Royal Mint Company Inc v Dow AgroSciences LLC

Filing 29

ORDER denying Defendant's 20 Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings Signed by Judge Stanley A Bastian. (JW, Operations Clk)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

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8 ROYAL MINT COMPANY, INC., a

NO. 2:14-CV-00233-SAB

9 Washington corporation,
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ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS

Plaintiff,
v.

12 DOW AGROSCIENCES, LLC, a
13 Delaware limited liability company,
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Defendant.

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Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the

17 Pleadings Relating to Plaintiff’s Implied Warranty Claim. ECF No. 20.
18 Plaintiff presents several claims in the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 11,
19 including claims under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, Washington
20 Product Liability Act, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
21 fitness for a particular purpose, and negligent misrepresentation. Defendant moves
22 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings only as
23 to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular
24 purpose. The motion was heard without oral argument.
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Legal Standard
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is functionally

27 identical to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine
28 Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). As such, ordinary liberal pleading
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 1

1 standards apply and a plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts, if taken as true, to
2 allow the Court to draw reasonable inferences that a plausible ground for relief
3 exists. Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Analysis

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A claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose

7 requires three elements to be pleaded sufficiently: (1) the seller had reason to
8 know of the buyer’s particular purpose; (2) the seller had reason to know the buyer
9 was relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in furnishing appropriate goods for
10 the buyer’s particular purpose; and (3) the buyer relied on the seller’s skill or
11 judgment. RCW 62A.2-315; Superwood Co. Ltd. v. Slam Brands, Inc., 2013 WL
12 6008489 *15 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
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In this case, Plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to give rise to a plausible

14 claim based for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose—
15 barely. First, Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that a fieldman called Defendant’s
16 representative and indicated Plaintiff was considering using Defendant’s product
17 to control salsify, a weed, in Plaintiff’s mint crops, satisfying the first element of
18 the claim. Second, Plaintiff alleges the fieldman inquired if the product would be
19 good for the purpose of controlling salsify in mint, satisfying the second element
20 of the claim. Third, Plaintiff alleges it then purchased the product and had it
21 applied to its mint fields as result of assurances by Defendant’s representative,
22 satisfying the final element of a claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness for
23 a particular purpose.
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Defendant asserts two reasons why it believes Plaintiff’s claim for breach of

25 implied warranty of fitness fail as a matter of law. Defendant alleges that the
26 product was used for its ordinary purpose—as purported on its label—and not any
27 particular purpose. Defendant has failed to point to any case law interpreting
28 Washington’s implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in a manner that
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 2

1 would render Plaintiff’s claim inadequate as a matter of law. Additionally, such a
2 decision is not well-suited to this stage of litigation. It has not yet been determined
3 what the “ordinary purpose” for the product is, or with what degree of specificity
4 of use Defendant’s representative indicated the product was appropriate for.
5 Defendant urges the Court to consider a label for the product which it provided to
6 determine the ordinary purpose of the product. This is problematic for at least two
7 reasons. First, the Defendant provides this label and it is not clear if the label is
8 identical to the one that Plaintiff would have received with the product at the time
9 in question. If the Plaintiff were the movant, the Court could accept Defendant’s
10 declaration and exhibit as true for purposes of the motion. Here, however,
11 Defendant is the movant and Plaintiff has not—nor could it be expected to at this
12 stage—produce the label it received with the product, if any such label existed.
13 Second, the label instructions are divided into three geographic categories with
14 extensive application notes for each. The category including Washington lists
15 thirty-four types of crops the product can be applied to. The label indicates sixty16 three species of weeds the product is intended for. Ignoring geographical
17 differences, the possibility of application to control a combination of more than
18 one species of weed in a crop, and any potential sub-species of crops, the possible
19 label uses of the product exceeds 2000. It is far from clear which, or how many, of
20 these applications should be considered the “ordinary use” for the product. The
21 Court is not deciding at this time that Plaintiff’s use was particular, or was not
22 ordinary, but instead, the Court declines to draw all the necessary inferences in
23 favor of the Defendant that it would need to succeed at this stage. Additionally,
24 the Court declines to make an unnecessary determination as to what Washington
25 state law is regarding warranties of particular purposes vis a vis ordinary purposes
26 when it is unclear if such a determination would be dispositive for this claim at
27 this juncture.
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 3