Neal v. Colvin

Filing 17

ORDER denying ECF No. 14 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting ECF No. 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. CASE CLOSED. Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (TR, Case Administrator)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

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RACHEL MARIE NEAL,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

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v.

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No.: 4:16-CV-5131-EFS

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

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Defendant.

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Before the Court are cross summary judgment motions. ECF Nos. 14 &

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15. Plaintiff Rachel Marie Neal appeals a denial of benefits by the

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Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). ECF No. 14. Ms. Neal contends that the

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ALJ erred because she (1) failed to properly evaluate medical opinion

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evidence

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(2) inappropriately found Ms. Neal not fully credible; and (3) failed to

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meet her burden at steps four and five of the disability analysis. ECF

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No. 14. The Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) asks the

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Court

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performing past relevant work as a receptionist. ECF No. 15. After

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reviewing

the

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informed.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant’s

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Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

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Judgment.

to

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ORDER - 1

from

treating,

affirm

the

record

examining,

ALJ’s

and

decision

relevant

and

reviewing

that

Ms.

authority,

medical

Neal

the

is

Court

sources;

capable

is

of

fully

I.

1

Statement of Facts1

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Ms. Neal was born in 1985. AR 51. She obtained her Associate’s

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Degree in 2011. AR 210. Ms. Neal has been diagnosed with congenital

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fusion of the vertebrae, spondylosis, and degenerative disc disease. See

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AR 101. In the past, Ms. Neal has treated her back pain with injections,

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opiate pain medication, muscle relaxers, massage, and physical therapy.

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See, e.g., AR 242. At the time of her application, it appears that Ms.

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Neal was using only ibuprofen to address her pain. AR 73–74. Ms. Neal

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spends

her

days

caring

for

her

young

son

and

performing

household

10

chores, and she engages in social activities with friends periodically.

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AR 235–242.

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Ms. Neal has significant employment history up until her alleged

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disability onset date. AR 223–234. Just prior to filing this claim, Ms.

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Neal was working as a receptionist in an orthopedic office, AR 223–224.

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She had worked in that position for approximately two years, AR 223–224,

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prior to relocating to a different city, see AR 355. Ms. Neal also

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reports working as a caretaker and in various retail positions. AR

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223-234.

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II.

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Procedural History
On November 12, 2013, Ms. Neal protectively applied for disability

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insurance

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security income, AR 186-192. Her alleged onset date was July 1, 2013.

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AR 184,

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reconsideration. AR 88–139, 141–144. Ms. Neal filed a written request

benefits,

186.

Ms.

AR

184–185,

Neal’s

and

claims

filed

were

a

claim

denied

for

supplemental

initially

and

upon

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26
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The facts are only briefly summarized. Detailed facts are contained in the
administrative hearing transcript, the ALJ’s decision, the parties’ briefs,

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and the underlying records.
ORDER - 2

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for an administrative hearing, AR 145–146, which was held before ALJ

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Caroline Siderius on February 23, 2015, AR 34.
On March 30, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Ms. Neal’s

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4

claims.

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decision.

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appealing the ALJ’s decision. ECF Nos. 1 & 4. The parties subsequently

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filed the instant summary judgment motions. ECF Nos. 14 & 15.

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III. Disability Determination
A

9

AR

20–29.

AR

1–4.

The
On

“disability”

Appeals
October

is

Council
6,

defined

denied

2016,

as

Ms.

the

review

Neal

of

filed

“inability

to

the

this

engage

ALJ’s

lawsuit

in

any

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substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

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physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death

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or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

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of

14

1382c(a)(3)(A).

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evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled.

16

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

not

less

than

twelve

months.”

The

decision

maker

42

U.S.C.

uses

a

§§ 423(d)(1)(A),

five-step

sequential
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Step one assesses whether the claimant is engaged in substantial

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gainful activities during the relevant period. If she is, benefits are

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denied.

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decision maker proceeds to step two.

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Step

C.F.R.

two

assesses

whether

not,

medically

If

the

24

combination

of

impairments,

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the

not

have

disability

C.F.R.

the

severe

impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step.

does

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a

is

416.920(c).

claimant

impairments.

has

she

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of

claimant

If

impairment

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combination

the

416.920(b).

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or

§§ 404.1520(b),

a

severe

claim

is

§§ 404.1520(c),
impairment
denied.

If

or
the

Step three compares the claimant’s impairment with a number of
listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as
to preclude substantial gainful activity.

ORDER - 3

20 C.F.R. §§ 404 Subpt. P

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App. 1, 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926.

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If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the

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claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment does

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not meet or equal one of the listed impairments, the evaluation proceeds

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to the fourth step.
Step four assesses whether the impairment prevents the claimant

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from

performing

work

she

has

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determining the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R.

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§§ 404.1520(e),

416.920(e).

performed

If

the

in

claimant

the

is

past.

able

This

to

includes

perform

her

10

previous work, she is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform this

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work, the evaluation proceeds to the fifth step.

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Step

five,

during

in

this

view

claimant
of

sequential

her

can

see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).
shifts

economy

the

15

proof

national

whether

education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g);

of

the

assesses

14

burden

in

step,

perform

The

work

final

13

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other

the

age,

disability

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analysis. The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a prima

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facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch,

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438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971). The claimant meets this burden if she

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establishes

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engaging in her previous occupation. The burden then shifts to the

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Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can perform other substantial

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gainful activity, and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the

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national economy” which the claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722

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F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). A claimant is disabled only if her

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impairments are of such severity that she is not only unable to do her

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previous

that

work

but

a

physical

cannot,

or

mental

considering

impairment

her

age,

prevents

education,

her

and

from

work

experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work that exists in

ORDER - 4

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sufficient quantity in the national economy.

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42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(B).
In this case, the ALJ determined that Ms. Neal was not disabled.

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4

At

5

substantial

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date. AR 22. At step two, the ALJ found that Ms. Neal has the severe

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impairment of degenerate disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine.

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AR 22–23. At step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Neal’s impairments did

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not meet or medically equal the severity of any listed impairments. AR

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step

one,

the

gainful

ALJ

determined

activity

that

Ms.

Neal

had

following

her

alleged

not

engaged

disability

in

onset

23. At step four, the ALJ found:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except she can lift twenty pounds occasionally,
ten pounds frequently; she can perform no work that
requires stretching arms out in any direction to lift more
than five pounds or push and/or pull with upper extremities
more than five pounds. She can sit for up to six hours in
an eight-hour workday, but for no more than two hours at
one time; stand or walk for up to four hours in an eighthour workday, but for one hour at a time. She can
occasionally squat, kneel, climb ramps and stairs, but
never crawl or climb ladders, rope or scaffolds and no work
at unprotected heights or operation of heavy machinery or
equipment. She should avoid constant turning of the neck in
all directions and jobs that require holding the head in a
flexed position for more than thirty minutes at a time.

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AR 23–24. This finding was based in part on the ALJ’s determination that

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Ms. Neal’s statements regarding the severity of her symptoms were “not

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entirely credible.” AR 25. Based on this assessment, the ALJ concluded

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that Ms. Neal could perform past relevant work as a receptionist. AR

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28-29. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded at step four that Ms. Neal is not

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disabled. AR 29.

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IV.

Standard of Review

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On review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the

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evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d

ORDER - 5

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20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526

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(9th Cir. 1980)). The Court upholds the ALJ’s determination that the

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claimant is not disabled if the ALJ applied the proper legal standards

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and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support

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the decision. Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983)

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(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Brawner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

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839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is more than a

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mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th

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Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance, McAllister v. Sullivan, 888

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F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human

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Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). “It means such relevant

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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

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conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations

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omitted). “[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [ALJ] may reasonably

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draw from the evidence” will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348

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F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). If the evidence supports more than one

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rational

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decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).

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V.

interpretation,

a

reviewing

court

must

uphold

the

ALJ’s

Analysis
The Court addresses each of Ms. Neal’s challenges to the ALJ’s

decision in turn.
A.

Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence

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“In disability benefits cases . . . physicians may render medical,

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clinical opinions, or they may render opinions on the ultimate issue of

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disability — the claimant’s ability to perform work.” Garrison v. Colvin,

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759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original). There are

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three types of physicians: treating physicians, examining physicians, and

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non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.

ORDER - 6

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1995). The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting

2

an

3

without

4

“substantial

5

substantial evidence requirement by setting out a detailed and thorough

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summary

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interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012

8

(internal quotation marks omitted).

examining

physician’s

providing

of

“specific

evidence”

the

facts

1.

9

opinions

in

and

the

and

and

may

not

legitimate

record.

conflicting

Id.

reject

such

reasons”

“An

clinical

ALJ

opinions

supported

can

evidence,

satisfy

stating

by
the

his

Dr. Sahota and Physical Therapist Randy Bruce

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Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of

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treating physician, Dr. Sahota, and physical therapist, Randy Bruce. Mr.

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Bruce

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approved

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limitations reflected in the statement were not supported by the record.

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Ms. Neal argues that this was inappropriate because Dr. Sahota’s findings

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were entitled to deference as findings of a treating physician, Mr.

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Bruce’s opinions were also entitled to consideration, and the findings

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were not contradictory to other medical evidence in the record.

completed
and

a

Medical

signed

by

Source

Dr.

Statement,

Sahota.

The

ALJ

and

that

found

that

statement
some

of

was
the

As an initial matter, under the Social Security regulations, “only

19
20

licensed

21

considered acceptable medical sources.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,

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1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotes omitted). Physical therapists are

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not “acceptable medical sources,” and their opinions are not entitled to

24

the

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§ 404.1513(a), (d); see also Huff v. Astrue, 275 F. App’x 713, 716 (9th

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Cir. 2008) (explaining that the “ALJ was entitled to give the physical

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28

physicians

same

therapist’s

deference

opinion

and

as

less

certain

other

acceptable

weight”

when

qualified

medical

the

specialists

sources.

opinion

20

are

C.F.R.

“contradicted

the

findings of other acceptable medical sources in the record, and the ALJ

ORDER - 7

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properly relied on the acceptable medical sources”). Still, the opinions

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of “other sources” such as physical therapists may be used to “show the

3

severity

4

claimant’s] ability to work,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d), and, in this

5

case,

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acceptable medical source.

of

the

[the

claimant’s]

report

prepared

impairment(s)

by

Mr.

Bruce

and

was

how

also

it

affects

approved

[the

by

an

7

The ALJ assigned “some weight” to opinions in the report prepared

8

by Mr. Bruce and signed by Dr. Sahota because “much of their opinion is

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generally consistent with the objective medical evidence.” AR 27. The

10

ALJ

found,

however,

that

“the

opinion

regarding

missed

days

and

11

limitations for focus and concentration are not supported by treating

12

source findings that described the claimant as stable or with only mild

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symptoms.” AR 27. The ALJ also found that the weight of the opinion was

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lessened due to the fact that Ms. Neal “has not undergone any consistent

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treatment with no treatment for more than two years and no consistent

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pain treatment.” AR 27. The ALJ concluded that “most of the restrictions

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prescribed by Mr. Bruce and Dr. Sahota have been incorporated by the

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undersigned into the residual functional capacity assessment in this

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decision.” AR 27.

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The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in rejecting the findings

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as to missed days and limitations on focus and concentration in the

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statement prepared by Mr. Bruce, an “other source,” and approved by Dr.

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Sahota, a treating source. The ALJ appropriately explained that she was

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rejecting

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treating source records and the fact that Ms. Neal had not undergone

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treatment

27
28

those

for

findings

over

two

because

years

and

they

used

were

only

inconsistent

both

over-the-counter

with

pain

medication to alleviate her symptoms. See AR 27. The ALJ noted that
treating records of Dr. Sahota himself described Ms. Neal’s condition as

ORDER - 8

1

“stable”

and

a

treating

record

from

Dr.

Wahl

described

Ms.

Neal’s

2

symptoms as mild. See AR 26–27. The ALJ did not err by giving more

3

weight to opinions from acceptable medical sources than to the statement

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prepared by Mr. Bruce and approved by Dr. Sahota. In addition, the ALJ

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did not reject the statement or even assign the opinion “little weight,”

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and instead gave the opinion “some weight” and accepted most of the

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findings in the statement because they were supported by the record.

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Ms. Neal also argues that the limitations suggested by Mr. Bruce

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and Dr. Sahota were not contradicted by the record and were confirmed by

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the medical examiner, Dr. Thompson. This argument is not supported by

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the record. While Dr. Thompson did not expressly disagree with the

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limitations proposed by Mr. Bruce and Dr. Sahota, his findings differed

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from

14

follows:

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24
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their

findings.

The

exchange

proceeded,

in

relevant

part,

Dr. Thompson: The RFC of Exhibit
10F, I believe, is what
counsel is referring to, and the opinion of the examining
doctors is considered. My job is not to disagree, and I don’t
necessarily disagree. However, I have to offer an RFC based on
strictly the objective musculoskeletal evidence in the written
record. That’s my charge. Consequently I have a somewhat more
— somewhat less restrictive RFC.
AR 42.
Claimant’s Attorney: [T]he attending sources have said that
she would be limited to seldom, meaning only up to about 10
percent of the time, of twisting the torso, or twisting the
neck, and that she should avoid maintaining a flexed neck
posture, and maintaining a forward bent posture, such as
trying to reach over a conveyor belt, something like that.
Would you concur with those restrictions?
Dr. Thompson: Yes, I would.
***

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27
28

Claimant’s Attorney: The attending physician also opined that
she is probably going to have episodic flare ups of symptoms
that absenteeism is likely to exceed two to three days per

ORDER - 9

as

5

month. Would you have any reason to disagree with that
observation?
Dr. Thompson: I do not have reason to disagree. Obviously my
role here is not to — not so much to make that estimate,
because I think that those kind of estimates, unless there’s
absolute evidence, is beyond the scope of what my roles [sic]
is.

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AR 44–45. After this line of questioning, the ALJ asked Dr. Thompson to

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clarify:

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2
3
4

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ALJ: I just want to clarify one of the limitations, doctor,
with her arms and the position of her head and her neck. Could
you just give me an idea of what kind of limitations she would
need in an eight hour day?
***
Dr. Thompson: So consequently a prolonged positioning in a
head down position really would be avoided. And it is indeed
time limited. People can do it for a period of time, and then
there has to be breaks or change positions [sic], or lie down
sometimes.
***
ALJ: It sounds like you would recommend limiting the movement
of the head. You don’t want a job where you’re having to look
up, look down, look sideways constantly. It sounds like this
is a person who would need to remain pretty much upright, and
without doing a lot of heavy lifting in any direction, or
really even light lifting in any direction.
Dr. Thompson: That’s my belief, your honor.
AR 46–48 (“sic” in original). Claimant’s attorney then followed up with
additional questions:

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24
25
26
27
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Claimant’s Attorney: Doctor I think you were saying that even
if we’ve got an upright position, or we’ve got the table in
the right place, because they’re trying to do something with
their hands, and if that job then requires them to look down
to do that, it’[s] that flexion of the neck that, with her
degenerative condition, she probably wouldn’t tolerate that
more than on a seldom basis, meaning about 10 percent of the
day? Is that fair?

ORDER - 10

1
2
3

Dr. Thompson: It’s very hard to make a number, but it would
certainly be limited. And it would probably not really meet
the definition of occasional, which is a third of a day. Would
doubt that.

4

AR 49. This exchange demonstrates that Dr. Thompson did not expressly

5

agree with the findings of Dr. Sahota and Mr. Bruce as to Ms. Neal’s

6

absenteeism or as to the finding that Ms. Neal’s flexion of the neck

7

would be limited to seldom. While Dr. Thompson also did not expressly

8

disagree with the statement findings, he did note that he would not

9

assign a number to Ms. Neal’s ability to perform certain activities and

10

found that assigning a number as to absenteeism was beyond the scope of

11

his responsibilities as a medical expert. Accordingly, the ALJ reasonably

12

found that the statement prepared by Mr. Bruce and signed by Dr. Sahota

13

was not fully supported by Dr. Thompson.

14

Thus, because the ALJ noted contradictory evidence in the record

15

and Dr. Thompson’s testimony did not fully support the findings of Dr.

16

Sahota and Mr. Bruce, the ALJ was justified in rejecting portions of the

17

statement that she found to be unsupported by the record.

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20
21
22
23
24

2.

Dr. Thompson

Ms. Neal contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the
opinion of the medical examiner, Dr. Thompson, because the ALJ’s RFC did
not reflect all limitations found by Dr. Thompson, and the ALJ did not
provide

an

explanation

for

rejecting

Dr.

Thompson’s

opinion.

This

argument is not supported by the transcript of the hearing.
As reflected in the exchange above, Dr. Thompson did not find, as

25

Ms. Neal asserts, that Ms. Neal should be limited to seldom twisting her

26

torso and neck or that Ms. Neal would need to avoid any forward flexion

27

of the low back. Dr. Thompson stated that he agreed with the findings of

28

Dr. Sahota and Mr. Bruce that Ms. Neal could conduct these activities
ORDER - 11

1

only on a seldom basis “or something like that.” AR 44. Dr. Thompson

2

later clarified that Ms. Neal’s ability to perform these tasks would be

3

“limited,” but declined to assign a particular number to how often Ms.

4

Neal could do such tasks. AR 49. In addition, in response to the ALJ’s

5

questioning, Dr. Thompson stated that Ms. Neal’s ability to look down

6

and flex the neck is time limited. AR 46. The ALJ’s RFC finding that Ms.

7

Neal cannot turn her head constantly and cannot hold her head in a

8

flexed position for more than 30 minutes is a reasonable interpretation

9

of Dr. Thompson’s statements.

10

In addition, Dr. Thompson stated that he had no reason to disagree

11

with the finding of Dr. Sahota and Mr. Bruce regarding absenteeism, but

12

rather than agreeing with that finding, Dr. Thompson stated that such a

13

finding

14

expert.

15

recommendation when she declined to include absenteeism in the RFC.

16
17

was

beyond

the

Accordingly,

The

Court

scope

the

therefore

of

ALJ

holds

his

did

responsibilities
not

that

the

contradict

ALJ

did

as

Dr.

not

a

medical

Thompson’s

reject

Dr.

Thompson’s findings.

18

B.

Credibility Determination

19

Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ improperly found that she was not

20

fully credible based on cherry-picking evidence from the record and a

21

flawed finding that Claimant’s daily activities were inconsistent with

22

her symptom testimony.

23

A

two-step

analysis

is

used

by

the

ALJ

to

assess

whether

a

24

claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible.

25

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. Step one requires the ALJ to determine

26

whether

27

impairment, which could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of

28

the pain or other symptoms alleged. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d

ORDER - 12

the

claimant

presented

objective

medical

evidence

of

an

1

1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th

2

Cir. 1996). Objective medical evidence of the pain or fatigue, or the

3

severity thereof, need not be provided by the claimant. Garrison, 759

4

F.3d at 1014.

5

If the claimant satisfies the first step of this analysis, and

6

there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must accept the claimant’s

7

testimony about the severity of her symptoms unless the ALJ provides

8

specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s

9

symptom-severity testimony. Id. An ALJ is not “required to believe every

10

allegation of disabling pain” or other non-exertional impairment. Orn v.

11

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007). To discredit a claimant’s

12

testimony after finding that a medical impairment exists, however, “the

13

ALJ

14

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Factors that an ALJ may consider in

15

weighing a claimant’s credibility include reputation for truthfulness,

16

inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily

17

activities, and unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek

18

treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Id. at 636.

must

provide

the

22

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

23

entirely credible . . . .” AR 25. The ALJ explained that “[s]upport for

24

this conclusion has been derived from the objective medical evidence,

25

the lack of treating medical opinion during the relevant period, as well

26

as the opinions of the independent medical expert at the hearing and the

however,

the

claimant’s

be

Neal’s

Id.

alleged

reasonably

Ms.

disbelief.”

21

symptoms;

that

the

determinable

could

found

for

20

impairment

ALJ

reasons

In

28

case,

cogent

19

27

this

specific,

expected

statements

to

“medically
cause

the

concerning

the

opinions of non-examining state agency medical consultants who had the
opportunity to evaluate the documentary evidence of record.” AR 25.

ORDER - 13

1

The ALJ noted: “[Ms. Neal] has not been referred to a chronic pain

2

management facility or undergone treatment for pain; she has undergone

3

generally

4

treatment,

5

evaluating

6

objective findings during the examinations.” AR 25. These findings are

7

supported by the record, and the Court holds that it was appropriate for

8

the ALJ to consider these inconsistencies between Ms. Neal’s conduct and

9

her testimony.

conservative
has

medical

After

10

been

treatment
sporadic

sources

describing

the

with

and

have

inconsistent

noted

medical

over-the-counter

no

more

evidence

in

and

than

the

Ibuprofen;

treating
mild

or

record,

and

stable

the

ALJ

11

further explained that Ms. Neal’s “allegation of total disability is not

12

reflective of the objective medical evidence.” AR 28. The ALJ reasoned

13

that “the level of activity reported by the claimant is inconsistent

14

with

15

caring for, playing with, and lifting her young son; spending time on

16

the computer and time with friends; being able to walk a half mile;

17

doing

18

driving a car; going shopping; paying bills and managing money; doing

19

crafts; and participating in game nights. AR 28. The ALJ also noted that

20

“the claimant acknowledged that she stopped working after the birth of

21

her son and her husband finding a better job so she could stay at home

22

with her son.” AR 28.

her

allegation

dishes,

of

laundry,

total

disability”

vacuuming,

because

sweeping,

Ms.

mopping,

Neal

reported

cooking

meals;

23

Although the Ninth Circuit has held that “impairments that would

24

unquestionably preclude work and all of the pressures of a workplace

25

environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting

26

in bed all day,” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016, the Court holds that the

27
28

ALJ appropriately considered the types of activities performed by Ms.
Neal and whether those activities were consistent with the level of

ORDER - 14

1

disability claimed. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.

2

1989). The Court holds that the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Neal’s reported

3

activities include activities that are consistent with light work is

4

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record.

5

The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for not

6

fully crediting Ms. Neal’s testimony as to symptom severity. The ALJ,

7

therefore, did not err in finding Ms. Neal’s testimony not entirely

8

credible

9

Neal’s daily activities, Ms. Neal’s failure to pursue treatment, and

10

other evidence in the record such as Ms. Neal’s statement that her

11

decision not to work was based on factors other than disability.

12

based

C.

on

inconsistencies

with

the

objective

evidence,

Ms.

Step Four and Step Five Findings

13

Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ failed to meet her burden at steps

14

four and five of the disability inquiry. Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ

15

erred at step four by failing to include restrictions suggested by Dr.

16

Thompson, Dr. Sahota, and Mr. Bruce. Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ was

17

required to advance to step 5 and that the ALJ failed to meet her burden

18

at step five because the hypothetical she posed to the vocational expert

19

did not fully capture Ms. Neal’s limitations.

20

“If an ALJ finds a severe impairment at step two, that impairment

21

must be considered in the remaining steps of the sequential analysis.”

22

Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009).

23

If the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert “does not reflect all

24

the claimant’s limitations, we have held that the expert’s testimony has

25

no evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can perform

26

jobs in the national economy.” DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850

27

(9th Cir. 1991). The hypothetical should be “accurate, detailed, and

28

supported by the medical record.” Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165

ORDER - 15

1

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.

2

1999)). It is, however, “proper for an ALJ to limit a hypothetical to

3

those

4

record.” Id.

impairments

The

5

Court

that

has

are

held

supported

that

the

by

substantial

ALJ

did

not

evidence

fail

in

to

the

include

6

restrictions suggested by Dr. Thompson, reasonably declined to fully

7

credit Ms. Neal’s testimony, and reasonably rejected portions of the

8

statement prepared by Mr. Bruce and approved by Dr. Sahota. Based on

9

these determinations, the Court now holds that the hypothetical the ALJ

10

posed

to

11

limitations supported by the record in this matter. Based on the opinion

12

of the vocational expert, the ALJ appropriately concluded that Ms. Neal

13

could perform past relevant work as a receptionist. Thus, Ms. Neal does

14

not

15

regulations, and the ALJ was not required to advance to step five.

16

VI.

meet

the

vocational

the

definition

expert

of

was

a

reasonable

disabled

under

the

reflection

Social

of

the

Security

Conclusion

17

For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds that the ALJ’s

18

finding of nondisability is both reasonable and supported by substantial

19

evidence in the record. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s Motion

20

for Summary Judgment and grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

21

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

22

1.

2.

25
26

Neal’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

ECF

No.

14,

is

DENIED.

23
24

Ms.

The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15,
is GRANTED.

3.

The Clerk’s Office is to enter Judgment in favor of the

27

Commissioner.
28

4.
ORDER - 16

The case shall be CLOSED.

1
2
3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this

Order and provide copies to counsel and ALJ Caroline Siderius.
DATED this 14th

day of August 2017.

4
5

___s/Edward F. Shea__
EDWARD F. SHEA
Senior United States District Judge

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Q:\EFS\Civil\2016\5131.Neal.ord.deny.smj.ss.lc02.docx

ORDER - 17