Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Trans Ocean Seafoods, Inc.

Filing 224

ORDER denying Defendant Trans Ocean Seafoods, Inc.'s 180 Motion for Attorney Fees, signed by Judge Richard A Jones. (SWT)

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,

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ORDER

v.
SERAPIA MATAMOROS, et al.,

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Case No. 15-1563-RAJ

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,
v.
TRANS OCEAN SEAFOODS, INC.,

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Defendant.

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I.

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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Trans Ocean Seafoods, Inc.’s
(“Trans Ocean”) Motion for Attorney’s Fees. Dkt. # 180. For the reasons that follow,
the Court DENIES Trans Ocean’s motion.
II. BACKGROUND

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INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 2015, Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) filed this action against Trans Ocean alleging federal claims for sexual
harassment, constructive discharge, and retaliation. Dkt. # 1 (Complaint). EEOC
brought the action to seek relief for current and former employees of Trans Ocean,
ORDER – 1

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Serapia Matamoros, Elena Perea Olea, Celia Sanchez Perea, and Maricela Dominguez. 1
Three of those employees, Serapia Matamoros, Elena Perea Olea, Celia Sanchez Perea,
joined the lawsuit as Plaintiffs-Intervenors alleging federal and state claims against Trans
Ocean for sexual harassment and retaliation. Dkt. # 12 (Intervenor Complaint).
The Court held a jury trial from March 27 to April 24, 2017. The jury reached a
partial verdict. They deadlocked on the EEOC’s federal sexual harassment claim seeking
relief for Serapia Matamoros and Plaintiff-Intervenor Serapia Matamoros’ federal and
state sexual harassment claims. The Court declared a mistrial on those claims. The jury
found against EEOC and Plaintiffs-Intervenors on all other claims. Now, Trans Ocean
moves for attorneys’ fees. Dkt. # 180. EEOC and Plaintiffs-Intervenors oppose the
motion. Dkt. ## 191, 199.
III. DISCUSSION

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Title VII permits a prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees under certain
circumstances:

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In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or
the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part
of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The threshold inquiry for the Court is whether the party seeking

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fees qualifies as the “prevailing party.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct.

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1642, 1646 (2016). EEOC and Plaintiffs-Intervenors do not dispute that Trans Ocean

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qualifies as a “prevailing party” for the purposes of requesting attorneys’ fees.

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“When a defendant is the prevailing party on a civil rights claim . . . district courts

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may award attorney’s fees if the plaintiff’s ‘claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or

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groundless,’ or if ‘the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’” Id.

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(quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434

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The EEOC also sought relief for Saul Martinez, but later amended its complaint to
remove him as a charging party. Dkt. # 135 (Amended Complaint).

ORDER – 2

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U.S. 412, 422 (1978)). “An action becomes frivolous when the result appears obvious or
the arguments are wholly without merit.” Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652,
666 (9th Cir. 2007).
“In determining whether this standard has been met, a district court must assess
the claim at the time the complaint was filed, and must avoid post hoc reasoning by
concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been
unreasonable or without foundation.” Harris v. Maricopa Cty. Superior Court, 631 F.3d
963, 976 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055,
1060 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most
airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.”
Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
Applying this standard, the Court finds that neither EEOC nor PlaintiffsIntervenors’ claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Much of Trans Ocean’s
argument to the contrary is foreclosed by the principle that the Court may not engage in
post hoc reasoning. For example, Trans Ocean contends that the charging parties’
allegations escalated after this lawsuit commenced and seeks to substantiate this
contention through a chart comparing their initial allegations versus their testimony at
trial. Trans Ocean also scrutinizes EEOC’s trial strategy as disingenuous, maintains that
it presented inconsistent and unreliable witness testimony, and purports that this case is
part of an emerging trend by the EEOC to bring frivolous lawsuits. Lastly, Trans Ocean
relies on the jury’s verdict against many of EEOC’s and Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ claims as
support for the deficiency of those claims. Trans Ocean’s reliance on after-the-fact, postcomplaint occurrences is immaterial to the Christianburg inquiry, which requires the
Court to examine the feasibility of the complaint at the time it was filed. See 434 U.S. at
422; Harris, 631 F.3d at 976.
Trans Ocean fares no better in its other efforts to show that the EEOC’s complaint
was frivolous. Trans Ocean frames its primary argument under a non-exclusive threeORDER – 3

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factor framework used by the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether an action is
frivolous. Dkt. # 180 (citing Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2005)
(identifying three “general guidelines” for gauging the frivolousness of a claim: “(1)
whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to
settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown
trial on the merits”)). The Ninth Circuit has not adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s threefactor test for frivolousness. Moreover, in reciting this framework, Trans Ocean cites
only the first two factors and omits the third—a notable omission, as Trans Ocean never
moved for pre-trial dismissal through Rule 12 or 56 and proceeded to a trial on the
merits.
Trans Ocean spends much of its remaining analysis arguing that EEOC was unable
to establish a prima facie as to each of its claims. But other than occasional criticisms of
EEOC’s pre-complaint investigation, Trans Ocean’s analysis contains no meaningful
argument that EEOC’s allegations were wholly without merit at the time they were filed.
Instead, Trans Ocean recites the elements of each claim and then asserts that EEOC was
unable to make a prima facie showing as to certain of those elements. Once again, Trans
Ocean appears to be relying on EEOC’s trial presentation despite the explicit prohibition
on considering such evidence.
This case differs from E.E.O.C. v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 1077
(E.D. Wash. 2015), a decision that Trans Ocean relies upon where the court concluded
that an action filed by EEOC was frivolous. In Global Horizons, the court dismissed
EEOC’s lawsuit on summary judgment. Then, based on an extensive record of EEOC’s
pre-complaint investigation, id. at 1081-90, the court concluded that defendant was
entitled to fees because EEOC was unprepared at the time it filed a complaint to allege
plausible, non-frivolous claims against the defendants. Id. at 1090. For example, EEOC
filed its lawsuit without knowing which claimants worked for the defendants and when.
Id. at 1090-91. Here, Trans Ocean has not made a comparable showing of frivolousness.
ORDER – 4

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According to Trans Ocean, EEOC’s interviews with non-complaining employees should
have convinced EEOC that the charging parties’ claims of harassment were unfounded.
These other employees denied that any harassment had occurred and “some” of them
stated in their interviews that the charging parties “could have had” an ulterior motive in
filing harassment complaints. Dkt. # 180 at 2. This information is insufficient to render
its subsequent action frivolous, as it would be equally reasonable for EEOC to believe
these other Trans Ocean employees had a motive conceal wrongful conduct by their
employer. Trans Ocean also contends, without elaborating, that EEOC “must have
known” that Trans Ocean’s existing practices to prevent and mitigate sexual harassment
were sufficient to establish a successful affirmative defense to a claim of harassment. Id.
at 2-3. This conclusory assertion does not establish that EEOC’s action was frivolous.
For these reasons, Trans Ocean has not shown that EEOC’s action was “wholly
without merit” at the time it was filed. See Galen, 477 F.3d at 666. Accordingly, Trans
Ocean is not entitled to attorneys’ fees.
IV. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Trans Ocean’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees. Dkt. # 180.

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DATED this 19th day of June, 2017.

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A

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The Honorable Richard A. Jones
United States District Judge

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ORDER – 5

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ORDER – 6