Dunmore v. Hamilton et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Thomas T. Cullen on 3/12/2025. (Opinion mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(jv)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
NATHANIEL BRUCE DUNMORE,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CLERK BRENDA S. HAMILTON, et al., )
)
Defendants.
)

March 12, 2025

LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK
BY: s/J.Vasquez

Case No. 7:24-cv-00134
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By:

Hon. Thomas T. Cullen
United States District Judge

Plaintiff Nathaniel Bruce Dunmore, proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Clerk Brenda S. Hamilton, Deputy Dillon, Sgt. Jones,
Major J. Williams, and the unnamed Deputy Clerk of Roanoke Circuit Court. 1 (See Compl. 1
[ECF No. 1].) Defendants Brenda S. Hamilton and the unnamed Deputy Clerk of Roanoke
Circuit Court (the “Clerk Defendants”) and Defendants Deputy Dillon, Sgt. Jones, and
Major J. Williams (the “Jail Defendants”) have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff ’s claims
against them. (See Clerk Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 20]; Jail Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
[ECF No. 21].) For the following reasons, the Court will grant both motions and dismiss this
action in its entirety.
I.
Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by “breaking [his] confidentiality” and mailing a copy of a motion to
quash indictment he filed in his criminal case to another inmate at the Roanoke City Jail.

1 Plaintiff also brought a claim against Judge Adam Mosely, but that claim has been dismissed. (See Or., Apr.

29, 2024 [ECF No. 12].)

(Compl. 2.) Plaintiff claims that, in doing so, the Clerk Defendants prejudiced the jury at his
criminal trial against him and endangered his life by leading the recipient inmate and others
to threaten him. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that the copy of his motion contained his
name, birthdate, and social security number, and he implies that the inmate used the
personally identifiable information mailed with the motion to identify him and facilitate the
threats. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 24, 2024, after he presumably reported his concerns
to Major J. Williams, Defendant Williams informed Plaintiff that his issue was not with the
Roanoke City Jail but with the Clerk of Courts and advised Plaintiff to contact an attorney
concerning any claim he may have. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff filed this action on February 20, 2024,
seeking $250,000 in damages. (Id. at 1–2.)
The Clerk Defendants jointly move to dismiss the claims against them under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m) and 12(b)(6) based on Plaintiff ’s failure to properly name the
Deputy Clerk for the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke in his complaint and for failure
to state a claim for which relief may be granted. (See Clerk. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 1–2.) The
Jail Defendants have also jointly moved to dismiss Plaintiff ’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6),
arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state any plausible claims for relief against them. (See Jail
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 1–2.) Both motions are ripe for review, and for the reasons explained
below, the Court will grant both motions and dismiss each of Plaintiff ’s claims under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 2

2 Because the Court finds dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6), it need not consider the unnamed

Deputy Clerk’s alternative argument for dismissal under Rule 4(m).

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II.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Occupy
Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 To survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). To be “plausible,” a plaintiff ’s claim must be supported by factual
allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. Although this “plausibility” standard is not akin to “probability,” it does require
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Instead, the complaint must contain “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts
that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“In deciding whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss, a court evaluates
the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents attached or incorporated into the
complaint.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir.
2011) (citations omitted). Additionally, the court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 765 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
“But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

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possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the
pleader is entitled to relief ’ as required by Rule 8.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (cleaned up).
III.
Plaintiff purports to bring his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes a civil
action by a citizen who is deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws” of the United States by a person acting under color of state law. To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both (1) “the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) “that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d
634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
A. The Jail Defendants
Liability under § 1983 is “personal, based upon each defendant’s own constitutional
violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).
Thus, a § 1983 claim requires concise factual detail about each defendant’s personal
involvement. See Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that liability
will lie under § 1983 only “where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted
personally” in the violation of plaintiff ’s rights and affirming dismissal of claim where
plaintiff did not allege personal involvement by the defendant) (internal citation and
quotation omitted). The Jail Defendants argue that Plaintiff ’s complaint does not contain
any factual allegations that would support a constitutional claim against them. (See Memo. in
Supp. of Jail Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 4–5 [ECF No. 21-1].) The court agrees.

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Although Plaintiff has named Williams, Jones, and Dillon as defendants, he has not
identified what any of them did to violate his rights. Plaintiff claims only that Defendant
Williams told Plaintiff he had no issue with the jail and to pursue any relief from the Clerk
of Courts. (Compl. 2.) He makes no allegations whatsoever concerning the actions of
Defendants Dillon or Jones and does not claim that any of the Jail Defendants violated his
constitutional rights. (See id. 1–2.) Because Plaintiff has not made any allegations concerning
the Jail Defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged violation of his constitutional rights,
the court will grant their motion and dismiss Plaintiff ’s claims against them. See Wilcox, 877
F.3d at 170; Truock, 275 F.3d at 402.
B. The Clerk Defendants
Plaintiff also fails to state plausible claims for relief against either of the Clerk
Defendants. First, Plaintiff ’s allegations do not support any § 1983 claim based on the
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment only protects
post-conviction detainees. See Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 606 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 2631, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1269 (2024) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 & n.16
(1979)); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–672, n. 40 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment
scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. . . . [T]he State does not acquire the
power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a
formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”). Here, Plaintiff ’s own
allegations make clear that he was not a convicted prisoner at the time the Clerk Defendants

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mailed his motion to quash but that he was, rather, a pretrial detainee awaiting his criminal
trial. (See Compl. 1–3.) Consequently, he was not subject to Eighth Amendment protections
during the events described in the complaint, and the court will dismiss his claims based on
the violation of such protections.
And although the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against deprivations of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law is applicable here, it is categorically not
violated by state action that is merely negligent. See Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir.
1995) (“The language and the purpose of the Due Process Clause . . . restrict violations
thereof to official conduct that entails some measure of deliberateness. . . . [N]egligent
deprivations of life, liberty or property are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Because
negligent conduct cannot support § 1983 claims, courts in this Circuit have repeatedly
dimissed § 1983 claims against clerks who negligently impede the due process rights of
litigants. See, e.g., Claybrooks v. Pugh, No. CV PJM-08-624, 2008 WL 11483444, at *1 (D. Md.
Mar. 18, 2008), aff ’d, 289 F. App’x 605 (4th Cir. 2008) (dismissing § 1983 claim against state
court clerk for failing to timely place plaintiff ’s motion to appoint counsel in his case file);
Landholt v. McBride, No. 3:22-CV-2599-SAL, 2023 WL 8596041, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2023)
(dismissing § 1983 claim against deputy clerk of court who failed to recall bench warrant for
plaintiff ’s arrest because there was no evidence that the deputy acted deliberately or
intentionally); Lowery v. McDowell Cnty. Superior Ct., No. 1:18-CV-00319-MR, 2020 WL
6875151, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 23, 2020) (dismissing § 1983 claim against clerk for failing to
file plaintiff ’s motion, even where plaintiff made conclusory allegation that the failure was
deliberate, because the complaint lacked “any plausible allegation that the failure to file his

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motion was the result of an intentional or deliberate deprivation of his constitutional
rights”); Harper v. Currituck Cnty. Clerk of Cts., No. 506-CT-3004-D, 2006 WL 4719768, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2006), aff ’d sub nom. Harper v. Currituck Cnty. Clerk of Cts., 220 F. App’x
171 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing § 1983 claim against clerk of court based on her
miscalculation of plaintiff ’s time-served where “plaintiff [did] not allege deliberateness in
connection with the alleged miscalculation”); Grate v. White, No. 4:07-2949HMHTER, 2007
WL 2903991, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2007) (holding that clerk’s “negligent failure to send a
copy of the order to the Office of the Attorney General is not actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983”); see also Pink, 52 F.3d at 76 (holding that a prison official’s “unintended misrouting
of a routine money order request is too far afield from state action used for purposes of
oppression to constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause”).
Plaintiff ’s allegations in this case do not allow the court to reasonably infer that the
Clerk Defendants intentionally or deliberately sent his motion to another inmate. Instead,
the complaint suggests that the Clerk Defendants acted only negligently in their mailing
error. Cf. Williams v. Glover, No. CA 6:10-1591-TLW-KFM, 2010 WL 6872297, at *5 (D.S.C.
July 12, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:10-CV-1591-TLW-KFM, 2011 WL
2682170 (D.S.C. July 11, 2011), aff ’d, 461 F. App’x 315 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that clerk of
court’s mailing court documents to public defendant rather than to plaintiff himself was
“[a]t best” negligence and did not support a § 1983 claim); Wright v. Wilson, No. 3:23CV746,
2024 WL 4648097, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 31, 2024) (“[Plaintiff ’s] allegations that Defendant
Wilson mistakenly gave [his] legal mail to another inmate sound, at most, in negligence.”)
(citing Pink, 52 F.3d at 75). Because negligent conduct cannot support a § 1983 claim based

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on a due process violation, the court must dismiss Plaintiff ’s Fourteenth Amendment claims
against the Clerk Defendants as well. See Pink, 52 F.3d at 75–76. And because Plaintiff has
not stated a plausible § 1983 against Hamilton or the Deputy Clerk, the Court will grant their
motion to dismiss the claims against them.
C. Plaintiff ’s Rule 12(d) Argument
As a final note, the additional evidence Plaintiff seeks to offer in support of his
claims does not alter this Court’s ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss. (See Pl.’s Resp. in
Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss [ECF No. 24]; Pl.’s Aff. [ECF No. 24-1]; Pl.’s Supp. Docs.
[ECF No. 24-2].) As Plaintiff acknowledges, courts deciding motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) are limited to considering only the sufficiency of the allegation in the complaint and
the documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint. Megaro v. McCollum,
66 F.4th 151, 157 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637
F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011)). And under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), if “matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). But the decision
of whether to convert a motion to one for summary judgment is committed to the
discretion of the district court, Miller v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 813 F. App’x 869, 873 (4th Cir.
2020), and courts should refrain from such conversion where, as here, “the parties have not
had an opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d at 448–49 (citing Gay v.
Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1985).

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In ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the court limited its consideration to
only those materials appropriate for such motions—namely, the complaint itself. 3 Although
Plaintiff ’s response in opposition to Defendants’ motions arguably offers additional
allegations and claims, Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend his complaint to include any
of these new claims or allegations. Having excluded materials outside the pleadings from its
Rule 12(b)(6) consideration, the court finds that the allegations contained in the operative
pleading fail to state any plausible claim for relief. 4
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant the motions to dismiss filed by
the Clerk Defendants (ECF No. 20) and the Jail Defendants (ECF No. 21).5
ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2025.
/s/ Thomas T. Cullen________________
HON. THOMAS T. CULLEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Because the court resolves Defendants’ motions without considering Plaintiff ’s affidavit or supporting
documents, the court will deny the Clerk Defendants’ related motion to quash Plaintiff ’s affidavit (ECF No.
27) as moot.

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4 To the extent Plaintiff ’s motion to quash indictment (ECF No. 24-2) is a matter of public record and thus
subject to judicial notice and consideration without converting Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions to ones for
summary judgment, see Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009), the court finds that
the contents of the motion—absent any indication that it was deliberately sent to the wrong inmate—has no
effect on the court’s analysis.
5 The court acknowledges that Plaintiff

has filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, asking the Court of Appeals to require this Court “to respond” to Plaintiff ’s
notice of change of address and to “send [him] and update of everything filed” in this case. (See USCA
Notice [ECF No. 31].) The Court of Appeals has not yet resolved Plaintiff ’s petition, but Plaintiff has not
sought a stay of the proceedings in this Court pending the Fourth Circuit’s decision. See Fed. R. App. P.
8(a)(1)(A) (instructing that “[a] party must ordinarily move first in the district court for . . . a stay of the
judgment or order of a district court pending appeal”). Accordingly, this court has the authority to rule on
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, despite the pendency of Plaintiff ’s petition. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
433 (2009) (“A stay is not a matter of right . . . . The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that
the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.”) (citations omitted).

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