Glatt v. City of Pasco et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Granting 25 Defendants' MOTION Remedial Plan and Final Injunction re 16 Consent Decree filed by Saul Martinez, City of Pasco, Rebecca Francik, Matt Watkins, Al Yenney, Tom Larsen, Bob Hoffman; and denying 21 Plaintiff's MOTION for Permanent Injunction filed by Bertha Aranda Glatt. Signed by Senior Judge Lonny R. Suko. (SK, Case Administrator)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
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BERTHA ARANDA GLATT,
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Plaintiff,
Case No. 4:16-CV-05108-LRS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
v.
CITY OF PASCO, et al.,
Defendants.
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I.
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INTRODUCTION
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On August 4, 2016, Plaintiff, Brenda Glatt, filed a Complaint against the City of
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Pasco and its City Council members in their official capacities alleging that the
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City’s “at large election method of electing Pasco City Council members violates
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Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act… 52 U.S.C. § 10301.” (ECF No. 1 at 9). Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) prohibits the imposition of a “voting qualification
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or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure...which results in a denial
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or abridgement of the right of any citizen...to vote on account of race or color.” 52
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U.S.C. § 10301(a). A violation of § 2 is established if, “based on the totality of
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circumstances,” the challenged electoral process is “not equally open to participation
by members of a [racial minority group] in that its members have less opportunity
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than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
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ORDER- 1
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elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). The essence of a § 2
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claim, as set forth in seminal case Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), is “that
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a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and
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[majority] voters to elect their preferred representatives.” 478 U.S. at 47.
On September 2, 2016, the court approved entry of the parties’ Partial Consent
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Decree wherein Pasco admitted liability and consented to the court’s finding that the
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City’s existing at-large method of electing all its members to the Pasco City Council
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violated § 2 of the VRA by diluting the electoral power of Pasco’s Latino voters.
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(ECF No. 16 at 10). The Partial Consent Decree fully resolves the issue of liability.
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The court enjoined the Defendants from conducting future elections under that
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system “or any other election method that violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights
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Act.” (ECF No. 16 at 12). The Partial Consent Decree did not mandate a particular
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remedy.
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Now pending are the parties’ proposed remedial plans (filed as cross-motions at
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ECF Nos. 21, 25) after they failed to reach agreement on this aspect of the case. On
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December 7, 2016, the court held oral argument. Present on behalf of Plaintiff were
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Brendan Monahan, Emily Chiang, La Rond Baker, Gregory Landis, and Cristin
Aragon. Present on behalf of Defendants, City of Pasco were John Safarli, Leland
Kerr, and Casey Bruner.
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ORDER- 2
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The parties’ motions are supported by declarations, reports, and data of highly
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experienced demographic and redistricting experts: Richard L. Engstrom, Ph.D.
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(ECF Nos. 23, 29); William S. Cooper (ECF Nos. 24, 28, 32); and Peter A. Morrison,
Ph.D. (ECF No. 26, Ex. 13; ECF Nos. 33, Exs. 1 and 2).
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There are three electoral formats commonly used by municipal governments in
the United States: at-large systems, single-member district systems, and “mixed” or
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“hybrid” systems. See Goosby v. Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 981 F.Supp.
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751, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). “In an at-large system, all members of the legislative
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body are elected from a district that includes all members of the electorate. In a
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single-member district system, the legislators are elected from compact, contiguous
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and essentially equipopulous districts. In a mixed system, some members of the
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legislature are elected from single-member districts, while other members, usually a
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smaller number, are elected at large. In a typical mixed system, the districts cover
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the entire municipality. Thus, each voter is represented both by one or more
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legislators elected from a district and one or more legislators elected at large.” Id.
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In this case, the Pasco City Council has adopted a “mixed” or “hybrid” 6-1
remedial plan redrawing its voting districts and utilizing a scheme in which six
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members are elected from districts and a single position is elected at-large. The
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primary issue is whether the remedial plan is legally acceptable. If it is, the parties
agree deference is owed to the Pasco City Council’s legislative judgment. If it is
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not, Pasco concedes the court has authority to judicially impose Plaintiff’s proposal
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with seven single-member geographic residency districts.
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This Memorandum
Opinion and Order approves the City’s remedial plan, directs its implementation,
and denies the Plaintiff’s request for permanent injunction, but retains jurisdiction.
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II.
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BACKGROUND
As with all cases under the Voting Rights Act, this one is driven by the facts. The
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City of Pasco has conceded that its current City Council election scheme violates §
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2. The key factual conclusions supporting the court’s finding of liability are
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contained in the Partial Consent Decree. (ECF No. 16). Because of their length, the
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stipulated facts and findings in the Partial Consent Decree are incorporated by
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reference.
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The parties have decided that the public interest is best served by efforts to settle
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this litigation thus avoiding “protracted, costly, and potentially divisive litigation.”
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(ECF No. 16 at ¶ 23). The experience of courts applying the Voting Rights Act
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confirms that it is one the most difficult and intricate responsibilities a district court
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will confront. See e.g., Patino v. City of Pasadena, 2017 WL 68467 (S.D.Tex. Jan.
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6, 2017) (after rulings on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, district
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court held a 7-day trial involving 16 witnesses and 468 exhibits resulting in a 11121
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page decision). The parties’ experts largely rely on the same sources of data, with
the exception that the Defendants’ expert, Mr. Morrison, has also supplied analysis
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based upon recently obtained data from the Franklin County Auditor’s Office.1 (ECF
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No. 33, Ex. 1). The experts’ methodologies differ and variances in their data exists,
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however these differences are not material to the court’s decision. No party has
requested a trial or evidentiary hearing on the facts.
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A. Pasco’s Demographics
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1. Latino Population
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The City of Pasco, is located in south central Washington and is one of three
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cities that make up the Tri-Cities region. Its geography encompasses approximately
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38.7 square miles. (ECF No. 28 at 2). Pasco’s population nearly doubled between
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2000 and 2010. (ECF No. 24 at 4). Its adjusted population based on the 2010
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decennial U.S. Census is 62,452. Id. More recent population estimates of the
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Washington Office of Financial Management indicate the population is 70,560.
(ECF No. 24 at 6). According to the 2010 Census, the City is 54.02%2 Latino and
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time along with Defendants’ Reply. (ECF No. 34). The court declines to strike the
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data or that portion of the Reply relying upon this new information absent evidence
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of prejudice.
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total population include 45.02% (based upon the 5-year 2010-2014 American
Plaintiff objects to this data on the sole basis that it was submitted for the first
Defendants’ expert indicates more recent estimations of the Latino share of the
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40.44% non-Hispanic White. (ECF No. 24 at 5). The 2010 Census data adjusted
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for annexations estimates that Pasco has a population under age 18 that is 66.47%
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Latino and 25.48% non-Hispanic White. (ECF No. 24 at 5).
Mr. Morrison estimates Pasco’s Spanish-surnamed voter registration is 31.8% as
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of October 2016. (ECF No. 33, Ex 1 at 3, ¶9; Ex. 2 at 4-5). This statistic is an
estimate of Latino registered voters in Pasco.
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2. Citywide Latino Citizen Voting-Age Population
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The American Community Survey (“ACS”), produced by the U.S. Census
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Bureau, provides two estimates of the Latino citizen voting-age population
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(“LCVAP”) (residents that are legally able to vote) in Pasco. The first is based upon
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a five-year survey for 2010-2015 and the second is based on the one-year survey for
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2015. The one-year estimate accounts for Pasco’s city limits as of 2015. (ECF No.
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33, Ex. 1 at 2). The estimates for LCVAP are 31.9% of the citywide eligible voter
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population (5-year estimate), 32.09% (5-year estimate adjusted), and 38.5% (2015
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1-year estimate). The 2015 estimate is most current and includes recent annexations,
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however, the five-year estimate (which does not take into account the 2014 and 2015
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annexations) is more statistically reliable.
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Community Survey estimate) and 49.7% (the 2015 1-year American Community
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Survey estimate). (ECF No. 24 at 7, ¶¶21-22).
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Given that a significant portion of the City’s population is Latino and young,
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trends show and experts forecast the LCVAP to increase in the coming years. (ECF
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No. 33, Ex. at 2). Mr. Morrison predicts the LCVAP is likely to exceed 40% by
2021. Id.
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B. Pasco’s 5-2 Method of Electing its City Council
Pasco is a non-charter code city with a council-manager form of government.
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(ECF No. 25 at 3). The Mayor and Mayor Pro Tempore are chosen by
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councilmembers. (ECF No. 25 at 5). While the Mayor presides over Council
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meetings, the role is “for ceremonial purposes.” Id. (quoting Wash.Rev.Code §
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35A.13.030).
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The Pasco City Council consists of seven members. When the last City Council
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election was held, the City was utilizing an at-large, numbered “place system” for
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electing councilmembers to serve staggered four-year terms. (ECF No. 31 at 10).
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Five of the seven positions (identified as Positions 1 through 5) were tied to
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geographical residency districts. Candidates for Positions 1 through 5 were required
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to reside in their respective geographical residency districts. In the August primary,
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voters narrowed the field of candidates for the district in which they resided. The top
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two candidates in each district proceeded in the general election, which was
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conducted at-large and the candidate receiving a majority of votes won. Positions 6
and 7 were both at-large positions, in that voters citywide narrowed the field of
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candidates for each seat in the primary and then voted for one of two candidates for
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each position in the general election. Washington state law requires that “all voters
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of a code city be permitted to vote in each city council race at the general election.”
Wash. AGO 2016 NO. 1 (Wash.A.G.), 2016 WL 439289 (Jan. 28, 2016)(discussing
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Wash.Rev.Code §35A.12.180). 3 The key features of Pasco’s election scheme were
the combination of: 1) a numbered place system; 2) a top two primary system; and
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3) at-large general elections for every seat with a majority vote rule. See ECF No.
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23 at ¶ 10.
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In 2015, Plaintiff Brenda Glatt, a Latina, was a candidate for Pasco City Council
at-large Position 6. In the general election, she was defeated decisively by non-
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Latino candidate Matt Watkins despite her strong support from Latino voters. (ECF
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to elect a councilmember” of a district, “unless the city had prior to January 1, 1994,
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limited the voting in the general election” to voters residing in the district.
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Wash.Rev.Code §35A.12.180. The role the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
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U.S. Constitution plays herein is acknowledged by the parties and this court. See
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Cleveland Cnty. Ass'n for Gov't by the People v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
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142 F.3d 468, 477 (D.C.Cir.1998) (per curiam) (“[I]f a violation of federal law
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necessitates a remedy barred by state law, the state law must give way; if no such
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violation exists, principles of federalism dictate that state law governs.”).
The statute provides that voters of the “entire city may vote at the general election
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No. 23 at ¶ 20).
The next municipal election will be in November 2017, at which time four (4) of
the seats on the Pasco City Council are presently up for election.
C. Pasco’s Efforts Toward Election Change
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Four years ago a Voting Rights Act case was filed against the city of Yakima,
Washington, a town of 91,000, just 80 miles from Pasco. As in this case, the
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complaint contended the city’s at-large electoral system of electing city
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councilmembers violated § 2. In August 2014, judgment was entered in favor of
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Plaintiffs. Montes v. City of Yakima, 40 F.Supp.3d 1377 (E.D.Wash., Aug. 22, 2014).
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The record evidences that since 2014, Pasco has been responsive to the concern
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that its election system had a disproportionate impact on the Latino vote. In 2014,
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Pasco hired a demographer. In March 2015, the City Council modified its district
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boundaries to provide 2 majority-minority districts “with the goal of providing for
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equal voting opportunity for all citizens” (ECF No. 26, Ex. 2 at 1). In May 2015,
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the City Council enacted Resolution No. 3635 declaring its intent to pursue a district-
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based election system and further declaring its continuing intent to provide equal
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voting opportunities for all its citizens, and to provide equitable and proportional
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representation. (ECF No. 16 at ¶ 6)(ECF No. 26, Exs. 4-5). However, state law
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mandating at-large general elections put the City in the proverbial position between
a rock and a hard spot. This position was confirmed in the State Attorney General’s
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Office response to the City’s query about the legality of modifying the at-large
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election scheme to avoid a violation of § 2. (ECF No. 26, Ex. 10); Wash. AGO 2016
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NO. 1 (Wash.A.G.), 2016 WL 439289 (Jan. 28, 2016) (“code cities in
Washington…face difficult decisions and potential legal risk regardless of what
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course they choose…Either course of action, whether to adhere to state law or to
depart from it, may be subject to challenge in court.”). Pasco continued to seek
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change by helping draft legislation (Senate Bill 6129) which would have allowed
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Pasco to avoid the restrictions of Wash.Rev.Code §35A.12.180. (ECF No. 25 at 9)
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The mayor testified before the state senate in favor of the bill, but the bill did not
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pass. Id. at 9-10.
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Months prior to filing this lawsuit, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
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of Washington notified Pasco that it believed its election system violated federal
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law. Pasco began consulting with the ACLU.
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necessary “as the only available means to bring the force of federal law to remedy
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the problem that exists as a result of state law.” (ECF No. 26, Ex. 10 at 2).
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The City felt the lawsuit was
As stated in the Partial Consent Decree, “there is no evidence of any
discriminatory motive or intent by the non-Latino population in exercising their own
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rights to vote.” (ECF No. 16 at 8, ¶ 20). There is no evidence in the record of a
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history of official discrimination against Latinos.
D. Partial Consent Decree Stipulations
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The Partial Consent Decree includes key concessions establishing the three
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Gingles preconditions for a violation of § 2, which are: (1) the minority group is
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sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district, (2) the minority group is politically cohesive, and (3) the majority
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group votes sufficiently as a bloc4 to enable it, in the absence of special
circumstances, “usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.” Thornburg v.
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Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). Specifically, the Partial Consent Decree states:
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(12)…Pasco’s large Latino population is sufficiently numerous and compact to
form a majority in at least one single-member district, is political[ly] cohesive,
and the non-Latino majority votes sufficiently as a block to defeat a Latino
preferred candidate.
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(17) The majority of voters in Pasco are white and have historically engaged in
bloc voting favoring non-Latino candidates….
(18) There is a pattern of racially polarized voting in the City of Pasco City
Council elections. The voting patterns and the presently mandated at-large
general election of all City Council candidates make it very difficult for the
Latino community to elect candidates of their choice. Although other minority
candidates have been elected to the City Council, as a result of racially polarized
bloc voting, no Latino candidate has ever won an opposed election to the Pasco
City Council. The first Latina to serve on the City Council was Luisa Torres. She
was appointed to the Council in 1989. Luisa ran for election in 1989 but was
defeated by a non-Latina candidate. The only other Latino to serve on the City
Council was also first appointed to the City Council, Saul Martinez. He
subsequently ran unopposed, which enabled him to retain his seat.
(19) In 2015, six Latinos ran for two positions on [the] City Council. Despite
strong support of Latino voters, the two Latinas who survived the primary
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the voter and the way in which the voter votes.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n. 21
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(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Racially polarized voting means “a consistent relationship between [the] race of
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election were both defeated in the November 2015 general election.
(ECF No. 16 at 5-8).
In conceding liability, Pasco also concedes there is “sufficient evidence” to
conclude that “based on the totality of circumstances,” the challenged electoral
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process impermissibly impairs the minority group's ability to elect representatives
of its choice. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44–45; see also Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160
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F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting the Gingles two-step analysis). Specifically,
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the Partial Consent Decree states as follows:
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(22)…[T]here is sufficient evidence of disparities to show inequality in
opportunities between the white and Latino populations and that the existing atlarge election system for the Pasco City Council has excluded Latinos from
meaningfully participating in the political process and diluted their vote such that
Latinos are unable to elect candidates of their choice to the City Council…In
order to remedy the City of Pasco’s Section 2 violation, the City must adopt a
new election system.
(ECF No. 16 at 8).
E. Council Approval of 6-1 Hybrid Single-Member/At-Large Plan
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After entry of the Partial Consent Decree, the City Council held public
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hearings to evaluate three alternative systems for future elections including
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alternatives with two, one, and no at-large positions. (ECF No. 26, Ex. 10). On
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September 19, 2016, the Council voted in favor of an election system comprised of
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six districts and one at–large seat. (ECF No. 21). On October 10, 2016, the Council
approved Ordinance No. 4315 creating the “6-1” redistricting plan. (ECF No. 26,
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Ex. 10). Under this plan, six of the councilmembers would be elected by the voters
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in each of the City’s six “single-member districts” (“SMD”); a seventh seat would
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be elected at-large. The geographic residency districts divide the entire territory
within Pasco city limits into six instead of five geographic districts. Three districts
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(Districts 1, 2 and 6) are majority-minority districts in which Latinos constitute more
than 50% of that district’s eligible and registered voters. (ECF No. 26, Ex. 13 at 2;
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ECF No. 33 at 5; ECF No. 33, Ex. 1 at 4). The new district boundaries align with
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58 out of 67 existing precincts. (ECF No. 33, Ex. 2 at 4). The City’s map and “Table
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1” of demographic data (based upon the 2010-2014 5-year ACS estimates) are
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reproduced in Appendix A attached to this decision.
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The Latino share of eligible voters based upon figures from the 2010-2014 513
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year ACS estimate for Position 1 was 54.0%; Position 2, 52.3%; Position 3, 27.3%;
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Position 4, 23.6%; Position 5, 13.0%; and Position 6, 56.0%. (ECF No. 26, Ex. 13
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at 5). The parties agree that the City’s plan provides three majority-minority
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“opportunity” districts (Positions 1, 2, and 6), and at least one district in which
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Latinos are not a majority but have a Latino voting age population exceeding 25%.
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The court notes that Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to respond or offer
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their own expert analysis of Mr. Morrison’s statistical analysis of current registered
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voters by District contained in “Table 2” at ECF No. 33, Ex. 1, based upon 2016
data from the Franklin County Auditor’s Office. (ECF No. 33, Ex. 1)(Morrison First
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Supplemental Report). Mr. Morrison estimates the Latino share of registered voters
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district-wide are: Position 1 (58.5%); Position 2 (61.6%); Position 3 (41.4%);
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Position 4 (40.9%); Position 5 (38.2%); Position 6 (61.7%). Id.
The City Council’s Ordinance states that this alternative was preferred over
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other proposals due to: 1) “its providing three Latino citizen-voter-age majority
districts, the same number as possible under the ACLU’s preferred seven district
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plan;” 2) “the plan providing greater opportunities for voters to influence the number
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of elections for members of the City Council and for voters to have the opportunity
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to run for seats on the City Council”; and 3) “the possibility of greater continuity of
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government and ease in implementation.” (ECF No. 26, Ex. 10 at 2). There is no
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evidence that the adoption of this plan was motivated by racial animus.
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F. Plaintiff’s Proposed 7-0 Plan
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Plaintiff opposes the plan passed by Pasco and proposes an alternative
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dividing the City into seven single-member residency districts and no at-large
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position. The Plaintiff’s map and table of demographic data is reproduced in
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Appendix B attached to this Order. Like the City’s plan, Plaintiff’s plan also
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provides three majority-minority districts and one district, in which the LCVAP
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exceeds 25%, which Plaintiff characterizes as an “influence district.”
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III. LEGAL STANDARDS
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The vote is one of the most critical features of a representative democracy and
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therefore one of our most fundamental rights. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
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562 (1964) (describing the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
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manner as “preservative of other basic civil and political rights”). Although great
progress has been made, “voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that,” and
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§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act remains a crucial “permanent, nationwide ban,” Shelby
Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013), on “even the most subtle forms of
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discrimination,” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Federal courts have a vital role in protecting the right “to participate equally in the
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political process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80. Though vital, this role is limited. The
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following key principles guide the court’s analysis and decision.
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A. General Remedial Powers under the VRA and the Complete and Full
Remedy Standard
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Where, as here, a violation of § 2 has been established, “courts should make an
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affirmative effort to fashion an appropriate remedy for that violation.” Monroe v.
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City of Woodville, Mississippi, 819 F.2d 507, 511 n. 2 (5th Cir.1987) (per curiam),
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cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988); Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1022
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(8th Cir. 2006)(the district court's “first and foremost obligation...is to correct the
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Section 2 violation.”). The legislative history of the VRA states:
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The basic principle of equity that the remedy fashioned must be commensurate
with the right that has been violated provides adequate assurance, without
disturbing the prior case law or prescribing in the statute mechanistic rules for
formulating remedies in cases which necessarily depend upon widely varied
proof and local circumstances. The court should exercise its traditional equitable
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powers to fashion the relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of
minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority
citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.
S.Rep. No. 417 at 31, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News at 208 (footnote omitted). In sum, “‘the [district] court has not merely
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the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.’”
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Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1412 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting Louisiana v. United
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States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)), cert. denied sub nom. City Council v. Ketchum,
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471 U.S. 1135 (1985); see also, Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty., 831 F.2d 246, 252 (11th
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Cir.1987)(A court “cannot authorize an element of an election proposal that will not
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with certitude completely remedy the Section 2 violation.”).
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A complete § 2 remedy does not mean that a remedial plan must guarantee
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electoral success for Latinos.
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exercise an electoral power that is commensurate with its population.’” U.S. v.
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Village of Port Chester, 704 F.Supp.2d 411, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting LULAC
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v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 428 (2006)); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,
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The plan must provide “a genuine opportunity ‘to
1014 n.11 (1994) (“[T]he ultimate right of § 2 is equality of opportunity, not a
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guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever race.”);
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Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1023 (“The defendants' argument that the remedial plan must
provide some sort of guarantee that Indian–preferred candidates will be elected is
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not persuasive; all that is required is that the remedy afford Native-Americans a
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realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.”).
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Any proposal to remedy a § 2 violation must itself conform to § 2. United States
v. Dallas Cnty. Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1437 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
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U.S. 1030 (1990). A remedy “should be sufficiently tailored to the circumstances
giving rise to the § 2 violation.” Id.
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A remedy for a § 2 violation must not itself be enacted with the discriminatory
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intent of diluting the Latino vote. Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty., Ala., 831 F.2d 246,
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249 (11th Cir. 1987); Edge v. Sumter Cnty. School Dist., 775 F.2d 1509, 1510 (11th
11
12
Cir. 1985). There is no evidence the at-large election scheme here was conceived
as a tool of racial discrimination. 5 C.f., Patino v. City of Pasadena, 2017 WL 68467
13
14
(S.D.Tex., January 6, 2017).
15
B. Judicial Deference
16
Where the Pasco City Council has exercised its political and policy judgment in
17
preparing and passing the Ordinance behind Defendants’ remedial scheme, the
18
proposal is properly characterized as a “legislative” plan. See e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb,
19
20
5
21
irrelevant in assessing the totality of the circumstances. Plaintiff’s contention that
22
intent is “irrelevant” here acknowledges that there is no “concrete evidence” of
23
discriminatory intent at play in this case. (ECF No. 31 at 10).
Although proof of discriminatory intent is not dispositive, when it exists, it is not
24
ORDER- 17
1
437 U.S. 535, 538 (1978) (upholding system as a valid legislatively enacted plan,
2
despite the absence of an express grant of legislative power to the City Council to
3
change the election system); Jenkins v. City of Pensacola, 638 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th
4
Cir. 1981)(conceding that on balance, the plan was “better viewed as a legislative
5
6
7
plan” rather than court-ordered, where the plan, which called for seven singlemember districts and three at-large districts, was formally adopted by ordinance after
8
liability was established and the court directed the parties to submit proposals).
9
Plaintiff makes no argument to the contrary.
10
11
Federal courts are reluctant to interfere with legislative decisions of governing
bodies especially when they concern issues as sensitive as those regarding who
12
votes, how they vote, and what districts they vote in. The Supreme Court has
13
14
cautioned that “redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task
15
which the federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt.” Wise v.
16
Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978) (plurality) (White, J.); see also, Connor v.
17
Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975);
18
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1973); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 39
19
(1982).
20
The role of the court in fashioning a remedy for a violation of the Constitution
21
22
23
was delineated by the Supreme Court is Wise v. Lipscomb, where the court said “it
is ... appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the
24
ORDER- 18
1
legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure
2
rather than for the federal court to devise and order into effect its own plan.” Wise,
3
4
437 U.S. at 540; see also United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420, 435 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“[A]t least in redistricting cases, district courts must offer governing bodies the first
5
6
7
pass at devising a remedy.”). This court’s role is similar in fashioning a remedy for
a violation of the Voting Rights Act. Where a legislative body proposes a plan which
8
completely remedies the § 2 violation and is not unconstitutional or otherwise illegal,
9
then that plan “will ... be the governing law,” even if it is not the plan the court would
10
have chosen. Wise, 437 U.S. at 540; see also, Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 39
11
(1982)(“a court must defer to legislative judgments on reapportionment as much as
12
possible”); Perry v. Perez, 132 S.Ct. 934, 941 (2012)(the legislative plan “serves as
13
14
a starting point for the district court.”); Williams v. City of Texarkana, Ark., 32 F.3d
15
1265, 1268 (8th Cir. 1994)(“If an appropriate legislative body offers a remedial plan,
16
the court must defer to the proposed plan unless the plan does not completely remedy
17
the violation or the proposed plan itself constitutes a section two violation.”);
18
Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1985)(“Thus, even where a legislative
19
choice of policy is perceived to have been unwise, or simply not the optimum choice,
20
absent a choice that is either unconstitutional or otherwise illegal under federal law,
21
22
23
federal courts must defer to that legislative judgment.”); McGhee v. Granville Cnty.,
N.C., 860 F.2d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[A] reviewing court must ... accord great
24
ORDER- 19
1
deference to legislative judgments about the exact nature and scope of the proposed
2
remedy...”); Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 501 n. 5 (7th Cir.
3
4
1991) (the court “must, wherever practicable, afford the jurisdiction an opportunity
to remedy the violation first, ... with deference afforded the jurisdiction's plan if it
5
6
7
provides a full, legally acceptable remedy.... But if the jurisdiction fails to remedy
completely the violation or if a proposed remedial plan itself constitutes a § 2
8
violation, the court must itself take measures to remedy the violation.”); Tallahassee
9
Branch of NAACP v. Leon Cnty., Fla., 827 F.2d 1436, 1438 (11th Cir. 1987)
10
(“[F]ederal courts must defer to the judgment of a state legislative body in the area
11
of reapportionment. Principles of federalism and common sense mandate deference
12
to a plan which has been legislatively enacted.”).
13
Plaintiff suggests the applicable legal standard in this case is the more stringent
14
15
one where “[t]he Supreme Court has directed the use of single-member districts to
16
remedy Section 2 violations unless there are compelling reasons not to use them.” 6
17
(ECF No. 21 at 8-9)(quoting Montes v. City of Yakima, 2015 WL 11120964, at *9
18
(E.D.Wash. 2015)). However, the broad reach of the Voting Rights Act supports a
19
20
6
21
district court is required to fashion a remedy, the Supreme Court has directed the
22
use of single-member districts unless there are compelling reasons not to use
23
them.” 2015 WL 11120964, at *9 (E.D.Wash. 2015)(emphasis added).
The quoted reference from Montes, in its entirety, reads as follows: “When a
24
ORDER- 20
1
broad view of permissible remedies. To be clear, the Supreme Court has not
2
mandated single-member districts in all instances. It has stated “a court drawn plan
3
4
should prefer single member districts over multi-member districts, absent persuasive
justification to the contrary.” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978)(emphasis
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
added).
Supreme Court precedent does not dictate remedial preferences for
legislative bodies; it requires deference to them so long as they meet the special
standards that are applicable.
C. Preemption of State Law
In reviewing a remedial plan, “a district court should not preempt the legislative
task nor intrude upon state policy any more than necessary.” Upham v. Seamon, 456
12
U.S. 37, 41–42 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794–
13
14
795 (1973)). This consideration is relevant here, where, state law proscribes at-large
15
general elections. Accordingly, a legislative remedy entitled to deference must not
16
unnecessarily conflict with this legislative judgment of the state of Washington. See
17
e.g., Large v. Fremont Cnty., Wyo, 670 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2012)(emphasis
18
added)(affirming rejection of deference to locally-devised plan where County’s
19
desired plan unnecessarily conflicted with Wyoming state law).
20
D. Totality of the Circumstances
21
22
23
As stated above, the court must consider whether Defendants’ remedial plan is
legally unacceptable because it fails to remedy the particular dilution violation or
24
ORDER- 21
1
violates anew constitutional or statutory voting rights. This evaluation requires the
2
court to consider “the totality of circumstances,” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b), through “a
3
4
searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality and on a functional view
of the political process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (internal quotations and citation
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
omitted). The typical factors which may be probative of a violation of § 2 are:
(1) “the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;”
(2) “the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;”
(3) “the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot
provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;”
(4) “if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;”
(5) “the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process;”
(6) “whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;”
(7) “the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to
public office in the jurisdiction;”
(8) “whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group;”
and
(9) “whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of
such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.”
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee’s Majority
23
24
ORDER- 22
1
2
3
4
Report contained in bill amending Voting Rights Act).
The most relevant of the so-called “Senate Factors” in the liability phase of this
litigation were the second and third factors. Where the enacted remedial plan has
not been utilized and there is no history by which to analyze the scheme, a
5
6
7
mechanical review of these factors does not aid the court in determining whether the
proposed plan meets the requirements of § 2. Hines v. Mayor and Town Council of
8
Ahoskie, 998 F.2d 1266, 1272 (4th Cir. 1993). The pertinent factors are addressed in
9
the Analysis, Section IV, below.
10
11
E. At-Large Plans are not Per Se Illegal
Both parties acknowledge that at-large plans are not per se unlawful. Gingles,
12
478 U.S. at 46 (“[E]lectoral devices, such as at-large elections, may not be
13
14
considered per se violative of § 2. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that, under the totality
15
of the circumstances, the devices result in unequal access to the electoral process.”).
16
“At-large procedures that are discriminatory in the context of one election scheme
17
are not necessarily discriminatory under another scheme.” U.S. v. Dallas Cnty.
18
Comm’n, Dallas Cnty., Ala., 850 F.2d 1433, 1438-39 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation and
19
quotations omitted).
20
IV.
ANALYIS – REMEDIAL PLAN
21
22
23
The gravamen of the § 2 violation herein is that the Pasco City Council has until
now operated under an at-large “place system” for electing all seven City Council
24
ORDER- 23
1
seats in a place where the voices of minority voters in a racially polarized electorate
2
have been drowned out by the will of majority voters. The City’s enacted remedy is
3
4
the court’s starting point.
The court begins with a look at how political life in Pasco would structurally
5
6
7
differ under the City’s hybrid 6-1 remedial plan. First, Pasco’s plan provides Latinos
with “rough proportionality” in their voting influence, in that it provides for three
8
majority-minority districts, instead of the former two. See Johnson v. De Grandy,
9
512 U.S. 997, 1019 (1994)(describing majority-minority districts as remedial
10
devices relying upon a “quintessentially race-conscious calculus aptly described as
11
the ‘politics of second best.’”). Next, whereas run-off primaries (district-based for 5
12
position) combined with at-large elections previously determined all seven positions,
13
14
the 6-1 plan provides for six single-member district-based general elections, instead
15
of none. As before, Position 7 remains at-large, untied to any district and elected by
16
the citywide population. Pasco residents would have the opportunity to run or vote
17
for just two positions on the Council, instead of all seven under the former election
18
scheme, or just one under Plaintiff’s proposal. Thus, the new election scheme retains
19
its use of numbered positions, a top-two primary, and majority vote general
20
elections, but limits their application to specifically drawn districts for all but one
21
22
23
seat.
The court’s task is to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances
24
ORDER- 24
1
present in Pasco, this combination of single district elections and a single at-large
2
position, viewed as a whole (and not simply focusing on the one at-large seat), offers
3
4
a complete remedy and provides undiluted opportunity for Latino citizens to
participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.
5
6
7
The Defendants contend the City’s 6-1 hybrid plan complies with the law and
was the result of a policy judgment, not an arbitrary choice or any intent to continue
8
discriminative past practices. The only aspect of the City’s plan Plaintiff contests is
9
its at-large component for Position 7. Plaintiff contends the total elimination of any
10
at-large component in the election system is necessary to “completely” and “fully”
11
remedy the § 2 violation. In Plaintiff’s view, the retention of any at-large seat puts
12
that seat currently “functionally off-limits” to Latino voters, ECF No. 27 at 6,
13
14
15
whereas her proposed single-member plan would “provide Latinos with immediate
influence” in a fourth district. (ECF No. 31 at 2).
16
The nature of Plaintiff’s challenge to Pasco’s remedy expands upon its challenge
17
to the former election scheme. Whereas Plaintiff contended the former at-large
18
election scheme impeded the ability of Latino voters to elect representatives of their
19
choice, i.e. their ability to determine city council elections, Plaintiff’s argument now
20
includes the contention that the remedy is unlawful because the citywide post
21
22
23
impairs Latinos’ ability to influence the outcome of the single position on the
Council. This type of “influence dilution” claim is addressed in the totality of
24
ORDER- 25
1
2
3
4
circumstances analysis that follows.
A. Proportionality
Defendants emphasize that the City’s remedial plan has reconfigured the
residency districts to achieve “rough proportionality,” where Latinos are a majority
5
6
7
of the registered and eligible voting populations in three districts (or 42.85% of the
total seats). This is a higher proportion than the Latino share of the citywide voting
8
age population, 38.5%. The Supreme Court has noted that “‘[p]roportionality’ as
9
the term is used [in the totality of circumstances analysis] links the number of
10
majority-minority voting districts to minority members' share of the relevant
11
population.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.11 (1994).
12
Proportionality has evolved from relevant evidence for liability determinations in §
13
14
2 cases, to a convenient, frequently used redistricting tool aimed to redress vote
15
dilution. Both proposals before the court recognize the creation of three majority-
16
minority districts provides Latinos with a realistic opportunity to elect
17
representatives of their choice. This is “obviously an indication that minority voters
18
have an equal opportunity, in spite of racial polarization, ‘to participate in the
19
political process and elect representatives of their choice.’” De Grandy, 512 U.S. at
20
1020.
21
22
23
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has admonished that while proportionality is
always a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances inquiry, the court is not
24
ORDER- 26
1
to place undue emphasis on it. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 436 (2006). This is
2
because there is no general requirement that all remedies include rough
3
4
proportionality (although the facts may dictate it, as they do here), proportionality
may not be used as a safe harbor, and it is “not to be pursued at the cost of fracturing
5
6
7
effective coalitional districts.” Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 133
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2016)(appeal pending); see also, U.S. v. Euclid City School Bd,
8
632 F.Supp.2d 740, 753 (N.D.Ohio 2009) (rejecting assertion that a remedy must
9
result in roughly proportional representation, as “[s]uch a contention confuses the
10
use of proportionality as one tool through which a reviewing court determines the
11
possible existence of vote dilution on the one hand, with a guarantee of proportional
12
representation on the other ... [t]he former is common sense, the latter is prohibited
13
14
by statute.”).
15
The degree of value assigned to proportionality may vary with the facts.
16
Undoubtedly, Pasco has considered its neighbor’s experience in devising a remedy
17
with proportionality in this case. In Montes v. City of Yakima, the mechanism
18
diluting the Latino vote was identical to that in this case: a numbered place system
19
with an at-large “city-wide majority takes all election” for all seven city council
20
seats. 2015 WL 11120964, *2 (E.D.Wash. 2015). The City of Yakima had proposed
21
22
23
a remedial electoral system that would include five single-member district positions
and two at-large positions. Id. at *2. Under the proposal, the two at-large positions
24
ORDER- 27
1
would be filled in a single election by way of “limited voting” and without a primary.
2
“Instead, each candidate who filed for office would appear on a single-ballot at the
3
4
general election,” and “each voter in the City would cast a single vote for any of the
candidates listed.” Id. The two candidates garnering the most votes would be
5
6
7
elected. Id. The court concluded the City’s proposal was not entitled to deference
as it was neither “effective” nor a “full” remedy for several reasons. First, Yakima’s
8
proposal posed unnecessary conflicts with state law mandating primaries. Id. at *5-
9
*7. Second, it failed to provide rough proportionality. 7 Id. at *8. These facts
10
distinguish this case from Montes and other cases8 Plaintiff cites in a significant way.
11
12
7
The Montes decision explains that Yakima had asserted the Latino citizen voting
13
age population in Yakima was 22.97%, which meant “Latinos should,
14
mathematically, hold 1.6 seats [on the seven member council] to be proportional to
15
their share of the CVAP.” Montes, 2015 WL 11120964, *8. The city’s plan only
16
provided one majority-minority district. Id. The court concluded the City’s plan
17
failed to accord proportionality because “Defendants’ proposal only gives the Latino
18
population an opportunity to attain one of the seven seats.” Id. The court concluded
19
proportionality was a “significant indicator of whether an electoral plan provides an
20
adequate remedy…” Id.
21
8
Rough proportionality was also absent in both of the rejected legislated hybrid
22
proposals in Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 126 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1997)
23
and U.S. v. Osceola Cnty, Fla, 474 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
24
ORDER- 28
1
2
3
4
This factor favors Pasco’s remedy; however, the analysis must proceed because
proportionality is not the end-all be-all test for the remedy of a violation of § 2.
B. Racial Polarization
It has been stipulated and this court has found that voting in Pasco evidences
5
6
7
racial polarization. In § 2 cases, racially polarized voting simply means that “the
race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or candidates; that
8
is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority language groups) vote
9
in blocs for different candidates.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 62. It “is the difference
10
between choices made by [minorities] and whites – not the reasons for that
11
difference” Id. at 63.
12
The court rejects Plaintiff’s invitation to hold that the findings on liability,
13
14
including the existence of racially polarized voting, automatically dictates the
15
eradication of all at-large seats for the Pasco City Council. See ECF No. 21 at 10.
16
None of the cases cited by Plaintiff support such a bright-line rule. Such an
17
interpretation would eliminate either court or legislative discretion and simply wrap
18
municipalities and “United States District Judges in a ‘single-member strait jacket.’”
19
Paige v. Gray, 437 F.Supp. 137, 171 (M.D.Ga. 1977); see also, U.S. v. Maregno
20
Cnty. Comm’n, 643 F.Supp. 232 (S.D.Ala. 1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 610 (11th
21
22
23
24
ORDER- 29
1
Cir.1987)(stating this interpretation “would annihilate a court’s ability to examine
2
on an ad hoc basis the totality of the circumstances presented and thereby to fashion
3
4
an equitable remedy which does not intrude upon state policy more than necessary
to meet the specific constitutional violations involved.”).
5
6
7
The impressive body of voting rights jurisprudence confirms that relief against
racially polarized bloc voting can utilize a hybrid election scheme without violating
8
§ 2. See e.g., Solomon v. Liberty Cnty. Comm’rs, 221 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir.
9
2000)(en banc)(finding no clear error in district court’s decision holding that
10
county’s use of at-large election scheme did not violate § 2, despite high degree of
11
racially polarized voting and “vestiges of official discrimination” in the county);
12
Tallahassee Branch of NAACP v. Leon Cnty., Fla., 827 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1987),
13
14
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960 (1988) (affirming deference to legislatively adopted
15
mixed plan consisting of five single-member districts and two at large); Calderon v.
16
Ross, 584 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1978), modified on rehearing, 589 F.2d 909 (1979)
17
(approving 5-2 plan); Paige v. Gray, 473 F.Supp. 137, 158 (M.D.Ga.
18
1977)(approving court-devised 6-1 hybrid remedial plan for city commissioners of
19
the city of Albany, Georgia, allowing retention of a single at-large position slotted
20
for the mayor); U.S. v. Euclid City School Bd., 632 F.Supp.2d. 740 (N.D.Ohio
21
22
23
2009)(approving city school board’s limited voting proposal and retention of at-large
elections as remedy for § 2 violation); U.S. v. City of Euclid, 523 F.Supp.2d 641
24
ORDER- 30
1
(N.D.Ohio 2007)(remedying the §2 violation by replacing multi-seat at-large contest
2
with hybrid 8-1 remedial plan providing eight single-member districts while
3
4
retaining at-large council president position) ; N.A.A.C.P. v. Kershaw Cnty., S.C.,
838 F.Supp. 237 (D.S.C. 1993)(accepting hybrid remedial plan arising out of at-
5
6
7
large method of electing members of city council with six single member districts
and at-large election of chair of county council); East Jefferson Coalition for
8
Leadership and Development v. Parish of Jefferson, 703 F.Supp. 28 (E.D.La.
9
1989)(approving 7-member council with six single–district members and one at-
10
large member was sufficient to give voters a “realistic ability to influence the
11
outcome of…elections,” despite the fact none of the single-member districts created
12
by the defendants' plan had a majority of African-Americans); James v. City of
13
14
Sarasota, Fla., 611 F.Supp. 25 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (approving mixed plan submitted
15
by city with two commissioners elected at-large by plurality vote); N.A.A.C.P. v.
16
City of Statesville, N.C., 606 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (approving jointly
17
proposed replacement for at-large method of election with hybrid 6-2 plan,
18
combining six district and two at-large voting methods); Vecinos DeBarrio Uno et
19
al., v. City of Holyoke et al, 960 F.Supp. 515 (D.Mass. 1997)(holding that totality of
20
circumstances established that city’s hybrid ward and at-large voting system for city
21
22
23
council did not deny Hispanics meaningful access on account of race and
recognizing favorable policy underlying at-large component insuring representation
24
ORDER- 31
1
2
3
4
on behalf of the community as a whole).
Though legally and statistically significant evidence of racial bloc voting exists
in this case, voting is rarely, completely polarized. Dr. Engstrom analyzed eight
primary and general election City Council contests from 2005, 2009, and 2015, the
5
6
7
last three election cycles that presented voters with a choice between or among
Latino and non-Latino candidates. (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 6). Racially polarized bloc
8
voting existed in five of the contests, where Hispanic candidates received support
9
from an estimated 58.3% to 86% of Latino voters compared to only 7.1% to 39.5%
10
of non-Latino voters. Racially polarized voting occurred in both the district-based
11
primaries and in the 2015 at-large general elections.
12
Five futile elections is enough to establish legally significant evidence of racially
13
14
polarized voting in Pasco. However, minority cohesion and polarized voting was
15
not present in the three contests in 2005. For example, that year, Joe Cruz was the
16
Latino candidate for at-large Position 7. In the primary, he received 48.2% of the
17
Latino and 33.7% of the non-Latino vote. He lost the general election by just 53
18
votes, and received an estimated 40.7% of the Latino vote and 49.7% of the non-
19
Latino vote. (ECF No. 23 at ¶¶23-24). Other election evidence that non-Latino
20
voters are willing to support Latino candidates exists, including in the 2015 primary
21
22
23
election, where Latino candidates received 39.5% of the non-Latino vote. (ECF No.
23, Table).
24
ORDER- 32
1
Though isolated election observations do not undermine § 2 liability, the
2
evidence pertaining to polarization involves patterns that are not consistently
3
4
extreme (such as 90% favoring one candidate and 90% favoring another). The
evidence also does not suggest there are insurmountable barriers to coalition
5
6
7
8
building. Expert evidence on citywide and district crossover voting is somewhat
sparse,9 however, at oral argument both parties acknowledged crossover voting and
the potential for coalition building exists.
9
The evidence that voting in Pasco tends to be racially polarized, the degree of
10
political cohesion, and the evidence of crossover voting factor into the court’s
11
totality of the circumstances analysis and decision.
12
C. Compact vs. At-large; Size of the District and Influence
13
In both Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s plans, Latinos are in the minority in four out
14
15
of seven positions and their “political fortunes remain tied to the interests of other
16
voters.”10 Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 431 (4th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff contends the
17
18
9
19
“current and anticipated future numbers assure Latinos across the city the increasing
20
prospect of forming useful coalitions with non-Latino voters to elect a fourth favored
21
candidate of choice.” (ECF No. 26, Ex. 3 at ¶ 11).
22
10
23
Latino voter demographics are not insignificant fractions. See Appendix A. Using
Defendants’ expert does indicate that the rationale for the 6-1 plan includes that
The court notes that in the three districts where Latinos are not a majority, the
24
ORDER- 33
1
“one difference” between the two proposals is that the City’s at-large position denies
2
Latinos the “meaningful opportunity to win election now” (ECF No. 31 at 9) whereas
3
4
a compact district would provide for the “immediate removal of dilutive effect.”
(ECF No. 31 at 7). If Plaintiff’s argument is that the very existence of one at-large
5
6
7
position will enable the white majority voters of Pasco to control four Council seats
instead of three, this proposition is akin to arguing Latino votes will be diluted unless
8
their effect is maximized. But the law does not require such a result. Dilution cannot
9
be inferred from the mere failure to guarantee minority voters maximum political
10
influence. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1017 (1994). Nothing in the Voting
11
Rights Act requires maximizing possible voting strength.
12
Indeed, there are no legal benchmarks for this court to compare and determine
13
14
how much influence a minority group should have. Even if having a smaller
15
residency district could increase a minority group's influence, it is difficult to discern
16
when an at-large component causes legal injury by diluting the minority group's
17
influence and when the minority group is merely seeking more influence than is
18
19
the 2010-2014 5-year ACS estimates, which do not account for Pasco’s city limits,
20
Defendants’ expert estimates the LCVAP as: 27.3% (District 3); 23.6% (District 4);
21
and 13.0% (District 5)). Defendants estimates the current percentage of Latino
22
registered voters (based upon 2016 data) for these districts are: 41.4% (District 3),
23
40.9% (District 4), and 38.2% (District 5), (ECF No. 33, Ex. 1)
24
ORDER- 34
1
legally guaranteed. The Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided ruling on the
2
viability of influence dilution claims.
3
4
The goal of § 2 is not to guarantee success at the polls for minority-preferred
candidates but to provide assurances of fairness in the electoral process. De Grandy,
5
6
7
512 U.S. at 1014; see also, Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 236 (5th Cir. 1978)(“the
equality involved is the equal opportunity to elect representatives. It is an effective
8
equality, although not a guarantee of equality of result after all, the right to vote was
9
protected, not the right to vote for the winning candidate.”). The guarantee of § 2 is
10
that a minority group will not be denied, on account of race or color, the ability “to
11
elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters.” Voinovich v.
12
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993). As a result, the question here is not whether the
13
14
Latino-preferred candidate will be elected to the at-large position, but whether the
15
at-large component would give Latinos less opportunity than others in the electorate
16
to form a majority and participate in the political process.
17
A minority group that is too small to form a majority may be able to join with
18
other voters to elect a candidate it supports. However, such groups will be obliged
19
“to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground” with other voters in the
20
district. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020. At this moment in time, this dynamic exists
21
22
23
in both Pasco’s at-large position and Plaintiff’s proposed “influence district”
(Position 5), where the Latino population is in the minority. Whereas, the citywide
24
ORDER- 35
1
Latino share of registered voting population is approximately 30% (compare ECF
2
No. 21-2 at 3 (29.81%) with ECF No. 33-1 at 4 (31.8%)), the LCVAP in Plaintiff’s
3
4
proposed residency district is estimated to be 27.25%, which Plaintiff concedes is at
least “comparable” (ECF No. 31 at 8) to the citywide statistic. Based upon trends
5
6
7
showing an ever increasing Latino voting age population, both parties predict these
levels of influence increasing and shifting over the next decade. The court cannot
8
and need not decide which seat (Defendants’ Position 7 or Plaintiff’s Position 5) will
9
most quickly accommodate favorable change for Latinos in Pasco.
10
11
Plaintiff contends more difficult coalition-building, socioeconomics and cost are
the reasons Latinos do not “have an opportunity to influence or win elections…in an
12
at-large setting.” (ECF No. 31 at 8). A socioeconomic disparity between Latinos
13
14
and non-Latinos exists in Pasco. (ECF No. 24, Ex. B). This disparity also presents
15
itself geographically “between predominantly Latino east Pasco and predominantly
16
White west Pasco.” (ECF No. 24 at 21, ¶59).
17
Plaintiff’s expert Mr. Cooper opines that “the geographic and socio-economic
18
divide would disadvantage campaign funding and get-out-the vote efforts for Latino
19
candidates in an at-large election compared to an election in a geographically smaller
20
and less populous single-member district.” (ECF No. 24 at 21, ¶ 60). See also, ECF
21
22
23
No. 27 at 10-11, ECF No. 28 at ¶ 19. These contentions are commonly made in
voting rights cases. Generally speaking, many features of our political system, such
24
ORDER- 36
1
as majority vote requirements and the high costs of campaigning, combined with
2
socio-economic disparities, often affect access to the political process.
3
4
Socioeconomic disparities alone do not show that minorities do not have equal
access to the political process. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 275 (5th Cir. 2016).
5
6
7
Evidence that might suggest socioeconomic disparities impede electoral
participation include reduced levels of voter registration, lower voter turnout among
8
minority voters, costly campaign financial expenditures for at-large elections,
9
evidence of minorities being discouraged from running for office because of the cost
10
of an at-large campaign, or evidence minority voters are hindered in registering,
11
casting ballots, qualifying to run, and campaigning for public office. The parties
12
have not offered this evidence. Instead, the record suggests that Latinos have run
13
14
for political office in Pasco and, as Plaintiff indicates, “…the Latino
15
community…has repeatedly produced and supported candidates for office.” (ECF
16
No. 21 at 3 (emphasis added)). This does not suggest a lack of access to the political
17
process. Though socioeconomic impediments no doubt exist, the court finds there
18
is an insufficient basis to conclude that socio-economics and cost would be
19
significant impediments to Latino participation in the single at-large election
20
provided for in the City’s remedial plan.
21
22
23
As for the potential for coalition building, there is plenty of room for
disagreement. Plaintiff contends coalitions are more likely to occur and to assist
24
ORDER- 37
1
Latino voting strength in a compact district where voters are “more likely to find
2
common ground” because “they share common interests driven by geography: their
3
4
children attend the same schools and play in the same parks they use the same
libraries and roads, and they walk under the same streetlights.” (ECF No. 31 at 8).
5
6
7
However, critics of pure district-based election forms cite the fact they can produce
a balkanizing effect, splintering communities and having the unintended effect of
8
increasing racial divides. The Supreme Court has warned about these social and
9
political costs of dividing communities along racial lines in the name of improving
10
electoral systems. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (observing that
11
“[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into
12
competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political
13
14
system in which race no longer matters…”). Considering the shape of Plaintiff’s
15
District 5 (Appendix B and ECF No. 24 at 13), it is reasonable to question how the
16
shape and size of that geographic unit would encourage a greater sense of cohesion
17
or shared identity over that of the city at-large. See discussion, Lani Guinier, Groups,
18
Representation, and Race–Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes,
19
71 TEX. L.REV. 1589, 1603 (1993).
20
Defendants counter that the proposed single at-large position is “the next-best
21
22
23
electoral opportunity” for Latinos in Pasco. They contend the inclusion of the atlarge district: 1) provides “city-wide representation and accountability”; 2) avoids
24
ORDER- 38
1
the “political ‘balkanization’ that can occur in exclusively single-member district
2
cities and provide greater city-wide unity”; 3) gives “candidates the option to run for
3
4
one of two seats”; 4) “double[s] the number of times a given citizen could vote for
representation on the council”; 5) gives “Latinos who reside in non-majority-
5
6
7
minority districts an eventual opportunity to elect their candidate of choice, whereas
Latinos in an exclusively SMD plan may never have that opportunity if they reside
8
in a non-majority-minority district”; and 6) provides “more flexibility to address the
9
City’s changing demographics during periods in between redistricting.” (ECF No.
10
30 at 7-8). Defendants’ expert also explains that “[s]cholarly studies suggest that
11
these new prospects – three ‘opportunity districts’ plus a fourth citywide ‘influence’
12
opportunity – might energize Latinos to register and turn out to vote in future
13
14
15
elections” as competiveness has been shown to be “among the strongest correlations
of voter turnout.” (ECF No. 26, Ex. 13 at ¶ 12).
16
These competing contentions are an inescapable part of redistricting
17
controversies. While vote dilution is a comparative inquiry, the court must be
18
cautious not “pre-empt” the legislative task. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539
19
(1978) (plurality) (White, J.). The essence of Plaintiff’s attack on the single at-large
20
position is that it fails to maximize Latino influence for purposes of forging an
21
22
23
advantageous coalition. Given the facts herein, most importantly the redesign of the
election scheme for the other six districts, the court is not persuaded that the size or
24
ORDER- 39
1
at-large nature of Position 7 adversely affects Latino potential to form a majority any
2
more or less than a seventh compact district would.
3
D. Majority Vote Requirement and Anti-single Shot Provisions
4
Dr. Engstrom identifies the majority vote requirement and inability to engage in
5
6
7
“bullet” or “single shot” voting11 as “two features of the at-large arrangement which
enhance the ability of a majority of voters to dilute the votes of the Latino minority
8
in Pasco.” (ECF No. 23 at ¶ 10). These features persist in both proposals whether
9
the election is district-based or includes an at-large component.
10
11
However, the
dilutive effects of these features are minimized where there is only a single at-large
position, compared to an at-large election for every seat (the arrangement Dr.
12
Engstrom was referring to in his report). In a majority rule system there will always
13
14
be an inherent disadvantage to the minority struggling for political power.
E. Tiebreaks
15
Plaintiff contends the problem with the retention of an at-large position is
16
17
18
11
19
the candidate favored by the group, and not cast[] any of their remaining votes for
20
any other candidate. By withholding their remaining votes from the candidates
21
competing with their preferred choice, minority voters have a better chance to
22
finish among the top…candidates and win one of the…seats.” (ECF No. 23 at ¶
23
26).
With single-shot voting, “a group of voters can cast[] one vote, if they wish, for
24
ORDER- 40
1
compounded by the fact that geographic districts are evenly split between three
2
majority-Latino and three majority-White districts. Plaintiff speculates that with this
3
4
even split, the at-large position will become a “critical” “swing vote” or “decisive
vote” on issues “on which the two populations are divided.” (ECF No. 27 at 11-12).
5
6
7
This court is unwilling to make a speculative assessment on the outcome of political
events based upon the odd number of seats and number of majority-minority
8
districts, especially considering the court’s analysis is focused upon ensuring
9
opportunity, not control. There is no evidence that any member of the City Council,
10
including the selected mayor, has more power or authority than any other member.
11
12
Unlike in the case cited by Plaintiff, Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d
593, 600 (7th Cir. 2000), the position of mayor is not slotted for the at-large position
13
14
and there is no evidence of the frequent needed for a tie-breaking vote. Nor can the
15
court anticipate there will be tie votes where there is no evidence suggesting that
16
elected officials are unresponsive to the needs of the minority community or that
17
representatives are politically unresponsive to Latino voter interests. Here, there
18
simply is no risk of the “unacceptable gravitation of power” to any single position.
19
Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty., 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987)(emphasis added)(rejecting
20
at-large chairperson position on the Council given the possibility of an unacceptable
21
22
23
gravitation of enhanced power to the position and ultimately agreeing upon a rotation
feature).
24
ORDER- 41
1
F. Policy
2
Policy considerations certainly counsel restraint in this case.
3
4
There is no evidence that the policy behind Pasco’s remedial plan is tenuous. The
court has carefully considered the stated rationale underlying the legislative
5
6
7
provision for the City’s plan, to wit: 1) “its providing three Latino citizen-voter-age
majority districts, the same number as possible under the ACLU’s preferred seven
8
district plan;” 2) “the plan providing greater opportunities for voters to influence the
9
number of elections for members of the City Council and for voters to have the
10
opportunity to run for seats on the City Council”; and 3) “the possibility of greater
11
continuity of government and ease in implementation.” (ECF No. 26, Ex. 10 at 2).
12
There is no basis for this court to question the reasonableness of these stated interests
13
14
15
and indeed, these are considerations that one would expect to give guidance in a
remedial election scheme.
16
Municipal election systems with at least one at-large component are extremely
17
common nationwide and used in nearly all of Washington’s code cities for their city
18
councils. (ECF No. 25 at 22, n. 20, citing http://mrsc.org/getdoc/c86e1df6-57ae-
19
407e-ac6a-be4d0f0b28c1/Council-Election-by-Wards-or-Districts.aspx). State law,
20
as it applies to Pasco, expresses a clear preference for at-large city councilmember
21
22
23
24
ORDER- 42
1
elections. The flexibility in election forms that many other states 12 have long
2
accorded their municipalities, supports the obvious fact that one form does not suit
3
4
all. Each form has possible advantages and disadvantages. See City of Tucscon v.
State, 229 Ariz. 172, 174 (2012) (Arizona Supreme Court recognizing that “although
5
6
7
at-large members are responsible to electors in the entire city, this may diminish
attention to the interests of particular neighborhoods or groups; district-based
8
elections, in contrast, assure representation from different geographic areas but may
9
elevate particular interests over citywide ones.”). The fact Washington State has
10
maintained laws imposing an at-large electoral scheme on municipalities is a factor
11
this court considers in the calculus here. Houston Laywers Ass’n v. Attorney General
12
of Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 426-427 (1991)(“[T]he State’s interest in maintaining an
13
14
15
electoral system…is a legitimate factor to be considered by courts among the totality
of circumstances…”).
G. Totality of the Circumstances
16
17
Changes in an election system invariably bring about results that cannot be
18
predicted with any degree of accuracy. When placed in the position of reviewing a
19
legislatively enacted remedial plan which has yet to be locally tested, the court must
20
21
12
22
towns to choose between at-large and district-based council elections); Fla. Stat., §
23
124.011.
See e.g., Ariz.Rev.Statutes §§ 9–232.04, 9–273 (allowing non-charter cities and
24
ORDER- 43
1
be wary of making predictions, involving itself unnecessarily in political judgments,
2
or directing unnecessary change. All precedent cautions judicial restraint in this area.
3
4
Vote dilution cases are circumstantial evidence cases often challenging at-large
voting schemes. While case law offers some direction, it is nearly impossible to
5
6
7
locate analogous cases when the test is so heavily fact-driven. For this reason, the
court is unable to “follow in the footsteps of” the six representative cases Plaintiff
8
suggests. They are all inapposite because they involved different legal standards
9
applicable to judicially ordered plans,13 or involved legislative proposals lacking
10
proportionality, 14or occurred in places with significantly more deplorable histories
11
of “open and unabashed” discrimination in all areas including the voting laws
12
13
14
15
16
13
17
(11th Cir. 1988) (judicially created plan imposed remedy creating five single-
18
member districts, including one “swing” district, where there was strong evidence
19
African American candidates would not be able to compete for an at-large seat);
20
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975)(striking down court-ordered reapportionment
21
that had a total deviation of 20.14%).
22
14
23
Cnty, Fla, 474 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
See e.g., U.S. v. Dallas Cnty Comm’n, Dallas Cnty., Ala, 850 F.2d 1433, 1438-39
Montes v. City of Yakima, 2015 WL 11120965 (E.D.Wash. 2015); U.S. v. Osceola
24
ORDER- 44
1
themselves, economics and social life. 15 Even in the case of Williams v. City of
2
Texarkana, Ark., 861 F.Supp. 771 (W.D.Ark. 1993), where it was agreed the remedy
3
4
would be judicially imposed, the court did not hold that the City’s proposed 6-1 plan
was unlawful or would not remedy the Voting Rights Act violation. 861 F.Supp. at
5
6
7
772 (W.D.Ark. 1993)(deciding the 7-0 plan was the plan “more prudent” because it
presented the “greatest potential for” proportionate representation and “less potential
8
for provoking continuing dispute, which would not be in the best interests of the
9
citizens…”); see also, Williams v. City of Texarkana, Ark, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir.
10
1994)(leaving validity of the 6-1 plan, chosen by the electorate after the court
11
imposed the 7-0 plan, for future determination of the district court should a challenge
12
be mounted).
13
The case law illustrates the fact there is no single “correct” way to design a
14
15
government; sometimes there are competing interests which can’t be reconciled;
16
there is no clear formula as to how much voting strength an individual citizen should
17
have; and it is not the role of the court to “calibrate democracy in the vain search for
18
an optimum solution.” Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S.Ct. 1120, 1140 (2016). The “full”
19
and “complete” remedy standard is not a standard that lends itself to application with
20
21
22
15
23
involving challenge to at-large systems in nine counties).
Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty., 649 F.Supp. 289 (M.D.AL. 1986)(class action lawsuit
24
ORDER- 45
1
2
3
4
mathematical exactitude.
In reviewing Pasco’s remedial plan the court has considered on one side of the
scale lies a history of not a single Latino ever having electoral success in a contested
Council election, the presence of racially polarized elections, and a socio-economic
5
6
7
divide. On the other side of the scale is proportionality, the absence of discriminatory
voting practices and intent, viable policies underlying the 6-1 plan, the participation
8
of Latinos in elections, crossover voting, demographics in a state of flux, and
9
officials’ responsiveness. The court concludes the totality of the circumstances,
10
judged by the record before this court, make it possible to reconcile the retention of
11
a single at-large seat. Under Pasco’s remedial plan, Latinos possess an equal
12
opportunity to elect representatives and to participate in the political process, which
13
14
was previously denied to them under the all at-large election scheme.
15
The City’s plan complies with the “full and complete” remedy standard and does
16
not violate the Constitution or Voting Rights Act anew. Accordingly, the court defers
17
to the City’s plan.
18
19
V.
IMPLEMENTATION
The Pasco City Council did not vote on how the proposal should be
20
implemented, leaving this decision to the court. The court orders immediate
21
22
23
implementation and orders that every seat be up for election in 2017, with four
positions (Positions 1, 3, 4 and 6) elected to a 4-year term, and for this election only,
24
ORDER- 46
1
3 positions (Positions 2, 5 and 7) elected to a 2-year term of office. Prompt
2
implementation is required for an effective remedy. This was recognized by the
3
4
parties in the Partial Consent Decree and briefing schedule in this case. This option
assures citizens will have their voices heard now.
5
VI.
6
INJUNCTION
Plaintiff has proposed that the court order that the “City of Pasco is permanently
7
8
enjoined from administering, implementing or conducting any future elections for
9
the Pasco City Council in which members of the City Council are elected on an at-
10
large basis, whether in a primary, general, or special election.” The court denies
11
this request. Future redistricting shall be done in a manner that complies with the
12
terms and intent of this Judgment and the Partial Consent Decree entered on
13
September 2, 2016, and otherwise complies with the provisions and requirements of
14
the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq.
15
VII. CONCLUSION
16
17
The task before the court is not one it has taken lightly. These issues do not
18
lend themselves to easy analysis and no court has devised a formula to resolve the
19
question of where the ideal solution lies for Pasco. Complicating the analysis, the
20
facts are in a constant state of change. Legislative apportionment is an issue which
21
22
justifies ongoing evaluation and adjustment by the executive and legislative
branches of government, if necessary.
23
24
ORDER- 47
Washington state law makes these
1
adjustments more difficult and less likely to occur voluntarily. For some concerns,
2
a judicial remedy is absent and “relief must come through an aroused popular
3
4
conscience that sears the conscience of the people’s representatives.” Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 269 (1962).
5
6
7
As a final note, the court commends the parties and the ACLU for their
collaboration prior to and subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit. Through their
8
sincere cooperation, most importantly, this case has been decided in time to
9
effectuate change before the next election.
10
11
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY FINALLY ADJUDGED AND
ORDERED:
12
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Plaintiff’s Proposed Remedial Plan (ECF
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
No. 21) is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion for Entry of Proposed Remedial Plan and
Final Injunction (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED.
2. The court herein approves, as a remedy for the § 2 violation, the City’s
remedial plan and the map reproduced in Appendix A.
3. The City of Pasco is ordered to take all steps necessary to implement the
plan in order to place all seven positions up for election in 2017 and thereafter,
20
provided, however, that the City may revise the districts based on annexations,
21
22
23
deannexations, and population changes reflected in the decennial census and at
appropriate times in the future when necessary to conform to the law.
24
ORDER- 48
1
4. In order to preserve the current staggered election plan for members of the
2
City Council, Positions 1, 3, 4 and 6 will be elected for a four-year term. Positions
3
4
2 and 5 and the at-large seat (Position 7) will be initially elected to two-year terms
and thereafter to four-year terms.
5
6
7
5. This decision and separately entered Judgment is binding upon all parties
and their successors. Future redistricting shall be done in a manner that complies
8
with the terms and intent of this Order and the Partial Consent Decree entered
9
September 2, 2016, and complies with the Voting Rights Act.
10
11
6. Without affecting the finality of this final decision and its associated
Judgment, the court retains jurisdiction of this cause through 45 days after the
12
certification of the 2017 general election for the purpose of enforcing its orders, and
13
14
15
if necessary, for the disposition of any remaining unresolved issues.
The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this Order, enter
16
Judgment accordingly, and provide copies to counsel.
17
DATED THIS 27th day of January, 2017.
18
s/Lonny R. Suko
________________________________
LONNY R. SUKO
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
19
20
21
22
23
24
ORDER- 49
APPENDIX A
City's Proposed Plan
055
058
059
060
052
056
057
050
051
054
053
037
045
043
044
046
067
1
2
3
4
5
6
023
035
024
025
063
048
041
District
033
034
040
065
049
022
042 038
039
047
066
032
008
019
026
062
027
036
020
030 028
031 029 021
015
016
017
018
001
010
014 009 005
011
012
013
006
102
003
007
004
002
APPENDIX B
CAPITOL AVE
JASON AVE
A ST
COMMERCIAL AVE
VID
A
3
E
CO
M
3
T
D3
EW
AR
EH
KS
OU
T
SE
S
LN
E
S RD 40 E
E LEWIS ST
CEDAR AVE
S SYCAMORE AVE
RR
A
SE
R
AVE
TIE
ST
P
EA
J AW
M
ER
CE
K
AR
RD
.8
1.2
Miles
Plaintiff's Remedial Plan
7TH ST
ED
OC
E LEWIS PL
3RD ST
397
12
DIETRICH RD
KING ST
RAINIER AVE
ST
N
VE
ST
A
S1
T
AIT
LAN
D
E
NG
TON
S
SM
WW
ASH
I
OR
EG
ON
N 4TH AVE
N 6TH AVE
EMPIRE DR
W A ST
S WEHE AVE
RD
EL
LS
W
ER
N 12TH AVE
20TH AVE
N 23RD AVE
N 18TH AVE
ST
2
S 5TH AVE
RD 28
RD 34
N RD 32
S 25TH AVE
N 37TH PL
RD 40
RD 56
RD 54
RD 64
FO
ST
EY
LN
YAR
N
HORIZON DR
SEDONA DR
RD 36
ATOM DR
RD 61
RD 60
RD 62
T RD 72
RD 68
RD 76
NIA
C
RD 84
RD 80
ZIN
RD 59
395 S
ENA
ST
LN
N RD 44
N RD 58
RD 92
RD 90
MIDLAND LN
ST
AD
O
RO
N
CO
PRAIRIE LN
N RD 96
RD 44
US R
T
WL
E ADELIA ST
ST
CA
SA
.4
EW
IS
W YAKIMA ST
W HOPKINS ST
E BROADWAY ST
E
H ON
HOS
WS
12
ANACONDA AVE
0
WL
Y
E
395
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
W NIXON ST
S 10T
H AV
District
W HENRY ST
AV
240
Water Area
Highway
PARK ST
RIVERHAVEN ST
3413
Pasco -- 7 Districts
D ST
HW
SHEPPERD ST
NT
RO
SF
CHRISTOPHER LN
5
W MARIE ST
BROWN ST
US
BEECH AVE
T
NIXON ST
RD 49
VES
TER
S
W AGATE ST
1
N CEDAR AVE
MARIE ST
HENRY ST
AY
R ST
BAKE
AVE
ST
N1
VE
DA
N 3R
PEARL ST
AGATE ST
WJ
S1
3TH
RD 116
RD 88
W ELLA ST
95
WY 3
US H
SYL
182
24TH AVE
N RD 26
IVY LN
RD 77
LN
W LEOLA ST
ARGENT RD
SU
NW
ILL
OW
SB
LV
D
ST
395
VE
T
W DRADIE ST
W LIVINGSTON RD
RICHARDSON RD
MELVILLE RD
WERNETT RD
A
NS
E
ARGENT PL
N 10TH AVE
SU
D ST
CHIL
FAIR
AN
M
DR
IDGE DR
VE
LL A
R
EA
A
RD 67
AN
ARGENT ST
6
INDIAN
R
LH
ILL
OD
BLV
BIN
D
ED
R
4
AY
WO
KWE
ROC
ST
AY
W
W
ST
LO
T
IL
UR
CO
TR
L
MOJAVE DR
APE
LW
TRIA
LN
W
CH
US
IND
SONORA DR
E FOSTER WELLS RD
AVE
AD
RO
RAIL
AVE
4TH
BURDEN BLVD
HOMERUN RD SALEM DR SAHARA DR
FRANKLIN RD
IW
RD
MONTEREY DR
LUCENA DR
CANDLESTICK DR
QUADRA DR
BELL ST
DE
LA
RUTH DR
SATURNA DR
O
RT
PO
NG
T
SAVARY DR
I 18
2
SU
NS
ET
CH
240
SANDIFUR PKY
LN
ADOBE DR
7
THREE RIVERS DR
RD 52
CURLEW LN
N RD 56
182
CORD DR
POWERLINE RD
CA
C
INE
REL
RD
6
10
RD
STUTZ DR
68
SHO
E
CR
IS
RR
HA
RD
T
EN
SC
IA
N RD
M
LN
AVE
EDELMAN RD
NORFOLK DR
ENTIAT CT
KOHLER RD
QUAIL RD
ROBERTA RD
MELODY LN
KAU TRL
LATIMER CT
NA
LI
PO
M
SHORELINE DR
DESERET DR
LN
CHEHALIS LN
DENT
IR
IS
ROAD
N RAIL
R
HILLCREST DR
PHEASANT RUN
RD QUAIL RUN RD
ICKY
B
CI
R
Population Summary Report
Pasco City Council --Plaintiff's Remedial Plan -- 7 districts
District
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Population
8724
8865
8587
9026
8980
9102
9168
Total
Deviation
-198
-57
-335
104
58
180
246
% Deviation
-2.22%
-0.64%
-3.75%
1.17%
0.65%
2.02%
2.76%
Latino
% Latino
NH White
% NH White
% Latino of all
citizens
83.59%
82.22%
83.39%
27.64%
52.31%
23.90%
28.64%
1074
1214
1195
5936
3816
6291
5731
12.31%
13.69%
13.92%
65.77%
42.49%
69.12%
62.51%
74.86%
72.78%
69.99%
30.88%
46.11%
19.85%
31.05%
33735
62452
7292
7289
7161
2495
4697
2175
2626
54.02%
25257
40.44%
45.02%
Ideal district size = 8,922
Total Deviation
District
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6.51%
18+_Pop
18+ Latino
% 18+ Latino 18+ NH White
% 18+ NH
White
% Latino
CVAP
% Latino of
Registered
Voters
5165
5596
5187
6090
6108
6365
6047
Total
4062
4301
4031
1403
2661
1242
1483
78.64%
76.86%
77.71%
23.04%
43.57%
19.51%
24.52%
859
1013
995
4318
3091
4703
4043
16.63%
18.10%
19.18%
70.90%
50.61%
73.89%
66.86%
54.78%
56.29%
54.08%
27.37%
28.98%
14.24%
24.04%
65.76%
65.33%
61.73%
19.25%
27.25%
15.45%
20.36%
40558
19183
47.30%
19022
46.90%
32.02%
29.81%
Note:
(1)% LCVAP calculated by disaggregating 2010-2014 ACS block group estimates for 18+ citizen Hispanics and Non-Hispanics to 2010 census blocks.
(3) Surname match of registered voters as of Nov. 30, 2015
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