CASCADE YARNS, INC. v. KNITTING FEVER, INC. et al

Filing 679

DISCOVERY ORDER - 3 granting pltf's 661 Motion re dft Knitting Fever's notice of depo to third party dft Robert Dunbabin Sr by Hon. James P. Donohue. (RS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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CASCADE YARNS, INC.,

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Plaintiff,

Case No. 10-cv-00861-RSM-JPD
DISCOVERY ORDER – 3

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v.
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KNITTING FEVER, INC., et al.,
Defendants,

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v.
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ROBERT A. DUNBABIN, et al.,
Third Party Defendants.

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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion regarding Defendant Knitting

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Fever Inc.’s (“KFI”) notice of deposition to Third Party Defendant Robert A. Dunbabin, Sr.

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Dkt. 661. Mr. Dunbabin was previously deposed in November 2011 in connection with a

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related Pennsylvania lawsuit, though he is not a party to that suit. See Dkt. 504. Plaintiff

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designated Mr. Dunbabin as its Rule 30(b)(6) deponent in this matter, and KFI submitted

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deposition notices proposing to depose Mr. Dunbabin in his individual capacity on June 6,

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2012, and in his Rule 30(b)(6) capacity on June 5, 2012.

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ORDER
PAGE - 1

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Plaintiff objected to this procedure, proposing that Mr. Dunbabin could be deposed in

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both his individual and corporate-designee capacity on June 5. KFI did not agree to this

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proposal, and instead went forward with a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on June 5. The parties

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have filed a Rule 37 submission requesting that the Court rule as to whether KFI is entitled to

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depose Mr. Dunbabin again in his individual capacity. Dkt. 661.

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Noting two depositions of Mr. Dunbabin was not necessary, because a Rule 30(b)(6)

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deponent must provide any relevant information within his or her personal knowledge. See

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Detoy v. City and County of San Francisco, 196 F.R.D. 362, 366-67 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

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Furthermore, as noted by the Detoy court, requiring a Rule 30(b)(6) to be deposed a second

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time “on his or her own behalf seems artificial and wasteful of both the parties’ resources and

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the witness’s time. Presumably, if the witness is capable of testifying on behalf of the

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designated entity, the witness is also capable of testifying as an individual, at the same

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deposition.” 196 F.R.D. at 367.

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KFI attempts to show why the Detoy presumption should not apply here, on the

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grounds that KFI did not have enough time to ask all of its corporate and personal questions

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during the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Specifically, KFI argues it did not have enough time to

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question Mr. Dunbabin as to his knowledge regarding allegedly defamatory statements, as well

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as whether Mr. Dunbabin used his political contributions to encourage government action

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against the Defendants. See Dkt. 661 at 16. But the deposition transcript excerpts provided by

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Plaintiff reveal a different story: it is clear that KFI pursued both of those lines of questioning

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on June 5. See Guite Decl. (Dkt. 664), Ex. A. A review of the deposition transcript excerpts

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does not suggest that KFI was limited in pursuing those topics.

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Thus, while there may be circumstances where two separate depositions would have

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been appropriate, the Court finds that this is not one of those circumstances. Because KFI has

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not shown that it did not have the opportunity to fully depose Mr. Dunbabin on June 5, the

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ORDER
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Court will not require Mr. Dunbabin to be deposed again in his individual capacity. The Court

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GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 661).

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DATED this 20th day of June, 2012.

A

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JAMES P. DONOHUE
United States Magistrate Judge

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ORDER
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