Friends of Moon Creek v. Diamond Lake Improvement Association Inc et al
Filing
276
ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS. GRANTING IN PART 269 Defendant Sorby's Motion to Dismiss; DENYING 271 Defendant DLIA's Motion to Dismiss; DENYING AS MOOT 272 Jeffrey's Consent to Motions to Dismiss, erroneously docketed as a motion. Signed by Senior Judge Justin L. Quackenbush. (SK, Case Administrator)
FILED IN THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
1
2
Sep 13, 2018
3
SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
FRIENDS OF MOON CREEK, an
unincorporated association, Cheryl
and Robert Balentine, George A. and
Jane Doe Tyler; Douglas M. and Jane
Doe Anderson; Tom and Michele Bowyer
Joe F. and Jane Doe Struther; Mark and
Jane Doe Moeser; Gaylan and Jane Doe
Warren, and Michael and Jane Doe
Jeffrey,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
DIAMOND LAKE IMPROVEMENT,
)
ASSOCIATION, INC., PHIL ANDERSON, )
Director Department of Fish & Wildlife,
)
SHARON SORBY, Coordinator Pend
)
Oreille County Noxious Weed Control
)
Board,
)
)
Defendants/Cross-/Counter-Claimants. )
___________________________________ )
No. 2:13-CV-0396-JLQ
ORDER RE: MOTIONS
TO DISMISS
20
BEFORE THE COURT are the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 269) of Defendant
21
Sharon Sorby, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 271) of Defendant Diamond Lake
22
Improvement Association, and the “Plaintiffs Jeffrey’s Consent to Motions to Dismiss”
23
(ECF No. 272), which Plaintiffs’ filing has been erroneously docketed as a motion.
24
I. Introduction
25
This litigation has a long and somewhat complicated history, which will not be
26
repeated in detail here. For prior history see Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
27
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 80); Order re: Realignment of Parties (ECF
28
No. 101)(containing brief recitation of parties and numerous claims). In short, this
ORDER - 1
1
litigation has been on-going for nearly five years, and has proceeded in both state and
2
federal court. The parties now report most claims have been resolved in state court, at
3
least at the trial level, with some claims also having been adjudicated on interlocutory
4
appeal.
5
The parties have intermittently filed status reports in this court concerning the state
6
court proceedings. On May 15, 2018, this court issued an Order (ECF No. 262) directing
7
the filing of status reports. The court directed the parties to address “the appropriate
8
disposition of this federal action given the preliminary injunction has been dissolved and
9
all claims are being litigated in state court,” and whether this matter should remain open.
10
(Id. at p. 4-5). The parties filed status reports and largely agreed the matter could be
11
closed, with the exception of Plaintiffs, who contended the file may need to remain open
12
for a potential attorney fee motion by Defendant DLIA. See Order (ECF No. 268). The
13
court’s Order of June 19, 2018, directed the parties that if they agreed to closure of the
14
file, they could file an appropriate stipulation pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41, or if they did
15
not agree, an individual defendant could move for entry of partial judgment. (ECF No.
16
268, p. 2). Two of the Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss. No stipulation to dismissal
17
was filed. Two of the Plaintiffs filed a notice formally consenting to dismissal.
18
II. Discussion
19
Plaintiffs (all but the Jeffrey’s Plaintiffs) filed a “Memorandum in Opposition to
20
Defendant DLIA’s Motion to Dismiss” (ECF No. 273). Plaintiffs object to DLIA’s
21
suggestion that its counterclaims be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs contend the
22
counterclaims should be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs state dismissal with
23
prejudice “is merited if only because three of the six waterfront plaintiffs have died
24
during the pendency of this Moon Creek litigation.” (Id. at p. 2). Plaintiffs state Plaintiff
25
Douglas Anderson died in 2015, Plaintiffs George Tyler and Joe Struthers died in 2016,
26
and one Plaintiff, Mark Moeser, sold his Moon Creek property. This is the first the court
27
has been informed of the deaths of any of the Plaintiffs. No suggestion of death was
28
filed, nor motion for substitution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25.
ORDER - 2
1
A. Defendant Sorby’s Motion to Dismiss
2
Defendant Sorby obtained dismissal of some of the claims against her by Order of
3
the state Superior Court on December 1, 2016. (ECF No. 270-1). The Superior Court
4
ruled she was not entitled to qualified immunity on the claims brought against her under
5
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sorby took an interlocutory appeal of the qualified immunity issue,
6
and on February 6, 2018, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled she was entitled to
7
qualified immunity. (ECF No. 270-2). The Court of Appeals remanded with directions
8
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Sorby. Those claims were dismissed by the Superior
9
Court on April 19, 2018.
10
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ have filed no opposition to the instant Motion. Failure to
11
timely respond may be deemed consent to the entry of an adverse Order. Local Rule
12
7.1(d). The claims against Defendant Sorby have been dismissed in the state court action,
13
and Plaintiffs have not opposed dismissal here. The court finds dismissal appropriate and
14
the Motion is GRANTED IN PART. The claims will be dismissed upon entry of final
15
judgment, but the court will not direct entry of a partial judgment pursuant to
16
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
17
B. Defendant DLIA’s Motion to Dismiss
18
According to the parties’ recent status reports, the only claims which remain
19
pending in state court are between Defendant/Counter-Claimant Diamond Lake
20
Improvement Association (“DLIA”) and Plaintiffs. DLIA states it “has been working
21
with Plaintiffs’ counsel to reach a resolution of all claims pending in state court,
22
including DLIA’s counterclaims.” (ECF No. 265). DLIA moves for dismissal of the
23
claims against it with prejudice and for dismissal of its counterclaims without prejudice,
24
so that it may pursue them in state court. (ECF No. 271, p. 2). DLIA states its
25
counterclaims “are dependent on state law” and this court need not retain jurisdiction.
26
The state court record submitted by DLIA does not demonstrate that all claims
27
against DLIA in state court have been finally adjudicated. DLIA submits a copy of a state
28
court Order granting in part a motion for summary judgment. DLIA submits documents
ORDER - 3
1
showing Plaintiffs’ request for interlocutory review of that Order was denied. DLIA
2
submits the “Commissioner’s Ruling” from the Court of Appeals dated November 16,
3
2017, which indicates the matter is not final. (ECF No. 271-1, at p. 16).
4
Commissioner’s Ruling states: “Friends may still appeal the superior court’s summary
5
judgment decision after trial on the remaining causes of action.” (ECF No. 271-1, p. 20).
6
Additionally, DLIA’s May 18, 2018 Status Report states in part: “If all claims
7
cannot be resolved, DLIA intends to move forward with a summary judgment in state
8
court on the sole remaining claim against it and may proceed to trial on its counterclaims.”
9
(ECF No. 265, p. 2). Thus, clearly not all claims have been resolved in state court. When
10
this court stayed the action on August 17, 2015, it did so because there were parallel state
11
and federal lawsuits. The court issued the stay pursuant to its inherent authority and under
12
the Colorado River1 doctrine. (ECF No. 216). The court considered, inter alia, the
13
interests of judicial economy, the fact all issues could proceed in state court, and the desire
14
to avoid piecemeal litigation. (ECF No. 216, p. 3-4).
The
15
In Colorado River, the Supreme Court considered the various abstention principles
16
and although it affirmed the district court’s dismissal, the Court stated: “Only the clearest
17
of justifications will warrant dismissal.” 424 U.S. at 819. The court noted the general rule
18
that there is no prohibition against concurrent state and federal proceedings, and the
19
federal court has a “heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction.” Id. at 820. The Ninth
20
Circuit has subsequently interpreted Colorado River to require a stay rather than dismissal.
21
In Attwood v. Mendocino Coast Hosp., 886 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1989), the court addressed
22
“whether the district court must stay or may dismiss an action when it declines to exercise
23
jurisdiction under Colorado River,” and concluded the court should have stayed the action.
24
The Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of the federal forum remaining open, if for
25
some unexpected reason the state forum is not adequate. Id. at 243. However, in the
26
ordinary course, no further substantive matters in federal court are contemplated: “the
27
decision to invoke Colorado River necessarily contemplates the federal court will have
28
1
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
ORDER - 4
1
nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case, whether it stays or
2
dismisses.” Id. citing Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
3
(1983).
4
In Attwood, the Ninth Circuit listed various reasons why a stay was preferable,
5
including “using a stay, a district court invoking Colorado River will not need to make
6
premature and speculative legal findings about the preclusive effect of various possible
7
state judgments.” 886 F.2d at 244. In order to enter Judgment at this juncture, this court
8
would need to have evidence the state court judgments were final, and make assessments
9
about preclusion doctrines. The parties have not supplied the necessary state court record,
10
nor provided any briefing on preclusion doctrines. After Attwood, the Ninth Circuit again
11
addressed this issue and stated: “Attwood stands for the proposition that district courts
12
must stay, rather than dismiss, an action when they determine that they should defer to the
13
state court proceedings under Colorado River.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Sun-Diamond
14
Growers, 912 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1990).
15
This court appropriately stayed the action (See Order at ECF No. 216), and as the
16
state court proceedings are not fully concluded, DLIA’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
17
DLIA also seeks to dismiss its own counterclaims without prejudice. Although such
18
voluntary dismissal may be permissible, it is unnecessary. Additionally, Plaintiffs oppose
19
the dismissal, and contend any dismissal of the counterclaims should be with prejudice.
20
(ECF No. 273). DLIA states the counterclaims are based on state law, and presumably
21
they were asserted in the state court pleadings, and can be adjudicated in state court.
22
Although the Ninth Circuit has required a stay rather than dismissal in this situation, the
23
court has also stated that in most cases where Colorado River is invoked, “complete
24
resolution” should occur in the state proceeding. Attwood, 886 F.2d at 245. Plaintiffs offer
25
no authority to dismiss DLIA’s counterclaims with prejudice, and the court will not
26
dismiss them without prejudice in view of Plaintiffs’ opposition.
27
C. Defendant Anderson
28
Defendant Anderson, the Director of the Washington State Department of Fish and
ORDER - 5
1
Wildlife (hereafter “Director”), reports the Superior Court granted his motion for summary
2
judgment on December 22, 2016, dismissing all claims against him. (ECF No. 264). The
3
Director contends, in a status report, that all claims in this federal action against him
4
should be dismissed with prejudice “in light of the complete dismissal of all injunctive and
5
monetary damages claims in state court.” (ECF No. 264). Plaintiffs concur that the
6
Superior Court did grant summary judgment dismissing the claims against Director
7
Anderson. (ECF No. 238). It appears dismissal of the claims against Defendant Anderson,
8
as asserted in the Second Amended Complaint, may be appropriate as the claims have
9
been fully resolved in state court.
10
However, Defendant Anderson has not filed a motion to dismiss. This court stated
11
in a recent Order that if the parties were not stipulating to dismissal, “a party may move
12
for entry of partial judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) in an appropriately supported
13
motion, including providing the relevant state court rulings upon which the motion relies.”
14
(ECF No. 268). As there is no pending motion by Defendant Anderson, and for the
15
reasons stated supra regarding DLIA’s Motion to Dismiss, the court will not dismiss the
16
claims against Defendant Anderson at this time.
17
III. Conclusion
18
Although it is anticipated that all claims will be resolved in the state court
19
proceeding and no further substantive proceedings will occur in this forum, a stay remains
20
the appropriate course of action until the state proceedings are final, or the parties agree
21
to dismiss this action. It appears the claims against Defendants Sorby and Anderson have
22
been fully resolved in favor of the Defendants, but the court will not enter a separate
23
judgment at this time. Plaintiffs and DLIA still have pending claims in state court, and
24
accordingly this court will not dismiss those claims.
25
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
26
1. The “Plaintiffs Jeffrey’s Consent to Motions to Dismiss” (ECF No. 272), which
27
28
was erroneously docketed as a motion, is DENIED AS MOOT.
2. Defendant Sorby’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 269) is GRANTED IN PART.
ORDER - 6
1
2
Plaintiffs’ claims against Sharon Sorby in the Second Amended Complaint shall be
dismissed with prejudice upon entry of final Judgment in this matter.
3
3. Defendant DLIA’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 271) is DENIED.
4
IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk shall enter this Order and furnish copies to
5
6
counsel.
Dated this 13th day of September, 2018.
7
s/ Justin L. Quackenbush
JUSTIN L. QUACKENBUSH
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ORDER - 7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?