Callaway v. Wolfe

Filing 10

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS. Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted, For Failure to Join a Party, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment ECF No. 7 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)

1
2
3
4
5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

6
7

RONALD CALLAWAY,
NO: 2:15-CV-0123-TOR
Plaintiff,

8

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

9

CINDY WOLFE,

10
11

Defendant.

12

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant’s 12(b) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.

13

7). This matter was heard without oral argument. Plaintiff Ronald Callaway is

14

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Defendant Cindy Wolfe is proceeding

15

pro se. The Court has reviewed the relevant pleadings 1 and supporting materials,

16

and is fully informed.

17
18

1

Plaintiff did not file a memorandum in opposition to this motion, but the Court

19

declines to construe such neglect as consent to the entry of an order adverse to him.

20

See Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2013).

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

1

BACKGROUND

2

Plaintiff Ronald Callaway filed a Complaint on May 5, 2015 (ECF No. 4),

3

against Defendant Cindy Wolfe, the property manager of Plaintiff’s former

4

apartment complex. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Defendant evicted him from his

5

apartment in retaliation for filing a complaint with the Washington State Human

6

Rights Commission. On August 10, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss.

7

ECF No. 7. Plaintiff has not filed a response.

8

FACTS

9

The following facts are drawn principally from Plaintiff’s complaint, as well

10

as the materials incorporated by reference and attached for this Court’s review by

11

Defendant 2, and are accepted as true for purposes of the instant motion. Bell Atl.

12

Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

13
14

Plaintiff was a tenant at 7 Oaks apartment complex (“7 Oaks”) for nearly a
decade. ECF No. 9 (Defendant’s SOF) at 7. The Defendant was the property

15
16

2

When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, under the doctrine of “incorporation by

17

reference,” a court may consider a document referenced in the complaint if its

18

authenticity is not questioned. See Marder v, Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.

19

2006); Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.

20

2002).

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

1

manager of 7 Oaks. Id. On September 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint with

2

the Washington State Human Rights Commission against the Defendant and the

3

owner of 7 Oaks, Barbara Oberg, alleging race discrimination in rental housing.

4

Id. In Plaintiff’s Complaint to this Court, he alleged that he “overheard

5

[Defendant] talk about getting Rid of Blacks and Drug Dealers.” ECF No. 4 at 2. 3

6

Plaintiff also alleged that after Defendant “towed [Plaintiff’s] car (wrongfully) and

7

Lost it,” “Refused to accept Rent Assistants (sic) from Snap & Veteran Service,”

8

and “ignored Request for Repairs.” Id.

9

On January 22, 2015, the Human Rights Commission issued a finding of

10

“No Reasonable Cause,” meaning there was “not sufficient evidence to show that

11

an unfair practice [] occurred” as defined by Washington state law. ECF No. 9 at

12

9. Subsequently, on February 2, 2015, Plaintiff received a “notice to terminate his

13

tenancy,” effective on February 28, 2015. Id. at 7. Plaintiff requested an extension

14

of his tenancy through March 31, 2015, and permanently vacated 7 Oaks on April

15

8, 2015. Id. at 8.

16
17
18

3

Plaintiff does not identify the “manager” as Defendant in the body of his

19

Complaint. ECF No. 4. He does, however, identify Defendant as “manager” in his

20

proposed summons. ECF No. 1-2.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 3

1

On March 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed a second complaint with the Human

2

Rights Commission against Defendant and Barbara Oberg. Id. at 7. The second

3

complaint, referencing Plaintiff’s eviction, alleged discriminatory retaliation for

4

having filed the original complaint. Id. at 7. On April 24, 2015, the Commission

5

issued a response again finding “No Reasonable Cause.” Id.

6

In his Complaint to this Court, Plaintiff stated he “was advised be

7

Department of Housing and Human Rights Commission to come to this court for

8

help.” ECF No. 4 at 2. Plaintiff noted he filed a complaint with the Commission,

9

and claimed he was subsequently evicted in retaliation. Id. Plaintiff requested

10

monetary damages for the loss of his car and his deposit as well as punitive

11

damages. Id.

12
13
14

Defendant now moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for failure to
join a party, or in the alternative for summary judgment. ECF No. 7.
DISCUSSION

15

Defendant’s motion requests the Court to either dismiss the complaint or,

16

alternatively, grant summary judgment in Defendant’s favor. Id. Defendant

17

attached the “Notice of Commission Action and Investigative Findings,” by the

18

Human Rights Commission, referenced in Plaintiff’s complaint, to her Statement

19
20

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 4

1

of Facts. ECF No. 9 at 6-9.4 Although the Court’s review on a 12(b)(6) motion to

2

dismiss is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, “[a] court may

3

consider evidence on which the complaint ‘necessarily relies’ if: (1) the complaint

4

refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3)

5

no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.”

6

Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). “The court may treat such a

7

document as ‘part of the complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true

8

for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting United

9

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, the Court will

10

consider the document incorporated by reference and attached for review by

11

Defendant, and treat Defendant’s motion as one for dismissal.

12

A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

13

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of

14

the plaintiff’s claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To

15

withstand dismissal, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to

16
17

4

The Court does not consider the attached photos in its determination of the

18

motion. Unlike the Human Right’s Commission document, the photos are not

19

referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint nor is there any explanation for them at this

20

stage of the proceeding.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 5

1

relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Naked

2

assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements

3

of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 557. “A claim has facial plausibility

4

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

5

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

6

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a plaintiff need not establish a

7

probability of success on the merits, he or she must demonstrate “more than a sheer

8

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

9

A complaint must also contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

10

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This

11

standard “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an

12

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

13

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In assessing whether Rule 8(a)(2) has

14

been satisfied, a court must first identify the elements of the plaintiff’s claim(s) and

15

then determine whether those elements could be proven on the facts pled. The

16

court should generally draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, see

17

Sheppard v. David Evans and Assocs., 694 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012), but it

18

need not accept “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal,

19

556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

20

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 6

1

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations

2

in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to

3

the party opposing the motion. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979,

4

988 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may disregard conclusory allegations and

5

arguments which are not supported by reasonable deductions and inferences. Id.

6

Here, Plaintiff claims discriminatory retaliation for or interference with the

7

exercise or enjoyment of rental housing, and thus, must demonstrate a prima facie

8

case that “(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant subjected him to

9

an adverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and

10

the adverse action.” Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128, 1129 (9th

11

Cir. 2001) (“[I]nterference, in particular, has been broadly applied to reach all

12

practices which have the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights under the

13

federal fair housing laws.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 42 U.S.C.

14

§§ 3604, 3617. The burden then shifts to the defendant to establish a legitimate,

15

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128. “If the

16

defendant articulates such a reason, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of

17

demonstrating that the reason was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive.”

18

Id.

19

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s Complaint contains insufficient facts and

20

conclusory allegations, and consequently, fails to state a claim. See ECF No. 7 at

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 7

1

3-6. In support of her argument, Defendant contends “the allegations of

2

discrimination and retaliation in this action are based upon the same facts as

3

alleged in the [P]laintiff’s previous two complaints with the Washington State

4

Human Rights Commission,” and the Commission found the “termination of

5

[Plaintiff’s] tenancy was based upon legitimate reasons.” Id. at 4. Defendant is

6

correct to continue on and state “the final actions by the Human Rights

7

Commission are no bar to [Plaintiff’s] claims in this Court.” Id. For that reason,

8

the fact that Plaintiff’s complaints were not accepted by the Human Rights

9

Commission has no bearing on the Court’s determination whether Plaintiff’s

10
11

Complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)(2).
The Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint contains sufficient facts to state a

12

claim to relief. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant talked about “getting Rid of

13

Blacks,” that Plaintiff’s car was then towed without cause, and that he was evicted

14

after filing a complaint with the Human Rights Commission. ECF No. 4 at 2.

15

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as pled, Plaintiff’s

16

Complaint contains sufficient facts to establish a plausible prima facie case of

17

claims for (1) interference with Plaintiff’s right to the enjoyment of his housing (in

18

the form of the alleged discriminatory towing of his car) and (2) retaliation for

19

filing the Human Rights Commission complaint (in the form of his subsequent

20

eviction). Thus, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s Complaint contains enough facts

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 8

1

for the Court to reasonably infer Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, see

2

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and satisfies Rule 8(a)(2). Accordingly, Defendant’s

3

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is denied.

4
5

B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join a Necessary Party
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for failure to join a necessary

6

party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7). Defendant contends

7

that Barbara Oberg, the owner of 7 Oaks, is a necessary party because the Court

8

cannot award complete relief if Ms. Oberg is not joined. ECF No. 7 at 8.

9

Joinder of parties is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. The

10

rule provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person who is subject to service of process

11

and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction must be

12

joined as a party if[,] in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete

13

relief among existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). This factor “is

14

concerned only with relief as between the persons already parties, not as between a

15

party and the absent person whose joinder is sought.” Eldredge v. Carpenters 46

16

N. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship and Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534, 537,

17

(9th Cir. 1981). The relevant question for purposes of determining whether

18

“complete relief” can be afforded is “whether success in the litigation can afford

19

the plaintiff[] the relief for which [he or she has] prayed.” Yellowstone Cnty. v.

20

Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original) (quotation and

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 9

1
2

citation omitted).
Here, as to the existing parties, it is possible for the Court to afford Plaintiff

3

the complete relief for which he has prayed. Plaintiff sued Defendant for

4

interference with the enjoyment of his housing and for retaliation for filing the

5

Human Rights Commission complaint. According to Defendant, since Plaintiff

6

“believes that the termination of his tenancy was motivated by racial

7

discrimination … it seems necessary to evaluate the owner’s intent with respect to

8

the termination of [Plaintiff’s] tenancy.” Id. at 10. However, this lawsuit between

9

Plaintiff and Defendant is capable of allowing Plaintiff to get complete relief for

10

what he seeks: monetary damages for the loss of his car and his deposit as well as

11

punitive damages. Evaluation of the owner’s motive or conduct is not necessary

12

for Plaintiff to obtain complete relief.

13

Defendant also argues that the principles of respondeat superior apply, and

14

thus, “this Court must apply vicarious liability of the owner/employer to Plaintiff’s

15

claims of discrimination and retaliation.” Id. at 7-8. The Fair Housing Act

16

“focuses on prohibited acts.” Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003). “In

17

relevant part the Act forbids any person or other entity whose business includes

18

engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate, for example,

19

because of race.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a)) (internal quotation omitted;

20

italics added). In the Fair Housing Act context, traditional agency principles apply,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 10

1

and a finding of vicarious liability can hold an employer liable for an employee’s

2

violation of the Act. Id. at 286-88. Here, Plaintiff could have also sued Ms. Oberg

3

under a theory of vicarious liability, but this does not make joinder of Ms. Oberg

4

necessary. The principles of respondeat superior do not support Defendant’s

5

argument to dismiss for failure to join a party.

6

Furthermore, “[a] plaintiff ordinarily is free to decide who shall be parties to

7

his lawsuit.” Simpson v. Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights, 608 F.2d 1171,

8

1174 (9th Cir. 1979). Plaintiff may have any number of reasons for not wanting to

9

sue Ms. Oberg. It is not the place of this Court, nor the Defendant, to force

10

Plaintiff to include Ms. Orberg where he only seeks relief for Defendant’s conduct.

11

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

12

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which

13

Relief Can be Granted, For Failure to Join a Party, or in the Alternative for

14

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 7) is DENIED.

15
16
17

The District Court Executive is directed to enter this order and forward a copy
to each of the parties.
DATED October 5, 2015.

18
19
20

THOMAS O. RICE
United States District Judge

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 11