Linehan v. AllianceOne Receivables Management, Inc.

Filing 291

ORDER by U.S. District Judge John C Coughenour granting Defendant Kimberlee Walker Olsen's 282 Motion to compel discovery from Plaintiffs Jones, Root, and Anderson. Olsen's request for fees is denied. (PM)

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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TIMOTHY LINEHAN, on behalf of
Plaintiff and a class,
Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. C15-1012-JCC
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
COMPEL

v.
ALLIANCEONE RECEIVABLES
MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Kimberlee Walker Olsen’s motion to

17 compel discovery from Plaintiffs Jones, Root, and Anderson (Dkt. No. 282). Olsen seeks
18 discovery on two topics: (1) whether Plaintiffs dispute the validity or amounts of their underlying
19 debts and (2) whether Plaintiffs filed any pleadings in the underlying debt collection actions. (Id.
20 at 1-2.) According to Olsen, this information is relevant to the causation element of Plaintiffs’
21 Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA) claims. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs dispute the relevance
22 of these requests, arguing that they are not required to establish causation because a violation of
23 the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) is a per se violation of the WCPA. (Id. at 8.)
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In multiple previous orders, this Court quoted the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion

25 in Panag v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington, 204 P.3d 885, 897 (Wash. 2009),
26 which states: “When a violation of debt collection regulations occurs, it constitutes a per se

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL
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1 violation of the CPA.” (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 26 at 4; Dkt. No. 44 at 4.) The Court applied this
2 language to conclude that, by pleading a sufficient FDCPA claim, Plaintiffs had likewise pleaded
3 a sufficient WCPA claim. (See id.)
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In her discovery motion, Olsen cites authority that calls into question this application of

5 Panag. (See Dkt. No. 282 at 6.) Specifically, the Panag court relied on a Court of Appeals case,
6 Evergreen Collectors v. Holt, 803 P.2d 10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), in concluding that an FDCPA
7 violation is a per se WCPA violation. The Evergreen court clarifies that a “claimant asserting a
8 per se violation [of the WCPA] must establish that a statute has been violated, that the violation
9 was the proximate cause of the damages, and that the plaintiff is within the class of persons the
10 statute is intended to protect.” 803 P.2d at 12 (emphasis added). In other words, a violation of the
11 FDCPA constitutes a violation of the WCPA, but a properly pleaded WCPA claim still requires
12 causation. Merely showing that the statute was violated is not enough to recover damages.
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This reading makes sense when one considers the damages available under each statutory

14 scheme. The FDCPA provides for limited statutory damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)
15 (individual plaintiffs may recover up to $1,000). By contrast, the WCPA provides for actual
16 damages, meaning the violation itself is not the actionable harm. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090.
17 Without the causation requirement, plaintiffs would be entitled to recoup damages not
18 contemplated by either statute.
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No Defendant previously cited Evergreen or made this argument. Nonetheless, in the

20 interest of accuracy and precision, the Court finds it appropriate to apply Panag and Evergreen
21 in this manner. Thus, the Court’s earlier application of Panag was erroneous and must be
22 corrected. See City of Los Angeles v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001)
23 (“As long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then it possesses the inherent
24 procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to
25 be sufficient.”); United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452-53 (9th Cir. 2000) (law
26 of the case doctrine inapplicable if “the first decision was clearly erroneous”).

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Accordingly, the Court now holds that alleging a valid FDCPA claim does not satisfy a

2 plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate causation under the WCPA. Rather, a valid FDCPA claim
3 establishes the first three prongs of a WCPA claim: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice
4 (2) occurred in trade or commerce and (3) affects the public interest. See Panag, 204 P.3d at 889
5 (describing conduct prohibited by WCPA and the five-prong test for WCPA claims). To the
6 extent that the Court’s previous holdings are in conflict, they are superseded.
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In light of this holding, Olsen has shown that her discovery requests will produce

8 evidence that is relevant and proportional to the needs of this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
9 Olsen’s motion to compel (Dkt. No. 282) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs must produce responsive
10 discovery and be prepared to testify on these topics at their February depositions.1
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Olsen asks the Court to award her reasonable fees and costs for bringing this motion.

12 (Dkt. No. 282 at 17.) If the Court grants a Rule 37 motion, the Court must award fees unless “the
13 opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified.” Fed. R. Civ.
14 P. 37(a)(5)(A). Here, given the Court’s previous orders, there was reasonable dispute as to the
15 relevance of the documents. Olsen’s request for fees is DENIED.
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DATED this 27th day of January 2017.

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John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Anderson has a pending motion to dismiss her WCPA claim (Dkt. No. 284). Until that
motion is resolved, Anderson is under no obligation to provide the requested discovery.
26 However, should Anderson’s WCPA claim remain after the motion’s resolution, this order shall
apply equally to her.
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL
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