N.E. et al v. Seattle School District

Filing 35

ORDER denying plaintiffs' 34 Motion for Reconsideration signed by Judge James L. Robart.(RS)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

8
9
N.E., et al.,

10

CASE NO. C15-1659JLR
Plaintiffs,

11
v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

12
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

13

Defendant.

14
15

I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Plaintiffs N.E., C.E., and P.E.’s1 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

16
17

motion for reconsideration of the court’s May 16, 2017, order of dismissal and judgment.

18

(See MFR (Dkt. # 34).) The court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ motion, the relevant portions

19

//

20

//

21
22

1

Plaintiffs C.E. and P.E. are N.E.’s parents. The court refers to them as “the Parents.”

ORDER - 1

1

of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,2 the court DENIES Plaintiffs’

2

motion for the reasons set forth below.

3
4

II.

BACKGROUND

On October 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed this interlocutory appeal from an

5

administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision regarding N.E.’s “stay-put” placement under

6

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (See

7

Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 1; 1st Hruska Decl. (Dkt. # 3) ¶ 7, Ex. 7 (“ALJ Decision”).)

8
9

N.E. is a male child who attended third grade at Newport Heights Elementary
School in the Bellevue School District (“BSD”) for most of the 2014-15 school year. (See

10

ALJ Decision at 2.) During most of that year and in the prior years, N.E.’s individual

11

education plan (“IEP”) placed him in general education classes with paraeducator support

12

(“general classes”) for the majority of the school day. (See id.; 1st C.E. Decl. (Dkt. # 4)

13

¶ 1.) The most recent IEP reflecting that arrangement is dated December 2014 (“the

14

December 2014 IEP”). (See ALJ Decision at 2; 1st C.E. Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1 (“12/14 IEP”).)

15

N.E. had significant difficulties during the 2014-15 school year. (See ALJ

16

Decision at 2; 1st C.E. Decl. ¶ 3.) Certain BSD officials and teachers, the Parents, and

17

their respective counsel attended an IEP meeting on May 26, 2015. (See ALJ Decision at

18

2; 1st Hruska Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 4 at 10-13 (“Landwehr Decl.”) ¶ 5.) At the meeting, the BSD

19

proposed a new IEP that would place N.E. in specialized classes for students with

20

behavioral and emotional disorders (“separate classes”). (See Landwehr Decl. ¶ 5; 1st

21
2

22

Plaintiffs do not request oral argument, and the court concludes that oral argument
would not be helpful to its disposition of the motion. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4).

ORDER - 2

1

C.E. Decl. ¶ 3.) The Parents objected to this proposal. (See ALJ Decision at 2; 1st C.E.

2

Decl. ¶ 3; Landwehr Decl. ¶ 5.)

3

At the meeting, BSD officials and the Parents also discussed where to place N.E.

4

for the remainder of the school year. (See ALJ Decision at 2.) When the meeting

5

occurred, N.E. was subject to an emergency expulsion and the Parents were

6

uncomfortable with N.E. returning to Newport Heights. (See id.; Landwehr Decl. ¶ 6.)

7

The BSD and the Parents agreed that N.E. would finish the final weeks of the 2014-15

8

school year at a different school in the district. (See ALJ Decision at 2.) At that school,

9

N.E. would spend the majority of the day in a one-on-two setting that included N.E., a

10

teacher, and a paraeducator, but no other students (“individual classes”). (See id.; 1st

11

C.E. Decl. ¶ 4; Landwehr Decl. ¶ 6.)

12

One day later, on May 27, 2015, the BSD produced a final IEP for N.E. (“the May

13

2015 IEP”). (See ALJ Decision at 2; 1st C.E. Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 2 (“5/15 IEP”).) The May

14

2015 IEP had two stages: (1) N.E. would finish the end of the 2014-15 school year in the

15

agreed-upon individual classes, and (2) N.E. would be placed in separate classes at the

16

start of the 2015-16 school year. (See ALJ Decision at 2-3; 1st C.E. Decl. ¶ 5; 5/15 IEP

17

at 15-16.) The Parents did not file an administrative due process challenge to the May

18

2015 IEP and instead allowed N.E. to continue attending the individual classes until the

19

school year ended on June 22, 2015. (See ALJ Decision at 2-3; 1st C.E. Decl. ¶ 7.)

20

The Parents and N.E. moved to Seattle in the summer of 2015 and contacted the

21

Seattle School District (“the District”) to enroll N.E. for the 2015-16 school year. (See

22

ALJ Decision at 3; 1st C.E. Decl. ¶ 8; Landwehr Decl. ¶ 7.) The Parents requested that

ORDER - 3

1

the District place N.E. in classes similar to the individual classes. (See ALJ Decision at

2

3; Landwehr Decl. ¶ 7.) The District reviewed N.E.’s records and decided to place him in

3

separate classes similar to those contemplated in the second part of the May 2015 IEP.

4

(See ALJ Decision at 3; 1st C.E. Decl. ¶ 8; Landwehr Decl. ¶ 7.)

5

The Parents objected and filed an administrative due process challenge to the

6

District’s decision. (See ALJ Decision at 3; Hruska Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1 (“DP Hearing

7

Req.”)); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). The due process challenge sought a declaration that the

8

District had denied N.E. a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), an IEP providing

9

for the individual classes contemplated in the first part of the May 2015 IEP, and

10

reimbursement for private placement. (DP Hearing Req. at 4-5.) At the same time, the

11

Parents filed a motion for “stay put,” arguing that N.E.’s stay-put placement is the

12

general classes described in the December 2014 IEP. (See ALJ Decision at 3; DP

13

Hearing Req. at 3; 1st Hruska Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2 (“Stay-Put Mot.”)); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)

14

(stating that pending a due process challenge, “the child shall remain in the then-current

15

educational placement of the child”). The District contended that the separate classes

16

described in the May 2015 IEP represented the appropriate stay-put placement for N.E.

17

(See ALJ Decision at 3; 1st Hruska Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, Exs. 3-5.) Following testimony and oral

18

argument on the stay-put motion, the ALJ sided with the District and concluded that

19

separate classes were N.E.’s stay-put placement. (See ALJ Decision at 1, 4.)

20

Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal sought reversal of the ALJ’s stay-put decision and

21

a declaration that the District is required to place N.E. in a general education setting

22

consistent with his December 2014 IEP pending the outcome of Plaintiffs’ due process

ORDER - 4

1

challenge to the District’s intended placement. (Compl. at 5.) Upon filing this appeal,

2

Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction

3

ordering the District to place N.E. in general classes pending the due process challenge.

4

(See Compl.; TRO Mot. (Dkt. # 2); 10/27/15 Order (Dkt. # 11) at 5.) The court denied

5

Plaintiffs’ motion because the court found no support for Plaintiffs’ theory that the court

6

could “ignore any unrealized stages of a multi-stage IEP or treat such stages as distinct

7

IEPs.” (10/27/15 Order at 9.)

8
9

Plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (See
Not. of Appeal (Dkt. # 15).) On November 11, 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

10

court’s denial of the TRO and preliminary injunction. See N.E. by and through C.E. &

11

P.E. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 842 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “[s]tage two

12

of the May 2015 IEP . . . was N.E.’s stay-put placement”). On February 3, 2017, the

13

Ninth Circuit issued its formal mandate, returning the case to this court’s jurisdiction.

14

(Mandate (Dkt. # 23).)

15

After the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate, the parties took no further action until

16

the court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why the case should not be dismissed as moot.

17

(3/9/17 OSC (Dkt. # 24) at 5.) In Plaintiffs’ response, they contended that an actual

18

controversy regarding N.E’s educational placement continues to exist. (Resp. to OSC

19

(Dkt. # 25) at 2.) Plaintiffs did not inform the court of the status of their underlying due

20

process claim. (See generally id.)

21

When the court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause, the court also afforded the

22

District an opportunity to respond (3/9/17 OSC at 5), but the District did not file a

ORDER - 5

1

response at that time (see Dkt.). Rather, on March 30, 2017, the District moved to

2

dismiss this matter as moot. (See generally MTD (Dkt. # 27).) On May 16, 2017, the

3

court granted the District’s motion, concluding that Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal was

4

moot because the underlying due process claim had been dismissed with prejudice.

5

(5/16/17 Order (Dkt. # 32) at 9 (“The court is no longer able to afford any relief to

6

Plaintiffs because the relief they seek relates directly to N.E.’s stay-put placement

7

pending that particular due process claim . . . .”).) The court further concluded that

8

neither Plaintiffs’ assertion that they were entitled to reimbursement of educational costs

9

nor Plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court altered

10

the court’s mootness determination. (See id. at 10-12); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)

11

(“[A] court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the

12

cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a

13

free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that

14

enrollment.”). Finally, the court concluded that the case did not fall within the “capable

15

of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness because the Parents stipulated to

16

dismiss the underlying due process claim with prejudice should they not prevail before

17

the Ninth Circuit, and the case was therefore inherently limited in duration. (Id. at

18

14-15.) Based on these conclusions, the court dismissed this matter with prejudice and

19

entered judgment. (Id. at 16; Judgment (Dkt. # 33).)

20

Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration on the bases that (1) the court did not

21

consider Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) in reaching its conclusion, and (2)

22

Plaintiffs provided notice that they intended “to seek reimbursement and compensatory

ORDER - 6

1

education in their original due process hearing complaint that contained the motion for

2

stay put on appeal.” (MFR at 2.) The court turns to Plaintiffs’ motion

3

III.

4

ANALYSIS

“Motions for reconsideration are disfavored,” and the court “will ordinarily deny

5

such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a

6

showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to [the

7

court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR

8

7(h)(1). Plaintiffs contend that the court should grant their motion to reconsider because

9

the court “failed to even consider” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) (MFR at 3), and

10

they requested reimbursement in the underlying due process case (id. at 6). Rule 54(c)

11

provides that every final judgment besides a default judgment “should grant the relief to

12

which the party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.”

13

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c); see also Ryan v. Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1080,

14

1088 (D. Ariz. 2016) (“Rule 54(c) allows the court to award monetary damages to

15

[p]laintiffs . . . if they prove facts entitling them to such relief, even though they failed to

16

plead such a request in their complaint.”). Rule 54(c) allows courts to “grant whatever

17

relief is appropriate in the case on the facts proved.” Cal. Ins. Guar. Assoc. v. Burwell,

18

--- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 58821, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017) (internal quotation

19

marks omitted).

20

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs did not raise Rule 54(c) in their response brief. (See

21

MTD Resp. (Dkt. # 29) at 2-3.) However, Plaintiffs do not explain why Rule 54(c)

22

provides a basis for reconsideration when they could have earlier brought this authority to

ORDER - 7

1

the court’s attention with reasonable diligence. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR

2

7(h)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to make the showing required to justify

3

reconsideration. See id.

4

Moreover, although Rule 54(c) permits a court to grant monetary relief where a

5

plaintiff’s complaint seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, see Z Channel Ltd.

6

P’ship v. Home Box Office, Inc., 931 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), Plaintiffs no longer

7

have a live claim3 that would entitle them to reimbursement for private placement, see

8

Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 442 F.3d 588, 596-97 (7th Cir. 2006)

9

(holding that the parents had abandoned a claim to reimbursement “originat[ing] in their

10

rights under the stay-put injunction” when the parents failed to seek reimbursement in the

11

district court); Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 90 (2d

12

Cir. 2005) (reasoning that “it would be particularly inappropriate to read a prayer for

13

compensatory education” into the operative complaint because the plaintiff “explicitly

14

included such relief in earlier iterations of her pleadings” but failed to include the request

15

in the operative complaint). Like in Brown, Plaintiffs abandoned their claim to

16

reimbursement by stipulating to dismissal of the underlying due process case in which

17
3

18
19
20
21
22

At least one court has noted that reimbursement could be viewed as an additional claim
or as additional relief on an existing claim, but the court did not decide the issue. See Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 598 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(c)). Courts in the Ninth Circuit appear to treat reimbursement as a claim rather than simply as
a form of relief. See, e.g., Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 890 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“The Wartenbergs’ claim for reimbursement for . . . tuition is a live controversy.”);
Browell v. Lemahieu, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1128 (D. Haw. 2000) (holding that an IDEA case
was moot because the “[p]laintiff has no monetary claim before this Court,” which left “no relief
that this Court can give”). Accordingly, because there is no reimbursement claim before the
court, see infra, the court cannot determine that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief, regardless of
whether they demanded that relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

ORDER - 8

1

they sought reimbursement. See 442 F.3d at 596-97; (Hokit Decl. (Dkt. # 28) ¶ 4, Ex. 3

2

(dismissing with prejudice the due process case upon which this interlocutory appeal is

3

premised); see generally Compl. (failing to seek reimbursement); see also DP Hearing

4

Req. at 5 (requesting in the underlying due process case reimbursement of private

5

placement costs the parents incurred).) Pursuant to that stipulation, the ALJ dismissed

6

with prejudice the 2015-16 claim upon which Plaintiffs base this interlocutory appeal,

7

and there is presently no claim for reimbursement—or any other claim—before the court.

8

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal is moot (see 5/16/17 Order at 9), and the court

9

did not commit manifest error in reaching this conclusion.4
Because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate manifest error in the court’s decision or new

10
11

facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to the court’s attention earlier

12

with reasonable diligence, the court denies their motion for reconsideration.

13

//

14

//

15

//

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

4

Although Plaintiffs do not raise the issue on reconsideration, the court further notes that
the fact that the Parents have filed a new due process claim—in which they apparently seek
reimbursement and a decision on stay-put placement related to N.E.’s IEP for the 2016-17 school
year—does not remedy the mootness problem. (See MTD Resp. at 5; P.E. Decl. (Dkt. # 29-1)
¶¶ 4 (stating the educational costs the Parents have paid from January 2016 to May 2016), 10
(stating that on April 17, 2017, the Parents filed a new due process hearing request that includes
a motion for stay-put placement based on N.E.’s December 2014 IEP).) As the court concluded
in its order of dismissal, even if this newly filed claim alleges that the District has subjected N.E.
to the same actions that gave rise to the 2015-16 due process claim, Plaintiffs failed to establish
that this case falls within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness.
(See 5/16/17 Order at 14-15.) Accordingly, any request for reimbursement in the new due
process case does not warrant reconsideration.

ORDER - 9

1
2
3
4

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration (Dkt. # 34).
Dated this 29th day of June, 2017.

5
6

A

7

JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

ORDER - 10