Noonan v. Seattle City Light

Filing 12

ORDER granting defendant's 6 Motion to Dismiss by Judge Ricardo S Martinez.(RS) cc plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,

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Case No. C15-1249 RSM

TIMOTHY A. NOONAN,

v.
SEATTLE CITY LIGHT,

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Defendant.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Seattle City Light’s Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 4(j) and 4(m).

Dkt. #6. Defendant moves for dismissal, arguing

that Plaintiff’s claims are barred for failure to properly serve the summons by “delivering a

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copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer” or as provided under

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state law, as required by Rule 4(j). Id. at 1. Plaintiff Timothy A. Noonan responds, but does

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not deny that he failed to serve Defendant in compliance with this rule. Dkt. #10. For the

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reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendant, GRANTS its Motion, and dismisses

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Plaintiff’s case.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

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II.

BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed with the Court on August 7, 2015. Dkt. #1. Although

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the Complaint was delivered to Seattle City Light’s paralegal on August 17, 2015, it has never

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been served on the City Clerk. Dkt. #8 at 2; Dkt. #7 at 25. The City notified the Plaintiff on

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September 17, 2015, that his attempt at service had been ineffective. Id. at 27-28. Plaintiff has
not since served the City Clerk. Dkt. #8 at 2.
III.

DISCUSSION

A municipal corporation must be served by “delivering a copy of the summons and of
the complaint to its chief executive officer” or service as provided for in state law. Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 4(j). Washington State law provides for service to be on the mayor, city manager, city clerk

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or designated agent. RCW 4.28.080(2). The City of Seattle has designated the City Clerk as its

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agent for service of process under this statute. SMC 3.42.030. Service must be accomplished

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within 90 days after the date of filing of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

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Where service is not made within the timeframe specified in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(m), as

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here, Courts perform a two-step analysis: (1) if plaintiff can show good cause for defective

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service, then the Court must extend the time period, and (2) if there is no good cause, the Court

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has discretion to dismiss or to extend the time period for service. In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507,

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512 (9th Cir. 2001). “At a minimum, ‘good cause’ [for failure to timely serve a complaint]

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means excusable neglect.” Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has the

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burden to show good cause. Id. A Plaintiff does not meet the good cause standard merely

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because he is acting pro se. Hearst v. West, 31 Fed. Appx. 366, 369 (9th Cir. 2002); c.f. Ghazali

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v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52 (9th Cir.1995) (“pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure”).

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

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Defendant argues that Plaintiff improperly served the Office of the Superintendent for

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Seattle City Light instead of the City Clerk. Defendant goes on to argue that the time limit

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should not be extended for service because the City brought the defect to Plaintiff’s attention

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and Plaintiff failed to correct his mistake. Dkt. #6 at 5. In Response, Plaintiff argues that he

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“believed that service had been met” when he served a paralegal at the office of the

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Superintendent, Dkt. #10 at 1-2. Plaintiff argues that his lawsuit has merit. Id. at 2. Plaintiff

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fails to explain why he did not correct his mistake after receiving the September 17, 2015, letter.

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On Reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause. Dkt. #11 at 2. The

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Court agrees. Plaintiff’s ignorance of the law, or the merits of his case, cannot alone constitute

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good cause for failing to serve within the Rule 4(m) deadline. The Court finds that Plaintiff was

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on notice of the defect in service, yet failed to rectify within the 90-day time limit set forth in

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Rule 4(m), and that this constitutes inexcusable neglect under Boudette, supra. As such, this

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case must be dismissed under Rule 4(m).

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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Having reviewed the relevant pleadings, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto,

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and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that:

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1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #6) is GRANTED.

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2) Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED.

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3) This case is CLOSED.
DATED this 29 day of February 2016.

A

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 3