Puget Soundkeeper Alliance et al v. McCarthy et al
Filing
103
ORDER. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 67 ) is DENIED and Defendants and Intervenors' cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 72 , 79 ) are GRANTED on the issue of Plaintiffs' standing to challenge the Waste Treatment System Exclusion via the instant motion. Signed by U.S. District Judge John C Coughenour. (TH)
Case 2:15-cv-01342-JCC Document 103 Filed 11/25/19 Page 1 of 15
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
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PUGET SOUNDKEEPER ALLIANCE et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
ORDER
v.
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CASE NO. C15-1342-JCC
ANDREW WHEELER et al.,
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Defendants.
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and
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AMERICAN FARM BUREAU
FEDERATION et al.,
Intervenor-Defendants.
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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt.
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No. 67), Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 79), and Intervenors’ cross-
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motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 72). Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing
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and the relevant record, and for the reasons explained herein, the Court finds oral argument
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unnecessary and hereby DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 67) and
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GRANTS Defendants and Intervenors’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 67, 72)
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on the issue of Plaintiffs’ standing to bring their instant motion.
ORDER
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I.
BACKGROUND
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The Court has set forth the underlying facts of this case in a prior order and will not
3
repeat them here. (See Dkt. No. 61.) The objective of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) is “to
4
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33
5
U.S.C. § 1251(a). The CWA provides that “it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants
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into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). The CWA renders
7
“the discharge of any pollutant by any person . . . unlawful” unless the discharge complies with
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certain requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 1344.
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The CWA applies to “navigable waters,” which are defined as “waters of the United
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States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1362(7). The instant motions
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revolve around the history of the CWA’s exclusion of certain waste treatment systems (“Waste
12
Treatment System Exclusion”) from its definition of “waters of the United States.” In 1979, the
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Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated a revised definition of “waters of the
14
United States” which provided, “waste treatment systems (other than cooling ponds meeting the
15
criteria of this paragraph) are not wasters of the United States.” National Pollutant Discharge
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Elimination System; Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,901 (June 7, 1979) (to be
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codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.3(t)(6)). In 1980, the EPA revised the Waste Treatment System
18
Exclusion to read as follows:
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Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet
the requirements of CWA (other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 C.F.R. §
423.11(m) which also meet the criteria of this definition) are not waters of the
United States. This exclusion applies only to manmade bodies of water which
neither were originally created in waters of the United States (such as a disposal
area in wetlands) nor resulted from the impoundment of wasters of the United
States.
Consolidated Permit Regulations: RCRA Hazardous Waste; SDWA Underground Injection
Control; CWA National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; CWA Section 404 Dredge or
Fill Programs; and CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,424
(May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.3). The EPA also clarified the Waste
ORDER
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Treatment System Exclusion’s application to treatment ponds, lagoons, and cooling ponds. See
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id. at 33,290, 33,298.
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Two months later, in response to petitions for review by industries and an environmental
4
group, the EPA acknowledged that the Waste Treatment System Exclusion’s definition “may be
5
overly broad” and suspended the last sentence of the Waste Treatment System Exclusion’s
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definition. Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21, 1980) (to be codified
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at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.3). 1 The EPA stated that it “intend[ed] promptly to develop a revised
8
definition and to publish it as a proposed rule for public comment.” Id.
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In 1983, the EPA republished the Waste Treatment System Exclusion and stated that
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“[t]his revision continues [the July 1980] exclusion.” See Environmental Permit Regulations:
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RCRA Hazardous Waste; SDWA Underground Injection Control; CWA National Pollutant
12
Discharge Elimination System; CWA Section 404 Dredge or Fill Programs; and CAA Prevention
13
of Significant Deterioration, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,146, 14,157 n.1 (Apr. 1, 1983) (to be codified at 40
14
C.F.R. pt. 122.2). In 1986, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”; with the EPA, the
15
“Agencies”) separately promulgated a rule stating that, “Waste treatment systems, including
16
treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA (other than cooling ponds
17
as defined in 40 CFR 123.11(m) which also meet the criteria of this definition) are not waters of
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the United States.” Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
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41,206, 41,250 (Nov. 13, 1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328.3). 2
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1
Following the suspension, the Waste Treatment System Exclusion read, “Waste
treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of
CWA (other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 423.11(m) which also meet the criteria
of this definition) are not waters of the United States.” See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,424; 45 Fed. Reg. 48,
620.
2
In 1984, the EPA proposed a rule to revise its regulations governing state Section 404
programs that mirrored the Waste Treatment System Exclusion without the suspended language,
which was promulgated as a final rule in 1988. See 404 Program Definitions and Permit
Exemptions; 404 State Program Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 39,012, 39,018 (Oct. 2, 1984) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.2); Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit
ORDER
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In 2014, the Agencies issued a proposed rule defining the scope of waters protected under
2
the CWA. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
3
Reg. 22,188 (Apr. 21, 2014). The Agencies stated that they were “propos[ing] no [substantive]
4
change to the exclusion for waste treatment systems designed consistent with the requirements of
5
the CWA” and therefore were not seeking public comment on the Waste Treatment System
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Exclusion. Id. at 22,189; see also id. at 22,190, 22,193, 22,195, 22,217. The Agencies proposed
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two changes, which they termed “ministerial,” to the Waste Treatment System Exclusion:
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“delet[ing] a cross-reference in the current language to an EPA regulation that is no longer in the
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Code of Federal Regulations” 3 and renumbering the Waste Treatment System Exclusion. Id. at
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22,217; (see Dkt. No. 79 at 11). 4 The Agencies stated that the proposed rule “continue[d] [the
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July 1980] suspension.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 22, 268.
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Plaintiffs Sierra Club and Idaho Conservation League submitted comments asserting that
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the proposed rule did not substantively change the Waste Treatment System Exclusion’s existing
14
language. (See Dkt. Nos. 67-1 at 59–60, 67-2 at 15–17.) In response to other comments, the
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Agencies removed the comma after “lagoons” that had appeared for the first time in the 2014
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proposed rule. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
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37,054, 37,097 (June 29, 2015). The Agencies also noted that “[m]any commentators also
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suggested making substantive changes to the existing exclusion for waste treatment systems” but
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stated that such comments were “outside the scope of the proposed rule” because the Agencies
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21
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Exemptions; Section 404 State Program Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,764, 20,774 (June 6, 1988)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.2); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2
3
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Separate revisions 40 C.F.R. § 432.11(m) deleted the regulation’s reference to cooling
ponds and thus rendered the Waste Treatment System Exclusion’s reference to that regulation
obsolete. See 47 Fed. Reg. 52,290, 52,305 (Nov. 19, 1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
423.11(m)).
4
Following the deletion of the cross-reference, the proposed Waste Treatment System
Exclusion read, “Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons, designed to
meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act.” 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188, 22,263.
ORDER
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were not proposing substantive changes to the Waste Treatment System Exclusion. Id.
2
In 2015, the Agencies issued a final rule defining the jurisdictional scope of the CWA
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(the “WOTUS Rule”). Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
4
Reg. 37,054 (Jun. 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). The WOTUS Rule became
5
effective on August 28, 2015. Id. at 37,054. Under the WOTUS Rule, the Waste Treatment
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System Exclusion reads, “Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons
7
designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act.” Id. at 37,105 (to be codified at 33
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C.F.R. pt. 328.3(b)(1)). The WOTUS Rule simultaneously lifted and reimposed the July 1980
9
suspension. See id. at 37,114 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. at 48,620). The WOTUS Rule provided that
10
“[c]ontinuing current practice, any waste treatment system built in a ‘water of the United States’
11
would need a section 404 permit to be constructed and a section 402 permit for discharges from
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the waste treatment system into ‘waters of the United States.’” Id. at 37,054; see 33 U.S.C.
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§ 1342 (governing Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit
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program); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (governing Section 404 permits for discharge of dredged or fill
15
materials).
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Plaintiffs move for summary judgment, asserting that the Agencies exceeded their
17
authority, acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and violated their notice-and-comment obligations
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in promulgating the Waste Treatment System Exclusion. (See Dkt. No. 67 at 1.) Plaintiffs seek a
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declaratory judgment stating the same, as well as injunctive relief. (See id. at 21–22.) Defendants
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and Intervenors have filed separate cross-motions for summary judgment. (See Dkt. Nos. 72, 79.)
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II.
DISCUSSION
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A.
Summary Judgment Legal Standard
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“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
24
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 56(a). In making such a determination, the Court must view the facts and justifiable
26
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v.
ORDER
C15-1342-JCC
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly
2
made and supported, the opposing party “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that
3
there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
4
574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
5
B.
Standing
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Plaintiffs assert that they have representational standing to challenge the Waste
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Treatment System Exclusion on behalf of their members, relying on two member declarations
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regarding “pending proposals or recently issued permits.” (Dkt. No. 67 at 17–18; see Dkt. Nos.
9
67-3, 67-7.) Plaintiffs have also filed several declarations concerning “future applications of the
10
Exclusion,” which they characterize as “organizational declarations describing how both the
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substantive and procedural failures in the WOTUS Rule harm the Plaintiff groups’ ability to
12
achieve their organizational missions.” (Dkt. Nos. 67 at 17, 83 at 13; see Dkt. Nos. 67-4, 67-5,
13
67-7.) The Court examines each claimed basis of standing in turn.
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1. Representational Standing
Standing, which is an “essential and unchanging” requirement of federal jurisdiction,
16
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), requires that parties have “a personal
17
stake in the outcome of the controversy [so] as to assure that concrete adverseness which
18
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends.” Allen v. Wright,
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468 U.S. 737, 770 (1984). When an organization seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction, it must
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prove “(a) its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
21
protect are germane to the organization’s purposes; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
22
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash.
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State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Thus, to maintain an action in federal
24
court based on representational standing, one of Plaintiffs’ members must show: (a) the member
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has suffered or will suffer a concrete and particularized “injury in fact,” (b) the injury is fairly
26
traceable to the conduct complained of; and (c) the injury is likely redressable by a favorable
ORDER
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decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409
2
(2013).
3
To constitute a concrete injury sufficient to support standing, the injury “must be ‘de
4
facto’; that is, it must actually exist.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (citing
5
Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009)). And for an injury to be imminent, it must certainly
6
impending;” thus, “‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” Clapper, 568 U.S.
7
at 409 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
8
The Supreme Court has clarified the types of injuries that must be shown by
9
environmental plaintiffs, specifying that “[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III
10
standing . . . is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.” Friends of the Earth,
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Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). Thus, “environmental
12
plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are
13
persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the
14
challenged activity.” Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). And
15
absent an injury in fact, an environmental plaintiff cannot premise his or her standing on alleged
16
deprivation of a procedural right. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)
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(“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the
18
deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.”).
19
When “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful
20
regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,” the plaintiff must make a strong showing on
21
the elements of standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. “Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the
22
object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but is
23
ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” Id. (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 758).
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The CWA’s citizen suit provision “extends standing to the outer boundaries” set by
25
Article III of the Constitution. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141,
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1147 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453
ORDER
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U.S. 1, 16 (1981)). “In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no
2
longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence
3
‘specific facts,’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion
4
will be taken to be true.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
5
6
i.
Myron Angstman
Myron Angstman is a member of Plaintiff Sierra Club and resides in Bethel, Alaska near
7
the Kuskokwim River. (See Dkt No. 67-3 at 1–2.) Angstman has expressed aesthetic and
8
recreational interests in the Kuskokwim River and the salmon it provides. (Id. at 2–3.) The
9
proposed Donlin Gold Mine project is located approximately 250 miles upstream from Bethel
10
and has been issued a Section 404 permit by the Corps. (Id. at 3–4.) Angstman first visited the
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Donlin project site in 1982 and has since returned several times. (Id. at 3.) The Donlin project
12
encompasses Crooked Creek, a tributary of the Kuskokwim River, and two of Crooked Creek’s
13
tributaries, American Creek and Lewis Gulch. (Id.) Angstman believes the Corps is relying on
14
the Waste Treatment System Exclusion to exclude natural surface waters within the project site,
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including American Creek and Lewis Gulch, so the mine’s operator can avoid violating water
16
quality standards beyond the project site. (Id. at 5.)
17
Angstman raises several concerns about the Donlin project, but none are sufficient to
18
support his standing to challenge the Waste Treatment System Exclusion. First, he voices general
19
concerns about negative effects of the Donlin project’s development pursuant to Section 404,
20
such as a general decline in the Kuskokwim River watershed’s water quality, contamination of
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surface waters, and “secondary effects” such as habitat destruction and increased barge traffic.
22
(See id. at 4, 6, 8.) But these alleged injuries are attributable to the Donlin project’s Section 404
23
permit, not the Waste Treatment System Exclusion, and thus are not fairly traceable to the
24
provision of the CWA Plaintiffs seek to challenge through this motion. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at
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560–61; Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Angstman next states that he is concerned that the Donlin
26
project’s waste treatment systems “will not perform as intended” and thus will allow pollutants
ORDER
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to harm the Kuskokwim River’s salmon populations or water quality. (Dkt. No. 67-3 at 4, 6.) But
2
these concerns are purely speculative: Angstman’s concerns of future harms necessarily rely on
3
the theoretical malfunction of the Donlin project’s waste treatment systems, and thus his claimed
4
injuries are neither concrete nor imminent. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at
5
1548; Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. 5
6
Plaintiffs assert that Angstman’s “primary harm” arises from his concern that the Donlin
7
project will reduce the “ecological services” that American Creek and Lewis Gulch perform for
8
the Kuskokwim River watershed, which may in turn harm his interests in maintaining Crooked
9
Creek and the Kuskokwim River as clean sources of drinking water and salmon habitats. (See
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Dkt. Nos. 67-3 at 6, 83 at 10.) But while Angstman asserts aesthetic interests in Crooked Creek
11
arising from his infrequent visits beginning in 1982, (see Dkt. No. 67-3 at 3), he does not express
12
recreational or aesthetic interests in American Creek or Lewis Gulch, (see generally id.). Absent
13
such interests, Angstman’s concerns cannot support an actionable injury in fact arising from
14
those bodies of water. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63;
15
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735. Further, Angstman’s assertion that the impoundment of American
16
Creek and Lewis Gulch may lead to contamination of Crooked Creek, which may in turn
17
negatively impact his aesthetic and recreational interests in the Kuskokwim River, is too
18
speculative to establish a concrete and imminent injury in fact. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548;
19
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. And finally, Angstman’s subjective belief that the Agencies are
20
relying on the Waste Treatment System Exclusion to impound American Creek and Lewis Gulch
21
is insufficient to carry Plaintiffs’ burden of establishing that Angstman’s injuries flow from the
22
Waste Treatment System Exclusion. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
23
In sum, Angstman has not identified an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the Waste
24
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5
Angstman acknowledges that the CWA imposes several requirements on new gold
mines to limit discharges and otherwise protect waters of the United States within and outside of
the mine site. (Dkt. No. 67-3 at 4–5.)
ORDER
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Treatment System Exclusion. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Absent
2
an injury in fact, Angstman cannot premise his standing on the alleged procedural defects in the
3
Agencies’ promulgation of the Waste Treatment System Exclusion within the WOTUS Rule. See
4
Summers, 555 U.S. at 496; (Dkt. No. 67-3 at 7–8). Therefore, Plaintiff Sierra Club lacks
5
representational standing to challenge the Waste Treatment System Exclusion on Angstman’s
6
behalf. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 67) is
7
DENIED and Defendants and Intervenors’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 72,
8
79) are GRANTED on this ground.
9
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ii.
James DeWitt
James DeWitt is a member of Plaintiff Idaho Conservation League and lives in Boise,
11
Idaho. (Dkt. No. 67-6 at 2.) DeWitt engages in outdoor recreation centered around clean water,
12
including birding and catch-and-release flyfishing. (Id.) DeWitt expresses personal recreational
13
and aesthetic interests in the Boise River, the Salmon River, and the Salmon River’s watershed
14
and tributaries. (See id. at 3–5.) DeWitt also expresses more general interests in various Pacific
15
Northwest wetland and marshes, Idaho’s salmon populations, and waters throughout the Western
16
Hemisphere used by migratory birds. (Id.) DeWitt is concerned about the Agencies’ potential use
17
of the Waste Treatment System Exclusion to exclude waters of the United States from
18
protection. (See id. at 8.)
19
DeWitt first expresses concerns about the Midas Gold Corporation’s proposed stibnite
20
and gold mine at the headwaters of the East Fork South Fork Salmon River. (Id. at 6.) DeWitt
21
believes that the Agencies “may rely on the Waste Treatment System Exclusion” to use several
22
surface streams that “appear to meet the definition of ‘waters of the United States’ under the
23
2015 Final Rule” to treat waste without a plan to ensure the streams meet applicable water
24
quality standards. (Id. at 6–7.) But general counsel for the Midas Gold Corporation’s has
25
declared that the Midas mine’s proposed waste treatment program does not rely on the Waste
26
Treatment System Exclusion at all, (see Dkt. No. 74 at 4), and DeWitt has not offered
ORDER
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contravening evidence in support of his speculative belief regarding the Agencies’ possible use
2
of the provision, (see generally Dkt. No. 67-6). 6 Therefore, DeWitt’s declaration does not satisfy
3
Plaintiffs’ burden on summary judgment that his purported harms flow from the Midas mine’s
4
use of the Waste Treatment System Exclusion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
5
In addition, even assuming the Midas mine implicated the Waste Treatment System
6
Exclusion, DeWitt has not asserted that his own aesthetic and recreational interests in the
7
relevant area will be lessened. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183; (Dkt. No. 67-6 at 6) (“I
8
care about preserving Chinook salmon as well as water clean enough to support human contact
9
recreation so I am concerned that [the proposed Midas mine will] harm water quality.”).
10
Moreover, DeWitt’s concerns regarding harmful discharges from the Midas mine necessarily
11
assume that the proposed Midas mine’s waste treatment systems will fail; such speculation does
12
not establish a concrete and imminent injury in fact. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; Clapper,
13
568 U.S. at 40; (Dkt. No. 67-6 at 7); (see also Dkt. No. 74 at 4) (discussing proposed Midas
14
mine’s obligations to comply with discharge limits pursuant to permits and Section 402 of the
15
CWA). Thus, DeWitt has not established that he has standing to challenge the Waste Treatment
16
System Exclusion based on his alleged harms flowing from the Midas mine. See Lujan, 504 U.S.
17
at 561.
18
Next, DeWitt states that he is concerned about the Hecla Grouse Creek Mine, a
19
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21
22
23
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25
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6
In a footnote, Plaintiffs acknowledge the general counsel’s statement that the Midas
mine will not rely on the Waste Treatment System Exclusion and state that the proposed
development plan “shows that portions of Fiddle Creek and Meadow Creek would be used as
settling ponds or channels for conveyed polluted runoff away from mining operations.” (Dkt. No.
83 at 11–12 n.2.) The Court assumes that Plaintiffs mean to imply that the use of these bodies of
water demonstrate that the Agencies will in fact rely on the Waste Treatment System Exclusion
for the Midas mine. But DeWitt’s declaration does not mention Fiddle Creek or Meadow Creek,
(see generally Dkt. No. 67-6), and Plaintiffs have not offered evidence establishing that either
body of water qualifies as a “water of the United States” that may be subject to the Waste
Treatment System Exclusion, (see Dkt. No. 83 at 11–12 n.2). Thus, Plaintiffs’ statement is
insufficient to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to the Midas mine’s reliance on
the Waste Treatment System Exclusion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
ORDER
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Superfund site located in the Salmon River watershed that was recently given a renewed CWA
2
permit. (Dkt. No. 67-6 at 7.) The Hecla mine contains a large pile of mine tailings and
3
overburden whose effluent is collected in a settling pond, discharged into Pinyon Creek, and then
4
discharged into Jordan Creek. (Id.) The Hecla mine’s permit requires it to comply with effluent
5
discharge limitations from Pinyon Creek to Jordan Creek; DeWitt takes issue with the lack of
6
protections accorded to the confluence point between the settling pond and Pinyon Creek. (Id.)
7
DeWitt has not expressed aesthetic or recreational interests in Pinyon Creek that have
8
been lessened by its alleged use as part of a waste treatment system, and thus he has not
9
adequately alleged an injury in fact arising from Pinyon Creek. See Friends of the Earth, 528
10
U.S. at 183; (see generally Dkt. No. 67-6.) 7 In addition, Dewitt has acknowledged that any
11
discharge from Pinyon Creek to Jordan Creek must comply with the Hecla mine’s CWA permit,
12
and he has not pointed to any instance when the Hecla mine violated its permit and thereby
13
harmed waters in which he maintains aesthetic or recreational interests. (See generally Dkt. No.
14
67-6; see also Dkt. No. 83 at 11) (discussing the Hecla mine’s location upstream of waters in
15
which DeWitt maintains recreational interests but failing to identify instances of harm to those
16
waters). Therefore, DeWitt has failed to identify a concrete and imminent injury to his interests
17
sufficient to support his standing to challenge the Waste Treatment System Exclusion. See
18
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183.
19
In sum, DeWitt has not identified an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the Waste
20
Treatment System Exclusion. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Absent
21
an injury in fact, DeWitt cannot premise his standing on the alleged procedural defects in the
22
Agencies’ promulgation of the Waste Treatment System Exclusion within the WOTUS Rule. See
23
Summers, 555 U.S. at 496. Therefore, Plaintiff Idaho Conservation League lacks representational
24
standing to challenge the Waste Treatment System Exclusion on DeWitt’s behalf. See Hunt, 432
25
7
26
In response to comments on draft NDPES permits for the Hecla site, the EPA noted that
Pinyon Creek has been “permanently dewatered.” (Dkt. No. 73-13 at 33.)
ORDER
C15-1342-JCC
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Case 2:15-cv-01342-JCC Document 103 Filed 11/25/19 Page 13 of 15
1
U.S. at 343. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 67) is DENIED and Defendants
2
and Intervenors’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 72, 79) are GRANTED on this
3
ground.
4
5
2. Organizational Standing
Plaintiffs briefly assert that their organizational declarations establish their standing to
6
sue, as each describes “how both the substantive and procedural failures in the 2015 Rule harm
7
the Plaintiff groups’ ability to achieve their organizational missions.” (Dkt. No. 83 at 13.)
8
9
To establish organizational standing separate from that of its members, an organization
must “allege[] such a ‘personal stake’ in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant the
10
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. E.P.A., 667 F.3d 6, 11
11
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433
12
(D.C. Cir. 1995)). Therefore, the organization “must demonstrate that it has ‘suffered injury in
13
fact,’ including ‘[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with
14
[a] consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitut[ing] . . . more than simply a
15
setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Nat’l
16
Taxpayers Union, 68 F.3d at 1433). An organization’s advocacy efforts during the administrative
17
process or litigation expenses incurred in challenging a given regulation are insufficient to
18
establish a concrete and demonstrable injury. See id. at 12 (citing Ctr. for Law & Educ. V. Dep’t
19
of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152. 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Nat’l Taxpayers Union, 68 F.3d at 1434; Spann
20
v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
21
Dalal Aboulhosn is Plaintiff Sierra Club’s Deputy Legislative Director and discusses
22
Plaintiff Sierra Club’s interests in ensuring that the CWA is fully enforced and consistent with
23
the Agencies’ regulations. (See Dkt. No. 67-4 at 1–3.) Aboulhosn describes Plaintiff Sierra
24
Club’s expenditure of resources in advocating against the Waste Treatment System Exclusion
25
during the administrative process and subsequent litigation challenging the provision, (see id. at
26
3–4), but these expenditures do not constitute an injury in fact sufficient to establish
ORDER
C15-1342-JCC
PAGE - 13
Case 2:15-cv-01342-JCC Document 103 Filed 11/25/19 Page 14 of 15
1
organizational standing. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 667 F.3d at 12.
2
Similarly, Chris Wilke, the Executive Director of Plaintiff Puget Soundkeeper, discusses
3
Plaintiff Puget Soundkeeper’s mission to protect the waters of Puget Sound. (See Dkt. No. 67-5
4
at 1–2.) Wilke does not identify any particular expenditure of Plaintiff Puget Soundkeeper
5
constituting a drain of resources sufficient to demonstrate injury in fact, and thus his declaration
6
does not establish Plaintiff Puget Soundkeeper’s organizational standing to challenge the Waste
7
Treatment System Exclusion. (See generally id.); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 667 F.3d at 12. 8
8
Finally, Austin Walkins is a senior conservation associate with Plaintiff Idaho
9
Conservation League, who discusses Plaintiff Idaho Conservation League’s mission to protect
10
Idaho’s environment. (See Dkt. No. 67-7 at 1–2.) Walkins discusses Plaintiff Idaho Conservation
11
League’s practice of objecting to the use of the Waste Treatment System Exclusion in specific
12
proposals for new or expanded projects in Idaho but does not identify a drain on Plaintiff Idaho
13
Conservation League’s resources beyond its normal advocacy efforts and operational costs. (See
14
generally id.) Therefore, Walkins has not identified an injury in fact sufficient to establish
15
Plaintiff Idaho Conservation League’s organizational standing. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home
16
Builders, 667 F.3d at 12; Nat’l Taxpayers Union, 68 F.3d at 1434.
17
Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have suffered an injury in fact
18
sufficient to support their organizational standing to challenge the Waste Treatment System
19
Exclusion. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 667 F.3d at 11. And because Plaintiffs have failed
20
to identify an injury in fact attributable to the Waste Treatment System Exclusion, Plaintiffs may
21
8
22
23
24
25
26
Wilke also discusses his personal interests in Puget Sound and its surrounding water
features and states that he is concerned that the Waste Treatment System Exclusion will be used
to strip various water features of protection, thereby causing a general decline in Puget Sound’s
water quality. (See Dkt. No. 67-5 at 4–7.) But Wilke does not identify any project, proposed or
existing, that is causing or will soon cause the harms he is concerned about. (See generally id.)
Therefore, Wilke’s declaration does not demonstrate that he has suffered a concrete and
imminent injury in fact capable of supporting Plaintiff Puget Soundkeeper’s representational
standing to challenge the Waste Treatment System Exclusion. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61;
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181, 183.
ORDER
C15-1342-JCC
PAGE - 14
Case 2:15-cv-01342-JCC Document 103 Filed 11/25/19 Page 15 of 15
1
not premise their organizational standing on the alleged procedural defects in the Agencies’
2
promulgation of the Waste Treatment System Exclusion within the WOTUS Rule. See Summers,
3
555 U.S. at 496. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 67) is DENIED
4
and Defendants and Intervenors’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 72, 79) are
5
GRANTED on this ground.
6
III.
7
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 67) is
8
DENIED and Defendants and Intervenors’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 72,
9
79) are GRANTED on the issue of Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the Waste Treatment System
10
11
Exclusion via the instant motion.
DATED this 25th day of November 2019.
A
12
13
14
John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15
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19
20
21
22
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24
25
26
ORDER
C15-1342-JCC
PAGE - 15
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