Kaseburg et al v. Port of Seattle et al

Filing 179

ORDER by U.S. District Judge John C Coughenour granting King County's 165 Motion for summary judgment on all remaining issues. In addition, the Court STRIKES from the record the chains of title for the McCray, Piantanida, Iden, and Kaseburg Plaintiffs (Dkt. Nos. 170-3 to 170-6), as well as the Declaration of John Rall (Dkt. No. 170-2). (PM)

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

1
2
3
4
5
6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

7
8
9

SCOTT KASEBURG, et al.,

10
Plaintiffs,
11
v.
12

CASE NO. C14-0784 JCC
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ALL REMAINING
ISSUES

PORT OF SEATTLE, et al.,
13
Defendants.
14
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant King County’s motion for summary

15

16 judgment on all remaining issues (Dkt. No. 165). Having thoroughly considered the parties’
17 briefing, oral argument on August 23, 2016, and the relevant record, the Court hereby GRANTS
18 the motion for the reasons explained herein.
19
20

I.

BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are already well established. Its central concern is the ownership of

21
22
23

a railway corridor (the “Corridor”) that stretches along the eastern shore of Lake Washington. In
the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Northern Pacific Railway Company assembled the Corridor

24 by purchasing private property and condemning shoreland. (Dkt. Nos. 168-2–168-4 and Dkt. No.
25 167-3.) In 2008, Northern Pacific’s successor in interest, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe
26 Railway Company, transferred its property interest in the Corridor to King County. (Dkt. No. 83
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 1

1
2

at 37–38, 40–41, 45.)
At issue in the instant motion are three of the deeds originally acquired by Northern

3 Pacific: the Kittinger Deed, the Lake Washington Land Company Deed (“LWLC Deed”), and
4 the Lake Washington Belt Line Company Deed (“Belt Line Deed”). Also at issue is the State of
5 Washington Shoreland Condemnation. (Dkt. No. 167-3.) The Court has already held that the Belt
6

Line Deed and the Condemnation granted easements entitling the easement holder to “own and

7
exercise the rights inherent in the railroad easement,” (Dkt. No. 107 at 6), that these rights
8
9

include the “exclusive use, possession, and control of the corridor,” (Dkt. No. 138 at 5), and that

10 they also include “incidental uses that are consistent with trail use and the operation of a
11 railroad.” (Id. at 18.)
12
13
14

In their Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs, who own property near the Corridor, stated
two causes for relief. First, they asked for an order quieting title in the Corridor against a number
of parties, including King County. (Dkt. No. 83 at 48.) Second, they asked for a declaratory

15
16

judgment that, among other things, “they are the fee owners of the railroad right-of-way at

17 issue.” (Id. at 50.) King County then counterclaimed to quiet title against Plaintiffs and for a
18 declaratory judgment. (Dkt. No. 18 at 10–14.)
19

To that end, King County now moves the Court to grant summary judgment against

20 Plaintiffs and find as follows:
21
22
23
24
25

1. That King County has a fee simple interest in the property conveyed via the Kittinger
Deed and the LWLC Deed.
2. That the State of Washington has a reversionary interest in the Condemnation
easement.
3. That King County has an easement in the property conveyed via the Belt Line Deed
and the Shoreland Condemnation.

26
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 2

4. That Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a quiet title and declaratory judgment action.

1

As the Court explains below, it finds for King County on each of these issues, which it

2

3 will address in turn.
4 II.

DISCUSSION

5

A.

6

Summary Judgment Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

7
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
8
9

Civ. P. 56(a). In making such a determination, the Court must view the facts and justifiable

10 inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v.
11 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly
12 made and supported, the opposing party “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that
13
14

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Material facts are those that may affect the

15
16
17

outcome of the case, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49.

18 Ultimately, summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing
19 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
20 party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
21

B.

The Kittinger Deed

22
The Court has already held that the Kittinger Deed was a “bargain and sale” deed, (Dkt.
23
24

No. 91 at 5–6), which Plaintiffs do not dispute. Bargain and sale deeds “automatically convey[] a

25 fee simple estate,” unless there is “additional language in the deed[] [that] clearly and expressly
26 limits or qualifies the interest conveyed.” (Id.)
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 3

Plaintiffs argue that the Kittinger Deed expressly limits the interest conveyed. They point

1

2 to Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass’n, in which the Washington
3 Supreme Court held that the use of “the words ‘right of way’ in both the granting clause and the
4 habendum 1 clause” of a bargain and sale deed “presumptively evinces the parties' intent to
5 convey only an easement.” 156 Wash. 2d 253, 266 (2006). Plaintiffs argue that, as in Kershaw,
6
“[t]he granting clause in Kittinger is for the railroad’s ‘right-of-way’ and it specifically says that
7
it is for ‘such purposes.’” (Dkt. No. 170 at 8.)
8
The Court agrees with King County that this is a misrepresentation—and a blatant one, at
9
10 that. In fact, the Court has already explained that while the Kittinger Deed does state that the
11 railroad “wishes to secure for such purposes the right-of-way over and across said lands,” it does
12 so “external to the granting clause.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 6.) As the Court elaborated, “the use of the
13
14

term ‘right of way’ outside the granting or habendum clauses does not overcome the presumption
of fee conveyance when a bargain and sale deed form was employed, and… the term ‘right of

15
16

way’ in a description of the property being conveyed does not qualify as a ‘clear and express

17 limitation’ on the interest.” (Id. at 7) (citing Roeder Co. v. K & E Moving & Storage Co., Inc.,
18 102 Wash. App. 49, 51, 55). Because “right of way” is used outside of the granting and
19 habendum clauses in the Kittinger Deed, it “automatically convey[ed] a fee simple estate.”
20
21

All of this is essentially a refresher on the Court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a
declaratory judgment (Dkt. No. 91). That motion requested, among other things, that the Court

22
declare that “the Railroad Originally Acquired an Easement for the Railroad Corridor.” (Dkt. No.
23
24
25

1

“A dictionary definition of the habendum of a deed is that it is the clause usually following the
granting part of the premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing
26 granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee.” 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 33.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 4

1

91 at 4.) In its order, the Court held that entering a declaratory judgment would have been

2 inappropriate at that time. As the Court explained, one of the bases for its holding was that
3 Defendants had “establish[ed] a genuine dispute” as to what sort of property interest the
4 Kittinger Deed conveyed. (Id. at 5.)
5
6

Plaintiffs argue that the existence of that earlier dispute means that summary judgment is
still inappropriate. But it was Defendants, not Plaintiffs, who raised that dispute—arguing that in

7
fact the Kittinger Deed conveyed a fee, not an easement. (Id.) Now that it is King County
8
9

moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs need to “come forward with specific facts showing that

10 there is a genuine issue for trial.” They have failed to do so. Instead, in the face of King
11 County’s persuasive argument that the Kittinger Deed is a bargain and sale deed that does not
12 expressly limit the property interest conveyed—and therefore conveys a fee simple—Plaintiffs
13
14

offer only rehashed legal arguments that the Court has already rejected.
Because Plaintiffs have not raised a single genuine dispute of material fact, the Court

15
16

holds that the Kittinger Deed conveyed a fee simple to Northern Pacific. In their Complaint,

17 Plaintiffs admit that King County acquired all of BNSF’s property interests (which had been
18 Northern Pacific’s) in the Corridor. (Dkt. No. 83 at 111, 121.) The Court therefore finds that
19 King County possesses a fee simple interest in the land conveyed by the Kittinger Deed and
20 quiets title on its behalf.
21

In the Declaration of Robert Nunnenkamp, Property Agent with the King County

22
Division of Parks and Recreation, he groups Plaintiffs into twelve different categories based on a
23
24

number of factors, including the location of their property, the language of their conveyances,

25
26
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 5

1

and their behavior during this lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 168-1.) 2 Plaintiffs do not dispute the bases of

2 the Nunnenkamp Declaration, its findings, or its admissibility. In Category 1, Nunnenkamp
3 groups all those Plaintiffs whose property sits alongside land conveyed to King County by the
4 Kittinger Deed. (Id. at 7.) Again, Plaintiffs do not dispute the accuracy of this grouping. Because
5 King County holds a fee in the Corridor land adjacent to these Plaintiffs’ properties, they have
6

failed to demonstrate any interest in this portion of the Corridor. The Court therefore dismisses

7
the claims of all Plaintiffs in Category 1.
8
C.

9

The Lake Washington Land Company Deed

King County next argues that it has a fee interest in those portions of the Corridor

10

11 acquired via the LWLC Deed. The Plaintiffs in Haggart v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 70 (2012),
12 which involved the vast majority of the Plaintiffs in this case, (Dkt. No. 113 at 8 n.8), stipulated
13
14

that the LWLC Deed did convey a fee interest. (Dkt. No. 167-4 at 3.) Plaintiffs do not dispute
that the LWLC Deed conveyed a fee interest, but they do argue that it is “irrelevant” to this case.

15
16

(Dkt. No. 170 at 10.)
The Court finds that the LWLC Deed conveyed a fee interest. It is a warranty deed, both

17

18 because it is captioned as such and because its granting clause states that: “The Grantor the Lake
19 Washington Land Company, a Corporation of the State of Washington, in consideration of the
20 sum of Two Thousand ($2000.00) Dollars, in hand paid, conveys and warrants unto the
21

Northern Pacific Railway Company, a Wisconsin Corporation, the following described real

22
estate….” (Dkt. No. 168-4 at 10) (emphasis added). As with bargain and sale deeds, warranty
23
24

deeds “convey fee simple title unless additional language in the deeds clearly and expressly

25
26

2

Nearly all Plaintiffs fall in more than one category.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 6

1

limits or qualifies the interest conveyed.” Brown v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 430, 437 (1996). There

2 is no such limiting language here.
As for the LWLC Deed’s relevance, Plaintiffs argue that King County “has made

3

4 absolutely no attempt to establish” which individual Plaintiffs own properties adjacent to land
5 conveyed by the LWLC Deed. (Dkt. No. 170 at 10.) That is incorrect. Instead, as King County
6
7

points out in its reply, the Nunnenkamp Declaration explicitly identifies all of the Plaintiffs
whose properties are adjacent to the LWLC Deed, and groups them together as Category 2. 3

8
9

(Dkt. No. 168-1 at 7.)
Plaintiffs do not specifically dispute any of Nunnenkamp’s findings. Rather, they state,

10

11 without any citations or elaboration, that the Nunnenkamp Declaration “conflicts with the prior
12 title work performed on behalf of the Port and King County,” and that the “only evidence before
13
14

the Court on this subject is the title work and mapping performed on behalf of the Port and King
County as set forth in Cindy Straup’s Declaration.” (Dkt. No. 170 at 10–11 & n.21.) But “[a]

15
16

summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory allegations

17 unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

3

In fact, the LWLC Deed is relevant for an additional reason that King County could not have
foreseen when bringing its motion due to Plaintiffs’ egregiously improper behavior. As the Court
explains below, despite its previous order requiring Plaintiffs to disclose their chains of title,
(Dkt. No. 138 at 22), they never did so. (Dkt. No. 171 at 9–10.) Nonetheless, in Plaintiffs’
response to King County’s motion, they present, for the first time, chains of title for four sets of
Plaintiffs, arguing that this evidence demonstrates that these Plaintiffs have a property interest in
the Corridor. (Id.) But what three of the chains actually demonstrate is that these Plaintiffs’
properties (and the properties of many of the Plaintiffs in this suit) actually derive from a deed
sold by the Lake Washington Land Company after it had sold the LWLC Deed to Northern
Pacific; in other words, after it no longer had any reversionary interest in the Corridor that it
could convey. (Compare Dkt. No. 168-4 with Dkt. No. 170-3 at 3, 27.) Therefore, the LWLC
deed is highly relevant to this suit, a fact that Plaintiffs, given their endless obfuscations, may
well have realized.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 7

1

Straup Declaration, which was submitted over a year ago, did not address the LWLC Deed. (Dkt.

2 No. 113-1.) Straup never even reviewed it. (Id. at 3.)
3

The Court therefore finds that the LWLC Deed conveyed a fee simple interest in the

4 Corridor to Northern Pacific, which has since been transferred to King County. As a result, the
5 Court dismisses the claims of all Plaintiffs whose property is adjacent to the LWLC Deed—i.e.,
6

all Plaintiffs in Category 2 of the Nunnenkamp Declaration.

7
8
9

D.

The State of Washington Shoreland Condemnation

On October 6, 1903, Northern Pacific initiated a condemnation proceeding in King

10 County Superior Court against a number of defendants. (Dkt. No. 167-1.) The goal—which it
11 achieved—was to extend the Corridor over submerged shorelands along Lake Washington. (Id.)
12 In December of that year, a jury resolved the defendants’ competing claims to the shorelands,
13
14

finding that “the State of Washington is the owner of all the shore lands of the second class
described in the petition.” (Dkt. No. 167-2 at 2.) The State was therefore entitled to

15
16

compensation for Northern Pacific’s condemnation. (Id.) The Superior Court entered final

17 judgment and a decree of appropriation on February 8, 1904. (Dkt. No. 167-3.)
18

A number of Plaintiffs, identified in the Nunnenkamp Declaration as those in Category 3,

19 live alongside land that Northern Pacific obtained via the Condemnation and are attempting to
20 quiet title to the underlying fee. (Dkt. No. 168-1.) King County admits that it only obtained a
21

railroad easement through the Condemnation land, (Dkt. No. 138 at 7–8), but it argues that the

22
Category 3 Plaintiffs cannot quiet title because the reversionary interest in the fee belongs to the
23
24
25

State of Washington.
Plaintiffs do not deny that the State owned the shorelands at the time of the condemnation

26 proceedings. (Dkt. No. 170 at 11.) But they argue, again without authority or evidence, that it no
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 8

1

longer owns the reversionary interest today. (Id.) This is plainly incorrect: the fee owner of

2 property underlying an easement retains a reversionary interest in that property. See Marvin M.
3 Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2014) (“In other words, if the
4 beneficiary of the easement abandons it, the easement disappears, and the landowner resumes his
5 full and unencumbered interest in the land.”). Plaintiffs provide no basis for their implicit
6

argument that because they own property alongside the Condemnation easement, they, not the

7
State, possess the reversionary interest in the underlying fee.
8
9

Plaintiffs also argue that because the State of Washington is not a party to this suit, it is

10 irrelevant whether it owns the fee in the condemnation land. But the Category 3 Plaintiffs are
11 attempting to quiet title to land that King County has shown actually belongs to the State. These
12 Plaintiffs are therefore required to raise some material dispute to this argument in order to
13
14

preserve their quiet title claims; they must, in other words, provide sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that they are the true owners of the underlying fee. They have not done

15
16

so—in fact, they haven’t provided any evidence at all. Plaintiffs may not quiet title to land that

17 they do not actually own, regardless of whether the true owner is a party to the suit. See King
18 Cty. v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wash. App. 888, 899 (1990) (“[O]wnership should be determined
19 according to the title [one] holds rather than according to whether other parties fortuitously
20 learned of the litigation and appeared to press their claim.”).
21

The Court therefore dismisses the Category 3 Plaintiffs’ claims. In addition, the Court

22
holds that because Northern Pacific acquired railroad easements in the Corridor via the
23
24

Condemnation and the Belt Line Deed, these interests were ultimately transferred to King

25 County. (Dkt. No. 83 at 37, 45.)
26

E.

Plaintiffs’ Standing to Quiet Title

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 9

1

King County also argues that each individual Plaintiff—including those in Categories 1

2 through 3—lacks standing to quiet title in the Corridor and that their claims should be dismissed
3 for this reason as well.
4

“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of

5 Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To satisfy Article III’s
6

standing requirements, “a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a)

7
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
8
9

injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed

10 to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Maya v. Centex
11 Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). It is Plaintiffs’ burden to satisfy this standard. U.S.
12 v. City and County of San Francisco, 979 F.2d 169, 171 (9th Cir. 1992).
13
14

In Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, they seek to quiet title in the Corridor under
RCW 7.28, the quiet title statute, and via declaratory judgment (RCW 7.24). (Dkt. No. 83 at 46–

15
16

50.) “RCW 7.28.010 requires that a person seeking to quiet title establish a valid subsisting

17 interest in property and a right to possession thereof.” Horse Heaven Heights, 132 Wash. App. at
4
18 195 (emphasis added). A party that cannot make this demonstration lacks standing as a real

19 party in interest. Id.; see also Sammamish Homeowners v. Cty. of King, No. C15-284 MJP, 2015
20 WL 3561533, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 5, 2015) (“The Washington statutes concerning quiet title
21

and declaratory judgments (deeds) (RCW 7.28.010, 7.24.020) require a property interest and an

22
injury in fact before suit may be brought under them.”).
23
24

King County argues that all Plaintiffs lack standing because they have failed to establish

25
4
A “valid subsisting interest” means “legal title to the real estate.” White v. McSorley, 47 Wash.
26 18, 20 (1907).

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 10

1

a property interest in the Corridor or a right to possession thereof. 5
1.

2

Valid Subsisting Interest

As the party moving to quiet title, the burden is on Plaintiffs to demonstrate that they

3

4 have a “valid subsisting interest” in the Corridor. Horse Heaven Heights, 132 Wash. App. at
5 195. Relying on the Nunnenkamp Declaration, King County argues that none of Plaintiffs’ deeds
6

explicitly conveys a property interest in the Corridor. (Dkt. No. 168 at 21.) Plaintiffs do not

7
dispute this point. Therefore, because their deeds do not grant them a fee interest in the Corridor,
8
9

Plaintiffs must rely on the centerline presumption. The Court has previously explained that under

10 the centerline presumption:
11

[T]he conveyance of land which is bounded by a railroad right of way will give
the grantee title to the center line of the right of way if the grantor owns so far,
unless the grantor has expressly reserved the fee to the right of way, or the
grantor’s intention to not convey the fee is clear.

12
13

(Dkt. No. 138 at 22 n.8) (internal quotation marks removed). To be entitled to the
14
15

centerline presumption, Plaintiffs must first establish that their property adjoins the right

16 of way and that they acquired it “from the fee owner of the right of way property.”
17 Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wash. 2d 567, 578 (1986). If they are able to do
18 so, the presumption applies unless it is rebutted through presentation of “persuasive
19

evidence of the grantor's intent to retain the right of way.” Id.

20
21

5

Standing is judged separately for counterclaimants in a quiet title action. See Washington Sec.
22 & Inv. Corp. v. Horse Heaven Heights, Inc., 132 Wash. App. 188, 195 (2006) (“[B]ecause this
case comes to this court upon cross motions for summary judgment quieting title, both WSIC
23 and the Rankins had the burden of proving ownership of the land in question and standing as a
real party in interest.”). As the Court explained above, King County has demonstrated an interest
24 in the Corridor and a right to possession thereof. Thus, regardless of whether Plaintiffs have
25 standing for their claims, the Court retains jurisdiction over King County’s counterclaims for
declaratory judgment and quiet title. Id. at 195–96.
26
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 11

1

The Court previously held that “the centerline presumption requires that all Plaintiffs

2 prove their chain of title back to the original grantor.” (Dkt. No. 138 at 22.) Nonetheless,
3 Plaintiffs make several arguments as to why they should not be required to produce their chains
4 of title. Yet they also provide, for the very first time, chains of title for four sets of Plaintiffs (out
5 of the eighty-five total Plaintiffs). The Court will first address Plaintiffs’ arguments against the
6

need to produce chains of title; then it will address the chains of title that Plaintiffs actually

7
produced.
8
9
10

a.

Plaintiffs’ Interpretation of the Centerline Presumption

Plaintiffs first argue that, in applying the centerline presumption, the Court should also

11 apply the so-called “strip and gore doctrine,” because “it Definitely Exists in Washington.” (Dkt.
12 No. 170 at 13.) Plaintiffs barely explain this doctrine, although the Court imagines that it does
13
14

not require the production of chains of title. Plaintiffs do not provide a single Washington case
adopting or applying the doctrine. Plaintiffs’ counsel already tried this tactic before Judge

15
16

Pechman, who similarly found that “Plaintiffs do not cite a single Washington case which has

17 adopted the doctrine.” Sammamish Homeowners, 2015 WL 3561533, at *3. The Court therefore
18 declines to apply the strip and gore doctrine.
19

Plaintiffs then argue that King County has misconstrued the centerline presumption and

20 misinterpreted Roeder. But at every turn it is Plaintiffs who misinterpret—willfully, it would
21

seem—crystal clear precedent. Plaintiffs argue that Roeder excludes from the centerline

22
presumption only those deeds that “contain BOTH a metes and bounds description and…also
23
24

refer to the railroad right-of-way as a boundary” in that description. (Dkt. No. 170 at 16.) But

25 Roeder actually—and quite limpidly—holds as follows:
26
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 12

1

First: When a party presents evidence that a grantor owned a right of way and that the

2

party acquired property from the grantor adjoining the right of way, then under the

3

centerline presumption the party’s title extends to the center of the right of way. Roeder,

4

105 Wash. 2d at 578.

5

Second: The presumption applies “[w]hen [a] deed refers to the grantor's right of way as

6

a boundary without clearly indicating that the side of the right of way is the boundary.”

7
Id. 576-77.
8
9

Third: The presumption is rebutted when “a deed refers to the right of way as a boundary

10

but also gives a metes and bounds description of the abutting property.” Id. at 577.

11

Fourth: The presumption may also be rebutted via evidence of the grantor’s intent to

12

retain the right of way. Id. at 578.

13
14

In other words, regardless of whether a party’s deeds contain a meets and bounds
description, the centerline presumption will not apply unless the party also demonstrates that it

15
16

received its property from a grantor that owned the right of way. The Roeder court was explicit

17 on this point:
18
19
20

The presumption that the grantor intended to convey title to the center of the right
of way is inapplicable where the adjoining landowner presents no evidence of
having received his or her property from the owner of the right of way. A property
owner receives no interest in a railroad right of way simply through ownership of
abutting land.

21 Id. at 578 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs next argue that Roeder should be limited to its facts.
22 However, they point to no limiting language in the opinion in support of their argument. As the
23

block quote above makes clear, the Roeder court’s holding was not narrow at all—at least in

24
regards to the necessity of providing chain of title evidence to support the centerline
25
26

presumption.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 13

Finally, Plaintiffs assert that “King County’s position is apparently that language in

1

2 ownership deeds that ‘exclude’ or ‘except’ the right-of-way means that the centerline
6
3 presumption does not apply.” (Dkt. No. 170 at 170.) According to Plaintiffs, this position is

4 contrary to the Washington Supreme Court’s holding in Kershaw. But King County’s “position”
5 is actually that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they obtained their deeds from a grantor that
6
owned the right-of-way—i.e. have failed to provide chains of title—so the centerline
7
presumption does not apply. King County’s position is the right one. Without such evidence,
8
Plaintiffs’ arguments about the differences between “exclude” and “except” are irrelevant. 7
9
b.

10
11

Plaintiffs’ Four Chains of Title

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that even if they really must provide chains of title to assert the

12 centerline presumption and maintain standing, the claims of four sets of Plaintiffs—the McCrays
13
14

(Dkt. No. 170-3), the Piantanidas (Dkt. No. 170-4), Kevin Iden (Dkt. No. 170-5), and the
Kaseburgs (Dkt. No. 170-6)—may nonetheless go forward. According to Plaintiffs, they have

15
16

“obtained chains of title for 4 of the Plaintiffs,” and these documents allegedly demonstrate that

17
18

6

Here, Plaintiffs appear to conflate King County’s argument that the centerline presumption
does not apply to all Plaintiffs who failed to provide chains of title with its more specific
19 argument that the centerline presumption does not apply to all Plaintiffs whose properties are
described in metes and bounds. The Court briefly addresses King County’s metes and bounds
20
argument below.
21 7 Plaintiffs assert that “King County’s argument lacks candor to the Court regarding the Kershaw
Sunnyside Ranches opinion.” (Dkt. No. 17 at 25.) But Plaintiffs already made this exact
22
argument about Kershaw—coupled with an identical “lack of candor” attack—to Judge
23 Pechman, who informed them that Kershaw
is not helpful to Plaintiffs. First and foremost, it is not a ‘centerline presumption’
24
case, so the theory that Plaintiffs are relying on is not at issue in Kershaw. Nor did
the Washington Supreme Court overrule any of the previous holdings of Roeder
25
(in fact, Kershaw calls Roeder ‘nearly indistinguishable.’)
26 Sammamish Homeowners, 2015 WL 3561533 at *3.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 14

1

“nobody in the chain of title specifically reserved the right-of-way to themselves and each

2 grantor granted all the interest they owned, including their interest in the underlying fee in the
3 railroad right-of-way.” (Dkt. No. 170 at 23.)
4

To quote Plaintiffs, this argument “is indeed curious,” (Dkt. No. 170 at 11), as King

5 County pointed out in its motion that “not a single Plaintiff has produced a chain of title.” (Dkt.
6

No. 165 at 15.) So then where did these four chains of title come from? It would seem that

7
Plaintiffs have had them this entire time. Apparently, despite the Court’s explicit order to
8
9

Plaintiffs that they produce all chains of title, (Dkt. No. 138 at 22), and despite the fact that

8
10 Plaintiffs acquired these documents on January 13, 2016, they simply chose not to disclose them

11 until now, in a response brief in which they rely on them. (See Dkt. No. 170 at 23) (arguing that
12 “even if this Court somehow accepts King County’s arguments, these 4 Plaintiffs have standing
13

even under Judge Pechman’s interpretation of the centerline presumption”).

14
This is the second time Plaintiffs have relied on evidence that they failed to disclose to
15
16

King County upon its request. (Dkt. No. 138 at 22, 23–24.) The difference now—and it is a

17 significant one—is that the Court has already ordered Plaintiffs to disclose these exact
18 documents. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ blatant disregard of the Court’s order is both inexplicable and
19 deserving of sanction. 9 Nor do they offer any excuse for their actions. However, the fact that
20 Plaintiffs have rather meekly inserted their chain of title argument—upon which their claims
21
22
23
24

8

(Dkt. No. 170-3 at 2; Dkt. No. 170-4 at 2; Dkt. No. 170-5 at 2; Dkt. No. 170-6 at 2.)

9

The Court notes that Plaintiff Scott Kaseburg updated the Court as to Plaintiffs’ progress on
responding to King County’s discovery requests after the Court granted its motion to compel.
26 (Dkt. No. 149-2.) It is therefore particularly concerning that he was also among the Plaintiffs
who did not release their chains of title.
25

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 15

1

necessarily turn—in the second-to-last paragraph of a 23-page brief is perhaps an admission of

2 guilt in itself.
3

The Court is empowered to dismiss these four sets of Plaintiffs for their discovery abuse,

4 or to strike these documents from the record. See Sanai v. Sanai, No. C02-2165Z, 2005 WL
5 1593488, at *8 (W.D. Wash. July 1, 2005), aff'd, 141 F. App'x 677 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissing
6

complaint where “[p]laintiffs’ pattern of discovery abuse and disobedience of Court orders has

7
been extraordinarily prejudicial”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii) (providing that
8
9

when a party disobeys an order to compel, the court may “strik[e] pleadings in whole or in part”

10 or prohibit the party from “introducing designated matters into evidence”). Moreover, since
11 Plaintiffs “agree that those [individuals] who did not respond to King County’s discovery can be
12 dismissed,” (Dkt. No. 170 at 22 n.34), they have essentially admitted that these Plaintiffs should
13
14

be dismissed as well. Because Plaintiffs inarguably disobeyed the Court’s order that they
disclose their chains of title, and then prejudiced King County by relying on undisclosed title

15
16

chains, the Court strikes this evidence from the record. Thus, without any evidence of their

17 chains of title, these four sets of Plaintiffs cannot assert the centerline presumption and do not
18 have standing.
19

But the Court wouldn’t want Plaintiffs to feel (or later complain) that they didn’t receive

20 a full hearing on the merits. Thus, it will address their four title chains below. As the Court
21

explains, these Plaintiffs would lack standing even if the Court didn’t strike this evidence, as

22
their chains of title are patently insufficient to satisfy the prerequisites of the centerline
23
24

presumption.

25

//

26

//

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 16

c.

1
2

The Declaration of John Rall

Along with their four chains of title, Plaintiffs present the Declaration of John Rall, in

3 which he interprets the deeds in Plaintiffs’ title chains (Dkt. No. 170-2). Rall’s alleged expertise
4 is in “identifying source deeds that Railroads used in acquiring specific property and determining
5 what rights were conveyed to the Railroad.” (Dkt. No. 170-2 at 1.) King County argues that the
6

Court should strike Rall’s Declaration because “the interpretation of a deed, like any other

7
contract, is not a proper subject for expert testimony.” (Dkt. No. 171 at 10.)
8
9

Judge Pechman was presented with a similar declaration from this same witness, and held

10 that “Plaintiffs offer no authority supporting their right to offer expert testimony on the legal
11 interpretation of a deed.” Hornish v. King Cty., No. C15-284-MJP, 2016 WL 1588346, at *7
12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2016). The same is true here. Perhaps that is because, as Judge Pechman
13
14

found and the Ninth Circuit has held, “[r]esolving doubtful questions of law is the distinct and
exclusive province of the trial judge.” Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d

15
16

1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, Rall’s legal conclusions “not only invade[] the province

17 of the trial judge, but constitute[] erroneous statements of law.” Id. at 1059. His testimony—
18 consisting of no more than rank legal argument, (Dkt. No. 170-2 at 2–3)—is therefore “not only
19 superfluous but mischievous.” Id.
20
21

For example, Rall states that “[n]o deed in the chains of title expressly reserved the fee
portion underlying the Railroad Right-of-way unto any predecessor grantor.” (Dkt. No. 170-2 at

22
3.) This is an impermissible legal conclusion, and, as the Court explains below, it is incorrect.
23
24

Because the entirety of the Rall Declaration—besides the description of his qualifications—

25 consists of such legal conclusions, the Court strikes it from the record.
26

//

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 17

1
2

d.

Plaintiffs’ Chains of Title and the Centerline Presumption

The chains of title for each of the four sets of Plaintiffs—the McCrays, the Piantanidas,

3 Iden, and the Kaseburgs—derive from a plat that unambiguously excludes the Corridor from the
4 platted lots. When interpreting plats, “the intention of the dedicator controls.” Rainier Ave. Corp.
5 v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 362, 366 (1972). Where, as here, a plat is unambiguous, the intent
6

of the grantor “must be determined from a consideration of the plat itself and of the descriptions

7
and dedicatory language contained therein.” Frye v. King Cty., 151 Wash. 179, 183 (1929). The
8
9

language of the plat need not be repeated in Plaintiffs’ deeds, because “where a deed describes

10 land as a lot laid out on and designated on a certain plat or survey, the plat becomes as much a
11 part of the deed as if it were copied into it.” Cook v. Hensler, 57 Wash. 392, 398 (1910).
12
13
14

The Kaseburg property falls within the Pleasure Point Park No. 2 plat. (Dkt. No. 168 at
13.) As the Court has explained, when a deed, or, in this case, a plat, “refers to the right of way
as a boundary but also gives a metes and bounds description of the abutting property, the

15
16

presumption of abutting landowners taking to the center of the right of way is rebutted.” Roeder,

17 105 Wash. 2d at 577. That is exactly the case here. The Pleasure Point plat gives a metes and
18 bounds description of the property using the Corridor as a boundary. (Dkt. No. 168-10 at 2.) The
19 Kaseburgs are therefore unable to shelter under the centerline presumption, and thus have no
20 property interest in the Corrider and no standing.
21

The Iden, McCray, and Piantanida Plaintiffs’ property falls within the Garden of Eden

22
No. 3 plat. (Dkt. No. 168 at 11 (Iden), 15 (McCrays), 18 (Piantanidas).) The “Description” of
23
24

this plat states that it “comprises the following described tract of land,” which it then describes,

25 “[e]xcept that portion occupied by the N.P.R.R. right of way and county roads as shown on said
26 plat.” (Dkt. No. 168-8 at 2.) “The term ‘except’ is generally meant to exclude the described
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 18

1

property.” Ray v. King Cty., 120 Wash. App. 564, 588 (2004). “[A]n exception operates to

2 withdraw some part of the thing granted which otherwise would pass to the grantee under the
3 general description.” Duus v. Town of Ephrata, 14 Wash. 2d 426, 430 (1942). As the court held
4 in Roeder, the centerline presumption will apply to a conveyance of land bounded by a railroad
5 right of way “unless the grantor has expressly reserved the fee to the right of way, or the
6

grantor's intention to not convey the fee is clear.” 105 Wash. 2d at 576. Here, by excepting the

7
NPRR right of way—which is now part of the Corridor—the plat expressly reserved the Corridor
8
9

from purchasers of the platted lots. Plaintiffs argue that King County has misinterpreted the word

10 “exception,” citing to Kershaw and Zobrist v. Culp, 18 Wash. App. 622 (1977). But neither of
11 those cases involved the centerline presumption. 10 They are therefore irrelevant.
12
13
14

Moreover, the chains of title for the McCray, Piantanida, and Iden Plaintiffs demonstrate
that they never acquired property from an owner of the Corridor—nor could they have. Again,
Roeder requires that a party demonstrate that it received its adjoining property “from the fee

15
16

owner of the right of way property.” 105 Wash. 2d at 578. Here, these Plaintiffs’ chains of title

17 show that their predecessor, the Hillman Investment Company, acquired its property on May 26,
18 1904, through a deed from the Lake Washington Land Company. (Dkt. No. 170-3 at 4
19 (McCrays); Dkt. No. 170-4 at 4 (Piantanidas); Dkt. No. 170-5 at 3 (Iden)). 11 As Plaintiffs
20
21
10

In addition, they are inapplicable because each involved a dispute over whether a deed
excepted an easement previously conveyed to a third party. Zobrist, 18 Wash. App. at 629;
23 Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, 156 Wash. 2d at 271. As the Court explains below, the exception
here involves a fee interest previously conveyed to a third party.
24
11
As King County points out, this deed was never disclosed to them even though they
25 specifically requested—and the Court ordered Plaintiffs to disclose—this very sort of evidence.
(Dkt. No. 138 at 21–22.) There is no question that it was highly prejudicial for Plaintiffs to
26 withhold the May 26, 1904 deed from discovery and then rely on it in their response brief.
22

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 19

1

essentially conceded (although they argued that it was “irrelevant”) and as the Court has

2 explained, the Lake Washington Land Company had already conveyed to Northern Pacific a fee
3 interest in the Corridor via the LWLC Deed. The May 26, 1904 Deed therefore could not have
4 conveyed to the Hillman Investment Company any interest in the Corridor, which the Deed itself
5 makes clear, stating: “from the lands above desc[ribed] is to be deducted the rights of way of
6

various r[ail] companies and co[unty] roads as sh[ow]n by the deeds heretofore filed in the office

7
of the Aud[itor] of s[ai]d K[ing] Co[unty].” (Dkt. No. 170-3 at 27.) Thus, these Plaintiffs never
8
9

received “adjoining property from the fee owner of the right of way property”—since the

10 Hillman Investment Company did not own the fee at the time of the conveyance.
11

Therefore, these four chains of title, which Plaintiffs have apparently concealed, do no

12 more than conclusively demonstrate that the centerline presumption does not apply to them and
13
14

that they have no interest in the Corridor. 12 Thus, they have no standing to sustain their quiet title
action.

15
F.

16

Additional Reasons for Dismissal

King County raises a host of additional arguments why the claims of various groups of

17

18 Plaintiffs fail for individualized reasons. Because Plaintiffs have not established that they have
19 an interest in the Corridor, the Court need not reach these arguments. Nonetheless, the Court will
20 briefly address them here.
21

First of all, there are a number of Plaintiffs who both parties essentially agree should be

22
23

12

King County argues persuasively that Plaintiffs also have no right to possess the Corridor,
24 which is the second RCW 7.28.010 requirement to quiet title. (Dkt. No. 165 at 16–17.) Plaintiffs
make no attempt to rebut this argument. Regardless, because Plaintiffs fail to establish that they
25 have an interest in the Corridor, the Court need not reach the question of whether they have a
right to possession. See RCW 7.28.010 (requiring “a valid subsisting interest in real property,
26 and a right to the possession thereof”) (emphasis added).
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 20

1

dismissed. As the Court mentioned above, “Plaintiffs agree that those Plaintiffs who did not

2 respond to King County’s discovery can be dismissed,” (Dkt. No. 170 at 22 n.34), although,
3 again, perhaps they fail to realize that this would also logically exclude the Kaseburg, Iden,
4 McCray, and Piantanida Plaintiffs who obtained their chains of title but did not disclose them.
5 Plaintiffs “generally agree” that those “plaintiffs who sold their property cannot quiet title,”
6

although they argue without elaboration that the purchasers of that property would later be

7
entitled to join the suit. (Id.) Plaintiffs also “generally agree” that “Plaintiffs who transferred
8
9

their properties to other legal entities cannot quiet title,” although they similarly argue that this

10 “depend[s] on a number of factual questions” that they do not elucidate. (Id.) Plaintiffs also
11 appear to agree that “only living plaintiffs have standing,” although they argue, without evidence
12 or citation to any authority, that the spouse or other heirs of the deceased plaintiff, Barbara
13
14

Bergstrom, (Dkt. No. 167-6), “would continue to have standing.” (Dkt. No. 170 at 22 n.34.) In
addition, several Plaintiffs have requested that they be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 167-9 at 5–6.) Were

15
16

it necessary to the Court’s decision, it would find that all of these individual Plaintiffs—which

17 King County has grouped as Categories 7 through 9, 11, and 12—should indeed be dismissed.
18 (Dkt. No. 168-1 at 7.)
19

Plaintiffs do contest King County’s argument that collateral estoppel bars the claims of

20 those Plaintiffs who have previously filed suit. But their response, in its entirety, is that King
21

County is “incorrect as a matter of procedure, fact, and law.” (Dkt. No. 170 at 22 n.34.) Given

22
that seven Plaintiffs—grouped as Category 10—have previously filed suit on the same operative
23
24
25
26
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 21

1

facts at issue here, 13 the Court would almost surely find their claims barred by collateral estoppel

2 were such a finding necessary.
Finally, King County argues that Plaintiffs in Categories 4 through 6 should be dismissed

3

4 because they cannot assert the centerline presumption due to: limitations in the language of their
5 deeds (Category 4); their properties having derived from plats that exclude the Corridor
6

(Category 5); and/or their predecessor having purchased shorelands excepting the Corridor

7
(Category 6). (Dkt. No. 168-1 at 7.) As the Court has explained, since all but four sets of
8
9

Plaintiffs failed to present chains of title (and these were insufficient), none can assert the

10 centerline presumption. Nonetheless, because Plaintiffs have failed to persuasively rebut King
11 County’s arguments as to the Plaintiffs in Categories 4 through 6, the Court would likely have
12 dismissed them on these grounds as well. 14
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

13

King County asserts, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that five of the current Plaintiffs were
parties to Ioppolo v. Port of Seattle, (Dkt. No. 165 at 25), in which the plaintiffs argued that
“BNSF’s interest [in the Corridor] was limited to a surface easement for a hiking and biking
trail.” Case No. C15-0358 JCC, 2015 WL 5315936, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2015). Two
other plaintiffs previously filed suit in Ao. V. Port of Seattle, No. 09-2-44773-0 KNT (King Co.
Sup. Ct. 2011), arguing that they had acquired title to property within the Corridor through
adverse possession. (Dkt. No. 167-7 at 8–9.) Both cases were dismissed. Ioppolo, 2015 WL
5315936, at *5; (Dkt. No. 167-8 at 2–3.)
14

Addressing the Category 4 grouping, Plaintiffs argue that the centerline presumption is
unavailable only to those Plaintiffs whose deeds describe their property in metes and bounds and
use the Corridor as a boundary. But dozens of Plaintiffs’ deeds do, in fact, describe their property
in this manner. (Dkt. No. 172-1 at 8.) Moreover, the rest of the Category 4 Plaintiffs, much like
the Category 5 and 6 Plaintiffs, obtained their property through conveyances excepting or
excluding the Corridor, (id.), which, as the Court explained above, also disentitles them to the
centerline presumption. Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary invoke Kershaw, Zobrist, the strip
and gore doctrine, and a ruling from the Central District of California on a motion to dismiss,
none of which relate to the application of the centerline presumption under Washington law.
(Dkt. No. 170 at 20–22.)
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 22

1
2

III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, King County’s motion for summary judgment on all remaining

3 issues (Dkt. No. 165) is GRANTED.
4
5
6

In addition, as the Court explained above, it hereby STRIKES from the record the chains
of title for the McCray, Piantanida, Iden, and Kaseburg Plaintiffs (Dkt. Nos. 170-3 to 170-6), as
well as the Declaration of John Rall (Dkt. No. 170-2).

7
8

It is therefore ORDERED that:
(1)

9

The process of railbanking the Corridor under the Trails Act preserved all

10

property rights formerly held by the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad (“BNSF”) and

11

authorized trail use;

12
13

(2)

King County currently holds all of BNSF’s property rights in the Corridor, as

well as the trail rights created by the Trails Act;

14
(3)

The June 24, 1903 deed from J.R. Lewis to the Northern Pacific Railway

15
16

Company, recording No. 269500 (also called the Kittinger Deed), conveyed a fee simple

17 interest.
18

(4)

The February 3, 1904 deed from the Lake Washington Land Company to the

19 Northern Pacific Railway Company, recording No. 287093 (also called the LWLC Deed),
20 conveyed a fee simple interest.
21

(5)

The State of Washington holds the reversionary interest to property acquired

22
through the February 8, 1904 Condemnation.
23
24
25
26

(6)

Plaintiffs lack standing under Washington’s centerline presumption doctrine to

challenge King County’s ownership interests in the Corridor.
//

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 23

1
2

FURTHERMORE, it is hereby ORDERED:
(1)

King County is granted a decree quieting title free and clear from all claims by

3

the Plaintiffs and/or their successors in interest to any portions of the land conveyed by the

4

February 11, 2013 quit claim deed from the Port of Seattle to King County, recording No.

5

20130213001645, attached as Exhibit A to this Order. The Plaintiffs, King County, and their

6

successors in interest shall recognize in perpetuity the boundary lines described in Exhibit A.

7
(2)

Title is quieted confirming that King County owns a fee interest in the portions

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

of the property described in Exhibit A that are derived from the June 24, 1903 deed from J.R.
Lewis to the Northern Pacific Railway Company, which is attached as Exhibit B to this Order.
(3)

Title is quieted confirming that King County owns a fee interest in the portions

of the property described in Exhibit A that are derived from the February 3, 1904 deed from
the Lake Washington Land Company to the Northern Pacific Railway Company, which is
attached as Exhibit C to this Order.

15
16
17
18

(4)

Title is quieted confirming that King County may exercise its easement rights in

any easement portions of the Corridor consistent with the prior rulings of this Court.
DATED this 23rd day of August 2016.

19
20
21

A

22
23
24

John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

25
26
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
PAGE - 24

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 1 of 24

EXHIBIT A

5

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 2 of 24

6

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 3 of 24

7

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 4 of 24

8

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 5 of 24

9

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 6 of 24

10

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 7 of 24

11

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 8 of 24

12

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 9 of 24

13

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 10 of 24

14

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 11 of 24

15

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 12 of 24

16

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 13 of 24

17

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 14 of 24

18

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 15 of 24

19

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 16 of 24

20

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 17 of 24

21

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 18 of 24

22

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 19 of 24

23

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 20 of 24

24

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 21 of 24

25

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 22 of 24

26

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 23 of 24

27

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-2 Filed 05/26/16 Page 24 of 24

28

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-3 Filed 05/26/16 Page 1 of 6

EXHIBIT B

29

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-3 Filed 12/02/14 Page 1 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 55-5 Filed 05/26/16 Page 2 of 6

30

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-3 Filed 12/02/14 Page 2 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 55-5 Filed 05/26/16 Page 3 of 6

31

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-3 Filed 12/02/14 Page 3 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 55-5 Filed 05/26/16 Page 4 of 6

32

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-3 Filed 12/02/14 Page 4 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 55-5 Filed 05/26/16 Page 5 of 6

33

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-3 Filed 12/02/14 Page 5 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 55-5 Filed 05/26/16 Page 6 of 6

34

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 1 of 12

EXHIBIT C

35

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 2 of 12
L47

á-.,ç t*

a

t--2

?-aÉ. ^

¿/a4L

Q--*"*,
ò-"*:
{*r¿

JL,q^--+"*
-/- ,
fu¿a
ò "¿t-- tÍ?*^ fu
Ø;4"-.-L

^41*.

¿

7

azaø

*,)

¿þ/

,

iâ

?*"

n.?t-:@

"-/

,

*':2

tu

a

M

þ^

-z4"

A-¿

r4

a
4

--+
¿/¿"

"*

7h

&Q

;'Áz h-#-,Æ .æ,

.á.r4

æ*),

t4

---1a-tla

o-/

)%"

,

"h

A7r

)

*t7,aehi

é¿...

(-)

'¿f ¿"-*á,
J** ç,2-¡
\¿

4442

*)
(a't

I /"-t;
,n*rfu
(o'l

(ÊÐ

4+¡ , z*- >

Vh

,7

7

-Qaa.^)

*) ,al*

\-âL >-,2't

, â*^a,

*/1

t¿'

7re
4-** f?h
V

?rf4.

T

a.Ð

ft-.ç2

zí

?#+4á-"

(a) -eonl i

22nn/t,

t

eÐ;

oou4r7r)^et*

4,2í),

,.tv

'æ.-A

-r*rtt-

lA

Gf)

¿4á/C)

r'--r¿â:--t
a

ôr'*

.t

¿-o¿-

é..¿l

Z--r**-¿

(r+', h
(*")

a-4 I

,---l

a*y'2

a-ru. +.-Q

a14-a

à.
4-

v

a4L

,u7

/zr)

.¿2.L

2r¿r-û4

^*

Wrlt) a--a

,t)

-/Z)ra1

-4. a*¿-*

4;'/-p-4

/."(

ã?

I

---¿

1¿

*2fr'-.,y'
å-a+

q-.-ã

-) z*
,á-n-* r
tl 1á"
'r*à*;
tÉ,
aø,-) ¿, o't

/r1<
^4t-

a-¡t'

A"Ð

y'7a'n

ar.r-<-

fOl/,
eríì

({),
tor¿"(/)

¿¿¿¿/

z.b*..Cal

á*n t-2,

t*

(ol. à.a
^ x---¡þ{4 y

êr?fu

fa#-, a2.

?d-

36

37

rc

Ann-.,Vr4, Wt

-4f

^,soát

's
.

/.,-7.v>z¡p

bv T

*-7fr".?t,

@

,1"

4'*Ð

tpI
,tryaoâog a¡r

re "fl ø

-ru

(+ø'

("at

@4u'q-Z

,4

ln

,9r

ræ

"

/- 3-f ry/Ç*

"t* (.ryl
T
7nþ
r!

"ry

ry7/

r,-?a.rv?r' ry/!
49

e*f

g-

v/- lp

'Þ

ry

c-r*o

L,-

!-

*-v

v7T
awg
-avt4

--

7/ Ø

WY L
L*'a ,Þ

7
#

*

+F'""'"+

(ø

7 #"7
P{-.*A

**f"

ryl

4A

/æ

-1t @r4

ß

*r

"7r

t*'?a'9
r.--t
¡/)

"77?

7L

o7'wtzl

le ""'-¿r'4

%
.4 r"<:*v
/-

¡--,-

r

47

<-ryr
s-ÞiT#

.e

/r/-*'cæ'
þ *o

-z-o

k

/"

Y¡ú,*.
nv(;¿,

('"/

,?aan/t

-77

4¿

(Ð/

4'
o

>"t"Ð. (6)
tL'

F"*r

f./

7++

v/''- "r/f

ooÈ

"-:7 r#'-<

-

unr(2o '¿¿

f/e.Lc,

w-d

Øz ay*<.<
,.-xt-pV

-7f

7¿

-1'r¿l

4..ø

:":rffi

,r-Þê

%-g*Vt"'4+2<
z-',"¿
t y¿,--,-

'Þ-(e)

ln=/

7T'-f

rQ

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 3 of 12

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 4 of 12

149

e e*-^J 4

2o 'á-- ?X-

"

-ztlo

'.r"#-;

-z*¿.¿a-à

пr¿)

¿24--A

a-.-2

a4-/
--1¿
tl1-<

J-

æ.-2

7/

êT ¿a*Ð

"-4-^* 7

á-^ e
¿/.-Z ----C

ø-

d.)

"É.7

-¿'?â

"9*

"* 4-rA

--¿^-<.¿<

e----7

I

ç.---2 4¿-P

ë-ê *-7É
e-ae:)

,J¿-¿---1

t

n!'7á-.-

,4.-*_

-¿1-./-

?â

f/,*'-3

a.

e¿**
uê

4ê

?'-4

ú ..r/n

ët4t-

? --l

a.d4

,o4

-r&

ú"¿

¡

ál

\
.p/ -uzt

fua-r-a-^*7

4

g/ø..a
h..r. ^-4

gA

â.--â 2-?. 2
a

a./t*,4;
æ

¿â.¿,L

,a .*"4

l-#,-

,7
,t
e*-

.*'.¿

?."*Á-

þa*)

4-.-

.Q-å

^4

*l

4

.lz4
¿¡-ø":A

.-2'-

J.Èa.

&-.,1

a

>,i-.t6 .,

a'/ a- f--*.4.4

¿"¿"1-

#..ail-D
n44a

aâ

, t-

do

f

H¡

-;- ¿**.-Z.f
1^

-ñ

v
>**-¿

4.;-/

a>,

4,a-<-¿

/;/*t,

a4-2

¿-;

4r*

Q¿

,?-t.:a.¿

^--2 7:/*
øTz"¿a

+

22.r'/

u4-ìA

¿+?.*/( cl

é)

-.

".

38

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 5 of 12
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 68-1
02/02/15
9

39

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 6 of 12
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 68-1
02/02/15
9

40

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 7 of 12
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 68-1
02/02/15
9

41

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 8 of 12
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 68-1
02/02/15
9

42

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 9 of 12
Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 68-1
02/02/15
9

43

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 10 of 12

287093
Lake Washington Land Company }
to
}
Northern Pacific Railway Company }
Deed.

Warranty Deed.

The Grantor the Lake Washington Land Company, a Corporation of the State of
Washington, in consideration of the sum of Two Thousand ($2000.00) Dollars, in hand paid,
conveys and warrants unto the Northern Pacific Railway Company, a Wisconsin Corporation, the
following described real estate situated in the County of King, State of Washington, to wit:
All those portions of the following Government subdivisions lying within the exterior
lines of a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width which has for its boundaries two lines that
are parallel with and equidistant from the center line of the Seattle Belt line Branch of the
Northern Pacific Railway Company as the same is now located, staked out and now in process of
construction over and across or adjacent to said Government subdivisions, to wit:
The Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter (N.W./4 of N.W./4) and the Southwest
quarter of the Northwest quarter (S.W./4 of N.W./4) of Section thirty-three (33), Township
twenty-five (25) North, range five (5) east, Willamette Meridian; Lot four (4) (or the northwest
quarter of the northwest quarter—N.W./4 of N.W./4) the northwest quarter of the Southwest
quarter (N.W./4 of S.W./4), and the Southwest quarter of the Southwest quarter (S.W./4 of
S.W./4) of Section four (4), Township Twenty-four (24) North; Range five (5) east; Lot four (4)
of section twenty (20), Township twenty-four (24) north, Range five (5) east; Lots one (1) two
(2) and three (3) of Section twenty-nine (29), Township twenty-four (24) north, Range five (5)
east; Lot two (2) of Section thirty-two (32), Township twenty-four (24) North, Range five (5)
east; Lots three (3) and four (4) of Section thirty one (31), township twenty-four (24) North,
range five (5) east, and Lots two (2), three (3) and four (4) of Section five (5), township twenty-

44

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 11 of 12

three (23) north, Range five (5) east; Lots one (1), three (3) and four (4), the Northeast quarter of
the Northwest quarter (N.E./4 of N.W./4), the southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter (S.E./4
of N.W./4), the northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter (N.E./4 of S.W./4), and the southeast
quarter of the Southwest quarter (S.E./4 of S.W./4) of Section nine (9), Township twenty four
(24) north, Range five (5) east, excepting there from any portions of any such subdivisions in
said section nine (9) included within the following description:
Beginning at a point on the dividing line between the east half of the northwest quarter
(E/2 of N.W./4) and the west half of the northwest quarter (W./2 of N.W./4) 1855 feet south of
the north line of said section nine (9), thence east at right angles 300 feet; thence south 1320 feet;
thence west to the Government meander line of Mercer slough; thence Northerly along said
meander line to a point 1855 feet south of the north line of said section; thence east to the place
of beginning, containing 37 acres more or less.
Also such additional widths or strips of land in any of said Government subdivisions as
may be necessary to catch the slopes of the cuts and fills of the roadbed of such railroad which
roadbed is to be constructed having a width at grade of twenty-two (22) feet and the cuts to have
a slope of one to one and the fills to have a slope of one-and-one-half to one.
The Lake Washington Land Company for itself, its successors and assigns, hereby
assigns to said Northern Pacific Railway Company its rights to purchase from the State of
Washington any of the shore lands in grant of any of the above named government subdivisions
embraced within a strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side
of the center line of the Seattle Belt line Branch of the Northern Pacific Railway Company as the
same is located, staked out and now in the process of of [sic] construction across said shore lands

45

Case 2:14-cv-00784-JCC Document 165-4 Filed 05/26/16 Page 12 of 12

but reserves to itself, its successors and assigns, the preference right to purchase from the State of
Washington all shore lands outside of said one hundred (100) foot strip.
In witness whereof the said Lake Washington Land Company has caused these presents
to be executed by its President and Secretary, thereunto duly authorized, and its corporate seal to
be affixed this 8 day of Sept. A.D. 1903.
{Seal}

Lake Washington Land Company by F.H. Brownell, Its President
Attest. S.C. Corneil, Its Secretary.

State of Washington County of Snohomish— S.S.
On this 8 day of Sept. A.D. 1903, before me, a notary public, personally appeared F. H.
Brownell and S.C. Corneil, to me known to be the President and Secretary, respectively, of the
corporation that executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged the said
instrument to be the free and voluntary act and deed of said corporation, for the uses and
purposes therein mentioned and on oath stated that they were authorized to execute said
instrument, and that the seal affixed is the corporate seal of said corporations.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and
year first above written.

{Seal}

J.A. [illegible]
Notary Public in and for the State of Washington residing at Everett.

Filed for record at request of Jay Sedgwick Feb. 3, 1904 at 53 min. past 10 A.M.
Grant S Lamping
County Auditor

46