Taylor v. Wexford Health Services

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by District Judge Jasmine H. Yoon on 3/6/2025. (Opinion and Order mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(jv)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION

March 06, 2025

LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK
BY: s/J.Vasquez

Jamie L. Taylor,
Plaintiff,
v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 7:24-cv-00635

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jamie L. Taylor, an inmate housed at Southwest Regional Jail- Haysi
proceeding pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a single named
Defendant, Wexford Health Services (“Wexford”). 1 Taylor contends that his needs for
medical treatment and consultation related to a claimed cardiac condition were not met in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I.

Facts and Procedural History

The complaint alleges facts supporting Taylor’s contention that he requires more
monitoring and consultation because of a prior heart surgery, during which heart valves were
replaced. (Compl. at 2, 4 (Dkt. 1).) He contends he has not been appropriately evaluated
and treated, and he claims to be suffering cardiac symptoms.

(Compl. at 2–4.)

The

complaint does not mention Wexford or even state that Wexford was the medical provider at

1

The correct name of the Defendant is Wexford Health Sources, Inc. Accordingly, the docket was changed to reflect
the correct entity name.

the institution housing Taylor. The sole mention of Wexford is in the case caption.
Wexford filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. 15) and a memorandum in support of the
motion to dismiss (Dkt. 16), based, in part, upon Taylor’s failure to make any factual
allegations against it. Both the complaint and Taylor’s response to the motion to dismiss (Dkt.
19) identify no action or omission of Wexford that contributed to his claimed injuries.
Taylor’s response to the motion to dismiss merely expanded Taylor’s factual allegations about
his condition and identified the actions of some individual nurses. Neither the complaint nor
Taylor’s response to the motion to dismiss described the nurses’ relationship with Wexford.
II.

Standard of Review

Taylor brings this action pro se, so the court liberally construes his pleadings. See Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, the court may neither construct a plaintiff’s
legal arguments for them, Spanos v. Vick, 576 F. Supp. 3d 361, 366 (E.D. Va. 2021), nor
“conjure up questions never squarely presented,” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,
1278 (4th Cir. 1985). When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, dismissal is appropriate when the complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
III.

Analysis

Liability under § 1983 is personal, meaning that a plaintiff must identify the particular
actions or inactions of each defendant that led to the claimed harm. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275
F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983
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suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009).

Defendants “may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. Therefore, Wexford cannot be held
liable simply as the employer of staff or as the health-care provider at the institution. Rather,
to state a viable § 1983 claim against a corporation, a plaintiff must identify acts of the
corporation that caused his alleged harm. Specifically, “a private corporation is liable under
§ 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation
of federal rights.” Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999).
Taylor failed to make any allegations against Wexford, so he has not met these
standards. When there are no specific factual allegations against a defendant, dismissal is
warranted. E.g., Harris v. City of Virginia Beach, 11 F. Appx. 212, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2001)
(upholding dismissal of five defendants because of lack of allegations of personal
involvement).
IV.

Conclusion

Because Taylor failed to make any allegations whatsoever against sole Defendant
Wexford, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted.
Accordingly, dismissal of this action is warranted, and the court GRANTS the motion to
dismiss and DISMISSES this action without prejudice, meaning that the dismissal of this
action is not a finding that Taylor could not in the future state a claim against other defendants
or the named defendant. It is merely a ruling that the complaint filed by Taylor in this action
fails to state a claim against the named defendant, so it cannot proceed.
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The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order
to Taylor.
ENTERED this 6th day of March 2025.

/s/

Jasmine H. Yoon

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

HON. JASMINE H. YOON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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