Langley v. GEICO General Insurance Company

Filing 81

ORDER denying 49 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Signed by Judge Salvador Mendoza, Jr. (JW, Operations Clk)

1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

5
6

GEORGE TERRY LANGLEY,
Plaintiff,

7

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

8
9

No. 1:14-CV-3069-SMJ

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

10
Defendant.
11
I.

12

INTRODUCTION

13

Before the Court, without oral argument, is Defendant GEICO General

14

Insurance Company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding IFCA

15

Claim, ECF No. 49. Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Insurance Fair

16

Conduct Act (IFCA) Claim because there was no denial of coverage or benefits.

17

Having reviewed the pleadings and the file in this matter, the Court is fully

18

informed and denies the motion finding that the IFCA claim may proceed either as

19

an unreasonable denial of payment of benefits or for violating an enumerated

20

Washington Administrative Code (WAC) provision.

ORDER - 1

II.

1
2

A.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background1

3

This case involves a dispute over a Recreational Vehicle (“RV”) insured by

4

GEICO under policy of insurance number 4262593512. The RV was purchased

5

with a salvage title by Sunwest through an online Co-Part auction for $50,500 on

6

August 16, 2012. Sunwest allegedly repaired the vehicle and sold it to Plaintiff

7

for $270,000. ECF No. 6-D. On April 18, 2013, Plaintiff purchased GEICO

8

policy of insurance No. 4262593512. On June 10, 2013, the RV was completely

9

destroyed by fire while being driven to a Pasco dealership by a Sunwest

10

employee. GEICO offered to pay plaintiff the original purchase price for the

11

salvage title RV of $50,500 by correspondence dated February 19, 2014. ECF

12

No. 6-M.

13

B.

Procedural Background

14

On May 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed the current lawsuit against Defendant in

15

Yakima County Superior Court, which Defendant subsequently removed to this

16

Court on May 27, 2014. ECF No. 1.

17

//

18
1

19
20

In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court has considered the facts and all reasonable inferences
therefrom as contained in the submitted affidavits, declarations, exhibits, and depositions, in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999).
However, in considering the facts, the Court does not rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data,
Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993), nor does the Court rely upon facts contained in affidavits
which directly contradict the affiants prior deposition testimony, Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 955
(9th Cir. 1999).

ORDER - 2

1

On July 1, 2014, Defendant moved to compel compliance with the

2

insurance policy’s appraisal provision. ECF No. 5. After the Court granted the

3

appraisal on August 29, 2014, ECF No. 25, Plaintiff sough reconsideration, ECF

4

No. 26, which was denied, ECF No. 30. Subsequently, Defendant moved twice to

5

compel Plaintiff’s compliance with the appraisal process, ECF Nos. 31 & 41,

6

which the Court subsequently granted. ECF No. 47.

7

On November 4, 2014, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

8

Olympic Steamship attorney fees on the grounds that no denial of coverage

9

occurred. ECF No. 36. On December 8, 2014, the Court dismiss the Olympic

10

Steamship attorney fee claim based upon Plaintiff concurring that dismissal was

11

proper, ECF No. 37. ECF No. 48.

12

On December 18, 2014, Defendant filed for partial summary judgment on

13

Plaintiff’s IFCA claim. ECF No. 49. On February 12, 2015, the Court was

14

advised that the appraisal process will not conclude until the end of March 2015.

15

ECF No. 70 at 4.
III.

16
17

A.

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Legal Standard

18

Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there is no

19

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

20

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once a party has moved for summary

ORDER - 3

1

judgment, the opposing party must point to specific facts establishing that there is

2

a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If

3

the nonmoving party fails to make such a showing for any of the elements

4

essential to its case for which it bears the burden of proof, the trial court should

5

grant the summary judgment motion. Id. at 322. “When the moving party has

6

carried its burden under Rule [56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply

7

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he

8

nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a

9

genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

10

U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). When

11

considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court does not weigh the

12

evidence or assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be

13

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v.

14

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). When considering the summary

15

judgment motion, the Court 1) took as true all undisputed facts; 2) viewed all

16

evidence and drew all justifiable inferences therefrom in non-moving party’s

17

favor; 3) did not weigh the evidence or assess credibility; and 4) did not accept

18

assertions made that were flatly contradicted by the record. See Scott v. Harris,

19

550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

20

(1986).

ORDER - 4

1

B.

Discussion

2

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s IFCA claim because

3

there was no denial of coverage or benefits. However, the parties dispute what

4

causes of action exist under the IFCA. Accordingly, this Court first construes the

5

provisions of the IFCA and then proceeds to address Defendant’s motion.

6

1.

7

The Washington State legislature passed the IFCA and referred it for a vote

8

of the people as Referendum 67 in 2007. Voters approved Referendum 67 on

9

November 6, 2007. The parties dispute what causes of action are available under

10

Insurance Fair Conduct Act, RCW 48.30.015

the IFCA, codified at RCW 48.30.015.

11

To determine what causes of action are available, the Court must turn to any

12

controlling Washington Supreme Court precedent interpreting the applicable

13

statute. In the absence of controlling Washington Supreme Court precedent, the

14

Court is Erie-bound to apply the law as it believes the Washington Supreme Court

15

would do so under the circumstances. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304

16

U.S. 64 (1938); Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (“If

17

there is no decision by [the state supreme] court then federal authorities must

18

apply what they find to be the state law after giving ‘proper regard’ to relevant

19

rulings of other courts of the State”).

20

//

ORDER - 5

a.

1

Existing Case Law

2

Here, neither party cites, nor has this Court found, any Washington

3

Supreme Court precedent interpreting RCW 48.30.015. However, the parties do

4

point to one nonbinding Washington appellate decision.

5

Washington Court of Appeals addressed RCW 48.30.015(1) finding that the

6

section describes “two separate acts giving rise to an IFCA claim. The insured

7

must show the insurer unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or that the insurer

8

unreasonably denied payment of benefits. If either or both acts are established, a

9

claim exists under IFCA.” Ainsworth v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 180 Wn. App.

10

52, 79 (2014) (not addressing RCW 48.30.015(5), finding a reasonable jury could

11

reach only the conclusion that both an unreasonable denial of coverage and an

12

unreasonable denial of payment occurred). Accordingly, neither party appears to

13

dispute that a cause of action can arise from either an unreasonable denial of

14

coverage or an unreasonable denial of payment of benefits.

15

In Ainsworth, the

However, Plaintiff maintains a third cause of action exists.

Plaintiff

16

maintains that a violation of the enumerated WAC provisions cited in RCW

17

48.30.015(5) is an independent basis for a cause of action, regardless of coverage

18

or benefits. To refute Plaintiff’s interpretation, Defendant points to a line of

19

federal court opinions. Reviewing the progeny of Washington federal court cases

20

ORDER - 6

1

addressing RCW 48.30.015, the Court is not persuaded that they provided a

2

proper interpretation of RCW 48.30.015.

3

The line of federal court opinions began in 2010 in the Western District of

4

Washington. The Travelers Court, looking only at RCW 48.30.015(1), found no

5

violation of the IFCA because the denial of coverage was reasonable. Travelers

6

Indem. Co. v. Bronsink, C08-1524JLR, 2010 WL 148366, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan.

7

12, 2010). Subsequently, in Bronsink, Judge Pechman stated that “[t]here are two

8

ways by which an insurer can violate the IFCA. One is by “unreasonably”

9

denying coverage . . . The IFCA also enumerates several sections of the

10

Washington Administrative Code (“WAC”), the violation of any one of which

11

will trigger a violation of the statute.” Bronsink v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,

12

C09-751MJP, 2010 WL 2342538, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2010). However,

13

the Bronsink opinion provides no explanation for how the Court reached the

14

conclusion that the WACs were independently actionable under the IFCA. After

15

Bronsink, a subsequent opinion by Judge Lasnik reached the opposite conclusion.

16

In Lease, a plaintiff did not allege a denial of coverage or payment, but instead

17

argued that a violation of WAC 284-30-330 constituted a per se violation of the

18

IFCA.

19

1862RSL, 2010 WL 4272453, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2010). The Court

20

disagreed without addressing the prior opinion in Bronsink and found that “[t]he

Lease Crutcher Lewis WA, LLC v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., C08-

ORDER - 7

1

language of the statute does not support plaintiff's argument. A violation of WAC

2

284-30-030 may justify the imposition of treble damages under RCW

3

48.30.015(2) and/or an award of fees and costs under RCW 48.30.015(3), but an

4

underlying denial of coverage is still required.” Id. The decisions in Travelers

5

and Lease were then cited favorably by Judge Robart when he reached the same

6

conclusion finding “[v]iolation of the regulations enumerated in RCW

7

48.30.015(5) provide grounds for trebling damages or for an award of attorney's

8

fees; they do not, on their own, provide a cause of action absent an unreasonable

9

denial of coverage or payment of benefits.” Weinstein & Riley, P.S. v. Westport

10

Ins. Corp., C08-1694JLR, 2011 WL 887552, at *30 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2011).

11

While in Bronsink Judge Pechman initially found violations of the WACs

12

sufficient to trigger a violation of the IFCA, she subsequently retracted that

13

position in two later opinions. See MK Lim, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., C10-

14

374MJP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126395 *7-8 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2011) (After

15

citing favorably to Travelers, Lease, and Weinstein, the Court noted its prior

16

opinion in Bronsink and stated that the “Court is not convinced [Bronsink] is a

17

proper reading of IFCA.” “The Legislature only provided a cause of action to one

18

who has suffered an unreasonably denial of coverage, not merely one who can

19

show a violation of one of the enumerated the [sic] WACs.”); Pinney v. American

20

Family Mut. Ins. Co., C11-175MJP, 2012 WL 584961 *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 22,

ORDER - 8

1

2012) (“Here, the Court follows the analysis of [Travelers, Lease, and Weinstein]

2

and finds a violation of one of the enumerated WAC provisions alone is not

3

sufficient to sustain a cause of action under IFCA.”).

4

The remaining federal authority rejecting a cause of action for a WAC

5

violation all reference back to the same cases in the Western District of

6

Washington. See e.g. Cardenas v. Navigators Ins. Co., C11-5578 RJB, 2011 WL

7

6300253, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2011) (citing to Weinstein and Travelers for

8

the proposition that the WACs do not alone provide a IFCA cause of action);

9

Morella v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, C12-0672RSL, 2013 WL 1562032, at *3

10

(W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2013) (same); Kabrich v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,

11

CV-12-3052-LRS, 2014 WL 3925493, at *11 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2014) (citing

12

Weinstein); Babcock v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 12-CV-5093-TOR, 2013 WL

13

24372, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2013) (citing to Cardenas and Weinstein).

14

However, recently, authority in the Eastern District of Washington has

15

begun to reject the precedent set by the Western District. See Merrill v. Crown

16

Life Ins. Co., 13-CV-0110-TOR, 2014 WL 2159266 (E.D. Wash. May 23, 2014)

17

(“The statute creates a private right of action against an insurer which (1)

18

“unreasonably denie[s] a claim for coverage or payment of benefits”; and/or (2)

19

violates one of several claims handling regulations promulgated by the

20

Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner. RCW 48.30.015(1),

ORDER - 9

1

(5).”); Hell Yeah Cycles v. Ohio Sec. Ins. Co., 16 F.Supp.3d 1224, 1235-36 (E.D.

2

Wash. Apr. 28, 2014) (“The statute also specifies that a first-party claimant may

3

sue his or her insurance company for violating any of the claims-handling

4

regulations promulgated by the Washington State Office of the Insurance

5

Commissioner at WAC 284–30–330 et seq. RCW 48.30.015(5).”).2 Similarly,

6

this Court, without providing a full explanation of its reasoning, stated in a

7

discovery dispute that “it is a violation of the IFCA for an insurer to refuse to pay

8

claims without conducting a reasonable investigation. WAC 284–30–330(4).”

9

Hover v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CV-13-05113-SMJ, 2014 WL

10

4239655, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2014) reconsideration denied, No. 13-CV-

11

05113-SMJ, 2014 WL 4546048 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2014)(“ Defendant believes

12

this was manifest error because ‘the only thing that gives rise to an IFCA violation

13

is an unreasonable denial of a claim for coverage or payment of benefits.’ ECF

14

No. 57 at 5. This is false.”).

15

Ultimately, having reviewed the existing case law, the Court is not

16

persuaded that an IFCA cause of action requires a denial of coverage or benefit.

17

Most of the authority cited is premised upon the rulings in Travelers, Lease, and

18

Weinstein. However, Travelers only addressed RCW 48.30.015(1) and did not

19
2

20

The Court notes that in 2013 Babcock opinion Judge Rice followed the holdings from the Western Washington
progeny of cases, but subsequently in Merrill and Hell Yeah Cycles appears to be moving back toward the initial
finding in Bronsink by adding the “and/or violates one of several claims handlings regulations” and citing to “RCW
48.30.015(5)” for a cause of action.

ORDER - 10

1

discuss the possible implications of RCW 48.30.015(2), (3), and (5).

2

Additionally, Lease and Weinstein limited its analysis of RCW 48.30.015(5) as

3

enumerating WACs which give rise to treble damages, costs, and fees under RCW

4

48.30.015(2) and (3). The opinions do not provide any analysis of the statutory

5

construction they utilized to reach their conclusions, and appear to only be looking

6

for express causes of action without determining whether the IFCA creates an

7

implied cause of action for violating an enumerated WAC.3
b.

8

Implied Cause of Action

9

The legislature may implicitly or explicitly create a cause of action. See

10

Ducote v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 167 Wn.2d 697, 702–03 (2009).

11

Whether a statute creates a cause of action is a matter of statutory construction.

12

Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979). Under the

13

ordinary rules of statutory construction, all of the words of the statute must be

14

given effect, so that no provision is rendered meaningless or superfluous. State v.

15

Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 615, 624 (2005).

16

construction, the ultimate goal is to determine the intent of the legislature. See

17

Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15–16. If the legislature does not expressly create a

18

cause of action, the Washington Supreme Court utilizes a three-part test to

19

determine the legislature's intent. Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.2d 912, 920–21

20

3

As in most matters of statutory

The Court concurs with the conclusions in Bronsink, Merrill, and Hell Yeah Cycles that a cause of action exists
for violating the WACs, but as those opinions do not explain how their conclusions were reached, the Court
provides a full explanation of its reasoning.

ORDER - 11

1

(1990). The Court must determine whether the plaintiff is “within the class for

2

whose ‘especial’ benefit the statute was enacted”; whether “legislative intent,

3

explicitly or implicitly, supports creating or denying a remedy”; and “whether

4

implying a remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation.”

5

Id. Implied causes of action are based upon the assumption that “‘the legislature

6

would not enact a remedial statute granting rights to an identifiable class without

7

enabling members of that class to enforce those rights.’” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at

8

919–20, (quoting McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265, 277 (1980) (Brachtenbach, J.,

9

dissenting)).
i.

10

Plaintiff is Within the Class Protected by the Statute

11

The first part of the test is satisfied because Plaintiff is “within the class for

12

whose ‘especial’ benefit the statute was enacted.” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920.

13

RCW 48.30.015 was enacted to provide insureds with a legal recourse against

14

their insurer independent from the Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff is a first

15

party claimant under an insurance policy who’s interest the legislature sought to

16

protect.
ii.

17

Legislative Intent Supports Creating a Claim

The second part of the test is satisfied because there are two sources of

18
19

explicit legislative intent to create a claim for violating the enumerated WACs.

20

//

ORDER - 12

1

The language in the statute provides support for creating a claim. Under the

2

ordinary rules of statutory construction, all of the words of the statute must be

3

given effect, so that no provision is rendered meaningless or superfluous. State v.

4

Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 615, 624 (2005). The statue provides a list of rules for

5

which a violation “is a violation for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) of this

6

section.” RCW 48.30.015(5). Subsections (2) and (3) provide

7
8
9
10
11
12

(2) The superior court may, after finding that an insurer has acted
unreasonably in denying a claim for coverage or payment of benefits
or has violated a rule in subsection (5) of this section, increase the
total award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the
actual damages.
(3) The superior court shall, after a finding of unreasonable denial of
a claim for coverage or payment of benefits, or after a finding of a
violation of a rule in subsection (5) of this section, award
reasonable attorneys' fees and actual and statutory litigation costs,
including expert witness fees, to the first party claimant of an
insurance contract who is the prevailing party in such an action.

13
RCW 48.30.015(2), (3) (emphasis added). Defendant maintains subsections (2)
14
and (3) limit violations of subsection (5) to damages.

However, such an

15
interpretation renders all of subsection (5) superfluous and meaningless. If, as
16
Defendant argues, a denial of coverage or benefits is necessary to maintain a cause
17
of action, then in every case in which such a denial of coverage or benefits exists
18
the “court shall” award reasonable fees and costs and “may” award treble
19
damages. RCW 48.30.015(2), (3). Accordingly, under Defendant’s theory, in
20
every IFCA claim the plaintiff either 1) fails to demonstrate a denial of coverage

ORDER - 13

1

or benefits and the claim is dismissed, or 2) demonstrates a denial of coverage or

2

benefits, and on that fact alone, the court has the discretion to aware treble

3

damages and is required to award fees and costs.

4

subsection (5) would always be immaterial because the denial of coverage or

5

benefit would always be independently sufficient to compel the award of fees and

6

costs, thus rendering all of subsection (5) superfluous and meaningless. The

7

legislature wrote subsections (2) and (3) in the disjunctive “or” and therefore

8

when interpreting the statute the Court must give each disjunctive clause effect.

9

The legislature mandated that a court award attorney fees and costs “after a

10

finding of a violation of a rule in subsection (5).” The only way for this mandate

11

to have any meaning is if plaintiffs have a cause of action for a violation of

12

subsection (5).

Therefore, a violation of

13

This interpretation of the IFCA is furthers supported by Referendum 67’s

14

explanatory statement. The effect of Referendum Measure 67 was explained to

15

the voters as follows:

16
17
18

ESSB 5726 would authorize any first party claimant to bring a
lawsuit in superior court against an insurer for unreasonably denying
a claim for coverage or payment of benefits, or violation of specified
insurance commissioner unfair claims handling practices
regulations, to recover damages and reasonable attorney fees, and
litigation costs.

19
Explanatory Statement, Referendum Measure 67, State of Washington Voters’
20
Pamphlet, Office of the Secretary of State, at 14 (Nov. 6, 2007),

ORDER - 14

1

http://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/Voters%27%20Pamphlet%202007.pdf

2

(“The Explanatory Statement was written by the Attorney General as required by

3

law and revised by the court.”) (emphasis added). Thus, when voters approved

4

the passage of the IFCA, a violation of the specified regulations, i.e. subsection

5

(5), was contemplated as a basis to bring a lawsuit.

6

Accordingly, the Court finds legislative intent to create a claim for violating

7

the enumerated WACs in both the language in the statute and the explanation of

8

that language provided to the voters.
iii.

9

Implied Remedy Is Consistent with the IFCA’s Purpose

10

Finally, the Court finds implying a remedy is consistent with the IFCA’s

11

purpose to provide fairness in the insurance claim process and encourages insurers

12

to engage in fair claims settlement practices. See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. of

13

Kansas v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 176 Wn. App. 185, 201 (2013) (“The purpose of

14

IFCA is to protect individual policy holders from unfair practices by their

15

insurers.”).

16

c.

Conclusion

17

Accordingly, the Court finds that at a minimum, an independent implied

18

cause of action exits under the IFCA for a first party claimant to bring a suit for a

19

violation of the enumerated WAC provisions in RCW 48.30.015(5). The Court

20

rejects the progeny of cases from the Western District of Washington which

ORDER - 15

1

reached a different conclusion, and concurs with the conclusion of Judge Rice’s

2

2014 opinions in Merrill and Hell Yeah Cycles.

3

2.

4

Based upon the foregoing analysis, to maintain a cause of action under the

5

IFCA, Plaintiff must prove either 1) an unreasonable denial of a claim for

6

coverage, 2) an unreasonable denial of payment of benefits, or 3) a violation of

7

WAC 284-30-330, 350, 360, 370, 380, or an unfair claim settlement practice rule

8

adopted under RCW 48.30.010 by the insurance commissioner that is codified in

9

chapter 284-30 of the Washington Administrative Code. RCW 48.30.015(1), (5).

10

Application to Defendant’s Motion

a.

Unreasonable Denial of a Claim for Coverage

11

The parties concur that no denial of coverage occurred and Plaintiff states

12

his IFCA claim is only for denial of payment of benefits and for violating specific

13

WAC regulations. ECF No. 53 at 6. Accordingly, there is no IFCA claim for

14

denial of coverage.

15

b.

Unreasonable Denial of Payment of Benefits

16

First, Defendant’s motion does not place reasonableness before the Court.

17

ECF No. 59 at 2 (“the issue of reasonableness . . . is not before the [C]ourt”). The

18

only issue of reasonableness this Court has addressed was the reasonableness of

19

documents requested of the insured in Defendant’s investigation of the loss,

20

applied only to the interpretation of the contractual provisions necessary to

ORDER - 16

1

determine whether an appraisal could be compelled.

ECF Nos. 25 & 30.

2

Furthermore, neither party has provided a factual statement required under Local

3

Rule 56.1. Accordingly, the Court’s inquiry must be limited to whether Plaintiff’s

4

allegation is sufficient to proceed as a denial of payment of benefits.

5

Defendant argues no denial of payment of benefits occurred because

6

Defendant offered to pay Plaintiff $50,500 on February 19, 2014, and then

7

maintains a valuation dispute arose. However, Plaintiff appears to maintain he

8

was denied payment of the benefit of his insurance policy when he was offered the

9

“extreme low-ball valuation of the R.V.” ECF No. 53 at 6. In determining what

10

is sufficient to maintain a denial of payment of benefit claim, the Court is guided

11

by the following:

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

The Court must construe “denial of payments of benefits” to
determine whether an outright refusal to pay a specific benefit
promised by the policy is required or whether an unreasonably low
payment will trigger the statute. Having reviewed RCW 48.30.015 as
a whole and virtually all of the relevant case law, the Court concludes
that an insurer cannot escape IFCA simply by accepting a claim and
paying or offering to pay an unreasonable amount. The benefits to
which a first-party insured is entitled are generally described as
payment of the reasonable expenses or losses incurred as a result of
an insured event. . . Where the insurer pays or offers to pay a paltry
amount that is not in line with the losses claimed, is not based on a
reasoned evaluation of the facts (as known or, in some cases, as
would have been known had the insurer adequately investigated the
claim), and would not compensate the insured for the loss at issue,
the benefits promised in the policy are effectively denied. If, on the
other hand, the insurer makes a reasonable payment based on the
known facts or is making a good faith effort to appropriately value
the loss, the fact that the insured did not immediately get all of the

ORDER - 17

1

benefits to which it may ultimately be entitled does not establish an
“unreasonable denial of payment of benefits.”

2
Morella v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, No. C12-0672RSL, 2013 WL 1562032, at
3
*3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2013) (citations omitted). The Court finds Morella
4
provides a persuasive interpretation of how to evaluate a claim for a denial of
5
payment of benefits when an offer is made but the value is disputed. However,
6
the Court does not have before it a sufficient factual position from either party to
7
determine the reasonableness of the valuation and further notes that the appraisal
8
process is ongoing. Accordingly, at this time the Court cannot determine whether
9
summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s unreasonable denial of payment of
10
benefits IFCA claim.
11
c.

Violation of the Enumerated WACs

12
Finally, as neither party has briefed the basis for the alleged enumerated
13
WAC violations under RCW 48.30.015(5), the Court cannot determine the merits
14
of the claim nor whether summary judgment is appropriate. Instead, all that can
15
be stated is that based upon the foregoing analysis Plaintiff may pursue applicable
16
WAC violations as an IFCA claim.
17
IV.

CONCLUSION

18
Therefore, the Court denies Defendant’s motion finding that on the records
19
so far presented, Plaintiff may proceed on an IFCA claim on either a theory of an
20
unreasonable denial of payment of benefits or a violation of an enumerated WAC.

ORDER - 18

1
2
3
4
5

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Defendant’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Regarding IFCA Claim, ECF No. 49, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order
and provide copies to all counsel.
DATED this 24th day of February 2015.
__________________________
SALVADOR MENDOZA, JR.
United States District Judge

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q:\SMJ\Civil\2014\Langley v. Geico-3069\deny.partial.msj.lfca.lc1.docx

ORDER - 19