walton
“must allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the defendant took
some action that adversely affected his First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal
relationship between his protected activity and the defendant’s conduct.” Martin v. Duffy, 977
F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017)). A lapse
of time between when the defendant learned of the plaintiff’s grievance or lawsuit and the
defendant’s allegedly retaliatory action “negates any inference that a causal connection exists
between the two,” based merely on the timing of the events. Hodges v. Meletis, No. 22-6427,
2024 WL 3504387, at *7 (4th Cir. July 23, 2024) (published).
Walton’s retaliation claims fail on the third prong of this legal standard. He simply fails
to state any facts connecting the alleged retaliatory acts in Claim 2 with his grievances or his
lawsuit about another inmate using his telephone account. None of the alleged retaliatory acts
(insufficient laundry services, taking his special mattress, interfering with his legal mail or
service on Inmate Brim, delivering mail after midnight, bringing tasers to his cell in the wee
hours, refusing to notarize documents, assaulting him in January 2023, locking him in his cell
for days at a time with no disciplinary reason, and losing his personal property items) include
facts showing that any of the prison officials he names as defendants even knew about
Walton’s lawsuit or grievances. Similarly, he does not allege any facts to show that his
grievances or lawsuit were motivating factors behind the officers’ alleged actions. Moreover,
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Walton has not named any specific defendant or other prison official who was personally
involved in many of these alleged retaliatory incidents. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (requiring showing
of defendant’s personal involvement in alleged violation).
Second, Walton’s allegations about the timing of his grievances and lawsuit, on the one
hand, and the alleged retaliatory actions by named officials, on the other, do not support an
inference of retaliation. The lawsuit and grievances were filed in 2022. Walton fails to provide
dates for many of the alleged retaliatory events. Moreover, from the record, it appears that
most, if not all, of these events occurred in 2023, months after Walton’s grievances and lawsuit.
Such gaps between the exercise of constitutional rights and the alleged retaliatory acts negates
an inference of retaliatory motive. Hodges, 2024 WL 3504387, at *7.
For the stated reasons, the court will grant the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to the
retaliation claims.
IV.
Walton has also filed two motions seeking to amend his claims. In each of these
motions, he raises events that occurred during much later time periods and involving different
jail officials. He apparently seeks to assert that these other officers perpetrated these later
alleged misdeeds to retaliate because he complained and filed a state lawsuit about Brim’s theft
from his telephone account. The court must dismiss these motions as futile and misjoined.
The motions do not state facts showing that Walton’s grievances or lawsuit motivated
any of the actions Walton complains of. And the many weeks or months that passed between
the grievances and the lawsuit and the alleged retaliatory acts simply cannot support a
retaliation claim. Id.
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Furthermore, the claims alleged in the motions to amend do not concern events or
defendants involved in the claims in the initial Complaint as required by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provisions regarding joinder of claims and defendants in a single lawsuit. Rule
18(a) allows a plaintiff to only join “as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party
has against an opposing party”; Rule 20 allows the joinder of several parties in one case only
if the claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series thereof, and contain a
question of fact or law common to all the defendants. Plaintiff’s multi-issue, multi-defendant
motions to amend are inconsistent with these well-established rules. The claims in his motions
bear no direct relationship to the events underlying the claims in his original Complaint. They
seek to add defendants that have no clear relationship to the defendants and allegations in the
Complaint itself. Thus, the court will deny Walton’s motions to amend.
V.
For the reasons stated, the court concludes that Walton’s motion seeking production
of documents and video must be denied; the defendants’ motions to dismiss must be granted;
Walton’s motions to amend must be denied; and all claims against the administrative and Doe
defendants must be summarily dismissed.
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and
accompanying Order to the parties.
ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2024.
/s/ Thomas T. Cullen________________
HON. THOMAS T. CULLEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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