Rygg et al v. Hulbert

Filing 40

ORDER granting dfts' 9 Motion to Dismiss ; denying Ryggs' 32 Motion for Rule 56(d) discovery by Judge James L. Robart.(RS)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

8
9
10

CAROLYN RYGG, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

11
12

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS

v.

13

CASE NO. C13-0864JLR

DAVID F. HULBERT, et al.,
Defendants.

14
15

Before the court is a motion to dismiss brought by numerous Defendants against

16 Plaintiffs Carolyn Rygg and Craig Dilworth. (Mot. (Dkt. # 9).) The Ryggs’ complaint,
17 in many respects, simply repeats claims previously brought by the Ryggs in an earlier18 filed action. In the previous action, the court dismissed these same claims for lack of
19 subject matter jurisdiction. The court still does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
20 these claims and accordingly GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims.
21 This leaves no federal claims in the case, and the court declines to exercise supplemental
22
ORDER- 1

1 jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the court GRANTS the
2 motion to dismiss and DISMISSES the Ryggs’ complaint without prejudice.
3
4

I.

BACKGROUND

This case is a new iteration of a dispute that began in 2004 and has spawned

5 multiple lawsuits in both state and federal court. (See 7/19/13 Order (Dkt. # 4) at 1.) In
6 the previous iteration, the Ryggs brought 50 claims against multiple defendants including
7 their neighbors, numerous attorneys, and numerous Washington State judges. (Rygg, et
8 al. v. Hulbert, et al., No. C11-1827JLR, Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 7).) In that action, the
9 Ryggs alleged a vast conspiracy to deprive them of justice and property, to invade their
10 privacy, and to violate state and federal law. (See id.) The court dismissed 48 of the
11 Ryggs’ 50 claims on a motion to dismiss. (Rygg, et al. v. Hulbert, et al., No. C1112 1827JLR, 7/16/12 Order (Dkt. # 104).) The remaining two claims went to trial before a
13 jury, which returned an almost immediate verdict for Defendants Larry and Kaaren
14 Reinertsen. (See Rygg, et al. v. Hulbert, et al., No. C11-1827JLR, Jury Verdict (Dkt.
15 # 315).)
16

The Ryggs filed this new action during the lead-up to trial in the earlier action.

17 The Ryggs claim they were forced to file this new action because the court denied their
18 motion to amend in the previous action. (Mot. to Recuse (Dkt. # 14) at 2.)
19

This new complaint is materially similar to the previous one. In particular, the

20 Ryggs name as defendants in this action many of the same defendants from the prior
21 action. (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) at 2-3.) The only new defendants in this action are attorneys
22 from the prior action: Cory Rein, Patrick Vail, Geoffrey Gibbs, and Ian Johnson. (See
ORDER- 2

1 id.) The new action, like the old action, asserts claims against at least five judges from
2 the Washington State Court of Appeals, six judges from the Washington State Supreme
3 Court, many of the Ryggs’ neighbors, and numerous attorneys who represented
4 defendants in prior actions. (Id.) They also assert similar causes of action as in the
5 earlier action, including many that are virtually identical to those found in the earlier
6 complaint. The Ryggs’ causes of action include: (1) “Set aside 2005 Judgment as Void
7 Because Hulbert Not a Judge in 2005; Enjoin Future State Court Process on Void
8 Judgment” (based on due process, equal protection, and state law); (2) “Fraud in Creating
9 Back-Dated Orders Not in Existence in 2005-March of 2012”; (3) “Fraud on Federal
10 Court”; (4) “Joint Use of Information Obtained By Electronic Eavesdropping”; (5)
11 “Abuse of Process/Deprivation of Property Rights Without Due Process”; (6) “Assault
12 and Battery”; (7) “Fraud on State Court”; (8) “Action to Restore Lost Monument/Clear
13 Cloud on Title”; (9) “Abuse of State Court Proceedings to Harass and Injure Plaintiffs”;
14 (10) “Violation of 1st Amendment Right by Retaliating Against Plaintiffs’ Counsel to
15 Deprive Ryggs of Counsel”; and (11) “State Statute Allowing Unpublished Decisions is
16 Repugnant to 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Declaratory and Injunctive
17 Relief” (based on equal protection, due process, First Amendment, overbreadth and
18 vagueness). (Id. at 6, 8, 10, 15, 21-23, 30, 35, 37, 39.)
19

The court stayed the case sua sponte, holding that a stay was appropriate given the

20 unique background of this case and the potential hardship on Defendants:
21
22

Defendants would suffer substantial hardship from being forced to defend a
second action so similar in character to the one that [preceded] it. Indeed, if
this case is allowed to move forward in ordinary fashion, there is nothing to
ORDER- 3

1

stop the Ryggs from continually bringing new lawsuits against the same
defendants over and over for years to come, adding a handful of new
allegations and legal theories each time.

2

3 (7/19/13 Order at 4.) The court held that all proceedings would be stayed, but that
4 Defendants would be permitted to file a single joint motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs
5 would be permitted to respond. (Id. at 1.) This motion to dismiss followed.
6

II.

ANALYSIS

7 A.

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Counts 1-3, 14-18

8

The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear most of the Ryggs’ claims. The

9 central problem with the Ryggs’ complaint is that it simply repeats many claims that the
1
10 court dismissed in the previous action, and the same logic that compelled the court to

11 dismiss the claims in the previous action applies here too.
12

Indeed, eight of the causes of action that appear in this new complaint also

13 appeared in the previous complaint. In particular, Counts 1- 3 (“Set Aside Judgment as
14 Void Because Hulbert Not a Judge in 2005; Enjoin Future State Court Process on Void
15 Judgment”) duplicate Counts 1-3 in the first action (“Set Aside 2005 Judgment as Void
16 Because Hulbert Not a Judge in 2005; Enjoin Future State Court Process on Void
17 Judgment”). (Compare Compl. at 5-7 with Rygg, et al. v. Hulbert, et al., No. C1118 1827JLR, Am. Compl. at 18-21.) Likewise, Counts 14-18 duplicate Counts 14-19 in the
19 earlier action. (Compare Compl. at 35-40 with Rygg, et al. v. Hulbert, et al., No. C1120
1

The claims may also be precluded by the doctrine of “claim splitting”—a relative of the
res judicata doctrine. See Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir.
2007). However, the court will not address this question in the absence of subject matter
22 jurisdiction.

21

ORDER- 4

1 1827JLR, Am. Compl. at 88-94.) These eight causes of action are identical in substance
2 to the corresponding causes of action contained in the prior complaint, and the parties are
3 all either the same or have an identity of interests with respect to the claims at issue.
4

In the prior action, the court dismissed all of the claims in question for lack of

5 subject matter jurisdiction. (Rygg, et al. v. Hulbert, et al., No. C11-1827JLR, 7/16/12
6 Order.) The court dismissed Counts 1-3 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
7 the claims failed to state a cognizable legal theory and were contradicted by judicially
8 noticeable public records. (Id. at 48-49.) Likewise, the court dismissed Counts 14-19
9 under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which “bars suits ‘brought by state-court losers
10 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
11 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
12 judgments.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Exxon
13 Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industr. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Again, the court
14 held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. (Rygg, et al. v. Hulbert,
15 et al., No. C11-1827JLR, 7/16/12 Order at 20-21.)
16

These claims have resurfaced in this new action, but no relevant facts have

17 changed: the court still does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. The
18 Ryggs have alleged no new facts with respect to these claims that would give the court
19 subject matter jurisdiction where it had none before. (See Compl.) The court
20 incorporates the analysis from its prior order into this order. The claims in this case are
21 largely the same, so the same reasoning applies. As such, the court is without jurisdiction
22 to hear Counts 1-3 and 14-18 and DISMISSES those claims without prejudice.
ORDER- 5

1 B.

Count 13

2

In Count 13 of their complaint, the Ryggs nominally assert a First Amendment

3 claim. (Compl. ¶¶ 184-88.) They assert that they “have a right to counsel of their
4 choice” (id. ¶ 185) and that their “right to free speech and to petition the government are
5 infringed” on account of disciplinary action taken against their attorney in a separate
6 matter (id. ¶¶ 186-87). Indeed, the Ryggs’ attorney in this action was recently suspended
7 from the practice of law. (See In re Matter of Starczewski, No. 2:13-rd-00082-MJP,
8 9/20/13 Order (Dkt. # 8).) The Ryggs are correct that civil litigants have a First
9 Amendment right to be represented by counsel of their choice. See, e.g., Hart v. Gaioni,
10 261 Fed. Appx. 66, 67 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). But they do not have a protected
11 First Amendment right to be represented by an attorney who is suspended from the
12 practice of law. See, e.g., In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 268 (5th Cir. 1976); Thoma v.
13 A.H. Robins Co., 100 F.R.D. 344 (D.N.J. 1983); Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings, 428
14 F. Supp. 273, 277-78 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Kremer v. Stewart, 378 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Pa.
15 1974); Hartman v. Cmmr. of Internal Revenue, 65 T.C. 542, 542-43 (Tax Court 1959); cf.
16 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151-52 (2006). The Ryggs request that
17 either (1) the disciplinary proceeding against their attorney be stayed or (2) their attorney
18 be allowed to continue to represent them while she is suspended. (Compl. ¶¶ 187-88.)
19 The Ryggs have presented no authority in support of this claim and have not stated a
20 cognizable legal theory showing that they are entitled to this relief. Accordingly, the
21 court DISMISSES Count 13 without prejudice.
22 //
ORDER- 6

1 C.

The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the
Remaining State Law Claims

2
The only claims left in this case are state law claims. The claims discussed above
3
have all been dismissed and the Ryggs voluntarily dismissed Counts 5 and 6. This leaves
4

Count 4 (fraud), Count 7 (abuse of process),2 Count 8 (assault and battery), Count 9

5
(fraud), Counts 10 and 11 (action to restore lost monument/clear cloud on title under
6

RCW 58 .04.020), and Count 12 (“abuse of state court proceedings”).

7
If a district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original federal
8

jurisdiction, “[t]he district court[] may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over”

9
the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In evaluating when it is appropriate
10
11

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts should consider “the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726

12
(1966). When the federal claims have dropped out of a case early, the court ordinarily
13

“should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.”

14
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). This is not a mandatory rule,
15

but “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,” the

16
court should dismiss the state law claims as well. Id. at 350 n.7; Reynolds v. Cnty. of San
17
Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996).
18
19
2

The Ryggs call this cause of action “Abuse of Process/Deprivation of Property Rights
Without Due Process” (Compl. at 21), but it is clear this is not a due process claim as that term is
21 usually understood. It is an abuse of process claim. (See Compl. ¶¶ 129-36.) The Ryggs have
not alleged that any government actor deprived them of due process, nor have they described
anything that resembles an actual due process claim. The court will not treat this abuse of
22 process claim as a federal due process claim.

20

ORDER- 7

1

The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state

2 law claims. Here, the federal claims have dropped out of the case at the earliest possible
3 stage. The court has invested no time and energy in the state law claims other than time
4 spent on similar claims in the previous action. Thus, judicial economy does not suggest
5 deviating from the ordinary course. See Reynolds, 84 F.3d at 1171. Likewise,
6 convenience does not favor retaining supplemental jurisdiction because the state claims
7 “may easily be carried across the street to the courtroom of a state superior court judge.”
8 Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 1991). With respect to fairness and
9 comity, there are no salient considerations that counsel in favor of keeping these purely
10 state law claims in federal court. Accordingly, the court follows the ordinary path in
11 cases where all federal claims are dismissed in the early stages, declines to exercise
12 supplemental jurisdiction, and DISMISSES the remaining state law claims without
13 prejudice.
14

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss

15

16 (Dkt. # 9) and DISMISSES the Ryggs’ complaint without prejudice.3
17 //
18 //
19 //
20
21

3

The court also denies the Ryggs’ pending motion for Rule 56(d) discovery (Dkt. # 32).
The Ryggs ask for discovery with respect to Defendants’ assertion of Anti-SLAPP statutes.
22 Since the court does not reach the Anti-SLAPP arguments, discovery is unnecessary.
ORDER- 8

1

Dated this 12th day of November, 2013.

3

A

4

JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge

2

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
ORDER- 9