The Riverside Publishing Company v. Mercer Publishing LLC et al

Filing 105

ORDER denying dfts' 101 Motion for TRO by Judge Richard A Jones.(RS)

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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THE RIVERSIDE PUBLISHING
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. C11-1249RAJ

v.
ORDER
MERCER PUBLISHING LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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This matter comes before the court on Defendants’ motion for a temporary

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restraining order (“TRO”). Dkt. # 101. For the reasons stated herein, the court DENIES

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the motion.

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About a year and a half ago, Plaintiff The Riverside Publishing Company

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(“Riverside”) brought this lawsuit asking the court to enter a TRO preventing Defendant

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Mercer Publishing LLC, its owner, and her marital community (collectively “Mercer”)

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from publishing test questions that Riverside alleged Mercer had not properly submitted

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for Mercer’s review in accordance with a settlement agreement the parties had reached in

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a previous litigation. The court denied the motion in an August 4, 2011 order. Since

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then, this litigation has multiplied in ways the court need not discuss for purposes of the

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motion now before the court. Among other things, the court ruled on November 4, 2011,

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ORDER – 1

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that Riverside waived any right to arbitrate this dispute. Riverside appealed that ruling,

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and its appeal is still pending.

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Now, Mercer apparently intends to publish a new set of test questions. As was the

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case before, Riverside contends that Mercer has not properly submitted the questions for

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review in accordance with the settlement agreement. This time, however, Riverside has

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filed an action in King County Superior Court. It has asked that court to appoint an

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arbitrator.

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Mercer now moves for a TRO, asking the court to enjoin Riverside from pursuing

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the King County action. In its view, Riverside is “forum shopping,” and the court ought

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to stop it.
The court begins by noting that Mercer’s request is, in reality, a request that the

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court enjoin the King County litigation. A federal court may enjoin state court

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proceedings only in rare circumstances. See, e.g., Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 523

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F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (addressing Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283).

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Mercer does not acknowledge the federalism concerns its motion raises, much less cite

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any precedent relevant to it.

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Putting that aside, however, Mercer’s cries of “forum shopping” are not well

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taken. Riverside has a new dispute. There are no doubt aspects of the new dispute that

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resemble the one it brought to this court in the summer of 2011, but Riverside’s choice of

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this forum 19 months ago does not compel it (or doom it) to choose this forum for all

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future disputes. Or, to put it another way, plaintiffs get to forum shop, unless they do so

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in violation of a doctrine that prohibits a particular variety of forum shopping. Mercer’s

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motion does not demonstrate impermissible forum shopping.

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ORDER – 2

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If the court’s orders in this litigation have a preclusive effect (the court does not

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suggest that they do), Mercer may make that argument in the state court. Other than that,

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it has articulated no grounds for a remedy in this court.

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DATED this 21st day of February, 2013.

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A

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The Honorable Richard A. Jones
United States District Court Judge

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ORDER – 3