Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke et al

Filing 95

ORDER denying 74 Intervenor Association of Flight Attendants' Motion to Dismiss or Stay, by Judge James L. Robart.(MD)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

8
9
10

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.,

11

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
INTERVENOR ASSOCIATION
OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY

v.

12
13

CASE NO. C11-0616JLR

JUDY SCHURKE, et al.,
Defendants,

14
15

and

16

ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS –
COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

17
18

Intervenor.

19

I.

20
21

INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Intervenor Association of Flight Attendants – Communication

22 Workers of America, AFL-CIO’s (“AFA”) motion to dismiss or stay. (AFA Mot. (Dkt #
ORDER- 1

1 74).) This is a preemption case arising out of a dispute between Plaintiff Alaska Airlines
2 Inc. (“Alaska”) and the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (“the
3 Department”). (1st Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 49) ¶ 3.) The Department investigated
4 complaints filed by Alaska flight attendants, who alleged that Alaska violated a state
5 family medical leave statute. (Id. ¶ 28.) Alaska filed this complaint seeking declaratory
6 and injunctive relief, arguing that federal collective bargaining law preempts state
7 enforcement of this leave statute. (Id. ¶ 3.) According to Alaska, flight attendant
8 complaints about compliance with state leave statutes should be resolved by procedures
9 established in the collective bargaining agreement between Alaska and AFA, not by the
10 Department. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.)
11

AFA asks the court to dismiss or stay this action pursuant to the abstention

12 principles from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co.
13 of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), and Colorado River Conservation District v. United
14 States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). (AFA Mot. at 2.) Federal courts generally abstain and
15 refuse to hear cases out of respect for ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S.
16 at 44-45. Abstention reflects a commitment to comity, federalism, and judicial economy.
17 Id. In this case, AFA asks the court to dismiss under the Younger abstention doctrine,
18 arguing that Alaska improperly seeks to enjoin ongoing state proceedings. (AFA Mot. at
19 6.) Alternatively, AFA asks the court to dismiss or stay the case under the Brillhart20 Wilton doctrine or the Colorado River abstention doctrine. AFA asks the court to decline
21 jurisdiction because the issues in parallel state proceedings are substantially the same as
22 the issues in this federal preemption proceeding. (Id. at 15.) The court has considered
ORDER- 2

1 the parties’ submissions filed in support of and opposition to the motion, and the
2 applicable law. For the reasons stated below, the court DENIES the motion to dismiss or
3 stay.
4
5

II.

BACKGROUND

Under the Washington Family Care Act (“WFCA”), employees who are entitled to

6 sick leave or other paid time off of work may use their leave to care for eligible family
7 members. See RCW 49.12.265-70. The WFCA defines “sick leave or other paid time
8 off” as “time allowed under the terms of an appropriate state law, collective bargaining
9 agreement, or employer policy, as applicable, to an employee for illness, vacation, and
10 personal holiday.” RCW 49.12.265(5). The Department is charged with enforcing the
11 WFCA: it investigates complaints and may issue notices of infraction if it reasonably
12 believes the employer has failed to comply with these statutory requirements. RCW
13 49.12.280; RCW 49.12.285.
14

During 2010, the Department began investigating complaints filed by several

15 flight attendants who alleged Alaska violated the WFCA. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) On
16 April 11, 2011, Alaska filed its first complaint alleging that the Department cannot
17 enforce the WFCA against Alaska because a federal statute—the Railway Labor Act
18 (“RLA”)—preempts such enforcement. (Compl. (Dkt. #1) ¶ 3.) The court dismissed this
19 complaint on February 14, 2012, on ripeness grounds, holding it could not conduct a
20 case-by-case preemption analysis because no actual employee’s complaint was before the
21 court. (See generally, 2/14/12 Order (Dkt. # 47).) Alaska filed an amended complaint on
22 March 14, 2012, this time challenging Department enforcement of the WFCA with
ORDER- 3

1 respect to a specific employee: Laura Masserant. (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-25) Ms.
2 Masserant is a flight attendant with Alaska and was President of the AFA Local
3 Executive Council at this time. (Id. ¶ 16.) The court granted the AFA leave to intervene
4 in this action on February 25, 2013. (2/25/13 Order (Dkt. # 70) at 1.)
5

Ms. Masserant filed a complaint with the Department on June 16, 2011, alleging

6 that Alaska violated the WFCA by denying her sick leave with pay to care for her sick
7 child. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) The Department began investigating Ms. Masserant’s
8 claims in June 2011, but did not issue a notice of infraction against Alaska until May 31,
9 2012, over a month after Alaska filed its amended complaint with this court. (AFA Mot.
10 at 3.) On June 20, 2012, Alaska appealed the notice of infraction, making essentially the
11 same preemption argument before an ALJ at the Washington Office of Administrative
12 Hearings. (Id.)
13

Alaska and the Department, concerned about the inefficiency of litigating this

14 federal case and the state administrative case at the same time, filed a joint motion to
15 dismiss the hearing before the ALJ. (Alaska Resp. (Dkt # 90) at 12; Dept. Resp. (Dkt. #
16 88) at 3.) On January 29, 2013, the ALJ agreed to dismiss the state administrative
17 hearing because of the ongoing federal case before this court. (Alaska Resp. at 12.)
18 Although the ALJ dismissed the state administrative hearing, the Department’s notice of
19 infraction against Alaska remains in place. (Dept. Resp. at 7.) Both the AFA (AFA Mot.
20 at 8) and Alaska (Alaska Resp. at 12) agree that the ALJ’s dismissal functions as a stay of
21
22
ORDER- 4

1 the state proceedings. 1 AFA filed this motion to dismiss or stay this federal case on
2 March 14, 2013, arguing that the court should abstain from the instant case because of
3 ongoing state proceedings. (See generally AFA Mot.)
4

III.

5

ANALYSIS

According to AFA, the court should stay or dismiss this case in deference to

6 ongoing state administrative proceedings before the ALJ. As a general rule, “[a]bsent
7 significant countervailing interests, the federal courts are obligated to exercise their
8 jurisdiction.” Walnut Props., Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)
9 (quoting World Famous Drinking Emporium v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th
10 Cir. 1987)). State proceedings do not necessarily change this rule because generally “the
11 pendency of an action in state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter”
12 in a federal court. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 800. AFA asks the court to deviate from
13 these principles and abstain from this case. (AFA Mot. at 1.) For the following reasons,
14 the court finds abstention inappropriate, whether under Younger, Brillhart, or Colorado
15 River.
16
17
18
1

Alaska and the Department entered into a stipulation to withdraw the Department’s
request for a hearing. (Decl. of Counsel in Support of Mot. (Dkt # 75) Ex. J.) In response, the
20 ALJ issued an Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, striking all further hearing dates but
allowing either party to re-file an administrative appeal. (Id.) AFA calls this Order a “stay” of
21 the administrative proceedings because the Department’s notice of infraction remains in place.
(AFA Mot. at 8.) Alaska calls the Order a stay without comment. (Alaska Resp. at 12.) The
Department disagrees, calling the Order a dismissal. (Dept. Resp. at 6.) The court takes no
22 position on this issue, but refers to the ALJ’s order as a “stay” for consistency.

19

ORDER- 5

1 A.

The Younger Abstention Doctrine

2

First, AFA asks the court to abstain from this case pursuant to the doctrine

3 articulated in Younger v. Harris. (AFA Mot. at 1.) Under Younger, federal courts may
4 not enjoin ongoing state proceedings under most circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45.
5 Although originally developed with respect to state criminal proceedings, Younger
6 abstention also applies to pending civil and administrative proceedings implicating
7 important state interests. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n., 457
8 U.S. 423, 433-34 (1982). Federal courts generally must abstain under Younger if state
9 proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate important state interest, and (3) provide an
10 adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Columbia Basin Apartment Ass’n. v. City
11 of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also
12 requires that (4) the federal action would effectively enjoin the state proceeding. Potrero
13 Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2011). If a federal
14 court abstains under Younger, it must dismiss rather than stay the case. Fresh Int’l Corp.
15 v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
16

The Younger abstention doctrine, however, rests on notions of comity, federalism,

17 and respect for pending state proceedings. Id. (quoting Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431
18 (1982)). It is jurisprudential rather than jurisdictional, arising from “strong policies
19 counseling against the exercise” of federal jurisdiction rather than a “lack of jurisdiction
20 in the District Court.” Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477
21 U.S. 619, 626 (1986). Consequently, a state may forego a tenable abstention claim and
22
ORDER- 6

1 submit to adjudication in a federal forum. Id. This sort of situation does not raise
2 federalism and comity concerns, and thus federal courts need not abstain:
3
4

It may not be argued, however, that a federal court is compelled to abstain
in every such situation. If the State voluntarily chooses to submit to a
federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court
force the case back into the State’s own system.

5
Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977). In other words, a
6
court need not reach the merits of a Younger claim when a state voluntarily submits to the
7
suit. Id. at 480 n.10. (holding that where a state “voluntarily chooses to submit to a
8
federal forum” the Court need not address Younger abstention); Kleenwell Biohazard
9
Waste & Gen. Ecology Consultants v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 394 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining
10
to reach the merits of a Younger claim when a state has voluntarily submitted to the
11
federal case).
12
Indeed, a state waives its Younger challenge, consenting to a federal forum, when
13
it “expressly urge[s]” the federal court to proceed. Dayton, 477 U.S. at 626. The Ninth
14
Circuit has stated in dicta that a state does not waive Younger by merely failing to raise
15
the issue. Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1535 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); but see
16
Kleenwell, 48 F.3d at 394 (declining to address defendant state agency’s Younger
17
argument because “the Commission did not raise this issue before the district court” and
18
thus voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction). As explained below, in this case the
19
Department went beyond failing to argue Younger.
20
First, the Department agreed to stop proceedings in state court. The Department
21
expressly urged federal resolution of this case by asking the ALJ to stay the state
22
ORDER- 7

1 administrative proceedings to avoid duplicative litigation. (Dept. Resp. at 3.) The Ninth
2 Circuit concluded in Walnut Properties that Younger federalism concerns “are not
3 present when a state court has stayed its own proceedings pending resolution of the case
4 in a federal forum.” 861 F.2d at 1107. 2 Had the Department argued for Younger
5 abstention, the fact that it previously agreed to stay the state administrative hearing might
6 be less convincing. See Columbia Basin, 268 F.3d at 800 (holding that the City did not
7 waive its subsequent Younger abstention claim by stipulating to stay the state case).
8 However, the fact that the Department did not raise Younger and also agreed to stay the
9 state case suggests this case does not raise the comity concerns underlying Younger. See
10 Walnut Props., 861 F.2d at 1107.
11

Second, the Department declined the opportunity to argue in favor of Younger

12 abstention. The Department expressly urged the court to hear this case because it does
13 not raise Younger before the court, and argues against Younger abstention in its response
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

2

In their briefing, Alaska and AFA discuss Walnut Properties and another case, San
Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1998), when evaluating whether
there is an ongoing state proceeding—the first part of the Younger test. (Alaska Resp. at 13;
AFA Reply (Dkt. # 91) at 7.) As the parties point out, the cases reach different conclusions
about whether stayed state proceedings are “ongoing” for Younger purposes. Compare Walnut
Props., 861 F.2d at 1106-07 (concluding state court proceedings were not “ongoing” when the
parties agreed to stay the case pending resolution of the federal proceedings) with San Remo
Hotel, 145 F.3d at 1104 (“Because the whole point of Younger abstention is to stop federal
interference with state proceedings, it seems backwards to reject abstention because the state
proceedings have been stayed to allow the federal case to proceed.”); see also Columbia Basin,
268 F.3d at 800 (recognizing the tension between Walnut Properties and San Remo Hotel). As
explained in this section, because the state has expressly urged the court to proceed with
Alaska’s preemption action, the court need not decide whether the stayed state proceedings were
“ongoing” in this case. Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs., 431 U.S. at 480 n.10. The court thus
declines to address the differences between Walnut Properties and San Remo Hotel with respect
to the merits of a Younger claim.
ORDER- 8

1 to AFA’s motion to dismiss. (Dept. Resp. at 4 (arguing that Younger abstention is
2 inappropriate because there is no ongoing state proceeding).) A state actively opposing
3 abstention “allays any concerns of offending comity.” Potrero Hills, 657 F.3d at 888
4 (declining to abstain when private intervenors raised a Younger claim but the state
5 opposed abstention and sought federal adjudication of the case); see also Sonsa v. Iowa,
6 419 U.S. 393, 396 n.3 (declining to consider Younger abstention when, in response to the
7 Court’s request to brief the issue, both parties argued against abstention). Younger
8 abstention is inappropriate when the state itself encourages federal resolution of a case,
9 even though other parties might argue for abstention. Potrero Hills, 657 F.3d at 888; see
10 also Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs., 431 U.S. at 477-78 (declining to reach the merits of a
11 Younger claim raised by amicus briefs when the state did not raise Younger on appeal);
12 Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Emps., 468 U.S. 491, 500 n.9 (1984) (refusing to address a state
13 agency’s Younger abstention claim when the state Attorney General “submit[ted] to the
14 jurisdiction of this Court in order to obtain a more expeditious and final resolution of the
15 merits of the constitutional issue”).
16

Younger abstention exists to prevent undue “interfere[ence] with the legitimate

17 activities of the States”; it is not a doctrine private parties can invoke to “force [a] case
18 back into the State’s own system.” See Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs., 431 U.S. at 479.
19 Because the Department has expressly urged the court to proceed, the court declines to
20 abstain under the Younger doctrine and will not address the merits of AFA’s Younger
21 claim.
22
ORDER- 9

1 B.

The Brillhart-Wilton Doctrine

2

District courts have broad discretion to stay or dismiss actions seeking declaratory

3 judgment, as recognized in Brillhart and Wilton v. Seven Falls Company. Brillhart, 316
4 U.S. at 495; Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995); see also 28 U.S.C.
5 § 2201 (federal courts “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
6 party seeking such declaration” (emphasis added)). The Brillhart-Wilton doctrine rests
7 on concerns about judicial economy and cooperative federalism. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at
8 495. In light of this purpose, district courts consider three primary factors when
9 evaluating whether to entertain a declaratory judgment action: “[1] avoiding ‘needless
10 determination of state law issues’; [2] discouraging ‘forum shopping’; and [3] avoiding
11 ‘duplicative litigation.’” R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 975 (9th
12 Cir. 2011) (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998)).
13

1. Needlessly Determining State Law Issues

14

First, courts decline jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act in order to

15 avoid needlessly determining state law issues. Id. District courts appropriately avoid
16 determining state law when: state and federal cases raise the same “precise state law
17 issues,” state law provides the rule of decision, and the federal case involves an area of
18 law expressly left to the states. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367, 1371
19 (9th Cir. 1991). This factor counsels against exercising jurisdiction when “no compelling
20 federal interests are at stake.” Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co.v. Digregorio, 811
21 F.2d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371.
22
ORDER- 10

1

AFA argues that the court should stay or dismiss under Brillhart because (1)

2 Alaska raised the same RLA preemption argument in the state proceedings before the
3 ALJ and (2) both the state and federal proceedings require determining state law issues.
4 (AFA Mot. at 17.) According to AFA, “[t]he state court should be given the opportunity
5 to construe the WFCA in a manner which does not violate” federal law “and the federal
6 court should not, in this action, needlessly determine those state law issues.” (Id. (citing
7 R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 975).) AFA cites Railroad Street and another case,
8 International Association of Entrepreneurs of America v. Angoff, 59 F.3d 1266 (8th Cir.
9 1995), when making this argument. (AFA Mot. at 17.) The court disagrees, and finds
10 these cases unpersuasive.
11

In International Association of Entrepreneurs, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

12 upheld the district court’s decision to decline jurisdiction over plaintiff’s preemption
13 action. Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am., 58 F.3d at 1270. However, the district court
14 applied Brillhart because the plaintiff improperly engaged in forum shopping, not
15 because the case required determining state law. Id. at 1270. The Eighth Circuit
16 affirmed the district court’s decision to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum
17 shopping. Id. at 1270. The court never mentioned determining state law issues, and did
18 not rely on this factor in its Brillhart analysis. Id. International Association of
19 Entrepreneurs in no way advances AFA’s argument that this court should stay or dismiss
20 to avoid needlessly determining state law issues because neither the district court nor the
21 Eighth Circuit discussed determining state law as a basis for declining jurisdiction.
22
ORDER- 11

1

AFA’s reliance on Railroad Street is similarly misplaced because, unlike the

2 present case, Railroad Street only involved state law issues. See R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d
3 at 971-73. Railroad Street, like Brillhart and Wilton, was an insurance case brought in
4 federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 973; Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 493;
5 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 280. State law supplied the rule of decision, the parties exclusively
6 raised state law issues, R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 971-73, and regulating insurance is an
7 area of law Congress has expressly left to the states, see Robsac, 947 F.2d 1367 (citing 15
8 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (1988)) (noting that “this case involves insurance law, an area that
9 Congress has expressly left to the states through the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”). By
10 contrast, the present action is not a diversity case in which the court applies state
11 substantive law, and Congress has not expressly left RLA preemption to the states.
12 Alaska’s action raises “compelling federal interests” because it requires the court to
13 determine the scope of a federal statute, which will provide the rule of decision in this
14 case. Thus, contrary to AFA’s contention, the court does not needlessly decide state law
15 issues by proceeding with this federal preemption action. 3 See Digregorio, 811 F.2d at
16
17

3

In its response to AFA’s motion to dismiss, the Department argues that the court should
grant its motion for summary judgment. (Dept. Resp. at 8.) Alternatively, if the court denies the
18 Department’s motion for summary judgment because the court must interpret state law, the
Department argues that the court should stay the case under Brillhart:

19
20

Although the Department believes that [the WFCA] is clear on its face and this
Court should grant summary judgment for the Department, if this Court believes
it needs to engage in interpretation of the state law, it should grant AFA’s motion
and the parties can initiate proceedings at [the Office of Administrative Hearings].

21

(Dept. Resp. at 8.) The court finds the Department’s argument faulty in several respects. First,
the court would still need to interpret state law in order to find the WFCA clear on its face and
22 grant the Department’s motion for summary judgment. Second, the Brillhart-Wilton doctrine
ORDER- 12

1 1255 (holding abstention appropriate because the issues raised “are more appropriate for
2 state court resolution” and “[n]o compelling federal interests are at stake”).
3

2. Forum Shopping

4

Second, courts decline jurisdiction over actions for declaratory relief to discourage

5 forum shopping. R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 975. Congress did not intend to expand
6 federal jurisdiction by enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, and a plaintiff may not use
7 this statute to bring a claim more properly raised in a pending state action. Int’l Ass’n of
8 Entrepreneurs of Am., 58 F.3d at 1270. For this reason, federal courts refuse to entertain
9 reactive declaratory actions filed solely to gain a tactical advantage. Id. (“the Declaratory
10 Judgment Act is not to be used either for tactical advantage by litigants or to open a new
11 portal of entry to federal court for suits that are essentially defensive or reactive to state
12 actions”); R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 976 (quoting Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371). The
13 forum shopping analysis focuses on whether the federal case is “reactive,” but does not
14 depend solely on timing of filing. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
15 Co., 460 U.S. 1, 17 n.20 (1983) (noting that “despite chronological priority of filing,” a
16 suit may still be “a contrived, defensive reaction” to a suit in another forum).
17

Courts examine the “sequence of events” leading to a federal action to determine

18 if a party engaged in forum shopping. See Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am., 58 F.3d at
19 1270. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Robsac found that the plaintiff engaged in forum
20
21 does not require abstention whenever a court must determine state law issues. Cf. R.R. St. & Co.,
656 F.3d at 975. As explained in this section, staying or dismissing the case is inappropriate
under Brillhart because the case does not require the court to needlessly determine state law
22 issues. See id.
ORDER- 13

1 shopping by filing a federal action in response to pending non-removable state court
2 proceedings. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371. Similarly, in International Association of
3 Entrepreneurs the plaintiff attempted to remove the state case to federal court, but filed
4 an untimely petition. Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am., 58 F.3d at 1268. Only after the
5 court denied its removal petition did plaintiff file suit in federal court, and the Eighth
6 Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to decline jurisdiction under these
7 circumstances. Id. at 1270. The district court properly did not allow plaintiff “to
8 circumvent the removal statute’s deadline by using the Declaratory Judgment Act as a
9 convenient and temporally unlimited back door into federal court.” Id.
10

AFA argues that Alaska engaged in forum shopping because Alaska filed its first

11 amended complaint after the Department began investigating Ms. Masserant’s complaint.
12 (AFA Mot. at 18.) The court finds little merit to AFA’s allegations. Unlike the plaintiffs
13 in International Association of Entrepreneurs and Robsac, Alaska did not file a defensive
14 or reactive federal action. See Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am., 58 F.3d at 1270;
15 Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371. Alaska filed its original complaint in April 2011, two months
16 before Ms. Masserant filed her complaint with the Department, over a year before the
17 Department issued Alaska a notice of infraction, and nearly two years before AFA
18 intervened in this suit. This sequence of events does not point strongly towards forum
19 shopping because Alaska did not, for example, file this case in response to non20 removable state proceedings, see Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371, or after unsuccessfully
21 attempting to remove a state case, see Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am., 58 F.3d at
22 1270. The forum shopping factor carries little weight where, like in the present case, one
ORDER- 14

1 party merely prefers federal resolution and another party prefers state resolution. Huth v.
2 Hartford Ins. Co., 298 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 2002).
3

3. Duplicative Litigation

4

Third, courts decline jurisdiction over actions for declaratory relief in order to

5 avoid duplicative litigation. R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 975. The Ninth Circuit described
6 an example in Railroad Street, where it said duplicative litigation would result if
7 retaining jurisdiction “required the district court to address the same issues of state law
8 and policy interpretation that the state court had been grappling with for several years.”
9 Id. at 976. In this case, little occurred in the state administrative proceedings before the
10 ALJ effectively stayed the case on January 29, 2013: the Department issued Alaska a
11 notice of infraction, Alaska appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the
12 ALJ held status conference hearings with Alaska and the Department. (Dept. Resp. at 3.)
13 After the state hearing stay there is little risk of piecemeal or duplicative litigation, and
14 this factor weighs against abstention.
15

Hearing this case would not needlessly determine state law issues, encourage

16 forum shopping, or result in duplicative litigation. The court weighs these factors and
4
17 declines to stay or dismiss Alaska’s declaratory judgment action. See R.R. St. & Co.,

18 656 F.3d at 975.
19
20
4

The court finds dismissing or staying the case inappropriate under the Brillhart-Wilton
doctrine. Therefore, the court does not address Alaska’s argument that the court has no
discretion to refuse to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act because Alaska
22 also requests injunctive relief.

21

ORDER- 15

1 C.

The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine

2

Last, AFA argues that the court should abstain under the Colorado River

3 abstention doctrine. (AFA Mot. at 21-24.) Courts possess less discretion to refuse to
4 exercise jurisdiction under the Colorado River abstention doctrine than under the
5 Brillhart-Wilton doctrine. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 285. Pending state proceedings generally
6 do not bar federal proceedings on the same issues because federal courts have “a virtually
7 unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River, 424 U.S.
8 at 817. Federal courts may stay or dismiss a case under Colorado River for efficient
9 judicial administration only under “exceptional” circumstances. Travelers Indem. Co.,
10 924 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990). Any doubts must be resolved against abstention
11 and “[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal.” Id. at 1369 (quoting
12 Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 819).
13

In Colorado River, the Colorado legislature divided the state into seven water

14 districts and established procedures for settling water claims within those districts. 424
15 U.S. at 804-5. Rather than adjudicate via these procedures, the United States sued some
16 1,000 water users in federal court. Id. at 805. The Supreme Court upheld the district
17 court’s decision to abstain, finding that “exceptional circumstances” justified abstention
18 for reasons of “wise judicial administration.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 284 (citing id. at 81819 20). In the Ninth Circuit, courts consider eight factors for determining whether to abstain
20 under the Colorado River “exceptional circumstances” test:
21
22

(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; (2) the
inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal
litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5)

ORDER- 16

1
2
3

whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits;
(6) whether the state court proceedings can adequately protect the rights of
the federal litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (8)
whether the state court proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal
court.

4 R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 978-79 (citing Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 870 (9th Cir
5 2002)). The first two factors are irrelevant in this case because Alaska’s suit does not
6 concern a specific piece of property and both the state and federal forums are located in
7 Washington. Id. at 979. Factors three and seven are also not relevant because, as
8 discussed for the Brillhart-Wilton doctrine, retaining jurisdiction does not raise piecemeal
9 litigation or forum shopping problems.
10

Moving to the rest of the Colorado River factors, the fourth factor weighs against

11 abstention because Alaska filed its complaint in the federal forum before Ms. Masserant
12 filed her complaint with the Department. Moreover, although the court will need to
13 resolve issues of state law, the fifth factor weighs against abstention because federal law
14 provides the rule of decision. When federal courts consider whether to surrender
15 jurisdiction, “in some rare circumstances the presence of state-law issues may weigh in
16 favor of that surrender” but “the presence of federal-law issues must always be a major
17 consideration weighing against surrender.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26.
18 The sixth and eighth factors weigh in favor of abstention because the state courts could
19 resolve all the issues in this case and adequately protect Alaska’s rights. Cf. Dayton, 477
20 U.S. at 629 (holding Younger abstention appropriate in part because state court review of
21 administrative hearings guaranteed plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to raise claims
22 based on federal law). Despite two factors favoring abstention, on balance, and in light
ORDER- 17

1 of the court’s “virtually unflagging” obligation to exercise its jurisdiction, the Colorado
2 River factors weigh against abstention in this case.
3
4

IV.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, the court DENIES Intervenor AFA’s motion to

5 dismiss or stay. (Dkt. # 74.) The court declines to dismiss Alaska’s action pursuant to
6 Younger abstention because the Department has expressly urged the court to proceed with
7 this case. The court also finds staying or dismissing the case inappropriate under the
8 Brillhart-Wilton doctrine because the case does not raise concerns about needlessly
9 determining state law issues, forum shopping, or duplicative litigation. Finally, the court
10 declines to dismiss or stay under Colorado River because in this case no “exceptional
11 circumstances” overcome the court’s obligation to exercise its jurisdiction.
12

Dated this 6th day of May, 2013.

13

15

A

16

JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge

14

17
18
19
20
21
22
ORDER- 18