Amirkhanov v. Colvin

Filing 24

ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING DEFENDANT'S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS by Judge David W. Christel. (KEB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

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AZAT AMIRKHANOV,

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Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 2:15-cv-01541-DWC
ORDER REVERSING AND

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,

REMANDING DEFENDANT’S
DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS

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Defendant.
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Plaintiff Azat Amirkhanov filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial
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review of Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)
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and supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to have this
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matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See Dkt. 6.
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After considering the record, the Court concludes the Administrative Law Judge
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(“ALJ”) erred by failing to provide clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial
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evidence for giving little weight to the opinion of examining psychologist Dr. Owen J.
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS
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1 Bargreen. Further, the ALJ failed to provide germane reasons supported by substantial
2 evidence for giving little weight to the opinion of Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner
3 (“ARNP”) Karen A. Rongren. Had the ALJ properly considered the opinions of Dr. Bargreen
4 and Ms. Rongren, the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) may have included additional
5 limitations. The ALJ’s error is therefore harmful, and this matter is reversed and remanded
6 pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Acting Commissioner for further
7 proceedings consistent with this Order.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI benefits, alleging

10 disability as of November 1, 2010. See Dkt. 8, Administrative Record (“AR”) 16. The
11 applications were denied upon initial administrative review and on reconsideration. AR 16. A
12 hearing was held before ALJ Ruperta M. Alexis on September 23, 2013. See AR 33-85. In a
13 decision dated January 27, 2014, the ALJ determined Plaintiff to be not disabled. See AR 1614 27. Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision was denied by the Appeals Council,
15 making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
16 (“Commissioner”). See AR 1-6; 20 C.F.R. § 404.981, § 416.1481.
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In Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, Plaintiff maintains the ALJ committed harmful error by

18 failing to properly consider: (1) the opinion of Dr. Owen Bargreen; and (2) the opinion of
19 Plaintiff’s treating nurse practitioner, Ms. Karen Rongren. Dkt. 17, pp. 1-2.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of

22 social security benefits if the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
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1 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1
2 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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DISCUSSION
I.

Whether the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion evidence of Dr.
Owen Bargreen.

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Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in giving little weight to the opinion of examining
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psychologist Dr. Owen J. Bargreen, Psy.D. Dkt. 17, pp. 2-6.
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The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted
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opinion of either a treating or examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
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Cir. 1996) (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988); Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908
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F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990)). When a treating or examining physician’s opinion is
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contradicted, the opinion can be rejected “for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported
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by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53
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F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995); Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). The
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ALJ can accomplish this by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and
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conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick
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v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751
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(9th Cir. 1989)).
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A. Dr. Bargreen’s Findings
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Dr. Bargreen completed two psychological evaluations of Plaintiff. See AR 813-17,
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835-38. During the first evaluation, on April 18, 2011, Dr. Bargreen interviewed and observed
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Plaintiff and conducted a mental status examination (“MSE”). AR 813-17. Dr. Bargreen
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observed the following symptoms: depression, interpersonal problems, and panic attacks. AR
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814. During the MSE, Dr. Bargreen observed Plaintiff was normally dressed with moderate
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
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1 body odor, oriented times three, tangential in thought, and generally explained himself
2 adequately. AR 816. Plaintiff was able to repeat four and six digits forwards and backwards,
3 but was not able to repeat five digits forwards and backwards. AR 816. Dr. Bargreen found
4 Plaintiff had a below average general knowledge compared to his peers because he knew the
5 capital of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, three United States presidents, and the makeup
6 of water, but did not know the capital of Holland, Cleopatra, or on what continent Boliva is
7 located. AR 816. Dr. Bargreen found Plaintiff had a below average vocabulary and mild
8 struggles with verbal expression. AR 816. He noted Plaintiff was able to define breakfast and
9 knew the word “reluctant,” but did not know the words “ominous,” “pragmatic,” or “generate.”
10 AR 816. Plaintiff was able to repeat simple commands and spell “world” forward and
11 backward; however, he failed serial sevens. AR 816. Dr. Bargreen also noted Plaintiff’s ability
12 to combine abstract thinking with fluid intelligence was considerably below his peers, but
13 Plaintiff’s social judgment appeared to be similar to his peers. AR 816.
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Dr. Bargreen opined Plaintiff was mild to moderately impaired in his ability to

15 understand, remember, and persist in tasks following simple instructions and moderately
16 impaired in understanding, remembering, and persisting in following complex instructions,
17 learning new tasks, performing routine tasks without undue supervision, being aware of normal
18 hazards and taking appropriate precautions, communicating and performing effectively in a
19 work setting with public contact, and maintaining appropriate behavior in a work setting. AR
20 815-16. Dr. Bargreen also found Plaintiff markedly impaired in his ability to communicate and
21 perform effectively in a work setting with limited public contact. AR 816.
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On January 5, 2012, Dr. Bargreen again evaluated Plaintiff. He interviewed and

23 observed Plaintiff and performed a second MSE. AR 835-38. Dr. Bargreen observed Plaintiff
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
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1 exhibited the following symptoms: sadness, nervousness, lethargy, agitation, and anger issues.
2 AR 835. Compared to the April 2011 MSE, Dr. Bargreen recorded very similar results and
3 limitations during the January 2012 MSE. See AR 837-38. For example, Dr. Bargreen found
4 Plaintiff had considerably below average general knowledge ability, some marked struggles
5 with verbal expression, moderate struggles with his attention and concentration, and his ability
6 to combine abstract thinking with fluid intelligence was below his peers. AR 837-38. Unlike
7 the April 2011 MSE, during the January 2012 MSE, Dr. Bargreen found Plaintiff’s social
8 judgment appeared to be below his peers. AR 838.
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Dr. Bargreen opined Plaintiff “appears to have a below average cognitive ability and

10 memory ability. [He] has some moderate mental health problems which prevent him from
11 working at this time.” AR 836. He also found Plaintiff is irritable and generally does not relate
12 well with others. AR 837. Dr. Bargreen opined Plaintiff was capable of volunteering or
13 working part-time. AR 836.
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B. ALJ’s Findings

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The ALJ found:

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Little weight is assigned to the consultative DSHS opinions from
Owen J. Bargreen, Psy.D., that the claimant’s GAF score is 50
and that he has marked mental health limitations, as he (1) did not
review any evidence of record and instead relied entirely on the
claimant’s subjective report of symptoms; a problem, for as
discussed above, the claimant is less than fully credible. (2) Dr.
Bargreen’s opinions are also inconsistent with his own exam
results as outlined above.

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AR 25 (internal citations omitted, numbering added).
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First, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Bargreen’s opinions because Dr. Bargreen did
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not review any evidence of record but instead relied entirely on Plaintiff’s subjective reports of
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his symptoms. AR 25. An ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion “if it is based ‘to a large
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
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1 extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as incredible.”
2 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r. Soc.
3 Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999)). This situation is distinguishable from one in
4 which the doctor provides his own observations in support of his assessments and opinions.
5 See Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2008) (“an ALJ
6 does not provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting an examining physician’s opinion
7 by questioning the credibility of the patient’s complaints where the doctor does not discredit
8 those complaints and supports his ultimate opinion with his own observations”); see also
9 Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001). “[W]hen an opinion is not more
10 heavily based on a patient’s self-reports than on clinical observations, there is no evidentiary
11 basis for rejecting the opinion.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
12 Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1199-1200).
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In reaching his opinions, Dr. Bargreen relied on his own observations, documented

14 results of the MSEs, and Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and reported mental health history.
15 AR 813-17, 835-38. Dr. Bargreen did not discredit Plaintiff’s subjective reports, and supported
16 his ultimate opinions with the mental examinations and his own observations. See AR 813-17,
17 835-38.
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When finding Dr. Bargreen relied entirely on Plaintiff’s subjective reports, the ALJ

19 noted Dr. Bargreen did not review any evidence of record. AR 25. However, the ALJ failed to
20 explain why this fact discredits Dr. Bargreen’s opinions. See AR 25. Defendant maintains,
21 citing Bayliss, an “ALJ may reject an examining physician’s opinion when the physician fails
22 to review a claimant’s records.” Dkt. 22, p. 3; Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. In Bayliss, the Ninth
23 Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s decision to give less weight to the examining physician because the
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
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1 physician did not review objective medical data or reports from treating physicians, but based
2 his opinion entirely on the claimant’s complaints and information submitted by family, friends,
3 and a former counselor. 437 F.3d at 1217. Unlike Bayliss, Dr. Bargreen relied on his own
4 observations, results from the MSEs he administered, and Plaintiff’s reported mental health
5 history and subjective complaints. Defendant cites, and the Court finds, no authority holding
6 an examining physician’s failure to supplement his own examination and observations with
7 additional records is a specific and legitimate reason to give less weight to the opinion.
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As Dr. Bargreen based his opinion of Plaintiff’s limitations on a combination of

9 personal observations, mental examinations, and Plaintiff’s mental health history and
10 subjective reports, the Court concludes the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Bargreen relied entirely on
11 Plaintiff’s subjective report of symptoms in forming his opinions is not specific and legitimate
12 reason supported by substantial evidence.
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Second, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Bargreen’s opinions because the opinions are

14 inconsistent with his own exam results. Discrepancies between a doctor’s functional
15 assessment and his clinical notes, recorded observations, and other comments regarding a
16 claimant’s capabilities “is a clear and convincing reason for not relying” on the assessment.
17 Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216; see also Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir. 1989).
18 However, “an ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while
19 doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical
20 opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a
21 substantive basis for his conclusion.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012-13 (9th Cir.
22 2014) (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir.1996)).
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
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Here, the ALJ failed to identify the specific evidence contained within Dr. Bargreen’s

2 exam results which contradict his opinions. AR 25. Rather, the ALJ provided only a
3 conclusory statement finding the exam results were inconsistent with the limitations opined by
4 Dr. Bargreen. See AR 25. Without more, the ALJ has failed to meet the level of specificity
5 required to reject a physician’s opinion. Therefore, the ALJ’s conclusory statement finding Dr.
6 Bargreen’s opinions are “inconsistent with his own exam results” is insufficient to reject the
7 opinion. See Embry v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (conclusory reasons do
8 “not achieve the level of specificity” required to justify an ALJ’s rejection of an opinion);
9 McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) (an ALJ’s rejection of a physician’s
10 opinion on the ground that it was contrary to clinical findings in the record was “broad and
11 vague, failing to specify why the ALJ felt the treating physician’s opinion was flawed”).
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The ALJ stated Dr. Bargreen’s opinions were not supported by his exam results as

13 outlined earlier in her decision. AR 25. Even if this statement was sufficiently specific, the
14 Court finds error because the ALJ only discussed the MSE results which supported finding
15 Plaintiff “not entirely credible.” See AR 23. For example, the ALJ stated Plaintiff was oriented
16 times three, was able to memorize three simple objects, and repeated four and six digits
17 forwards and backwards. AR 23. She did not discuss Dr. Bargreen’s finding that Plaintiff could
18 not repeat five digits forwards and backwards. See AR 23, 816, 837. The ALJ also noted
19 Plaintiff could correctly identify the United States capital, name three United States presidents,
20 define the word “breakfast, and recognize the word “curious.” AR 23. She did not discuss the
21 MSE results showing Plaintiff did not know Benjamin Franklin, Cleopatra, and Napoleon
22 Bonaparte; the capital of Holland; the words “ominous,” “pragmatic,” “generate,” “acute,”
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
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1 “ruminate,” or “palliate;” and could not identify the continent on which Boliva is located. See
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The ALJ failed to discuss any exam results showing Plaintiff had limitations.

4 Accordingly, the Court concludes, even if the ALJ’s statement referencing the exam results
5 discussed earlier in her opinion was sufficiently specific to reject Dr. Bargreen’s opinions, the
6 finding is not supported by substantial evidence. See Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1465 (“where the
7 purported existence of an inconsistency is squarely contradicted by the record, it may not serve
8 as the basis for the rejection of an examining physician’s conclusion”).
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The Court also notes the ALJ failed to discuss all of Dr. Bargreen’s opinions. The ALJ

10 “need not discuss all evidence presented.” Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.3d 1393,
11 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the ALJ “may not reject ‘significant probative evidence’
12 without explanation.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Vincent,
13 739 F.2d at 1395). The “ALJ’s written decision must state reasons for disregarding [such]
14 evidence.” Flores, 49 F.3d at 571. Here, the ALJ did not discuss in detail Dr. Bargreen’s
15 opinions. See AR 25. She only broadly identified two portions of Dr. Bargreen’s opinions: (1)
16 Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores; and (2) Plaintiff’s marked mental health
17 limitations. AR 25. Dr. Bargreen opined Plaintiff had several functional limitations which
18 impacted his ability to perform full-time work. See AR 813-17, 835-38. For example, Dr.
19 Bargreen found Plaintiff had several moderate impairments and one marked impairment. See
20 AR 815-16. He also opined Plaintiff would be unable to work full-time. AR 836. The ALJ
21 failed to discuss this significant, probative evidence, which is error.
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There are additional exam results showing Plaintiff had limitations which were not discussed by the ALJ.
The Court has provided a portion of the results to illustrate the ALJ only discussed the findings within the MSEs
which supported finding Plaintiff not entirely credible.
ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS
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For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes the ALJ failed to provide specific

2 and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for giving little weight to Dr.
3 Bargreen’s opinions. Accordingly, the ALJ erred.
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“[H]armless error principles apply in the Social Security context.” Molina v. Astrue,

5 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless, however, only if it is not prejudicial
6 to the claimant or “inconsequential” to the ALJ’s “ultimate nondisability determination.” Stout
7 v. Commissioner, Social Security Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006); see Molina,
8 674 F.3d at 1115. The determination as to whether an error is harmless requires a “case9 specific application of judgment” by the reviewing court, based on an examination of the
10 record made “‘without regard to errors’ that do not affect the parties’ ‘substantial rights.’”
11 Molina, 674 F.3d at 1118-1119 (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009)).
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Had the ALJ properly considered the opinions of Dr. Bargreen, she may have included

13 additional limitations in the RFC and in the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational
14 expert, Mark A. Harrington. For example, Dr. Bargreen opined Plaintiff is only able to work
15 part-time because of his mental impairments. AR 836. He also found Plaintiff will not do well
16 with tasks when he is not under careful supervision. AR 816. If Dr. Bargreen’s opinions were
17 given great weight, the ALJ may have found Plaintiff unable to work full-time or may have
18 found Plaintiff needed to have close interaction with supervisors. Instead, the ALJ found
19 Plaintiff was able to perform sedentary work with limitations, including only occasional
20 interaction with supervisors. AR 22. As the ultimate disability determination may have
21 changed, the ALJ’s error is not harmless.
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
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II.

Whether the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion of Karen A.
Rongren, ARNP.

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Plaintiff maintains the ALJ erred when she gave little weight to the opinion of Karen A.
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Rongren, ARNP. Dkt. 17, pp. 6-10.
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Pursuant to the relevant federal regulations, medical opinions from “other medical
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sources,” such as nurse practitioners, therapists and chiropractors, must be considered. See 20
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C.F.R. § 404.1513 (d); see also Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223-24 (9th
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Cir. 2010) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), (d)); SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939. “Other
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medical source” testimony “is competent evidence that an ALJ must take into account,” unless
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the ALJ “expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane to each
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witness for doing so.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001); Turner, 613 F.3d at
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1224. “Further, the reasons “germane to each witness” must be specific.” Bruce v. Astrue, 557
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F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009); see Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054 (explaining “the ALJ, not the
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district court, is required to provide specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony”).
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Ms. Rongren, Plaintiff’s treating nurse practitioner, submitted a letter stating Plaintiff is
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being treated for a lumbar disc herniation, a right shoulder rotator cuff injury, uncontrolled
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insulin dependent type II diabetes, and chronic, severe anxiety. AR 1089. Ms. Rongren opined
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Plaintiff needs help pulling a shirt over his head when he dresses, moving or lifting things such
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as cookware, boxes, or books, and ascending and descending stairs. AR 1089.
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In regard to Ms. Rongren’s opinion, the ALJ stated:
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although some weight is given to the opinion from Karen A.
Rongren, ARNP, that the claimant has both mental and physical
limitations, little weight is given to portions of it such as her
statement that he has, “lumbar disc herniation which causes
chronic pains and will require surgery soon,” and “chronic severe
anxiety,” because this is ([1]) not supported by the objective

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evidence or his daily activities, and ([2]) . . . she is not an
acceptable medical source.

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AR 25 (internal citations omitted, numbering added).
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First, the ALJ found Ms. Rongren’s opinion was entitled to less weight because it was
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not supported by objective evidence or Plaintiff’s daily activities. AR 25. While the Court
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finds these two reasons may be germane, 2 the ALJ’s reasoning is not sufficiently specific. “The
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ALJ must provide an explanation for his determination.” McCann v. Colvin, 111 F.Supp.3d
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1166, 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (citing Van Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1467); see also Embrey, 849
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F.2d at 421-22 (conclusory reasons do “not achieve the level of specificity” required to justify
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an ALJ’s rejection of an opinion). The ALJ has provided only a conclusory statement, and does
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not explain which pieces of objective evidence or daily activities fail to support Ms. Rongren’s
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opinion. Further, the ALJ does not clarify which portions of Ms. Rongren’s opinion she finds
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to be unsupported by the evidence and Plaintiff’s daily activities.
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As the ALJ failed to provide any explanation regarding her findings, the Court cannot
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determine if she has provided specific, germane reasons supported by substantial evidence for
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giving little weight to Ms. Rongren’s opinion. See McCann, 111 F.Supp.3d at 1175 (finding
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the ALJ failed to provide specific, germane reasons for discounting a nurse practitioner when
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An ALJ may discredit lay testimony if it conflicts with medical evidence; however, an opinion cannot be

19 rejected as unsupported by the medical evidence. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511 (an ALJ may discount lay testimony
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that “conflicts with medical evidence”); Bruce, 557 F.3d at 1116; see also Wobbe v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4026820, *8,
n. 4 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2013), aff'd, 589 Fed. App’x 384 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting Bruce “stands for the proposition that
an ALJ cannot discount lay testimony regarding a claimant’s symptoms solely because it is unsupported by the
medical evidence in the record; it does not hold inconsistency with the medical evidence is not a germane reason to
reject lay testimony” (emphasis in original)). An ALJ may also reject lay witness evidence if other evidence in the
record regarding the claimant’s activities is inconsistent with the lay witness’s opinion. See Carmickle v.
Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ’s rejection of lay witness evidence
because it was inconsistent with claimant’s successful completion of continuous full-time coursework constituted
reason germane to the lay witness). Here, the ALJ discredited Ms. Rongren’s opinion because it was not supported
by objective evidence, not because it was inconsistent with the record. As such, this is likely not a germane reason.
However, inconsistencies with daily activities may be a germane reason for giving little weight to Ms. Rongren’s
opinion.
ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS
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1 the ALJ provide no explanation for finding the opinion was inconsistent with the overall
2 medical record, the claimant’s daily activities, and his work history); Blakes v. Barnhart, 331
3 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We require the ALJ to build an accurate and logical bridge
4 from the evidence to her conclusions so that we may afford the claimant meaningful review of
5 the SSA’s ultimate findings.”); Gilbert v. Colvin, 2015 WL 4039338, * 5 (W.D. Wash. July 2,
6 2015) (finding the ALJ did not provide a sufficiently specific reason to discredit a claimant’s
7 parents when the ALJ did not give “any idea as to what in the medical evidence was
8 inconsistent” with the opinion and concluding the ALJ’s finding was further suspect because
9 the ALJ relied on medical evidence he improperly considered).
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Second, the ALJ gave little weight to Ms. Rongren’s opinion because Ms. Rongren is

11 not an acceptable medical source. A medical opinion from an “acceptable medical source” is a
12 factor “that may justify giving that opinion greater weight than an opinion from a medical
13 source who is not an ‘acceptable medical source’;” however, “after applying the factors for
14 weighing opinion evidence, an opinion from a medial source who is not an ‘acceptable medical
15 source’ may outweigh the opinion of an ‘acceptable medical source,’ including the medical
16 opinion of a treating source.” See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 06-03P, 2006 WL 2329939.
17 As such, an ALJ may not reject an opinion from a nurse practitioner merely because she is not
18 an “acceptable medical source,” as the ALJ did in this case. See AR 25; Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511
19 (“Other medical source” testimony “is competent evidence that an ALJ must take into
20 account”). The Court therefore finds ALJ’s second reason for giving little weight to Ms.
21 Rongren’s opinion is not germane.
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For the above stated reasons, the Court finds the ALJ erred by failing to provide

23 specific, germane reasons supported by substantial evidence for giving little weight to Ms.
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS
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1 Rongren’s opinion. As Ms. Rongren found Plaintiff was more severely limited than the
2 limitations contained in the RFC, the ultimate disability decision may have changed if her
3 opinion was given great weight. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115-17. Therefore, the error is not
4 harmless and requires remand.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby finds the ALJ improperly concluded

7 Plaintiff was not disabled. Accordingly, Defendant’s decision to deny benefits is reversed and
8 this matter is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order.
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Dated this 18th day of April, 2016.

A

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David W. Christel
United States Magistrate Judge

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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS
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