Reed Jr. v. Garosimowicz

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DISMISSAL ORDER granting Reed in forma pauperis status. The court orders that this action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(a). Signed by District Judge Jasmine H. Yoon on 1/3/2025. (Opinion and Order mailed to Pro Se Party/Parties via US Mail)(aab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Samuel C. Reed, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Andrew J. Garosimowicz,
Defendant.

$-&3,h4
0''*$&
64
%*45
$0635

"5
30"/0,&
7"
'*-&%
January 03, 2025
-"63"
"
"645*/
$-&3,

#:

s/A. Beeson

%&165:
$-&3,

Civil Action No. 7:24-cv-00777

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DISMISSAL ORDER
Plaintiff Samuel C. Reed, Jr., an incarcerated individual proceeding pro se, filed a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming Virginia State Police Trooper Andrew
Garosimowicz as the defendant. Reed complains that Garosimowicz directed him to stop
driving his car and that this attempted traffic stop caused Reed to crash. Reed in his complaint
denied that he had filed a prior action involving the same facts. (Compl., Dkt. 1 at 2.)
However, Reed did file a previous case arising out of the same facts in this court. Civil Action
No. 7:24-cv-00673.
Reed submitted the financial documentation and consent to collection of fees form
required to support his application to proceed in forma pauperis. The court has reviewed this
information and GRANTS Reed in forma pauperis status.
I.

Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court must conduct an initial review of a “complaint
in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity.” See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring the court, in
a case where a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, to dismiss the case if it is frivolous or
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted). Pleadings of pro se litigants are liberally
construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, liberal construction does not
permit the court to ignore a pleading’s failure to allege facts setting forth a cognizable claim.
See Weller v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). A complaint that offers
only “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255–56 (4th
Cir. 2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . [O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. A claim is “facially plausible”
when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. When the complaint of an
incarcerated individual or individual proceeding in forma pauperis fails to state a plausible claim
upon which relief could be granted, the case must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B),
1915A(a).
II.

Analysis

For the same reasons set out in the court’s dismissal order entered in Civil Action No.
7:24-cv-00673, (Dkt. 6), Reed’s complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim upon which
relief could be granted. As he did in his prior action, Reed contends that he was “enjoying my
-2-

personal Liberty of power of Locomotion” when Garosimowicz attempted to initiate a traffic
stop. (Compl. at 2.) He contends that this violated his “liberty of Power of Locomotion and
right to Interstate Travel” and caused him to “have a real Bad Traffic accident.” (Id. at 2, 3.)
Reed has no viable claim based upon the First Amendment right to interstate travel.
“The constitutional right to travel is not a right to travel in any manner, without regulation,
and does not provide travelers a right to ignore state traffic laws.” Byndon v. Pugh, 350 F. Supp.
3d 495, 510 (N.D. W. Va. 2018). Here, Reed states that Garosimowicz attempted to stop him.
(Compl. at 1). Even when an officer arguably lacks any reason whatsoever to stop an
individual, a driver is not permitted to evade or ignore the officer’s directive to pull over. Such
conduct is criminal conduct that violates Section 46.2-817 of the Code of Virginia, which
forbids disregarding a signal by a law enforcement officer to stop. The First Amendment does
not provide a shield that protects Reed against his violations of the law.
III.

Conclusion

For the reason set forth above, Reed’s complaint fails to state any viable claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to § 1983, and the court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any pendent state law claim(s) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Accordingly,
the court orders that this action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(a). If Reed believes he can identify sufficient facts that
would support a plausible claim of entitlement to relief, he may submit another complaint
stating those facts, subject to any applicable statute of limitations.

-3-

ENTERED this 3rd day of January 2025.

/s/

Jasmine H. Yoon

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

HON. JASMINE H. YOON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-4-