Moore v. Squire et al

Filing 52

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief District Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 3/7/2025. (Opinion mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(aab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
KEYANTA LAMONT MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. N. BOWMAN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 7:23-cv-00439
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
Chief United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Keyanta Lamont Moore, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was severed into several actions. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 9.) Moore
later filed an amended complaint naming nine defendants. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 22.) Those
nine defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 42.) Moore responded. (Dkt.
Nos. 50, 50-1.) Defendants’ motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s allegations in this matter describe events that occurred when he was at Keen
Mountain Correctional Center (KMCC). When the cases were severed, this action involved the
allegations in paragraphs 1–6, 8–12, and 20 of the original complaint, which include an “initial
incident of excessive force, which occurred on an unspecified date, but apparently before May
20, 2023.” (Dkt. No. 9 at 5.) Moore alleged that officers used excessive force against him
during a strip search and during his transport to segregation immediately thereafter, and that
defendants failed to check on him in the three days following. (Id.)
On October 24, 2023, the court issued an order denying five motions to amend that had
been filed by plaintiff and granting leave to file an amended complaint as a single document.
(Dkt. No. 21.) Moore filed an amended complaint in compliance with the court’s order, naming

nine defendants: correctional officers Hess, Owens, and R. Boyd, Sgts. Boyd, N. Bowman, Stell,
and Squier, Lt. Dye, and Ms. Harr, a KMCC staff member. Moore appears to allege eight total
claims. 1
In claim one, Moore alleges that Sgt. Bowman sexually harassed him in violation of the
Eighth Amendment when she was present for a strip search. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.)
In claim two, he alleges that correctional officer Boyd and Sgt. Squier used excessive
force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they tackled him after he put a piece of paper
in his mouth. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.)
In claim three, Moore alleges that correctional officers Hess and Owens used excessive
force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they were escorting him from his cell to the
shower. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.)
Claim four alleges that two unspecified officers were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4.)
Claim five alleges that Sgt. Squier allowed Moore’s old cellmate to steal Moore’s
personal property. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Moore’s sixth claim alleges that Sgt. Stell and an unknown person violated his rights by
not turning in his grievances. (Id. ¶ 6.)
In the seventh claim, Moore alleges that unknown persons have called him the “N word
or the C.O. have made racial remark” against him in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Id. ¶ 10.)

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Some additional claims are listed but they are duplicative to claims that the court has severed into other
lawsuits. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18, 19; see also Dkt. No. 9 (explaining severance of claims).) These claims will
also be dismissed without prejudice.

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And in the eighth claim, plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Boyd violated his Eighth Amendment
rights when Boyd failed to protect plaintiff from a potential attack from correctional officers.
(Id. ¶ 20.)
Defendants move to dismiss claims four through eight. Plaintiff’s response does not
address several of the arguments raised by defendants in their motion. (Dkt. Nos. 50, 50-1.)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss
When analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must view all well-pleaded allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Kashdan v. George Mason Univ. 70 F.4th 694, 700 (4th Cir. 2023).
“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Even so,
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at
555. A plaintiff must “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 681 (2009). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, 557).
In addition, pro se plaintiffs are held to a “less stringent standard” than lawyers, and
courts construe their pleadings liberally, no matter how “inartfully pleaded.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must still meet the “minimum threshold

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of plausibility” under Twombly and Iqbal. See Manigault v. Capital One, N.A., CIVIL NO. JKB23-223, 2023 WL 3932319, at *2 (D. Md. June 8, 2023). While pro se complaints “represent the
work of an untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude,” district courts are not required to
“conjure up questions never squarely presented to them” or to “construct full blown claims from
. . . fragments.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277–78 (4th Cir. 1985).
B. Section 1983
Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under color of state law, deprives
another person of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). Additionally, because liability is “determined person by person,” a plaintiff must
show that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution.” King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2023).
C. Claim Four
Moore alleges that the “same 2 officers” that “brutally” beat him acted with deliberate
indifference to his medical condition after placing him in a segregation cell. The officers were
supposed to check on him every 15 minutes but failed to do so. One officer, referred to as a
female, spoke with plaintiff, but all she did was check his blood pressure. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4.)
It is not clear to which officer or officers plaintiff is referring in this claim when he refers
to the “same 2 officers” that beat him because in claim two, Moore claims that Boyd and Squier
used excessive force against him, and in claim three, Moore claims that Hess and Owens used
excessive force. Additionally, Moore does not identify by name the female officer who is

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alleged to have provided inadequate medical care when checking on him. Moore’s response to
the motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 50-1) does not address his failure to specifically identify which
officer acted with deliberate indifference toward him. Because liability under § 1983 requires
personal involvement, and Moore has not made personal allegations against unknown
defendants, this claim is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Smith v. Logan, C/A No. 6:22-cv-02667HMH-KFM, 2022 WL 14763226 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2022) (recommending dismissal of claims
against unnamed defendants because of personal involvement requirement).
Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.
D. Claim Five
Claim five involves Moore’s allegation that Sgt. Squier allowed plaintiff’s property to be
stolen. This is not sufficient to state a federal due process claim because the Virginia Tort
Claims Act provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy. “State employees’ unauthorized
actions, whether intentional or negligent, that deprive a prisoner of property do not violate the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause when the state has made a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy available to him.” Kessing v. W. Va. Reg’l Jail, Case No. 7:19CV00546,
2019 WL 5166211, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2019) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
531–33 (1984)) (finding that because plaintiff “possessed tort remedies under Virginia state law
to seek reimbursement, namely the Virginia Tort Claims Act, . . . he cannot prevail in a
constitutional claim for the alleged loss of his radio or other property items”). Plaintiff’s
response does not address claim five or the argument raised by defendants to support dismissing
this claim. (Dkt. No. 50-1.)
Thus, this claim will be dismissed.

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E. Claim Six
Plaintiff alleges in claim six that Sgt. Stell and an unknown officer are not mailing his
grievances. “I am trying to follow the grievance process, but staff here are preventing me from
doing so.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) In his response to the motion to dismiss, Moore states that he
“would turn in multiple written complaints and grievances as to find a remedy to the wrongs that
were committed towards him. They would take his grievances, state that they were turning them
in, but really wouldn’t.” (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3.) However, inmates do not have a constitutional
right to the prison grievance process. Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir.
2017). Moore has no constitutional claim based on allegations that officers interfered with his
grievance activities. See Allee v. Streeval, Case No. 7:21CV00084, 2023 WL 2644281, at *4
(W.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2023) (explaining that even if plaintiff could prove his allegation that
officers “trashed documents that he intended as support for his grievance about COVID
conditions . . . he would have no viable constitutional claims”) (citing Booker, 855 F.3d at 541).
Thus, the court will dismiss this claim.
F. Claim Seven
In claim seven, plaintiff alleges that the situation was “racially motivated,” asserting that
he was called the “N word” or other racial remarks by an unspecified correctional officer. This
allegation is once again insufficient to state a claim because it does not allege the personal
involvement of a specific defendant or defendants. See, e.g., Al-Mujahidin v. Stephan, CA No.
9:20-cv-01001-BHH-MHC, 2021 WL 2482417, at *4 (D.S.C. May 20, 2021) (dismissing claim
against unnamed person because “there is no allegation or evidence of personal involvement”).
Moreover, verbal threats or harassment, even including the use of racial epithets, is not sufficient

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to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Johnson v. McCoy, Civil Action No. 7:19-cv-00005,
2021 WL 1113377, at *10 (W.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2021) (citing Henslee v. Lewis, 153 F. App’x 179,
179 (4th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiff’s response does not address any of the arguments raised by
defendants in support of dismissing this claim. (Dkt. No. 50-1.)
Thus, this claim will be dismissed.
H. Claim Eight
Moore, in claim eight, alleges that Sgt. Boyd failed to protect him from a potential attack.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Moore maintains that Sgt. Boyd “did in fact fail to protect him by
attempting to place him in the direct custody of two correctional officers that brutally beat him
by throwing his face into a wall, which in fact caused him to lose several teeth.” (Dkt. No. 50-1
at 3.)
A prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights may be violated where a prison official fails to
protect an inmate from harm caused by other prisoners or another prison official. To show
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege that the prison official had actual knowledge of an
excessive risk to the plaintiff’s safety. Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 2014).
Moore’s allegations are that Sgt. Boyd should have prevented this potential attack because he
was forced to be with the same officers who assaulted him previously. However, Moore does
not allege that another attack occurred, much less that one occurred due to deliberately
indifferent actions by Sgt. Boyd. Moore only alleges that he was afraid that another attack was
going to occur. In the absence of any allegation that Sgt. Boyd’s actions or inactions caused a
violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, Moore cannot state a claim for relief. Moore’s
response (Dkt. No. 50-1) does not address the argument that he was not harmed after being
placed in the custody of officers who previously harmed him.

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Moreover, Moore alleges that he told Sgt. Boyd that he feared for his safety, and Boyd
confirmed that it was “my job to protect you. And I am not gonna let anybody harm you and I
am going to take you myself with a different officer.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Thus, Moore cannot
demonstrate that Sgt. Boyd disregarded a substantial risk of harm to him. “A prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment with deliberate indifference when he is subjectively aware of a
substantial risk of harm and disregards the risk. A prison official who acts reasonably, however,
cannot be found liable.” Carter v. Tatum, Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-239 (RCY), 2023 WL
6797494, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2023) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994)).
For these reasons, this claim will be dismissed.
I. Claims Against Ms. Harr
Finally, Moore has not articulated any claims against one of the defendants, Ms. Harr.
His response does not address this failure to allege any facts pertaining to Ms. Harr. (Dkt. No.
50-1.) Thus, defendant Harr will be dismissed from this lawsuit.
III. CONCLUSION
The court will grant the motion to dismiss in an appropriate order.
Entered: March 7, 2025.

/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon
Chief United States District Judge

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