Friends of Moon Creek v. Diamond Lake Improvement Association Inc et al

Filing 219

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - denying 217 Motion for Declaratory Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Justin L. Quackenbush. (CC, Case Administrator)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

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FRIENDS OF MOON CREEK, an
unincorporated association, Cheryl
and Robert Balentine, George A. and
Jane Doe Tyler; Douglas M. and Jane
Doe Anderson; Tom and Michele Bowyer
Joe F. and Jane Doe Struther; Mark and
Jane Doe Moeser; Gaylan and Jane Doe
Warren, and Michael and Jane Doe
Jeffrey,

)
) No. CV-13-0396-JLQ
)
) ORDER DENYING MOTION
) FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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DIAMOND LAKE IMPROVEMENT,
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ASSOCIATION, INC., PHIL ANDERSON, )
Director Department of Fish & Wildlife,
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SHARON SORBY, Coordinator Pend
)
Oreille County Noxious Weed Control
)
Board,
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Defendants/Cross-/Counter-Claimants. )
___________________________________ )

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BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment (ECF No.

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217). Defendants filed a “Joint Response” (ECF No. 218) opposing the Motion. No

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Reply was filed, and the Motion was submitted without oral argument on September 17,

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2015.

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The Motion was filed on August 18, 2015, the day after the court had issued an

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Order staying the proceedings. (ECF No. 216). The Motion seeks to have the court enter

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a declaratory judgment in accord with the rulings made in the court’s Order Re: Motions

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for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 206) filed on May 13, 2015. The Motion does not

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address why entry of a declaratory judgment at this time is appropriate, but rather focuses

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ORDER - 1

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on the court’s authority to enter such judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). That the

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court “may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims

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or parties,” does not mean that the court should do so, particularly here when the matter

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has been stayed and the parties are litigating the matter in state court.

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The court presumes that Plaintiffs seek entry of a judgment in order that they may

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more effectively argue to the state court that the issues have been conclusively

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established. The court stayed this action in the interests of judicial economy. The court

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noted that the primary claim at issue was a state law trespass claim and that the state court

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could grant complete relief. The court did not intend for the parties to re-litigate issues

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which were already decided. The court stated: “It would appear that the parties are in a

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position to request an expedited trial setting in state court. Issuing a stay in this action

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should not result in undue delay in the final resolution of the litigation between the

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parties.” (ECF No. 216, p. 4). The court further stated that the stay was “not indefinite

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and the resolution of the parties’ dispute should not be unduly delayed” and has required

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the filing of status reports. (Id.).

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Defendants’ Response argues that the Motion was filed in violation of the court’s

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Order staying proceedings and should be denied. Defendants further argue that the

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language of Plaintiffs’ proposed declaratory judgment is not consistent with this court’s

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prior rulings as stated in the Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 206).

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Defendants contend entry of a partial final judgment is not in the interests of judicial

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economy as it could “foster piecemeal appeals”. (ECF No. 218, p. 5). Both sides direct

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the court to Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2005). In the Wood case,

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the district court entered a final judgment as to a partial grant of summary judgment

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pursuant to Rule 54(b). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the Rule 54(b)

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certification was “improvidently granted” and dismissed the appeal. Id. at 883. The court

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found it was routine case, facts on all the claims and issues overlapped, and that

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successive appeals were likely. The court stated that a district court must take “judicial

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administrative interests into account” and that “[a]bsent a seriously important reason,

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both the spirit of Rule 1 and the interests of judicial administration counsel against

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certifying claims or related issues in remaining claims that are based on interlocking

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facts, in a routine case, that will likely lead to successive appeals.” Id. However, the

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court also stated: “We do not mean to suggest that claims with overlapping facts are

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foreclosed from being separate for purposes of Rule 54(b).” Id. at 881.

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Thus the Wood case confirms that a partial final judgment may be entered under

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Rule 54(b), but also cautions that doing so should not be routine. “It is left to the sound

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judicial discretion of the district court to determine the ‘appropriate time’ when each final

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decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. This discretion must be exercised

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in the interest of sound judicial administration.” Id. at 878. This court will not enter a

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Rule 54(b) judgment at this time.

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The parties are directed to proceed cooperatively and expeditiously in the state

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court matter. It is not this court’s expectation that the parties will waste time re-litigating

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issues already determined and the time required for additional discovery should be short.

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In the instant briefing, DLIA continues to argue an issue already decided and states that

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DLIA has never “conceded” it was a joint actor. (ECF No. 218, p. 10). This court, based

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on the summary judgment record, has already ruled: “The court further finds that the

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evidence in the summary judgment record establishes, as a matter of law, that Sorby, a

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state actor, and DLIA were acting jointly such that DLIA’s actions in regard to the 2012

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herbicide application constitute state action.”(ECF No. 206, p. 13). Neither side to this

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litigation should unduly delay this matter through re-argument of issues decided or by

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engaging in duplicative discovery in the state court action. Any such conduct may be

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brought to the attention of this court, as such conduct diminishes the interests of judicial

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economy which contributed to the court’s decision to grant the stay. In order to further

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ensure that this matter is not unduly delayed and that the parties are working in the spirit

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of Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 (“...to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every

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action and proceeding”), the court adjusts herein the deadlines for filing status reports.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

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1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment (ECF No. 217) is DENIED.

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2. The stay is not indefinite and the resolution of the parties’ dispute should not be

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unduly delayed. The parties shall file a status report on or before January 2, 2016, and

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every four months thereafter. The status report may be filed jointly or separately and

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need not be lengthy.

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3. If the dispute between the parties is resolved via settlement, the parties shall

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promptly notify the court. Additionally, the parties shall promptly inform the court if

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judgment is entered by the state court.

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4. The court’s Order (ECF No. 80) which granted in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for

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Preliminary Injunction shall remain in effect during the pendency of the stay unless

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otherwise ordered by this court.

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IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk shall enter this Order and furnish copies to
counsel.
Dated this 29th day of September, 2015.
s/ Justin L. Quackenbush
JUSTIN L. QUACKENBUSH
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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