Chandler v. Warden and Officers et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief District Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon on 1/6/2025. (Opinion mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(aab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
CHAUNCEY CHANDLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN AND OFFICERS, et al.,
Defendants.
CHAUNCEY CHANDLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ABINGDON REGIONAL JAIL, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 7:24-cv-00650
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
Chief United States District Judge

Civil Action No. 7:24-cv-00651
By: Elizabeth K. Dillon
Chief United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Chauncey Chandler, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed these two
civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They are before the court for review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that both complaints
fail to state a claim, and the court will issue orders of dismissal.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court must conduct an initial review of a
“complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.” See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (requiring court,
in a case where plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, to dismiss the case if it is frivolous or
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted). Pleadings of self-represented litigants are
given a liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). Liberal construction does not
mean, however, that the court can ignore a clear failure in pleadings to allege facts setting forth a

claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387,
391 (4th Cir. 1990). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Applying
these standards to Chandler’s complaints, the court concludes that they do not state any actionable
claims under federal law. Thus, it must be summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1).
The court considers both complaints together because the allegations are largely the
same. In the first action (the ‘650 case), plaintiff alleges that he is being charged a dollar a day
while he is at the Southwest Regional Jail. (See Compl.) He also complains that “they don’t
have me in any program while I can earn my 65% for time credit, they will not allow me to work
to earn time or a little money to buy . . . anything.” (Id. at 4.) In the second action (the ‘651
case), plaintiff asserts that the $1.00/day charge constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (See
Compl.) He “never sign a contract to agree with this type of charge” and he is now $438 in debt.
(Id. at 4.) As a result, plaintiff alleges that he cannot buy soap and he has had a nervous
breakdown. (See id.)
Plaintiff’s complaint about being charged a fee by the jail is legally insufficient. Prisons
and jails are entitled to charge inmates for necessities and medical care. See White v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 94 F. App’x 262, 264 (6th Cir. 2004). An Eighth Amendment violation only occurs if the
prison or jail conditions the right to receive necessary care or necessities on the payment of such
fees. See Wilson v. Thompson, Civil Action No. 5:13CV-P21-R, 2013 WL 3423756, at *3 (W.D.
Kent. July 8, 2013). Plaintiff fails to make such an allegation. See Waters v. Bass, 304 F. Supp.
2d 802, 807–08 (E.D. Va. 2004) (dismissing challenge to one dollar per day room and board fee
because plaintiff did not “identify how the . . . fee program deprives him of his basic human

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needs”).
Further, to the extent that plaintiff is challenging his inability to earn good time credits,
inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in earning such credits. See West v. Angelone,
165 F.3d 22, 1998 WL 746138, at *1 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Inmates have no protected liberty interest
in remaining in or being assigned to a particular good conduct allowance level . . .”); Mill v.
Holmes, 95 F. Supp. 3d 924, 931–34 (E.D. Va. 2015) (finding that “maintaining a particular . . .
earning level” for good conduct “is not a protected liberty interest in Virginia”).
For the foregoing reasons, the court will summarily dismiss these complaints, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state any actionable claims. In consideration of
plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant, however, and because he may be able to state sufficient
factual allegations to state an Eighth Amendment claim, the court will dismiss without prejudice
and allow him an opportunity to file an amended complaint asserting only that claim, and only
against the proper defendants, if he so chooses.
Appropriate orders will be entered.
Entered: January 6, 2025.

/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon
Chief United States District Judge

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