Northwest Sheet Metal Workers Organizational Trust et al v. Associated Heating & Sheet Metal, Inc.

Filing 38

ORDER granting in part plaintiffs' 36 Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees signed by Judge Ricardo S Martinez.(RS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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NORTHWEST SHEET METAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST, et al.,

Case No. C15-0458RSM

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v.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,

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ASSOCIATED HEATING & SHEET
METAL, INC.,
Defendant.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

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This matter initially came before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

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which included a request for attorneys’ fees and costs. Dkt. #28. On June 6, 2017, the Court

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granted Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Defendant had failed to raise any genuine dispute as to

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the amounts owed to Plaintiffs. Dkt. #34. In addition, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request for

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attorney’s fees and costs, and directed Plaintiffs to file a supplemental motion, appending the
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evidence necessary to support their request. Id. Plaintiffs have since filed that supplemental

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motion, to which Defendant has failed to respond. Dkt. #36. Plaintiffs ask the Court for a total

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award of $17,976.00. For the reasons discussed below, the Court now GRANTS IN PART AND

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DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion.

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ORDER - 1

II.

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

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“When it sets a fee, the district court must first determine the presumptive lodestar figure

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by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable

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hourly rate.” Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993). The reasonable
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hourly rate is determined with reference to the prevailing rates charged by attorneys of

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comparable skill and experience in the relevant community. See Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886,

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895 (1984). In determining the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation, the Court

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may exclude any excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours billed. Hensley v.

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Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). The Court may also adjust the lodestar with reference to
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factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975). The

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relevant Kerr factors here are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

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the questions; and (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly. “The lodestar

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amount presumably reflects the novelty and complexity of the issues, the special skill and

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experience of counsel, the quality of representation, and the results obtained from the litigation.”
Intel, 6 F.3d at 622.
B. Reasonableness of Rates
The Court first examines the hourly rate for time billed by their counsel requested by
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek a billing rate of $210 per hour. Dkt. #37 at ¶ 2. “The party seeking

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fees bears the burden of documenting the hours expended in the litigation and must submit

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evidence supporting… the rates claimed.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945-46

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(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). In the Ninth Circuit, “the determination of a

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reasonable hourly rate ‘is not made by reference to the rates actually charged the prevailing

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ORDER - 2

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party.’” Welch, 480 F.3d at 946 (quoting Mendenhall v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 213 F.3d 464,

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471 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Rather, billing rates should be established by reference to the fees that

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private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge

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their paying clients for legal work of similar complexity.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

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“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the
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community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the

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plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers

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of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). “Generally, when determining

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a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits.”

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Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (vacating award of
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attorneys’ fees in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case where district court failed to identify

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the relevant community or address the prevailing market rate).

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In this case, Plaintiffs have presented neither evidence of their attorney’s experience nor
evidence supporting the reasonableness of the rate requested for the Seattle market. See Dkt.

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#37. A review by this Court of similar ERISA actions in which attorney’s fees were awarded

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reveals that the rates awarded to experienced litigators in this area in 2017 averaged $180 per

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hour. Accordingly, given the absence of proper evidence from Plaintiffs as to comparable

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attorney rates in the community, and considering the Court’s own review of comparable cases,

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the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish a reasonable hourly

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rate of $210 per hour, and will therefore calculate the lodestar using the hourly rate of $180 per
hour for their attorney’s time.1

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While the Court notes that Defendant has not opposed Plaintiffs’ motion, the Court also
acknowledges an independent duty to review the rate and hours requested.
ORDER - 3

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C. Reasonableness of Hours

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Now turning to the reasonableness of the hours requested, the Court notes that “[t]he party

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seeking fees bears the burden of documenting the hours expended in the litigation and must

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submit evidence supporting” the request. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. As noted above, the Court

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excludes those hours that are not reasonably expended because they are “excessive, redundant,
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or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Further, the Ninth Circuit has held it is

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reasonable for a district court to conclude that the party seeking attorney’s fees fails to carry its

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burden of documenting the hours expended when that party engages in “block billing” because

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block billing makes it more difficult to determine how much time was spent on particular

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activities. Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). Likewise, intra12
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office conferences between experienced counsel, absent persuasive justification by the moving

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party, may be excluded from an award as unnecessary and duplicative. See id. at 949.

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As an initial matter, the Court adjusts the total amount of attorney fees requested from
$17,976.00 to $15,408.00, based on the reduced rate of $180 per hour (85.6 hours x $180 =

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$15,408.00).

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The Court next turns to more specific reductions. Plaintiffs have presented a detailed

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description of the time spent defending this action. Dkt. #37. The Court has reviewed their

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attorney’s billing entries. Id. The Court will not award fees for the time Plaintiffs’ counsel spent

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discussing the case between either attorneys in his own office or with his own clients, as that

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activity constitutes intra-office conferences or is analogous to intra-office conferences. Further,

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counsel has partially engaged in block billing time entries, which has left the Court unable to

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attribute some of the time spent on a particular activity. Dkt. #37; Welch, 480 F.3d at 948.

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Accordingly, where the Court cannot discern from the time entry itself the amount of time to

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ORDER - 4

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attribute to a particular activity, it will reduce those entries by half. For all of these reasons, the
Court will deduct $981.00 the following time from its award of attorney’s fees as follows:

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9/21/16

0.80 hours (0.80 x $180/hr = $144.00)

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9/21/16

0.10 hours (0.10 x $180/hr = $18.00)

9/22/16

0.10 hours (0.10 x $180/hr = $18.00)

9/22/16

0.20 hours (0.20 x $180/hr = $36.00)

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9/26/16

0.10 hours (0.10 x $180/hr = $18.00)

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9/29/16

0.10 hours (0.10 x $180/hr = $18.00)

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9/29/16

0.10 hours (0.10 x $180/hr = $18.00)

9/29/16

0.10 hours (0.10 x $180/hr = $18.00)

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10/5/16

0.65 hours (0.65 x $180/hr = $117.00)

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10/11/16

0.10 hours (0.10 x $180/hr = $18.00)

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10/25/16

0.20 hours (0.20 x $180/hr = $36.00)

10/26/16

0.30 hours (0.30 x $180/hr = $54.00)

10/31/16

0.85 hours (0.85 x $180/hr = $153.00)

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12/6/16

0.30 hours (0.30 x $180/hr = $54.00)

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4/5/17

1.35 hours (1.35 x $180/hr = $243.00)

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4/6/17

0.10 hours (0.10 x $180/hr = $18.00)

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Dkt. #37.

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In light of the rate reduction already imposed, and the time reductions noted above, the

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Court finds that the remaining hours requested by Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable, and will

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award the fees associated with those hours, again noting that the hourly rate has been reduced to

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ORDER - 5

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$180 per hour. Accordingly, the total amount of attorney’s fees awarded is $14,427.00
($15,408.00 - $981.00 = $14,427.00).
D. Lodestar Adjustment
The Court finds that the time set forth above, less the reductions noted by the Court,

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reflects the reasonable time spent defending this matter and does not find it necessary to make
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any lodestar adjustments.
E. Costs
Plaintiff has not sought an award of any costs in this matter.

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III.

CONCLUSION

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Having considered Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion for Fees and Costs, the Declarations
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and Exhibits in support thereof, and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and

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ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ motion (Dkt. #36) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

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for the reasons discussed above. Plaintiff is awarded fees in the amount of $14,427.00 in

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attorney’s fees.

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DATED this 17 day of July, 2017.

A

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RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ORDER - 6