Jones v. United States of America

Filing 8

ORDER by Judge James L. Robart granting United States' 3 Motion to Stay; the disposition of Mr. Jones' §2255 petition is STAYED until after the Supreme Court issues its decision in Beckles or until further order of this court; parties to file a joint status report as stated in the Order. (AD)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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REIORDAN DANNY JONES,

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Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO STAY

v.

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CASE NO. C16-0717JLR

I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 18, 2016, Petitioner Reiordan Danny Jones, a federal prisoner, filed a

17 petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on the
18 Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 2551
19 (2015). (Petition (Dkt. # 1).) Respondent United States of America (“the Government”)
20 moves to stay these proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s ruling on whether Johnson
21 applies to the residual clause of Section 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
22 (“U.S.S.G.”). (Mot. (Dkt. # 3).) Mr. Jones does not oppose the Government’s motion.
ORDER- 1

1 (See generally Resp. (Dkt. # 4).) The court has considered the motion, Mr. Jones’s
2 response, 1 the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully
3 advised, 2 the court GRANTS the Government’s motion to stay for the reasons stated
4 below.
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II.

BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2008, Mr. Jones was convicted of five counts of distribution of

7 cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). See United States
8 v. Jones, No. CR07-0232JLR (W.D. Wash.), Dkt. ## 1 (Complaint), 63 (Jury Verdict).
9 The presentence report calculated an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 360 months
10 to life in prison. (Petition at 4.) The court held Mr. Jones’s sentencing hearing on June 2,
11 2008, Jones, No. CR07-0232JLR (W.D. Wash.), Dkt. # 67 (Min. Entry for Sentencing),
12 and sentenced Mr. Jones to 180 months of imprisonment to be followed by eight years of
13 supervised release. Id., Dkt. # 68 (Judgment).
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On May 18, 2016, Mr. Jones filed a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his

15 sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (See Petition.) Mr. Jones contends that he is entitled to
16 a resentencing based on a “true” guidelines range of 168 to 210 months. (Id. at 2.) On
17 July 5, 2016, the Government filed a motion to stay all proceedings in light of the
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The Government did not file a reply memorandum in support of its motion for a stay.
(See generally Dkt.)
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No party has asked for oral argument, and the court considers it unnecessary to the
disposition of this motion. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4) (“Unless otherwise
ordered by the court, all motions will be decided by the court without oral argument.”).

ORDER- 2

1 Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544, 2016 WL
2 1029080 (June 27, 2016). (See Mot. at 2.) Mr. Jones does not oppose the Government’s
3 motion because his “current release date is July 5, 2020, and his likely release date if
4 resentenced would not be affected by the government’s requested stay.” (Resp. at 1.)
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III.

ANALYSIS

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Application of Johnson to the Sentencing Guidelines

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In Johnson, the Supreme Court concluded that the residual clause of the Armed

8 Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which defines a “violent felony” to include any felony
9 that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,”
10 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), is unconstitutionally vague and that “[i]ncreasing a defendant’s
11 sentence under the clause denies due process of law.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557, 2563.
12 Based on this decision, Mr. Jones challenges the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a),
13 which is set forth below in italics:
(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal or state
law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—

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(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or

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(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.

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ORDER- 3

1 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (italics added). 3 Mr. Jones contends that the residual clause of
2 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s conclusion that
3 the ACCA’s identically-worded residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. (Petition at
4 3.) He argues that his sentence, which he asserts was based in part on enhancements
5 arising from the residual clause, was imposed in violation of the Constitution. (See id.)
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The Government moves to stay all proceedings in light of the Supreme Court’s

7 grant of certiorari in Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544, regarding the application of
8 Johnson to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). (See generally Mot.)
9 Specifically, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine, in pertinent part, (1)
10 whether Johnson’s holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2),
11 thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral
12 review, and (2) whether Johnson applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging
13 federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). 4 See
14 United States v. Trujillo, No. CR 10-00605 WHA, 2016 WL 3844325, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
15 July 15, 2016) (citing Beckles, No. 15-8544). The Government argues that the court
16 should stay these proceedings because the Supreme Court’s ruling in Beckles is likely to
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The court notes that the Sentencing Commission has adopted an amendment to the

18 definition of “crime of violence” in the guidelines, effective August 1, 2016, that deletes the
residual clause at § 4B1.2(a)(2). See United States v. Grant, No. 09-CR-01035-PJH-1, 2016 WL
19 3648639, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016).
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The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in Beckles to determine whether mere
possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a “crime of violence” only in the
commentary of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a “crime of violence” after Johnson. See United
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States v. Trujillo, No. CR-10-00605 WHA, 2016 WL 3844325, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016)
(citing Beckles, S. Ct. Case No. 15-8544).

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ORDER- 4

1 be dispositive of Mr. Jones’s petition. (Mot. at 2.) The Government asserts that a “stay
2 is in the interest of judicial economy, since, if the [c]ourt proceeds to decide this motion,
3 the losing party will almost certainly pursue an appeal in light of Beckles, thereby
4 generating extra litigation that may well be avoided if the [c]ourt stays the matter pending
5 Beckles.” (Id.)
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Mr. Jones does not oppose the government’s motion to stay because his “current

7 release date is July 5, 2020, and his likely release date if resentenced,” based on a
8 guidelines range of 168 to 210 months, “would not be affected by the government’s
9 requested stay.” (Resp. at 1; see also Petition at 2.)
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Stay of the Proceedings

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A court has discretion to stay proceedings before it. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398

12 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005). In deciding whether to grant a stay, the court must
13 evaluate “‘the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to
14 grant a stay.’” Id. at 1110 (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir.
15 1962). In the specific context of habeas corpus proceedings, there are “special
16 considerations that place unique limits on a district court’s authority to stay a case in the
17 interests of judicial economy.” Yong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 208
18 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000). “[A]lthough considerations of judicial economy are
19 appropriate, they cannot justify [an] indefinite, and potentially lengthy, stay,” particularly
20 where the habeas petitioner would suffer “substantial prejudice” from the delay. Id. at
21 1120-21. Thus, a court ruling on a motion to stay a habeas proceeding should consider
22 whether the stay would prejudice the petitioner, whether the length of the stay would be
ORDER- 5

1 unduly long, and whether the stay would promote judicial economy. See id. at 1120-21;
2 Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110 (quoting CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268). After considering these
3 factors in the context of Mr. Jones’s petition, the court grants the Government’s motion to
4 stay.
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1. Prejudice

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Most importantly, there is little danger of prejudice to Mr. Jones from a stay. As

7 Mr. Jones notes, if he is entitled to resentencing, his new release date would likely not
8 occur before the Supreme Court decides Beckles. (See Resp. at 1); United States v.
9 Roberson, Case No. 12-cr-00550-PJH-1, 2016 WL 4208435, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10,
10 2016) (“A decision in Beckles is expected within a year. . . .”); but see Knox v. United
11 States, C16-5502BHS, 2016 WL 3906915, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 19, 2016) (“[I]t is also
12 unclear when or if the Supreme Court will decide Beckles.”). Because Mr. Jones’s
13 resentencing, if any, would likely result in a release date after the stay is lifted, the danger
14 that he would be unconstitutionally confined during the stay dissipates. See, e.g., United
15 States v. Rodriguez, Case No. 13-20405, 2016 WL 4124096, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3,
16 2016) (granting a stay where there is no indication that a stay would prejudice defendant
17 who is serving a 98-month sentence with an expected release date in 2020). Mr. Jones’s
18 case is therefore fundamentally different from a case in which the petitioner’s potential
19 new release date would fall during the period of the proposed stay or has already
20 occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, Case No. 14-cr-00549-EMC-1, 2016 WL
21 4585750, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (denying a stay where the defendant’s potential
22 release date if his § 2255 motion is successful had already passed); Roberson, 2016 WL
ORDER- 6

1 4208435, at *2 (denying a stay where the defendant sought a reduced term of
2 imprisonment that may exceed his time served). Accordingly, Mr. Jones will not be
3 prejudiced by a stay.
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2. Length of Stay

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Further, the stay the Government seeks is not likely to be especially “lengthy,”

6 Yong, 208 F.3d at 1121, particularly when compared to the remainder of Mr. Jones’s
7 sentence, even if he is entitled to resentencing. On the one hand, the Supreme Court will
8 not begin to hear oral arguments until October 2016 and has not yet calendared Beckles,
9 see Lilley v. United States, C16-0410JLR, (W.D. Wash.), Dkt. # 10 (8/16/16 Order) at 6;
10 but see Roberson, 2016 WL 4208435, at *2 (noting that “a decision in Beckles is
11 expected within a year, [so] the government does not seek an indefinite stay”), so there is
12 little doubt that a stay will last at least several months and perhaps as long as a year. On
13 the other hand, the stay here is not as long as the impermissible stay in Yong, which could
14 have lasted for “years.” Yong, 208 F.3d at 1120. Therefore, the length of the proposed
15 stay does not counsel against granting a stay.
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3. Considerations of Judicial Economy

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Finally, considerations of judicial economy support granting the Government’s

18 motion, particularly where there is no prejudice to Mr. Jones. The Supreme Court is
19 posed to answer questions that are potentially dispositive of Mr. Jones’s petition, namely
20 whether (1) Johnson’s holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2),
21 thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral
22 review, and (2) whether Johnson applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging
ORDER- 7

1 federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). As the
2 Government points out, “extra litigation . . . may well be avoided” if the court grants a
3 stay until the Supreme Court decides the issues pending in Beckles. (Mot. at 2.) While it
4 is possible that the Supreme Court will not issue a clear ruling in Beckles, the court at this
5 time has no indication that it will not. See Knox, 2016 WL 3906915, at *2 (“[I]t is also
6 unclear when or if the Supreme Court will decide Beckles.”); but see Roberson, 2016 WL
7 4208435, at *2 (“Unlike the appeal at issue in Yong[,] which was subject to further
8 review, the Supreme Court is likely to decide conclusively the question presented in
9 Beckles whether Johnson applies retroactively to collateral challenges to sentence
10 enhancements applied under the residual clause of the guidelines.”). 5 In addition, the
11 court can lift the stay should the Supreme Court not rule fully or timely on Beckles.
12 When coupled with the lack of prejudice a stay would impose on Mr. Jones, judicial
13 economy supports issuing a stay here.
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The court notes that the Ninth Circuit recently lifted the stays previously entered in
Gardner v. United States, No. 15-72559 and Jacob v. United States, No. 15-73302 (9th Cir. Aug.
19 1, 2016), which the government cited in support of the instant motion to stay. (See Mot. at 2,
n.2; Not. of Supp. Auth. (Dkt. # 7)); see also United States v. Stewart, No. 13-CR-00131-PJH-1,
20 2016 WL 4208799, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s recent action in
Gardner and Jacob in support of its order denying a similar motion to stay another 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 petition based on Johnson). That the Ninth Circuit lifted these stays does not, however,
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change the court’s determination that there is little danger of prejudice to Mr. Jones by granting
the stay the Government seeks.

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ORDER- 8

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IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court GRANTS the Government’s motion for

3 a stay of Mr. Jones’s petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
4 § 2255 (Dkt. # 3). The court further ORDERS that the disposition of Mr. Jones’s 28
5 U.S.C. § 2255 petition is STAYED until after the Supreme Court issues its decision in
6 Beckles or until further order from this court. Within seven days of the Supreme Court’s
7 decision in Beckles, the court ORDERS the parties to file a joint status report informing
8 the court of the decision and its impact on this litigation. The court also ORDERS the
9 parties to file a joint status report within seven days of any other developments in either
10 the Beckles case or with respect to Mr. Jones’s petition that are relevant to the stay.
11 Either party may move to have the stay lifted if circumstances change.
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The court further DIRECTS the clerk to strike the noting date for Mr. Jones’s

13 petition. The court will issue a new noting date for the petition after the stay is lifted.
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Dated this 9th day of September, 2016.

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JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge

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ORDER- 9