Hecock v. United States of America

Filing 14

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF by Judge Ricardo S Martinez. (RS)cc Hecock

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner, 11 12 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF v. 13 CASE NO. C13-173-RSM JASON MICHAEL HECOCK, 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Respondent. THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant-Petitioner Jason Hecock’s Motion for Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. # 1) and Response by Plaintiff United States of America (Dkt. # 10). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief is DENIED. Background Defendant-Petitioner Jason Hecock filed the instant Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate the sentence imposed at his sentencing hearing in CR11-178RSM on January 25, 2012. Dkt. # 1. Mr. Hecock has served a 185-day term of incarceration in CR05-159RSM after he pleaded guilty to a single count of Distribution of 24 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF - 1 1 MDMA and is currently on supervised release. On March 31, 2011, Defendant had an initial 2 appearance for three supervised release violations: (1) possession of marijuana with intent to 3 distribute; (2) possession of Oxycontin with intent to deliver; (3) possession of drug 4 paraphernalia. See CR05-159RSM, Dkt. ## 82, 88. 5 On October 14, 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to three related counts alleged in the 6 indictment in CR11-178RSM: (1) Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, in violation 7 of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D); (2) Possession of MDMA, Hydrocodone, Codeine, 8 and Heroin, with Intent to Distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and 9 (3) Possession of Oxycodone with Intent to Distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 10 841(b)(1)(C). The sole recommendation contained in the Plea Agreement specified that, 11 “The government agrees to recommend that the sentence in this matter be served 12 concurrently to any time period imposed on the supervised release violations in 13 CR05-0159RSM. However, Defendant understands that the United States 14 Probation Office will recommend that the sentence in both matters be served 15 consecutively.” 16 Dkt. # 27, p. 9. At Defendant’s plea hearing and through Defendant’s sworn plea colloquy, the 17 presiding Magistrate Judge found that Defendant was competent to enter a guilty plea and 18 understood the consequences of the plea. See CR11-178RSM, Dkt. # 25; CR13-173RSM, Dkt. # 19 10, pp. 4-5. 20 On January 1, 2012, the Court held a combined disposition hearing on Defendant’s 21 supervised release violations in CR05-0159RSM and sentencing hearing in CR11-178RSM. In 22 its Sentencing Memorandum, the government recommended an above Guideline range term of 23 forty-six months on CR11-178RSM, and a term of twenty-four months for the supervised release 24 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF - 2 1 violations, to be served concurrently. CR11-178RSM, Dkt. # 30, p. 4. In its Sentencing 2 Memorandum, the defense recommended a term of thirty-seven months in custody at the high 3 end of the Guideline range, with either dismissal of the supervised release violations or a 4 sentence of nine months on the violations to run concurrently. Id. at Dkt. # 31, p. 3. The Court 5 imposed a term of thirty-seven months, consecutive to a disposition term of nine months for the 6 supervised release violations. Id. at Dkt. # 32; CR05-0159RSM, Dkt. # 33. 7 8 Analysis 9 In his petition for habeas relief, Mr. Hecock claimed that his sentence should be vacated 10 on two grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel and breach of the plea agreement by the 11 Government. Dkt. # 1, pp. 4, 5. Petitioner also stated a conclusory allegation that he was 12 “induced into signing two plea agreements,” though he failed to develop these allegations or 13 support them with any factual assertions. See Id. at 5. The government denies all claims. See Dkt. 14 # 10. 15 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Court shall vacate and set aside a judgment upon a finding 16 that “the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not 17 authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or 18 infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to 19 collateral attack.” The presiding judge has discretion to determine whether an evidentiary 20 hearing is warranted upon review of the record. See Rule 8, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases 21 in the District Courts. “If it plainly appears from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits 22 and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief,” the Court must 23 24 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF - 3 1 deny the motion. Id. at Rule 4(b); see also Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th 2 Cir.1982). 3 4 5 1) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner must establish both 6 that his “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced 7 the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient 8 performance, a defendant must show that “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or 9 omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. 10 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” in light of the “strong 11 presumption that counsel ‘rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 12 exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’” United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1460 13 (9th Cir. 1994)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). To demonstrate actual prejudice, the 14 “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 15 errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. “The 16 benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so 17 undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 18 having produced a just result.” Id. at 685. 19 Mr. Hecock claims that his counsel was ineffective because: (1) he failed to argue for a 20 total sentence not exceeding thirty seven months, concurrent with the supervised release 21 disposition, and (2) he failed to properly explain the contents of the plea agreement. Dkt. # 1, p. 22 4. The record fails to support either assertion. 23 24 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF - 4 1 Contrary to Mr. Hecock’s assertion, his counsel argued for precisely a thirty seven month 2 maximum term, as plainly evidenced through the defense Sentencing Memorandum. See CR113 178RSM, Dkt. # 31, p. 3. The record also contradicts Petitioner’s claim that his counsel failed to 4 explain to him the contents of his plea agreement. Mr. Hecock indicated an understanding of the 5 Plea and its consequences through his sworn plea colloquy and by signing the Plea Agreement. 6 Upon this basis, the Magistrate Judge found Mr. Hecock competent to enter the plea. The 7 Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation recommended that the Defendant be 8 adjudicated guilty based on the Judge’s determination that the “guilty pleas were knowingly, 9 intelligently, and voluntarily made” under oath. Id. at Dkt. # 28. Mr. Hecock neither objected to 10 the Report and Recommendation nor raised any indication throughout proceedings that he did 11 not fully understanding his Plea and its consequences. The Court consequently finds that Mr. 12 Hecock has failed to demonstrate either inadequate performance by his counsel or actual 13 prejudice. 14 15 16 2) Breach of Plea Agreement Petitioner’s second contention, that the Government breached the Plea Agreement, is also 17 not supported by the record. As an initial matter, the Court notes that habeas relief is not 18 warranted on Mr. Hecock’s cursory assertion that he was induced into “signing two plea 19 agreements.” Dkt. # 1, p. 5. Petitioner merely inserts this claim under Ground Two of his petition 20 for habeas relief but fails to offer any facts to support his claim. “Conclusory allegations which 21 are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 22 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court accordingly declines to consider this claim. 23 24 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF - 5 1 As to Petitioner’s assertion that the Plea Agreement that he signed “called for a total 2 combined, concurrent sentence of 37 months,” Dkt. # 1, p. 5, the Court finds that this allegation 3 is contradicted by the record. Through the Plea Agreement, the Government agreed to 4 recommend that the sentence “in the instant matter be served concurrently to any time imposed 5 on the supervised release violations in CR05-0159RSM.” CR11-178, Dkt. # 27, p. 9. The 6 Government fully adhered to this commitment in recommending that Petitioner serve a term of 7 forty-six months on CR11-178RSM, to be served concurrently with a term of twenty-four 8 months for the supervised release violations. See Id. at Dkt. # 30, p. 4. Nowhere in the Plea 9 Agreement was a commitment made by any party as to recommending a thirty-seven month 10 term. 11 The Court similarly finds to be without merit Petitioner’s contention that the “District 12 Court sentenced the Petitioner to consecutive sentences, in violation of the plea agreement.” Dkt. 13 # 1, p. 5. The Plea Agreement forewarned Defendant that “no one has promised or guaranteed 14 what sentence the Court will impose” and further that the “Agreement binds only the United 15 States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington.” CR11-178, Dkt. # 27, ¶¶ 6, 18. 16 In signing the Agreement, Petitioner also indicated that he was on notice that the U.S. Probation 17 Office “will recommend that the sentence in both matters be served consecutively.” Id. at ¶ 17. 18 The record clearly indicates that no promise was made to Mr. Hecock as to the sentence that the 19 Court would impose and that Mr. Hecock was well-informed of the Court’s discretion in 20 sentencing. As the Court finds Mr. Hecock’s claims regarding breach of the Plea Agreement to 21 be directly contradicted by the record and thus without merit, it declines to consider the 22 Government’s argument that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. 23 24 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF - 6 1 2 Conclusion Accordingly, it plainly appears from the Petition, Answer, and the record of the 3 underlying actions that Mr. Hecock is not entitled to the requested habeas relief. For the reasons 4 stated herein, it is hereby ORDERED that: 5 (1) Defendant’s Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DENIED. 6 (2) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 7 (3) The related civil case file shall be CLOSED. 8 9 DATED this 18 day of December 2013. 10 11 12 13 A RICARDO S. MARTINEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR HABEAS RELIEF - 7

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