Gutierrez et al v. Allied Professionals Insurance Company
Filing
40
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A STAY; denying 19 Motion for Entry of Default Judgment; striking 21 Stipulated Motion for Order Re Service and Withdrawal of Motion for Default; granting in part (stay) and denying in part (dismiss) 24 Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings. Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (CV, Case Administrator)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
5
6
7
8
ELISEO GUTIERREZ and VERONICA
GUTIERREZ, husband and wife, and
DR. MICHAEL SCOTT ANGLESEY,
individually,
9
Plaintiffs,
10
No.
4:15-CV-5033-EFS
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR
A STAY
v.
11
12
ALLIED PROFESSIONALS INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Risk Retention Group,
Inc. an Arizona Corporation,
13
Defendant.
14
15
This Order serves to supplement and memorialize the Court’s oral
16
ruling on the three pending motions, which were heard on September
17
23, 2015.1
For the reasons that follow, the Court stays this matter
18
until the Central District of California resolves Defendant Allied
19
Professionals
Insurance
Co.’s
(APIC)
to-be-filed
motion
seeking
20
relief from that court’s prior decision and the Ninth Circuit reacts
21
to that ruling.
22
//
23
/
24
25
1
26
appeared on Defendant’s behalf.
Andrea Clare appeared on Plaintiffs’ behalf, and David Schoeggl
ORDER - 1
1
A.
Factual and Procedural Background2
Eliseo Gutierrez sought chiropractic treatment from Dr. Michael
2
3
Anglesey in December 2012.
Complaint, ECF No. 3 ¶ 3.2.
4
visit on December 13, 2012, Mr. Gutierrez fell ill, either while
5
waiting for chiropractic treatment or after receiving chiropractic
6
treatment, and was taken to the hospital.
7
determined 34-year-old Mr. Gutierrez suffered a bilateral vertebral
8
artery dissection, causing a stroke and severe neurological trauma.
9
Id. ¶¶ 3.2-3.3.
Id. ¶ 3.2.
During a
The hospital
The next day, Dr. Anglesey followed up with Mrs.
10
Gutierrez to see how Mr. Gutierrez was doing.
11
him of Mr. Gutierrez’s condition and thanked him for the call.
12
was
13
Gutierrez’s condition during this telephone call.
no
discussion
that
chiropractic
care
Mrs. Gutierrez advised
was
the
cause
There
of
Mr.
Later, Mrs. Gutierrez inquired with medical personnel as to the
14
15
potential causes of her husband’s condition.
16
the hospital physicians that Mr. Gutierrez’s artery dissection was
17
caused by a cervical adjustment.
18
the Washington State Department of Health against Dr. Anglesey.
On
19
20
Health
January
sent
Dr.
28,
2013,
Anglesey
the
a
It was determined by
Mrs. Gutierrez filed a claim with
State
letter,
of
Washington
which
Department
informed
him
of
of
an
21
22
2
23
documents
24
appear undisputed based on the present record.
25
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2008); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903
26
(9th Cir. 2003).
This background is based on the Complaint’s factual allegations, the
ORDER - 2
and
court
cases
referenced
therein,
and
any
facts
that
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
1
investigation
2
negligence or malpractice.”
3
assigned to an investigator but did not identify the name of the
4
complainant or provide any information about the complaint.
5
3 ¶ 3.4.
6
related to the Gutierrezes.
7
regarding
a
complaint
of
alleged
“incompetence,
This letter advised that the matter was
ECF No.
Dr. Anglesey did not suspect that this investigation was
One month after receiving this letter, Dr. Anglesey submitted an
8
application
to
renew
his
professional
malpractice
9
Allied Professional Insurance Co. (APIC).
insurance
with
ECF No. 3 ¶ 3.5.
Dr.
10
Anglesey had purchased professional liability policies from APIC for
11
approximately eight years.
12
for the March 2, 2013, to March 2, 2014 period doubled as an invoice.
13
Id. ¶ 3.5.
14
“no” to the following questions:
15
Id. ¶ 3.1.
The single-page renewal form
On the single-page renewal form, Dr. Anglesey answered
Since your last renewal has any agency or association
investigated or taken action against you or your license?
Since your last renewal, has any malpractice allegation
been asserted against you or your associates, or has
there been any event or indication suggesting a claim may
be made or that your care might have been deficient or
cased harm?
16
17
18
19
Dr. Anglesey faxed in his renewal form and invoice to APIC, which
20
stamped it “received” on February 29, 2013.
Id. ¶ 3.5.
APIC issued
21
Dr. Anglesey a claims-made policy, covering the period of March 2,
22
2013, through March 2, 2014.
This policy includes an arbitration
23
clause, which states:
24
25
26
All disputes or claims involving the Company shall be
resolved by binding arbitration, whether such dispute or
claim arises between the parties to this Policy, or between
the company and any person or entity who is not a party to
ORDER - 3
the Policy but is claiming rights either under the Policy
or against the Company. . . . The arbitration shall occur
in Orange County, California.
The laws of the State of
California shall apply to any substantive, evidentiary or
discovery issues.
1
2
3
4
ECF No. 35 ¶ 13.
In March 2013, the Washington State Department of Health (DOH)
5
6
wrote
Dr.
Anglesey
7
complainant as Mr. Gutierrez and requesting his full and complete
8
patient
9
Gutierrez’s
records.
regarding
ECF
complaint
No.
to
3
¶
APIC
“2013-269CH,”
3.6.
on
or
identifying
Dr.
Anglesey
before
April
reported
1,
2013,
10
requested that APIC assist him with the DOH investigation.
11
3.7.
12
Id.
the
Mr.
and
potential malpractice claim involving Mr. Gutierrez.
On April 22, 2013, Dr. Anglesey again informed APIC of the
On April 26, 2013, APIC sent two letters to Dr. Anglesey.
13
¶
ECF
14
No. 3 ¶ 3.8.
15
advised that the APIC policy did not provide coverage for the April
16
22,
17
Anglesey’s renewal application and advised that APIC determined that
18
Dr. Anglesey violated his policy’s application warranty by failing to
19
disclose the potential Gutierrez claim on the renewal application in
20
February 2013.
21
opportunity to provide information regarding his non-disclosure no
22
later than May 10, 2013.
23
The first letter discussed the DOH investigation and
2013-tendered
claim.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.9.
The
second
letter
discussed
Dr.
This letter offers Dr. Anglesey the
Id.
On May 7, 2013, Dr. Gutierrez provided APIC with information;
24
however, APIC did not alter its determination.
25
rescinded both the 2012-13 policy and the 2013-14 policy.
26
ORDER - 4
On May 30, 2013, APIC
ECF No. 3
1
¶ 3.10.
APIC refunded the premiums that Dr. Anglesey had paid.
2
Dr.
Anglesey kept the refunded money.
On June 20, 2013, letters were sent to Dr. Anglesey and the
3
4
Gutierrezes
from
the
DOH,
stating
5
investigation the Chiropractic Commission closed the case because of
6
insufficient evidence.”
7
the Gutierrezes retained an attorney.
8
Gutierrezes offered to settle all claims against Dr. Anglesey for $3
9
million, which is believed to be the full applicable policy limits of
Id. ¶ 3.11.
that
“[b]ased
upon
our
Upon receiving DOH’s letter,
Id. ¶¶ 3.12 & 3.13.
10
Dr. Anglesey’s liability policy with APIC.
11
2014, Dr. Anglesey’s counsel demanded that APIC provide coverage for
12
the Gutierrez claim and advised that Dr. Anglesey intended to consent
13
to judgment as to the Gutierrezes’ claims because he lacked the funds
14
and resources to defend the Gutierrez lawsuit and requested that APIC
15
reconsider its coverage denial and its decision not to defend Dr.
16
Anglesey.
17
coverage and rejected any obligation to defend Dr. Anglesey.
18
3.14.
ECF No. 3 ¶ 3.13.
Id. ¶ 3.15.
The
On March 25,
APIC reaffirmed its decision to deny
Id. ¶
On April 28, 2014, APIC filed a lawsuit in the Central District
19
20
of
California,
21
arbitrate
the
22
provision
or
23
rescission of the insurance policy.
24
8:14-CV-00665-CBM).
25
California federal lawsuit and moved to dismiss the lawsuit.
26
3 ¶ 3.16.
ORDER - 5
seeking
dispute
a
court
under
alternatively
the
order
requiring
insurance
for
the
policies’
declaratory
parties
to
arbitration
relief
regarding
ECF No. 24, Ex. A (Case No.
Dr. Anglesey and the Gutierrezes appeared in the
ECF No.
On May 19, 2014, the Gutierrezes filed a lawsuit against Dr.
1
2
Anglesey in Benton County Superior Court.
3
14-2-01315-6 (Benton County Superior Court).
4
Gutierrezes and Dr. Anglesey agreed to settle the state court lawsuit
5
for a $3,000,000 consent judgment in favor of the Gutierrezes, a
6
covenant not to execute the consent judgment, and an assignment to
7
the
8
contingent
9
reasonableness and entering judgment.
10
Gutierrezes
On
of
on
May
the
28,
Dr.
state
2014,
to
of
find
the
Anglesey’s
court
against
the
APIC,
settlement’s
ECF No. 29 at 6-7.
asked
County
Washington law, and notice was provided to APIC of the reasonableness
13
hearing.
14
arguing
15
District of California lawsuit.
16
reasonableness
17
voluntarily dismissed its state-court lawsuit against Dr. Anglesey
18
without prejudice on July 31, 2014.
19
The Gutierrezes chose this approach as APIC filed a motion to compel
20
arbitration in the California federal court on June 19, 2014, and
21
therefore
22
defend the California federal lawsuit.
In
the
the
the
state
of
California
should
under
needed
federal
not
intrude
on
the
Central
Before the state court ruled on the
proposed
Gutierrezes
reasonable
APIC opposed the Gutierrezes’ request,
court
the
was
Benton
12
that
settlement
the
Superior
ECF No. 29 at 7.
the
rights
approving
Gutierrezes
that
On May 20, 2014, the
11
23
Court
all
Gutierrez v. Anglesey, No.
settlement,
the
Gutierrezes
ECF No. 3 ¶ 3.18; ECF No. 29-2.
to
locate
California
counsel
to
ECF No. 29-2.
lawsuit,
the
Gutierrezes
filed
a
24
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to
25
state a claim.
26
Marshall heard argument on September 8, 2014.
ORDER - 6
ECF No. 29, Exs. A & B.
Federal Judge Consuelo
On January 15, 2015,
1
Judge Marshall entered an Order dismissing the federal lawsuit on the
2
grounds the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, noting “[t]o
3
this Court’s knowledge, there has been no subsequent litigation or
4
settlement between any of the parties, nor is there a pending claim,”
5
ECF No. 29-3 at 3.
Judge Marshall did not address the Gutierrezes’
6
argument
federal
7
jurisdiction over them.
On
8
9
10
that
the
February
court
in
California
lacked
personal
Id. at 6.
10,
2015,
APIC
appealed
the
California
federal
court’s order of dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Case No. 15-55231.
The appeal is pending.
11
On March 9, 2015, Dr. Anglesey and the Gutierrezes signed a
12
“Settlement Agreement, Assignment of Rights, Covenant not to Execute,
13
Duty to Cooperate, and Mutual Releases.”
14
of the agreement was to “forever settle and resolve all disputes,
15
claims and controversies that have been asserted, will be asserted,
16
or could have been asserted, by Gutierrez against Anglesey in the
17
lawsuit entitled Eliseo and Veronica Gutierrez v. Michael Anglesey
18
and Jane Doe Anglesey, which will be filed in Benton County Superior
19
Court . . . no later than 45 days of this agreement.”
20
In
21
against
22
Gutierrezes any and all rights that Dr. Anglesey maintained under the
23
2012 and 2013 professional liability policies issued by APIC.
24
agreement required the parties to “request a review by the Benton
25
County
26
settlement within 30 days of the lawsuit filing.” At the September
the
agreement,
him
in
Superior
ORDER - 7
Dr.
the
Court
Anglesey
amount
in
ECF No. 32-1.
stipulated
to
$3,000,000
and
of
regard
to
the
entry
The purpose
Id. at 1 ¶ A.
of
assigned
reasonableness
judgment
to
of
the
The
the
1
23, 2015 hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel Ms. Clare advised the Court
2
that the Gutierrezes filed an ex parte motion in the Benton County
3
Superior Court to obtain a reasonableness determination; the Benton
4
County
5
reasonable without providing APIC notice or an opportunity to be
6
heard.3
Superior
Court
reportedly
determined
the
settlement
was
7
On April 6, 2015, the Gutierrezes and Dr. Anglesey filed this
8
lawsuit in the Eastern District of Washington against APIC, claiming
9
that
APIC
breached
its
duty
of
good
faith,
violated
Washington
10
Consumer Protection Act, and violated Washington’s Insurance Fair
11
Conduct Act in its dealings with Dr. Anglesey, and seeking a judicial
12
determination regarding insurance coverage and APIC’s duty to defend
13
Dr.
14
Complaint on APIC; however, APIC filed two motions to dismiss as it
15
deemed those service attempts deficient.
16
submits that it was properly served on June 19, 2015; and counsel for
17
APIC then contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel to discuss that it would
18
withdraw its motions to dismiss based on improper service.
19
28 at 2-3.
Anglesey.
ECF
No.
3.
Plaintiffs
took
steps
to
serve
ECF Nos. 7 & 11.
the
APIC
ECF No.
20
On June 30, 2015, APIC moved the Ninth Circuit to remand the
21
appealed matter back to the Central District of California on the
22
grounds
23
creates a case or controversy over which the Central District of
24
California has jurisdiction.
that
the
Gutierrezes
and
Dr.
Anglesey’s
ECF No. 24, Ex. B.
new
settlement
Recently, the Ninth
25
3
26
As the Court was not provided a copy of this ex parte motion or the Benton
County Superior Court’s order, the Court is unaware of the date of these
actions and the language contained on the documents.
ORDER - 8
1
Circuit
2
permitted the Central District of California to entertain a reopening
3
of
4
permission to file a renewed motion to remand with the Ninth Circuit.
5
Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(b).
the
denied
lawsuit
APIC’s
it
motion
to
dismissed,
and
remand
if
so,
without
then
prejudice
APIC
was
and
granted
ECF No. 38, Ex. 1.
6
On July 2, 2015, Plaintiffs sought default judgment against APIC
7
in this lawsuit because APIC had yet to file an answer following the
8
mailing of a summons and the Complaint, as well as other methods of
9
service.
ECF No. 20.
A week later APIC filed a Stipulated Motion
10
for Order Re Service and Withdrawal of Motion for Default, advising
11
the
12
service and therefore the Plaintiffs’ motion for default was moot so
13
long as APIC “answer[ed] or otherwise respond[ed] to the complaint by
14
July 16, 2015.”
15
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings.
16
Court
that
the
parties
ECF No. 21.
had
resolved
the
issues
relating
to
By that date, APIC filed a Motion to
ECF No. 24.
Days later, Plaintiffs’ counsel Andrea Clare filed a declaration
17
advising
18
Judgment had been premised on APIC filing an answer—not a motion to
19
dismiss.
20
counsel David Schoeggl, Ms. Clare understood that APIC would file an
21
answer; she had overlooked the reference to “or otherwise respond to
22
the complaint” in the follow-up email sent by Mr. Schoeggl.
23
26 at 3-4; ECF No. 26, EX. B.
24
agreed to withdraw the Motion for Default Judgment if APIC did not
25
file an answer, Plaintiffs ask the Court to rule on the Motion for
26
Default Judgment, ECF No. 19.
ORDER - 9
that
her
agreement
ECF No. 26.
to
withdraw
the
Motion
for
Default
Based on a telephone conversation with APIC’s
ECF No.
Because Plaintiffs would not have
ECF No. 26 at 5.
1
With this factual and procedural background, the Court turns to
2
the three pending motions: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment,
3
ECF
4
Withdrawal of Motion for Default, ECF No. 21; and APIC’s Motion to
5
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings, ECF No. 24.
6
B.
No.
19;
the
“Stipulated”
Motion
for
Order
Re
Service
and
7
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment and the “Stipulated
Motion” for Order Re Service and Withdrawal of Motion for
Default
8
Plaintiffs seek entry of a judgment by default against APIC
9
because APIC failed to answer within twenty-one days of service.
19.
APIC
opposes
10
No.
11
responsive
12
July 16, 2015, and contends that Plaintiffs ought to abide by their
13
counsel’s agreement to withdraw the motion for default.
document—its
the
motion
dismissal
contending
motion—by
the
that
it
ECF
filed
agreed-upon
a
date,
ECF No. 27.
14
Given Ms. Clare’s misunderstanding as to the parties’ agreement
15
regarding under what circumstances Plaintiffs would withdraw their
16
motion for default judgment, the Court declines to require Plaintiffs
17
to withdraw their motion and strikes the “Stipulated” Motion for
18
Order Re Service and Withdrawal of Motion for Default. The Court
19
turns to analyzing whether entry of default judgment is appropriate.
20
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, obtaining a default
21
judgment is a two-step process.
22
be entered when the "party against whom a judgment for affirmative
23
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend."
24
Civ. P. 55(a).
25
default judgment may then file a motion for default judgment pursuant
26
to Rule 55(b).
ORDER - 10
First, under Rule 55(a), default may
Fed. R.
Once default has been entered, the party seeking a
The decision whether or not to grant default is
1
within the discretion of the district court.
Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616
2
F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980).
3
grant or deny a motion for default and subsequent motion for default
4
judgment, the court considers the following factors:
In exercising its discretion to
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the
merits
of
plaintiff's
substantive
claim;
(3)
the
sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake
in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning
material facts; (6) whether the default was due to
excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the
merits.
5
6
7
8
9
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
10
Here, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter default judgment without
11
first seeking entry of default.
Local Rule 55.1 requires that the
12
moving party provide notice at least 14 days prior to the filing of
13
the motion for entry of default and file an affidavit stating that
14
this this notice requirement has been satisfied.
L.R. 55.1((a)(1) &
15
(2).
Plaintiffs failed to satisfy these procedural requirements.
16
Even if these procedural requirements had been met, the Court
17
declines to enter default against APIC.
APIC is defending itself:
18
APIC has filed
motions to dismiss based on improper service and
19
communicated to opposing counsel that it would file an answer or
20
otherwise respond to the Complaint, which it has now done.
None of
21
the Eitel factors, other than possibly the merits of Plaintiffs’
22
substantive claims, support entry of default under the circumstances.
23
In light of APIC’s continued interest in defending itself, the Court
24
finds justice requires that the merits of this dispute be resolved.
25
The next question is which court is the proper forum to resolve the
26
ORDER - 11
1
underlying
coverage
2
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims:
3
required
4
District of California.
5
forum question.
6
C.
by
the
dispute
insurance
between
the
parties
and/or
the
an arbitrator (as APIC maintains is
policies),
this
Court,
or
the
Central
APIC’s motion to dismiss addresses this
APIC’s Motion to Dismiss
7
In its motion, APIC asks the Court to dismiss this lawsuit
8
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and the Court’s
9
inherent powers because the Central District of California lawsuit
10
was
the
first-filed
lawsuit
as
to
the
insurance-related
matters
11
between the parties, and Plaintiffs should be prevented from forum
12
shopping.
13
regarding APIC’s motion to remand pertaining to the Central District
14
of California, APIC asked the Court to consider staying the lawsuit
15
to permit APIC an opportunity to file a motion with the Central
16
District
17
dismissal order in light of the Plaintiffs’ new settlement agreement
18
and assignment of rights under the insurance policy.
19
oppose dismissal, transfer, or a stay of this lawsuit, arguing 1)
20
this
21
declaratory judgment lawsuit that APIC filed in federal court in
22
California, 2) a Washington court should hear their state-law claims
23
because RCW 49.18.200 invalidates the insurance policies’ arbitration
24
provision
25
Arbitration
26
inconvenient for the parties, witnesses, and attorneys.
At the hearing, given the Ninth Circuit’s recent ruling
of
California
state-law
ORDER - 12
and
tort
RCW
Act,
and
to
seek
lawsuit
is
49.18.200
3)
a
is
relief
from
substantially
not
California
that
by
would
be
prior
Plaintiffs
different
preempted
forum
court’s
the
from
the
Federal
costly
and
1
Beginning with the first-filed doctrine, this doctrine is a
2
well-settled judicial comity doctrine which permits one district to
3
decline
4
involving the same parties and
5
another district.
6
93, 95 (9th Cir. 1982); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t
7
of Defense, 611 F.2d 738, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1979); Manuel v. Convergys
8
Corp.,
9
doctrine’s purpose is to prevent conflicting judgments and promote
10
judicial efficiency; accordingly, if these goals will not be served,
11
then a court need not abide by the first-filed doctrine.
12
Scientology of Cal., 611 F.3d at 750.
to
430
exercise
F.3d
jurisdiction
over
a
matter
if
a
complaint
issues has already been filed
in
Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d
1132,
1135
(11th
Cir.
2005).
The
first-filed
Church of
13
Plaintiffs submit that the Court need not apply the first-filed
14
doctrine because the Central District of California did not address
15
the merits of APIC’s declaratory judgment action once it determined
16
that no case or controversy existed.
17
of California determined no case or controversy existed because the
18
Gutierrezes and Dr. Anglesey at that time advised the court that they
19
were no longer seeking to settle the dispute between them, and the
20
Gutierrezes dismissed its state-court lawsuit against Dr. Anglesey.
21
Then,
22
ruling that no case or controversy existed, the Gutierrezes and Dr.
23
Anglesey entered into another substantially similar agreement.
within
two
months
of
the
However, the Central District
Central
District
of
California’s
24
Therefore, it was the Gutierrezes’ and Dr. Anglesey’s chosen
25
course of settlement and litigation-related conduct that caused the
26
Central District of California court to not reach the question of
ORDER - 13
1
arbitration or insurance validity. Under these circumstances, the
2
fact that the Central District of California did not reach the merits
3
in its declaratory judgment lawsuit is not a basis to not abide by
4
the first-filed doctrine.
Plaintiffs
5
also
submit
that
this
Court
should
exercise
6
jurisdiction because a Washington-based court, not a California-based
7
court,
8
Plaintiffs
9
provision is not valid under RCW 49.18.200. The Gutierrezes may be
should
hear
highlight
pursuant
that
to
Washington
the
RCW
state-law
insurance
49.18.200
tort
policies’
the
claims.
arbitration
10
correct
11
arbitration provision is invalid as applied to a Washington insured.
12
See State Dep’t of Transp. v. James River Ins. Co., 176 Wn.2d 390,
13
399 (2013); but see Speece v. Allied Prof’ls Ins. Co., 289 Neb. 75,
14
88 (2014).
15
before the Central District of California, if the court determines it
16
is
17
exercise subject matter or personal jurisdiction.
now
that
their
insurance
policies’
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs can bring this same argument
presented
with
a
case
or
controversy
over
which
it
can
18
Plaintiffs further argue that the Central District of California
19
could choose to decline to exercise jurisdiction over APIC’s lawsuit
20
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Evanston Ins. Co. v.
21
Workland & Witherspoon, PLLC, 2014 WL 4715879, *7 (E.D. Wash. Sept.
22
22, 2014) (citing case law on this point); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co.
23
v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co.
24
of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942).
However, this line of federal-
25
court-abstention
a
26
abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit brought
ORDER - 14
cases
apply
where
federal
court
is
asked
to
1
under the Declaratory Judgment Act because there is a state court
2
lawsuit involving the same issues and the same parties.
3
Court sits in Washington, it is a federal court—not a state court,
4
therefore this line of cases is inapposite.
Although the
Under the circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to stay
5
6
this
lawsuit
to
permit
the
Central
District
of
California
an
7
opportunity to consider APIC’s to-be-filed motion seeking relief from
8
the court’s prior dismissal order, and the Ninth Circuit to consider
9
the Central District of California’s decision.
To ensure that this
10
lawsuit does not stay for an extended period of time, APIC must file
11
its motion with the Central District of California within fourteen
12
days (October 7, 2015).
Concerned
13
of
that
time
and
this
the
lawsuit
harm
will
that
be
stayed
this
delay
for
an
will
extended
14
period
cause
the
15
Gutierrezes, Plaintiffs’ counsel orally requested the Court to order
16
all motions pertaining to arbitration be filed within twenty-eight
17
days.
18
Judge Marshall and the Ninth Circuit, given their respective dockets,
19
may be unable to resolve the matters that will be brought before them
20
within twenty-eight days, the Court declines at this time to impose a
21
filing deadline for briefs related to arbitration, especially since
22
the question of what forum should resolve the question of arbitration
23
has
24
California and/or the Ninth Circuit fail to take action related to
25
APIC’s to-be-filed motion, by January 1, 2016, the Gutierrezes are
26
free to file a motion with this Court seeking relief from the stay.
Recognizing the Gutierrezes’ concern but also recognizing that
not
ORDER - 15
yet
been
determined.
Should
the
Central
District
of
1
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
2
1.
is DENIED.
3
4
The Gutierrezes’ Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 19,
2.
The “Stipulated” Motion for Order Re Service and Withdrawal
5
of Motion for Default, ECF No. 21, is STRICKEN as it was
6
not agreed upon by the parties.
7
3.
APIC’s
Motion
to
Dismiss,
or
in
the
Alternative,
Stay
8
Proceedings, ECF No. 24, is DENIED IN PART (dismiss) and
9
GRANTED IN PART (stayed pending the Central District of
10
California’s action on APIC’s to-be-filed motion, and the
11
Ninth Circuit’s related action).
12
4.
No later than fourteen days, APIC is to file its motion
13
seeking relief with the Central District of California.
14
APIC is to promptly file a copy of the Central District of
15
California’s
16
Central
17
dismissal,
18
Appeal’s decision.
19
5.
This
decision
District
then
lawsuit
is
of
a
with
this
California
copy
STAYED;
of
the
the
Court,
and
choose
to
Ninth
should
the
revisit
its
Circuit
scheduling
Court
of
conference
is
20
STRICKEN. If the Central District of California elects not
21
to
22
scheduling conference.
23
revisit
IT IS SO ORDERED.
its
dismissal,
the
Court
will
reset
the
The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this
24
Order and provide copies to all counsel, the Ninth Circuit Court of
25
Appeals (Case No. 15-55231), and the Central District of California
26
(D.C. No. 8:14-cv-00665-CBH-SH).
ORDER - 16
1
DATED this
24th
day of September 2015.
2
s/Edward F. Shea
EDWARD F. SHEA
Senior United States District Judge
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Q:\EFS\Civil\2015\5033.motions.lc1.docx
ORDER - 17
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