Baugher v. Kadlec Health System
Filing
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ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO STRIKE. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ECF Nos. 15 , 31 is DENIED. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment ECF No. 20 is DENIED. Defendants Motions to Strike ECF Nos. 35 , 36 are DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court shall file a Scheduling Conference Notice. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
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PAMELA A. BAUGHER,
NO: 4:16-CV-5095-TOR
Plaintiff,
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v.
KADLEC HEALTH SYSTEM dba
REGIONAL HEALTH CENTER,
ORDER DENYING CROSS
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT’S
MOTIONS TO STRIKE
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Defendant.
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BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
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Nos. 15, 31), Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20), and
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Defendants Motions to Strike (ECF No. 35, 36). This matter was heard with oral
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argument on November 8, 2016. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Defendant is
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represented by Jerome A. Aiken and Peter M. Ritchie. The Court has reviewed the
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briefing and the record and files herein, and is fully informed.
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ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO STRIKE ~ 1
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BACKGROUND
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Plaintiff filed the Complaint on July 12, 2016 and an Amended Complaint
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on September 27, 2016, 1 alleging Defendant: (1) failed to give an adequate
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medical screening and failed stabilize her emergency medical condition in
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violation of the Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42
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U.S.C. § 1395dd, (2) failed to accommodate her claustrophobia in violation of the
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), and (3) is liable for
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the tort of intentional inflection of emotional distress. ECF Nos. 1, 31. Plaintiff
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filed the Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims on September 7, 2016, and
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amended the Summary Judgment on September 27, 2016. ECF Nos. 15, 31.
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Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the EMTALA claim on
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September 19, 2016. ECF No. 20.
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of right “within: (A) 21 days after serving [the pleading], or (B) if the pleading is
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one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a
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responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e),
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or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Plaintiff filed her Amended
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Complaint and Summary Judgment on September 27, 2016. This was the first
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amended complaint and was timely submitted.
A plaintiff can amend a pleading without leave of the court once as a matter
ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO STRIKE ~ 2
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DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment may be granted to a moving party who demonstrates
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“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
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to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the
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initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the
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non-moving party to identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of
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material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
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“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position
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will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably
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find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. For purposes of summary judgment, “[i]f a party
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fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another
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party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the
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fact undisputed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also L.R. 56.1(d).
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A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the
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governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute concerning any such fact is
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“genuine” only where the evidence is such that a reasonable trier-of-fact could find
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in favor of the non-moving party. Id. “[A] party opposing a properly supported
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motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
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his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
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for trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also First
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Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968) (holding that a
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party is only entitled to proceed to trial if it presents sufficient, probative evidence
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supporting the claimed factual dispute, rather than resting on mere allegations).
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Moreover, “[c]onclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is
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insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment.”
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Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
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Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[M]ere
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allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary
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judgment.”).
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Finally, in ruling upon a summary judgment motion, a court must construe
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the facts, as well as all rational inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to
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the non-moving party, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), and only
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evidence which would be admissible at trial may be considered, Orr v. Bank of
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Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct.
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1861, 1863 (2014) (“[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
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of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
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his favor.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
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ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
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B. EMTALA
Also known as the “Patient Anti-Dumping Act,” EMTALA requires certain
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hospital emergency departments 2 to provide an “appropriate medical screening
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examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department,
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including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department, to
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determine whether or not an emergency medical condition exists.” 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1395dd(a); see Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1165
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(9th Cir. 2002). If an “emergency medical condition” exists, the hospital must,
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except for circumstances not present here, “stabilize” the patient before release. 42
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U.S.C. § 1395dd(b). “Emergency medical condition” is defined as:
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(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical
attention could reasonably be expected to result in-(i) placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part . . .
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§ 1395dd(e). The term “to stabilize” is defined as providing “such medical
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treatment of the condition as may be necessary to assure, within reasonable
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medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition is likely to
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result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility . . .” Id.
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The parties do not dispute that EMTALA applies to Defendant Kadlec.
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1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on EMTALA
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Taking all facts and inferences in favor of the Plaintiff3: the Plaintiff became
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ill on July 4, 2016 to the point Plaintiff believed she had a medical emergency and
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that she may be dying. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff sought emergency services from
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Defendant Kadlec, complaining of chest pain. Id. The staff made comments, such
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as: “you sue us and then expect us to help you.” Id. Despite this, Kadlec admitted
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Plaintiff for medical services. ECF. No 14 at 2. Plaintiff was taken to a room, but
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Plaintiff told Kadlec staff that she could not remain in the room, complaining that
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she may be allergic to the cleaner and that she was claustrophobic, and requested
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that Kadlec assist her outside of the room. ECF No. 22 at 7-8. Kadlec employees
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were aware of Plaintiff’s high blood pressure. Id. at 8. Plaintiff left the room and
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then Kadlec employees gave her an ultimatum: return to the room or leave the
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hospital. Id. Plaintiff did not return to the room. Id. Kadlec then called the
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Richland Police Department complaining that Plaintiff is refusing to leave. ECF
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26 at 4.
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Under these facts, a reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff was not given
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an adequate screening and that Defendant failed to stabilize Plaintiff’s emergency
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This includes the facts for which Plaintiff has personal knowledge and that
she supported by declarations under penalty of perjury.
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medical condition—high blood pressure—before forcing her to leave. 4 Thus,
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Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be DENIED.
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2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on EMTALA
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Taking the facts and inferences in favor of Defendant: 5 Plaintiff sought
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medical services on July 4, 2016 from Defendant, complaining of chest pain. ECF
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No. 22 at 9. Kadlec employees told Plaintiff she was welcome and that they would
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do everything they could to help her. ECF No. 22 at 7. Plaintiff, “had even
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respirations, stood unassisted, spoke in an unlabored voice, and showed no signs of
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immediate distress.” ECF No. 22 at 9. Plaintiff was uncooperative, refused to
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provide her name or date of birth, and repeatedly left when Kadlec employees
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attempted to give her medical services. Id. After initially refusing, Plaintiff
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allowed Kadlec to take an EKG. Id. at 10. Apparently Plaintiff became disruptive
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Plaintiff need not present expert testimony to survive the motion.
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Much of Defendant’s proffered evidence suffers from lack of foundation and
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is hearsay, without meeting any of the exceptions to hearsay. For example, the so-
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called medical records Defendant submitted, ECF No. 22 at Ex. A, lack a proper
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foundation and contain statements and narratives that are not limited to the medical
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diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 803(4), and are
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otherwise inadmissible.
ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
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and Kadlec employees told Plaintiff they would call the police if she did not
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comply with the privacy and respect of other patients and staff. Id. at 7. After the
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EKG, but before treatment was completed, Plaintiff voluntarily left the emergency
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room against medical advice and did not return. ECF No. 20 at 5.
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Under a generous reading of these facts, a reasonable juror could find that
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Defendant conducted an adequate medical screening of Plaintiff by taking an EKG
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of Plaintiff, Plaintiff did not suffer from an emergency medical condition that
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required stabilization, and that even if an emergency medical condition existed,
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Plaintiff voluntarily left. Thus, on this disputed record, Plaintiff’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment must be DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s EMTALA claim.
C. ADA
The ADA forbids discrimination against an individual “on the basis of
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disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
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privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation
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by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
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accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins
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Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 669–70 (9th Cir. 2010).
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To prevail on a public accommodation discrimination claim, “a plaintiff
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must show that: (1) [the plaintiff] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2)
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the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public
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accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the
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defendant because of her disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730
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(9th Cir. 2007). “Disability” under the ADA is defined as “a physical or mental
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impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
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individual.” 42 USC § 12102. “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited
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to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
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walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
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concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”
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Discrimination by public accommodations includes “a failure to make
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reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such
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modifications are necessary to afford such . . . services . . . to individuals with
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disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications
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would fundamentally alter the nature of such . . . services . . .” 42 U.S.C.
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§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Discrimination also includes the “failure to take such steps
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as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded,
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denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals
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because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can
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demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the . . .
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service . . . being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 42 U.S.C.
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§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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Plaintiff moves the Court for summary judgment on her ADA claim. 6
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Taking the facts and inferences in favor of Defendant, Kadlec personnel attempted
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to accommodate Plaintiff’s claustrophobia by providing several alternative rooms.
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ECF No. 22 at 7. A reasonable juror could find these attempts were sufficient and
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that additional accommodation would alter the nature of the service or impose an
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undue burden. At this stage of the proceeding, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
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Judgment is DENIED as to the ADA claim.
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D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
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To prevail on a claim for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
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distress, the Plaintiff must prove “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2)
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intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to
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plaintiff of severe emotional distress.” Kloepfel v. Bokor, 149 Wash.2d 192, 195–
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96 (2003) (citation omitted). Defendant’s conduct must be “so outrageous in
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character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
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decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
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community.” Id. at 196 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (citing
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Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59-60 (1975)).
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judgment on the EMTALA claim. ECF No. 20 at 6.
Defendant is silent on the ADA claim and only moves for summary
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Taking the disputed facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
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Defendant,7 Defendant offered its emergency services to Plaintiff, Defendant did
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not intend to cause any emotional distress, and Defendant’s conduct was
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reasonable in light of the disturbance caused. ECF No. 22 at 7. Under this lens
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and at this stage of the proceeding, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
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DENIED with respect to the ADA claim.
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grant summary judgment on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional
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distress.
As with the ADA claim, Plaintiff, but not Defendant, moves this court to
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 15, 31) is
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DENIED.
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2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) is DENIED.
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3. Defendant’s Motions to Strike (ECF Nos. 35, 36) are DENIED as moot. 8
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4. The Clerk of Court shall file a Scheduling Conference Notice.
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The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this Order and
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provide copies to counsel.
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DATED November 8, 2016.
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THOMAS O. RICE
Chief United States Chief District Judge
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Summary Judgment a plethora of information from the record presented by
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Plaintiff. These requests are moot as the Court is denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment.
Defendant moved this court to strike and not consider for the Motion for
ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO STRIKE ~ 12
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