Howery v. The Boeing Company
Filing
54
ORDER granting dft's 39 Motion to Dismiss; plaintiff permitted to file an amended complaint within 21 days of this order by Judge Ricardo S Martinez.(RS)
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
6
7
8
CRYSTAL HOWERY,
Case No. C14-01555RSM
Plaintiff,
9
10
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND LEAVE
TO AMEND
v.
THE BOEING COMPANY,
Defendant.
11
12
I.
13
14
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Rule 12(c) Motion to Dismiss.
15
Dkt. #39. Defendant seeks to dismiss all causes of action in this matter for Plaintiff’s failure to
16
allege any facts raising a plausible claim for relief. Id. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing
17
that her “facts must be accepted as true for purposes of this motion, and asserting that the
”
18
motion is improper because the pleadings are not yet closed. Dkt. #52. For the reasons set
19
forth herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion, but allows Plaintiff leave to amend.
20
21
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Crystal Howery initially filed this action in the District Court for the Northern
22
District of California, alleging violations of, among other statutes, Title VII of the Civil
23
24
25
Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, arising from her employment
with Defendant Boeing Company (
“Boeing) in Everett, Washington, and termination
26
ORDER - 1
1
therefrom. Dkt. #1.
2
pauperis status in this Court. See Dkt. #1, Ex. 2. After Plaintiff filed her action, Boeing filed
3
a motion to transfer venue to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). California District
4
5
Plaintiff has been proceeding pro se, but has not sought in forma
Judge Vince Chhabria granted Defendant’s Motion, finding that the case could have been filed
in the Western District of Washington and that the relevant convenience factors strongly
6
favored transfer to this District. Dkt. #21. The action was then transferred to this District on
7
8
October 9, 2014, and assigned to the undersigned Judge. Dkt. #22. Plaintiff thereafter
9
appealed Judge Chhabria’s transfer order, which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied,
10
entering its mandate on December 29, 2014. This Court then considered Plaintiff’s motions to
11
appoint counsel and motion to transfer. See Dkts. #35 and #37.
12
On January 30, 2015, this Court denied Plaintiff’s motions. Dkt. #37. The Court
13
determined that Plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support any of the factors
14
15
in favor of appointment of counsel, but informed Plaintiff that she could re-file a motion to
appoint counsel should Plaintiff believe in good faith that she is able to meet the relevant
16
criteria. Id. at 4. The Court further found that venue is appropriate in this Court and declined
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
to transfer the matter back to California. Id. at 4-5.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:
Harassment and Retaliation for opposing and reporting discriminatory
practices as well as for participating in investigations regarding
discrimination. Violation(s) of: the Equal Pay Act; the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act; the Americans with Disabilities Act; the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act; the Civil Rights Act; the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act; and other violations of the law.
Dkt. #1 at 2.
25
26
ORDER - 2
1
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant discriminated against her based on her race,
2
religion, sex, national origin, disability, genetic information and age. Dkt. #1 at 2. In support
3
of her allegations, Plaintiff provides the following “facts
”:
4
5
I was not paid for my hourly work. I was also denied a bonus. Requests
for reasonable accommodation were denied. I was harassed. I was
placed on leave without pay. I was terminated.
6
Id. According to Plaintiff, the alleged discrimination occurred between December of 2011
7
8
and June 2012. Id. at 3. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
9
Commission (
“EEOC who could not determine whether any violations had occurred, and
”),
10
received a Right-to-Sue Letter on February 9, 2014. Id., Attachment 1. She then proceeded
11
with this lawsuit.
12
13
14
15
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to
dismiss a suit “[a]fter the pleadings are closed . . . but early enough not to delay trial. Fed. R.
”
16
Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when, taking all allegations in the
17
18
19
pleading as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stanley v.
”
Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Fleming v.
20
Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).
21
pleadings is “functionally identical to a motion to dismiss, the standard for a Rule 12(c)
”
22
motion is the same as for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF
23
Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1052 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008).
24
25
Because a motion for judgment on the
In deciding a 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, this Court is limited to the allegations on the
face of the complaint (including documents attached thereto), matters which are properly
26
ORDER - 3
1
judicially noticeable and other extrinsic documents when “the plaintiff’s claim depends on the
2
contents of a document, the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, and
3
the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document, even though the plaintiff does
4
5
not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint. Knievel v. ESPN, 393
”
F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court must construe the complaint in the light most
6
favorable to the Plaintiff and must accept all factual allegations as true. Cahill v. Liberty
7
8
Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court must also accept as true all
9
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the material allegations in the Complaint. See
10
Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 2013); Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139
11
F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the Court is not required to accept as true a “legal
12
conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
”
13
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The Complaint “must
14
15
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face. Id. at 678. This requirement is met when Plaintiff “pleads factual content that
”
16
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
17
18
19
20
misconduct alleged. Id. Absent facial plausibility, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.
”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
B. Extrinsic Documents
21
The Court first addresses Defendant’s request that it consider the Collective
22
Bargaining Act which governed Plaintiff’s employment while she was working for
23
Defendant. Dkts. #39 at 10 and #40, Ex. A. The Court denies the request as it is not
24
necessary to consider that document in reaching its decision on this motion.
25
26
ORDER - 4
1
C. Alleged Failure to Meet Pleading Standard
2
Defendant argues that Ms. Howery’s claims should be dismissed because she fails to
3
meet the required pleading standards for her claims. The Court agrees. Even when taking
4
5
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, she has failed to allege the most basic facts such as her age, race,
or other identification of a protected class in which she alleges to be a member. See Dkt. #1.
6
She further fails to allege any facts indicating what she allegedly did (other than participating
7
8
in investigations of discrimination and reporting discriminatory behavior), who allegedly
9
retaliated and/or discriminated against her, what acts occurred, and when they occurred in
10
relation to her participation in investigations and reports of discrimination. As a result, she
11
fails to allege any plausible claims for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For these reasons, the
12
Complaint must be dismissed.1
13
14
15
D. Leave to Amend
Ordinarily, leave to amend a complaint should be freely given following an order of
dismissal, “unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured
16
by amendment. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); see also DeSoto v.
”
17
18
19
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) ( district court does not err in
“A
denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile. (citing Reddy v. Litton Indus.,
”
20
Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, if Plaintiff wishes to amend her
21
Complaint, she is permitted to file such Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days of
22
the date of this Order.
23
deficiencies listed above.
1
Plaintiff argues that this motion has been brought improperly because the pleadings are not yet
closed. However, Defendant filed its Answer on September 17, 2014. Therefore, the pleadings
are closed, and Plaintiff’s argument is rejected.
24
25
26
ORDER - 5
The Amended Complaint should address, at a minimum, the
1
2
3
4
5
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and having reviewed Plaintiffs’ motions, any responses
thereto, and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #39) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff is permitted to file an Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days
6
of the date of this Order. The Amended Complaint should address, at a minimum,
7
8
9
10
11
the deficiencies listed above.
3. Plaintiff is warned that the failure to file an Amended Complaint within the time
allotted will result in the dismissal of her case.
DATED this 6 day of April, 2015.
12
A
13
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
ORDER - 6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?