Roybal v. Toppenish School District et al

Filing 115

ORDER RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 83 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part. Signed by Judge Salvador Mendoza, Jr. (AY, Case Administrator)

1
FILED IN THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT May 30, 2018
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON SEAN F. M AVOY, CLERK

3

C

4
ROBERT ROYBAL,

No. 1:14-CV-03092-SMJ

5
Plaintiff,
ORDER RULING ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

6
v.
7
8

TOPPENISH SCHOOL DISTRICT;
JOHN CERNA,
Defendants.

9
10

Before the Court is Plaintiff Robert Roybal’s Motion for Partial Summary
11
Judgment, ECF No. 83. The Court heard oral argument on this motion on May 11,
12
2018, and orally granted the motion in part. The Court then referred the parties to
13
mediation on the issue of damages. The parties held a settlement conference on May
14
29, 2018, but were unable to reach a resolution. This Order memorializes and
15
supplements the Court’s oral ruling.
16
BACKGROUND
17
A.

Undisputed Facts

18
Plaintiff Robert Roybal was employed as a principal by the Toppenish School
19
District (the District) from 2005 to 2012. In 2012, he was transferred to the positions
20
of Vice Principal of Toppenish Middle School and recruiter for the Computer

ORDER - 1

1

Academy Toppenish Schools (CATS). ECF No. 35-1. That same year, he received

2

a raise in base pay from $90,296 to $92,021. For the 2013–2014 school year,

3

Roybal’s base pay increased to $96,526. These salaries were consistent with the

4

School District’s pay structure for elementary school principals. ECF No. 51-1 at 3.

5

Roybal received his evaluation for the 2012–2013 school year on August 14,

6

2013. Id. at 42. The evaluation was completed by Jeanette Ozuna, the human

7

resources director during the 2012–2013 school year. Id. at 42. The evaluation gave

8

Roybal low marks, rating him as “basic” in all categories. Id. at 42. Under the

9

applicable evaluation standards, this rating required the District and Roybal to

10

create and implement a professional development plan to address points of

11

incompetence. See id. at 57.

12

Roybal objected to the evaluation, asserting that it did not comply with the

13

requirements set out in the memorandum of agreement between the Toppenish

14

Principal’s Association and the District. The memorandum of agreement requires

15

the District’s evaluations of principals to comply with specified evaluation

16

standards, District policy, and current Washington State statutes. Id. at 39. Roybal

17

brought his concerns to the District’s superintendent, John Cerna. Cerna did not

18

acknowledge any error with the evaluation. Id. at 8.

19

On August 16, 2013, Roybal’s attorney, Kevan Montoya, sent the District a

20

letter concerning Roybal’s evaluation. Id. at 46. The letter identified that its purpose

ORDER - 2

1

was to “ensure [the evaluation] follows Toppenish School District (District) policy

2

and Washington State law.” Id. The letter went on to explain that Roybal believed

3

his evaluation lacked evidence supporting its conclusions, in violation of Wash.

4

Admin. Code § 392-191A-140(2). Id. Approximately two weeks later, Cerna called

5

Roybal into his office, where Human Resources Director Larry Davison was also

6

present. Cerna criticized Roybal for “going outside” the District by hiring an

7

attorney and appeared visibly upset. Id. at 12.

8

On May 2, 2014, the District served Roybal a letter indicating he would be

9

reassigned for the 2014–2015 school year to a part-time social studies teaching

10

position and a part-time EAGLE/CATS recruiter position. Id. at 59. Due to the

11

reassignment, Roybal’s base pay was reduced from $96,526 to $56,599. Id. The

12

letter did not provide the basis for the reassignment, but indicated that the

13

assignment was in accordance with Wash. Rev. Code (RCW) § 28A.405.230. Id.

14

On May 15, 2014, the District sent Roybal a letter stating the reasons for the

15

transfer. Id.

16

On May 22, 2014, Roybal and his counsel appeared at an informal meeting

17

with the District’s board of directors and Cerna. See ECF No. 88-1. Roybal

18

maintained that the meeting was not the proper process for transferring him and

19

requested reconsideration of his reassignment. Id. at 3–4. At the meeting, Roybal

20

was given a document titled “Basis for Robert Roybal reassignment,” ECF No. 51-

ORDER - 3

1

1 at 84, but had no opportunity to respond to it. Roybal was not permitted to conduct

2

discovery, present evidence, or call witnesses. See ECF No. 88-1. The District

3

issued its written response on June 2, 2014, denying Roybal’s request for

4

reconsideration.

5

Roybal is still employed as a teacher in the Toppenish School District. To

6

date, Roybal has not received a notice of probable cause under RCW

7

§ 28A.405.300, nor has he received a hearing under RCW § 28A.405.310.

8

B.

Procedural History

9

Roybal filed suit in Yakima County Superior Court on June 13, 2014, against

10

Toppenish School District and superintendent John Cerna (collectively,

11

“Toppenish”). Toppenish removed the matter to this Court on June 30, 2014.

12

On March 27, 2015, Toppenish moved for summary judgment, and on May

13

1, 2015, Roybal filed a cross motion for summary judgment. The Court granted

14

Toppenish’ motion for summary judgment on Roybal’s demand for a writ of

15

mandamus and breach of contract claims. ECF No. 63. The Court granted Roybal’s

16

motion for summary judgment on his § 1983 due process claim. Id.

17

Toppenish appealed, and the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion on September

18

20, 2017, reversing in part and dismissing in part. ECF No. 73. The court of appeals

19

reversed the summary judgment grant to Roybal on the due process claim and

20

directed this Court to enter judgment on behalf of Toppenish. Id. The court of

ORDER - 4

1

appeals further noted that it lacked jurisdiction to review Roybal’s First Amendment

2

retaliation claim, and instructed that this claim should proceed to trial. Id. The Court

3

entered an amended order reflecting the Ninth Circuit’s mandate on February 23,

4

2018. ECF No. 76.
Roybal filed the instant motion for summary judgment on March 14, 2018.

5
6

ECF No. 83. Oral argument occurred on May 11, 2018.
DISCUSSION

7
8

A.

This Court has already determined that the District’s transfer process
violated Roybal’s statutory rights under RCW § 28A.405.230.

9
As a preliminary matter, a brief overview of the statutory scheme governing
10
the removal of tenured principals is helpful to understanding the arguments at issue
11
in this case. RCW § 28A.405.230—the statute that the District cited in its transfer
12
notice to Roybal—governs the transfer of untenured administrators to subordinate
13
certificated positions. The statute requires that the superintendent notify the
14
administrator in writing of the transfer on or before May 15th preceding the
15
commencement of the next school term. Id. Following the notification, the
16
administrator may meet informally with the board of directors in an executive
17
session to request reconsideration of the superintendent’s decision. Id. The board
18
must then notify the administrator in writing of its final decision within ten days of
19
the meeting. Id.
20

ORDER - 5

1

Section 28A.405.245 sets out a similar procedure for terminating principals

2

who have worked more than three consecutive years as a principal in the district.

3

The statute provides,

4
5
6

Transfer of the principal to a subordinate certificated position shall be
based on the superintendent’s determination that the results of the
evaluation of the principal’s performance using the evaluative criteria
and rating system established under RCW 28A.405.100 provide a valid
reason for the transfer without regard to whether there is probable
cause for the transfer.

7
RCW § 28A.405.245. If such is the case, the principal is subject to transfer in
8
accordance with the same informal meeting procedures set out in RCW
9
§ 28A.405.230.
10
Importantly, RCW § 28A.405.245 applies only to principals “first employed
11
by a school district” after June 10, 2010. Likewise, RCW § 28A.205.230 does not
12
apply to principals hired before June 10, 2010. Accordingly, principals hired before
13
June 10, 2010, such as Roybal, are entitled to statutory due process proceedings
14
before being transferred to a subordinate certificated position.
15
The statutory framework establishes a right to notice, a formal hearing before
16
a hearing examiner, and appeal. RCW §§ 28A.305.300–.380. First, the district must
17
notify the principal of the adverse decision in writing, and the notification must
18
specify the probable cause for such action. Id. § .300. The principal may then
19
request a statutory hearing to determine whether sufficient cause exists to justify
20
the adverse action. Id. Prior to the hearing, the principal may request subpoenas,

ORDER - 6

1

take depositions, conduct discovery, and retain counsel. Id. At the hearing, the

2

principal may respond to allegations against him or her and present evidence. Id.

3

Following the hearing, the principal may appeal the decision to the superior court

4

in the county in which the school district is located. Id. § .320.

5

In its prior motion for summary judgment, Toppenish contended that Roybal

6

was not a tenured principal under RCW § 28A.405.230 because he was transferred

7

to the position of vice principal in 2012. The Court determined that, under

8

Washington law, a principal’s classification does not change when the principal is

9

transferred but maintains the same annual salary. ECF No. 63 at 10. The Court went

10

on to conclude that “because Plaintiff retained his status, the District’s decision to

11

transfer him to a lesser-paying position before the 2014–2015 school year triggered

12

statutory due process protections.” Id.

13

In its previous order, the Court held that the District violated Roybal’s

14

statutory rights by transferring him to a subordinate certificated position without a

15

probable cause hearing. Id. Although the Court’s conclusion that the District

16

violated Roybal’s constitutional due process rights was reversed on appeal, the

17

holding that the District violated Roybal’s statutory rights by failing to hold a

18

hearing remains valid.

19
20

ORDER - 7

1

In sum, the undisputed facts show that the District violated Roybal’s statutory

2

rights under RCW § 28A.405.310. Consistent with this Court’s prior holding,

3

Roybal is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

4

B.

Roybal is entitled to reinstatement plus damages under RCW
§ 28A.405.350.

5
The parties next dispute the appropriate remedy for a statutory due process
6
violation. Roybal argues that he is entitled to reinstatement plus damages for lost
7
wages in the years following his transfer to a subordinate certificated position under
8
RCW § 28A.405.350. Toppenish argues that the appropriate remedy is an order
9
directing a hearing consistent with RCW § 28A.405.300 et seq. Both the statute and
10
the case law favor Roybal’s position that he is entitled to reinstatement and
11
damages.
12
RCW § 28A.405.350 governs the remedy for violations of a tenured
13
principal’s statutory due process rights:
14

16

If the court enters judgment for the employee, in addition to ordering
the school board to reinstate or issue a new contract to the employee,
the court may award damages for loss of compensation incurred by the
employee by reason of the action of the school district.

17

Id. The statute’s plain text unambiguously directs the court to order reinstatement

18

of the employee and permits the court to award damages.

15

19

Roybal’s position finds ample support in Washington case law as well. See,

20

e.g., Foster v. Carson Sch. Dist. No. 301, 385 P.2d 367 (Wash. 1963) (awarding

ORDER - 8

1

damages where teacher was dismissed without proper notice); Van Horn v. Highline

2

Sch. Dist. No. 401, 562 P.2d 641 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (awarding reinstatement

3

plus damages where teacher’s contract was improperly not renewed). Hyde v.

4

Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No. 49, is the most analogous to the case at bar. 611 P.2d 1388

5

(Wash. Ct. App. 1980). In that case, Ed Hyde brought suit challenging the

6

nonrenewal of his contract as principal with Wellpinit School District. Id. at 1390.

7

Prior to his termination, Hyde received a letter from the district superintendent

8

listing fifteen “negative items” regarding Mr. Hyde’s performance as principal and

9

requesting his voluntary resignation. Id. at 1389. The letter closed by stating that if

10

Hyde did not resign, the superintendent would recommend that the board vote not

11

to renew Hyde’s contract. Id. Hyde met informally with the board to request

12

reconsideration. The board deferred voting on the matter for two more sessions,

13

then denied Hyde’s request. Id. at 1389–90.Hyde appealed, and the superior court

14

dismissed the appeal as untimely. The court of appeals reversed. Id. at 1392. The

15

court of appeals did not determine whether Hyde’s appeal was untimely, reasoning

16

that the board’s termination was facially inadequate because it was not based on the

17

statutorily-required principal evaluation standards. Id. The court of appeals

18

remanded to the superior court for reinstatement and award of damages and

19

attorney’s fees under RCW § 28A.58.490 (recodified as RCW § 28A.490.350). Id.

20

Thus, as Hyde demonstrates, when a principal is terminated in violation of his or

ORDER - 9

1

her statutory rights, the court may order reinstatement plus damages and attorney’s

2

fees.

3

In support of its argument that the appropriate remedy is a hearing, Toppenish

4

cites two cases: Cronin v. Central Valley Sch. Dist., 193 Wash. App. 1022, 2016

5

WL 1533377 (Apr. 14, 2016) (unpublished), and Giedra v. Mt. Adams Sch. Dist.

6

No. 209, 110 P.3d 232 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). However, Toppenish’s reliance on

7

these cases is misplaced. Unlike the present action, the teachers in Cronin and

8

Giedra sued only for declaratory and injunctive relief directing the school district

9

to provide them with a pretermination hearing. In Cronin, a teacher was fired in

10

violation of RCW §§ 28A.405.300 and .310. Cronin, 2016 WL 1533377, at *11.

11

The teacher then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to compel the school

12

district to engage in the hearing process. Id. at *6. The district court dismissed the

13

action as an untimely appeal, but the court of appeals reversed. Id. The court of

14

appeals granted the teacher’s request for declaratory relief requiring the district to

15

participate in the statutory hearing process. Id. at *16. The court of appeals

16

explicitly noted that its opinion did not address damages for lost pay and benefits

17

because the trial court had not addressed the issue and it was not briefed on appeal.

18

Id. Thus, Cronin merely stands for the proposition that a wrongly terminated teacher

19

may be entitled to injunctive relief. This does not mean the teacher not also entitled

20

ORDER - 10

1

to other forms of relief. The holding in Giedra is similarly limited to the relief

2

requested by the plaintiffs. 110 P.3d at 236–37.
Accordingly, because the Court enters judgment in Roybal’s favor on the

3
4

issue of violation of statutory due process,

RCW § 28A.405.350 plainly directs

5

the court to order reinstatement and permits an award of damages and attorney’s

6

fees.

7

C.

Roybal is not entitled to summary judgment on his claim under RCW
§ 49.52.070.

8
RCW § 49.52.070 permits an employee to recover double damages for
9
wrongfully withheld wages. The employer’s failure to pay wages must be “willful.”
10
Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 961 P.2d 371, 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). An
11
employer’s act is not willful if it results from the employer’s carelessness in failing
12
to pay or if a “bona fide” dispute existed between the employer and employee
13
regarding the payment of wages. Id. at 160. Here, Toppenish willfully failed to pay
14
Roybal wages owed. However, Roybal can succeed on summary judgment only if
15
he can show that no bona fide dispute existed as to the wages owed. This he cannot
16
do. A bona fide dispute must arise from a fairly debatable difference in opinion as
17
to whether wages are owed.
18
Here, a reasonable jury could find that Toppenish fairly disputed whether
19
Roybal’s was entitled to a hearing before a hearing officer prior to his transfer to a
20
subordinated certificated position. The process followed by the District in notifying

ORDER - 11

1

and transferring Roybal to the subordinate certificated position closely tracked the

2

procedures for transferring a nontenured administrator set out in RCW

3

§ 28A.405.245. A reasonable juror may find this fact supports Toppenish’s

4

assertion that it had a good faith belief that Roybal was not a tenured administrator

5

at the time of his transfer and that his transfer was valid. Because an issue of fact as

6

to Toppenish’s willfulness remains, Roybal is not entitled to summary judgment on

7

his claim for damages under RCW § 49.52.070.

8

D.

The matter will proceed to trial on the question of damages.

9

The parties dispute the actual damages incurred by Roybal as a result of

10

Toppenish’s violation of his statutory rights. At the hearing, the Court instructed

11

the parties to contact Magistrate Judge Dimke to arrange mediation on the issue of

12

damages. The parties did so, but were unable to reach a resolution. The Court

13

therefore makes no finding on this issue of damages at the summary judgment stage.

14

The issue of damages will be reserved for trial.

15

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

16

1.

GRANTED in part.

17
18

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 83, is

2.

Pursuant to RCW § 28A.405.350, Roybal is entitled to reinstatement.

19

The District shall reinstate Roybal as soon as practicable but no later

20

than the start of the 2018–2019 school year. Reinstatement does not

ORDER - 12

1

require that Roybal serve in the position of principal, but it must

2

comply with Sneed v. Barna, 912 P.2d 1035 (Wash. App. 1996), in

3

that his salary must be commensurate with a principal of similar

4

standing.

5
6
7

IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and
provide copies to all counsel.
DATED this 30th day of May 2018.

8
__________________________
SALVADOR MENDOZA, JR.
United States District Judge

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

ORDER - 13