Raines et al v. Seattle School District No 1

Filing 267

ORDER by Judge Thomas S. Zilly. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, docket no. 250 , is GRANTED in part and DEFERRED in part. Plaintiffs' second cause of action for racial discrimination, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendant's motion is otherwise DEFERRED until oral argument, which is SET for January 31, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. (CL) (cc: M. Perkins)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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BEVERLY RAINES; SANDRA BOSLEY;
CHALICE STALLWORTH; AUDREY
WEAVER; JACQUES JOHNSON; and
MARCUS PERKINS,

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Plaintiffs,

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ORDER

v.

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C09-203 TSZ

SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1,

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Defendants.

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THIS MATTER comes before the Court on defendant’s motion for summary

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15 judgment, docket no. 250. Having reviewed all papers filed in support of, and in
16 opposition to, defendant’s motion, the Court enters the following order.
17 Discussion
18 A.

Standard for Summary Judgment

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The Court shall grant summary judgment if no genuine issue of material fact exists

20 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
21 The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
22 of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if
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1 it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
2 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the
3 adverse party must present affirmative evidence, which “is to be believed” and from
4 which all “justifiable inferences” are to be favorably drawn. Id. at 255, 257. When the
5 record, however, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
6 non-moving party, summary judgment is warranted. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521,
7 529 (2006) (Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
8 discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
9 establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
10 party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
11 B.

Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

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All six remaining plaintiffs allege racial discrimination in the employment context

13 under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Under § 1981, to prevail on such claim against a municipal
14 employer, a plaintiff must prove that the challenged employment decision resulted from a
15 “policy or custom” of the municipality. See Fed. of African Am. Contractors v. City of
16 Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
17 amended § 1981, statutorily overruled Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701
18 (1989), and created an implied right of action against municipalities, but did not alter the
19 “policy or custom” requirement of Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658
20 (1978)). Plaintiffs make no allegation that defendant Seattle School District No. 1 has an
21 “official policy or established custom” of discriminating against employees on the basis
22 of race, that any individual who engaged in discriminatory behavior was “an official with
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1 final policy-making authority,” or that an official with policy-making authority “ratified”
2 a subordinate’s racially discriminatory action. See Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa,
3 591 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing various legal theories for municipal
4 liability). Instead, plaintiffs appear to rely on the contention that defendant failed to
5 adequately train its employees to avoid racial discrimination.
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To impose liability on a municipal employer for failure to adequately train its

7 employees, a plaintiff must prove that the government’s omission amounted to
8 “deliberate indifference” to the right at issue, Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1249, which is here
9 “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens,” 42
10 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The “deliberate indifference” standard is met when “the need for more
11 or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation
12 of . . . rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been
13 deliberately indifferent to the need.” Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1249 (quoting City of Canton
14 v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). A plaintiff must demonstrate that the failure to train
15 “reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality.” Id. (quoting Harris, 489
16 U.S. at 389). To adopt a lesser standard of fault “would result in de facto respondeat
17 superior liability on municipalities,” which the United States Supreme Court has
18 consistently rejected, and would force the federal courts to engage in “an endless exercise
19 of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs,” a task for which federal
20 courts are “ill suited” and which would “implicate serious questions of federalism.” Id.
21 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 392).
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In this case, plaintiffs have not made the type of showing required to survive

2 summary judgment. Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence concerning the training
3 programs offered by defendant or how such programs are in any way deficient. They
4 have presented no information indicating that defendant knew or should have known that
5 more or different training was needed and deliberately or consciously refused to provide
6 such training. Thus, with respect to plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim, the Court concludes that, as
7 a matter of law, plaintiffs have failed to identify any triable issue.
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Remaining Claims

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With respect to the remaining claims, namely (i) violation of the Rehabilitation

10 Act of 1973, alleged by plaintiffs Johnson, Perkins, Stallworth, and Weaver; (ii) violation
11 of the Washington Law Against Discrimination, alleged by all six remaining plaintiffs
12 with regard to a combination of one or more of the following grounds: age, gender, race,
13 disability, and/or retaliation; and (iii) defamation, alleged by plaintiffs Stallworth and
14 Weaver, the Court DEFERS ruling on defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
15 SCHEDULES oral argument concerning such claims for Thursday, January 31, 2013,
16 at 10:00 a.m. The parties are DIRECTED to be prepared to discuss at the hearing
17 whether the claims of any remaining plaintiffs should be consolidated for purposes of
18 trial, with trial to proceed forward on March 4, 2013.
19 Conclusion
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For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment, docket

21 no. 250, is GRANTED in part and DEFERRED in part. Plaintiffs’ second cause of action
22 for racial discrimination, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is DISMISSED with
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1 prejudice. Defendant’s motion is otherwise DEFERRED until oral argument, which is
2 SET for January 31, 2013, at 10:00 a.m.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this 18th day of January, 2013.

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A

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THOMAS S. ZILLY
United States District Judge

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