Mooney v. Colvin

Filing 20

ORDER Denying 18 Defendant's Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Robert H. Whaley. (CV, Case Administrator)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

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JENNIFER MOONEY,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,

No. 1:16-CV-3006-RHW

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTER
JUDGMENT

Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). ECF No. 18. The Court has considered the
briefing and the history of the case, and is fully informed. The motion was heard
without oral argument.
Background
On October 12, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff Jennifer Mooney’s Motion
for Summary Judgment and remanded for immediate payment of benefits without
further proceedings. ECF No. 16. The Court held that the Administrative Law

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTER JUDGMENT ~ 1

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Judge (“ALJ”) had erred in discrediting the medical opinion of Dr. Caryn Jackson,

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M.D., Ms. Mooney’s treating physician. Id. at 8-11. When the limitations set forth

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by Dr. Jackson were presented to vocational expert Trevor Duncan, Mr. Duncan

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testified that these limitations would eliminate Ms. Mooney’s ability to sustain

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gainful employment. Id. at 11. Based on this testimony, the Court found Ms.

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Mooney to be disabled, additional proceedings would be unnecessary, and ordered

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a remand for payment of benefits. Id. at 11-13. On the same day, judgment was

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entered in favor of Ms. Mooney. ECF No. 17.

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The Commissioner timely filed this Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on

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November 9, 2016, alleging that the Court committed clear error and the decision

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was manifestly unjust. ECF No. 18.

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Analysis
A party may ask the Court to amend or alter a previous order pursuant to

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FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). This is “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the

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interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani,

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342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). The decision to deny or grant a motion pursuant

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to FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) is within the discretion of the district court. McQuillion v.

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Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003). A 59(e) motion may be granted

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when: (1) the motion is necessary to correct “manifest errors of law upon which

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the judgment is based”; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTER JUDGMENT ~ 2

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previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to “prevent manifest

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injustice”; or 4) there is an intervening change in controlling law. Turner v.

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Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), district courts have the power to enter a

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judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of

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Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The

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Commissioner’s determination will be set aside when the ALJ’s findings are based

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on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

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Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

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405(g)).
The Commissioner asserts that the Court erred by applying the “credit-as-

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true” to Dr. Jackson’s opinion. ECF No. 18 at 3-6. The “credit-as-true” rule

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requires that: (1) the record is fully developed and no further administrative

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proceedings would be useful; (2) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient

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reasons for rejecting the evidence; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence

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were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find disability on remand.

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Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Further, the Ninth Circuit

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has indicated that it could be an abuse of discretion for a district court not to

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remand when all of these conditions are met unless the record as a whole seriously

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calls into doubt that the claimant is disabled. Id.; see also, e.g., McCartey v.

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Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1706-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504

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F.3d 1028, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).

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In Garrison, a vocational expert testified that based on the limitations set

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forth in the improperly discredited evidence, the claimant could not work.

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Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1022. That is also what happened in the instant case. Based

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on the limitations set forth in Dr. Jackson’s improperly discredited evidence, Mr.

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Duncan testified that Ms. Mooney is unable to work. See ECF No. 16 at 11-12, AR

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177, 1058-59. Because of this clear evidence of disability, the Court had the

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discretion to remand for further proceedings or an immediate award of benefit. The

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Court reviewed the full record and found that further proceedings would be

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unnecessary and the record did not seriously call into doubt that Ms. Mooney is

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disabled. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1022-23.

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

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1. Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), ECF No. 18, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this
Order, forward copies to counsel and close the file.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2016.
s/Robert H. Whaley
ROBERT H. WHALEY
Senior United States District Judge

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